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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to review the extent to which the European Convention for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' has influenced the political and 
2 legal order of England and Wales. Analysis is explored along a number of lines of 
investigation. 
A review of the influence of the ECHR on the constitutional order of the UK is prefaced by 
analysis of its early influence on the order of the Netherlands, Germany and France. 3 Analysis 
gives rise to two questions: 
Does the ECHR, dependent on the signatory-state with its own constitutional arrangement and legal 
culture, support a claim that a collective enforcement of human rightS4 protection can not exist 
empirically, therefore can not achieve as a transcending philosophy? 
0 Does the ECHR's apparent affinity with the monist order of the civil-law tradition render it in 
relation to the UK dualist order an impracticable statement of ideal? 
Drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the rights and freedoms of the ECHR are 
accorded a generic structure, essentially subject to derogation. Whether the ECHR is capable of 
advancing an effective fon-n of human rights protection, this thesis examines the genesis of the 
ECHR, including its absence of inquisitorial function. Analysis gives rise to the question: 
0 What is to be expected of the ECHR: the promotion of a common understanding of HR intimated by 
the Congress of Europe 1948, or a collective enforcement of protection inherent in an understanding 
of the telos of the ECHR? 
Narrowing the focus of analysis to the UK, this thesis examines its response to the concern of 
terrorism, asylum and various aspects of criminal justice and asks: 
0 Whether the concept of HR protection has become the last haven of sui-generis positivism, and if so, 
the ECHR a raison d'etre of the si gnatory- state? 
With regard to the judicial treatment of the rights and freedoms of the individual post the 
5 
Human Rights Act 1998 , this thesis examines the functioning of Section 3 of the HRA. 
Analysis raises a number of questions: 
' Hereafter. ECHR 
2 Excluding the legal order and legislative autononiý of Scotland. Hereafter, UK 
Following its ratification bN the Netherlands. Germany and France 
Hereafter. HR 
Hereafter, HRA 
0 Does a division in judicial reasoning exist between, and/or within, the higher and lower courts 
regarding the application of the HRA/ECHR? If so, on what grounds? 
Can a universal humanity exist in a legal order where rights are treated as a form of residual liberty 
remaining after legal restraints are subtracted? 
Whether post 2000, a decline in autonomous law has resulted in a convergence of the legal and 
political and the creation of a national responsive law in which the HR concern of the 
individual is placed below that of the prevailing Government and judiciary, the findings of this 
thesis are used to test the assertion that: 
The Article I ECHR agreement by the UK to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights 
defined in Section 1, is not matched by a realisation of those rights by everyone within its 
jurisdiction; 
0 Subject to the sovereignty of Governments and politics of the national judiciary, the ECHR 
constitutes an order for the popularisation of the concept of HR protection, as opposed to a system 
for the collective enforcement of the rights and freedom of the individual. 
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Section 1: Citizen UK 2000 and the European Convention for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Introduction 
Section 1.1: Research Approaches Employed and Research Methods Defined 
The primary approach employed is legal-positivism. The approach asserts that knowledge 
derives from the data of legal experience and not from the rationalisation of values. There is 
sound reason for its maintenance. In accordance with positivism, rights presuppose an order 
created by law. Applied to the analysis of HR, the approach manages data as rules, which makes 
it possible to determine the dicta of law without excessive analysis of the theories behind it. The 
approach remains the dominant philosophy of the UK judge, committed to a utilitarian 
structuring of law. 
However, the flaw in positivism is that an understanding of HR development necessitates not 
only empirical analysis of 'official action ... organised round the enforcement of 
legal precepts 
and the maintenance of a legal order, ' but the social environment in which institutions exist. ' 
The observation is pertinent in relation to the ECHR. The management of data as an assessment 
of rules constitutes an out-dated representation of what is an achievement between supranational 
construct and signatory-state. Positivism may highlight the effect of the ECHR in terms of legal 
processes, but does not explain the reasoning of the social actor. In the UK, the judiciary remains 
a source of law developed through ongoing exposition, rather than an apriori code. 
2 The flaw in positivistic analysis formed the subject of criticism by Black . Advancing the 
approach of Durkheim, 3 Black observed that reliance on rules as observed data constituted a bar 
to recognition that legal practice consisted of social acts. Applied to the ECHR, 
acknowledgement of social processes serves to move analysis from the tabulation of data to the 
understanding of political and judicial action. Two approaches adopted in this thesis are 
knowledge and opinion about law' and post-behaviouralism. 
As a supranational construct, the ECHR represents a change in the political and social context in 
which law exists in European society. Instrumental in the procurement of measurable data, KOL 
examines the way in which the ECHR contributes to HR protection in signatory-states. 
Technological development has extended the capacity of the State to control society to the extent 
that legal analysis can not be separated from consideration of policy. Post-behaviouralism serves 
R. Cotterrell The Sociology of Lznv (Butterworth and Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London 1984) 3 
D. Black 'The Boundaries of Legal Sociolotg)" (1972) YLJ 81,1086 
3 F'. Durkheim Rules qf Sociological Alethod (Macmillan Press, London 1982) 247 
' Hereafter, KOL 
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to broaden the notion of the legal and political beyond that of institutions, toward acknowledging 
the behaviour of the minister, legislator and judge. 
In accordance with positivism, values as statements of preference fall outside the realm of fact. 
However, insofar as values are embodied in law as rules, values do underlie the structural 
arrangement of society. Independent of the principal approach employed in this thesis, a number 
of secondary approaches from a range of socio-legal and political fields are acknowledged. 
Whether a normative order of the kind intimated by the ECHR can be developed, this thesis 
raises a number of questions best addressed by normative-political theory. Examining the 
politics of the ECHR theorising is prescriptive, drawing on the arguments of sociology to 
examine justification for a universal arrangement of HR protection. Focusing on the institutional 
and procedural arrangement of the ECHR, one use made of the approach is a constitutional 
analysis to rationalise the functioning of the ECHR, in particular the diversity of its application 
in specific signatory-states. 
A primary research method employed is a comparative case-study analysis of the treatment of 
the ECHR by the UK, Netherlands, Germany and France. The method of data-collection is 
quantitative, capable of replication. With regard to data-gathering, the technique employed 
consists of the use of primary and related secondary sources, including formal legal, political and 
constitutional documentation; judicial ruling and commentary; and informed political and 
sociological debate. 
Finally, facilitating analysis of the practicality of the ECHR, use of institutional and 
constitutional analysis make for finding based on cause and consequence. Two methods 
employed are: (1) formal-legal: the analysis of 14R in relation to the ECHR, public law and 
government organisation; and (2) descripti ve- inductive: analysis of procedure, institutions, and 
impetus for the enforcement of a universal European order of HR protection. 
Section 1.2: Literature Review 
Section 1.2.1. - Why Human Rights as a Focus of Study? 
The proposition that persons, regardless of culture or ethno-geographic location, possess 
inviolable rights has continued to challenge the practice of law and politics. With regard to the 
UK, as legislation has proliferated, the concern of FIR has pervaded most areas of legal life. 
Forming the focus of this thesis, if an achievement of the twentieth-century was to promote FIR 
3 
protection, then a concern for the twenty-first is to examine the effectiveness of policies 
advanced, and the exertion of the establishment charged with realising them. ' 
Section 1.2.2: Researching Citizen UK 2000 
(1) The Concept of Human Rights 
The concept of HR forms the focus of considerable socio-political, philosophical and legal 
analysis. This is reflected in a vast literature review. 6 Yet, albeit the language of rights may have 
become part of 'a common currency' of twenty-first century life, conviction with which they are 
asserted remains devoid of philosophical agreement either as to their character, content or 
foundation. 7 Although clarification of the concept by focusing on its philosophical foundation 
may appear theoretical, it is its definition and role assigned at the national level which dominates 
its evolvement. 
Analysing the effect of the ECHR on the rights and freedom of the individual, this thesis 
examines the influence of the ECHR on national legal and political practice, as can be explained 
by legal and political theory. Analysis advances the question whether dependent on the 
constitutional arrangement and culture of the si gnatory- state, the ECHR does support a claim 
that a collective enforcement of FIR protection can not exist empirically, therefore can not 
achieve as a transcending philosophy. 
For example, whereas the concept of HR is used literally in the international context, in UK law 
rights are discussed in terms of civil-] iberties. Although not interchangeable concepts, this thesis 
highlights the value accorded them by two schools of thought: civil-libertarianism and 
positivism. 
In accordance with the former, a HR is perceived as an inviolable freedom in which civil- 
liberties operate. A liberty is subsidiary to a right and may be changed provided that the latter is 
otherwise protected. The approach embodies the philosophy adopted throughout the work of 
Steiner and Alston, 8 Ewing, 9 and Stone. 10 Focusing on the individual, the approach constitutes an 
expression of Mills. " Examining the enforcement of morality by law, Mills distinguished 
G. Power Realising Human Rights (St. Martin's Press, New York 2000) Introduction 
6 Including, J. Bentham Anarchical Fallacies, in J. Waldron Nonsense upon Stilts (Methuen Publications, London 1987), A. Dicey 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan Press, London 1965); R. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously 
(Duckworth Press, London 1978)-, D. Forseythe Human Rights in International Relations (CUP, Cambridge 2000); H. Hart 'Are 
There an) Natural Rights"' [ 19591 P. R. 64,175; A. Ingram A Political Theory of Rights (OUP, New York 1994)-, J. Mills On Libeqv 
in M. Warnock Utilitarianism (Fontana Press, London 1962); R. Pound Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (YUP, New Haven 
1954) and J. Waldron Theories of Rights (OUP, Oxford 1984) 
P. Jones 'Re-examining Human Rights' (1989) B. JP. S. 19,69 
J. Steiner and P. Alston International Human Rights in Context (OUP, Oxford 2000) 
C. Geart-, and K. FNN ing The Strugglefior Civil-Liberties (OUP, Oxford 2000) 
10 R. Stone Textbook on Civil-Liberties (OUP, Oxford 2004) 
" J. Mills The Power Elite (OUP, New York 1956), and The Sociological Imagination (Penguin Group Publishers. Han-nondsworth 
1970) 
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between a public and private realm of morality and concluded that the purpose for which power 
could be exercised over an individual was to prevent harm to others. The opinion is cited by 
Stone as a starting point to his unsympathetic attitude toward collective rights and his premise 
that the concern of the individual should not be unduly subordinated to the needs of the group. 12 
The approach is characteristic of UK HR activists and legal-practitioners generally, critical of 
one area of twenty-first century HR concern: criminal justice. In so far as a special position is 
accorded droits subjectif, the value accorded HR stands in contrast to the policy of the prevailing 
UK Government, and (arguably) Parliament. Analysing Government plans to rebalance the 
criminal justice system in favour of the community13 highlights a second approach to the 
concept of rights, one grounded in the utilitarianism of Bentham, 4 and Dicey: " concerned not so 
much with accrediting value to the rights of the individual, than the ability of the state to 
determine his relationship with society, its forms and functions. It is this conception which forms 
the focus of Stone's criticism of the UK's treatment of the terrorist-suspect: that in so far as 
Parliament can be panicked into reacting with undue regard for liberty by a situation of 
perceived emergency, it is not so much that it is decided that the rights of the individual must 
give way to the desire to control terrorists, than whether the effect of such a decision is ever 
seriously considered. 16 
Highlighting how ideology shapes the development of HR, the application of classic-rights 
theory to HR analysis remains significant. Not merely in questioning the utilitarian management 
of the UK order of HR protection, but the reality expected of a universal system. Whether such 
examination provides adequate analysis of the term as it has come to acquire in contemporary 
political practice" however, is questionable. 
(2) The ECHR 
Examining the role of the ECHR, as deduced from formal and related documentation, this thesis 
questions the ECHR as a construct whose objective is to establish rights of the individual to be 
secured by si gnatory- states: an objective going beyond mere negative restraint on Governmental 
interference. Grounded on the premise that a list of rights is only as good as the mechanism in 
place for enforcing it, 18 this thesis examines the ECHR's construction,, the lack of control 
machinery for ensuring the uniform-application of its terms, and the intention of its drafters. 
Stone (2004), Op. cit at 2 
Home Office (2004) Cutting Crime, Delivering Justice: A Strategic Planfor Criminal Justice 2004-2008 (TSO, London 2004) 
Bentham in J. Waldron (1987), Op. cit. at 53 
DiccN (1965). Op. cit at 203 
Stone (2004), Op. cit at 10 
In particular the supranational construct 
B. Dickson Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997) 8 
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With regard to its construction, analysis of the text of the ECHR highlights areas where the 
individual should be protected. For example, one of the Council of Europe's aims was listed as 
being a solution to intolerance in relation to the treatment of minorities. However, whereas the 
ECHR remains devoid of provision regarding the self-determination of minorities, examination 
of religious hatred discloses a need for clarification of the term 'religious freedom. ' Further, the 
ECHR advocates principles none of which are new to liberalism, except that they are expressed 
on a universal level. The ECHR declares that everyone has a right against unjustified 
interference by a public authority however, by means of derogation, the only absolute rights are 
Articles 3 and 4. A state is not prevented from pursuing legitimate aims by its own means. For 
instance, albeit the ECHR advocates against extensive internment of the individual. providing 
that there is objective basis for it and the matter is under judicial control, Article 5 does not 
prohibit it. Similarly, Article 2 is not breached by the use of force necessary to affect a lawful 
arrest. '9 There is nothing preventing force being used, only that its use is accountable. The same 
applies to state-surveillance, wiretapping and DNA collation: such practices are not prevented by 
Article 8. Articles 9,, 10 and II share the same structure: the second paragraph sets forth grounds 
in which a state can restrict the exercise of the right expressed in the first. Highlighting the 
limitations of HR protection inherent in the text itself, whether the ECHR was/is intended 
neither to affect state-autonomy as traditionally perceived, nor acknowledge HR in the strong 
sense, this thesis examines the contention in accordance with theorist Vasak 20 as well as the 
view that the ECHR was drafted with the aim inter-alia of achieving domestic status. 21 
Finally, with regard to the role of the ECHR as deduced from the intention of its drafters, 
according to Steiner and Alston, 22 Robertson and Merrills, 23 one purpose for its creation was to 
bring the democratic countries of Europe within a common ideological framework. Examining 
the impetus for the ECHR, this thesis questions whether such conservatism remains its primary 
objective. Analysis advances examination of the normative role of the ECHR as a guardian of 
individual FIR toward its empirical capability; the practicality of the application of Dworkin's 
interpretation of rights in the strong sense : 24 insofar as the ECHR allows rights to be derogated 
more accurately leads to their interpretation in Hohfeldian terms as liberties as opposed to 
claimS; 25 as well as, the relevance of the reasoning of Mills: insofar as the ECHR shares 
19 VcCann v UK (1996) 21 EH RR 97 
20 K. Vasak 'L'application des HR et de libertes fundamentales par le productions nationals, Article 13 de la ECHR, Droit 
Communautaire et droit national sername de Bruges' in 'the European Guarantee of Human Rights: a Political Assessment (5-8 
November 1975, '4 th International Colloquy, Strasbourg: 1976) 39 
" T. Buergenthal 'Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and its National Application' (1970) 18 A. JC. L. 
233 
22 Steiner and Alston (2000). Op. cit. at 572 
21 A. Robertson and G. Merrills Human Rights in the World, (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1996) 121 
gh 
24 T hat 'when NN e saN that someone has the 'rig t' to do something ... we 
imply that it would be wrong to interfere with his doing it... ' 
Dworkin (1978), Op. cit at 188 
25 W'. Hol-ifeld 'Fundamental L, c, -, al Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' (1913) 23 YL. J 16,710 
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characteristics with the communitarian critics of liberalism that the individual cannot be thought 
of as being independent of a community 
(3) The Constitutional Order of the UK, Netherlands, Germany and France 
Whether the ECHR is capable of advancing an effective form of HR protection, its 
implementation remains with the sign atory- state. However, some forms of constitutional order 
appear more capable of acknowledging the ECHR than others. Characteristic of the civil-ImN 
order of Europe, a monist constitutional arrangement, whereby international and municipal law 
are considered one interlocutory order, provides for the inclusion of international treaty into 
national law. As exemplified by the constitutional order of France, where international treaty 
duly ratified, has an authority superior to that of national law; and the arrangement of Germany, 
where conferral of the status of lex specialis deregate leges generales 26 on international treaty 
renders it the more specific law. 
In contrast,, the UK dualist system regards international and national law as two separate orders, 
each with its own code of practice and authority. Whether the ECHR's (arguable) affinity with 
the civil-law order renders it in relation to the UK an impracticable statement of ideals, this 
thesis examines the arrangement of the UK in relation to that of the ECHR's more prominent 
signatories: the Netherlands, Gen-nany and France. Reasons for the choice of signatories are as 
follows. 
According to the World HR Guide 2' and the Netherlands Planning Office 28 the Netherlands's 
early response to the ECHR rendered it a signatory-state 98% committed to HR. However, 
despite being characterised by a written constitution which sets out the rights of the individual, 
this thesis questions the findings, as well as those of Polakiewicz and Jacob-Fultzer, 29 van Dijk 
and van Hoof, 30 as to whether the degree of protection awarded HR is in fact greater than that 
ordinarily afforded by the legislative process. 
With regard to the constitutional arrangement of Germany, its Basic Law of 1949 constitutes a 
supreme law binding on Government officials. Whereas Article 24 allows Germany to transfer 
some of its sovereign power to international organisations, Article 25 provides for the integration 
of public international law into German Federal Law. With regard to the legal order, 
considerable emphasis is placed on the rights of the individual. The positivist premise separating 
26 As treaty constitutes a more specific law, national law should be interpreted, as far as practicable, in accordance with it 
2" C. Humana World Human Rights Guide (Pan Publications, London 1987) 189 
2' Netherlands Planning-Office (1994), Social and Cultural Report, Table 11.28,44, in M. Curtis Western European Government and 
Politics (Longman Press. NeNN York 1997) 3 53 
J. PolakieNN icz. and V. Jacob-Fultzer 'The European Convention on Human Rights in Domestic Law' (1991) H. R. L. J 12.65 
P. Van Dijk and G. Nan Hoof Theorj, and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers. Boston 1990) 585 
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law from politics is discarded, along with the automatic application of legislation: Whereas, 
Article I provides a standard by which to measure the legitimacy of legislative action, Article 19 
states that in no case may a basic right be encroached. However, such constitutional status is not 
without limitation. While individual liberty remains a guarded value, it is nevertheless confined 
within the framework of the overall political and moral order. Examining the findings of 
Murphy, Tanenhaus, 31 and Bernhardtý32 this thesis examines the importance of the conferral of 
lex specialis deregate leges generales on treaty law and questions whether, despite its apparent 
commitment to the immutable rights of man, the German order remains dependent on the 
principles of societal obligation. 
The same questioning is applied to the arrangement of France. During the 1946 Fourth and 1958 
Fifth Republic, France restored its parliamentary system. Two features arose out of the 
restoration: a declaration of rights, and a power accorded a measure of the judiciary to oversee 
its application. However, despite the scope of protection accorded the individual, including a 
number of social and economic rights, its impact remains questionable. The uncertain 
functioning of the French etat de droit and a judicial reluctance to accept behaviour in 
contravention of established social principle, imposing an arguable restraint on individual and 
collective behaviour. 
(4) The National Judiciary 
A feature of the ECHR is its creation of a legal order for the protection of HR. However, one 
limitation is that different legal arrangements and judicial histories ensure that the philosophy of 
the national legal order is not unifon-n throughout contemporary Europe. Examining judicial 
commentary and case-law, this thesis examines the functioning of the ECHR as a supranational 
construct by means of analysis of the early response of the judiciary of the Netherlands, 
Germany and France. 33 Narrowing the focus of investigation to the treatment of the ECHR by 
the UK judiciary, analysis is approached by examining not merely positive law, but principles 
common to the legal order. 
For example, considerable academic and judicial opinion has been expressed regarding the status 
and impact of the ECHR. However, constituting the first (arguable) challenge of its kind to 
common-law, the courts' early response to the ECHR was essentially archetypal. Whereas, in R 
W. Murphy and J. Tanenhaus Comparative Constitutional Lmv (St Martin's Press. Ne, ýN York 1997) 659 
R. Bernhardt Reform of the Control Machinery under the European Convention on Human Rights, in R. Macdonald The European 
ýývstemfibr the Protection of 
Human Rights (N ij hoff Publ ications, Dordrecht, 1995) 26 
"i-videnced in the rulings of the Hoge-Raad: Netherlands Supreme Court. Bundesgerichtshoff. German Federal Court of Justice-. 
Bundesi, ent, attungsgerichr German Federal AdministratiNe Court , and 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtt-. German Federal Constitutional 
Court. The Conseil d'Etar French Suprenic AdministratiN e Court, Cour de Cassatiow French Supreme CIN il and Criminal Court. 
and Conseil Constitutionnel: French Constitutional Court 
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v Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, ex-parte Salamat-Bibi, 34 Lord Denning 
considered a fear of involvement in the determination of policy to lay at the core of judicial 
reluctance toward the application of the ECHR, other objections highlighted by Griffith 35 
included the advantage inherent in unwritten principles of judicial practice and the creation of 
the impression that the ECrtHR was something of a court of appeal. Although a conjunction 
between UK and international law was maintained by judicial technique, in which the courts 
31 
made reference to the ECHR in the event of a lacuna, ambiguity, or uncertain point of law. 
evidence pointed to a reluctance to concede to the telos of the ECHR, grounded on a premise 
that the interpretation of unincorporated treaty was not a matter which fell to the jurisdiction of 
37 
the court . 
The constitutional status of the ECHR formed the focus of Duffy, 38 Griffith 39 and Warbrick, " 
who criticised the hiatus between the absence of judicial intervention to challenge municipal 
decision, and the finding of the ECrtHR that the ECHR could only be satisfied by the availability 
of such review. " Examining the constitutional sensibilities of the judiciary, this thesis examines 
its employment of the negative structure of protection highlighted in the annotated case-law and 
reports of Bailey 42 and Allen. 43 As well as, a number of strictures on its ability to expand FIR 
protection as perceived by Street44 and the effect of such limitations (if any) on its ability to 
apply the ECHR. Analysis gives rise to a number of questions: 
0 Can the judiciary realistically adapt to a European HR order when its approach to HR remains 
primarily positivist and not purposive? 
Can HR be practicably protected in an order in which they are treated as a form of residual liberty 
remaining after legal restraints are subtracted? 
Can the ECHR have an effect on a judiciary used to dealing with issues raised by applying case-law, 
distinguishing precedents or interpreting legislation, in what can be described as an inward/backward 
approach? 
Analysing the functioning of the HRA according to Craig, 45 Philipson '46 
Edwards 
'47 
Stone 
'48 
Gearty'49 Stan-ner 50 and relevant case-law, this thesis examines the impact of Section 3" on 
31 [ 197611 WLR 979 
. 15 J. Griffith 'The Political Constitution' (1979) M. L. R. 1,42 
" Exemplified in lVaddinglon v Miah [1974] 2 All ER 377; Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1; Re 0 [1991] 2 WLR 475. - Rv 
Hallstrom, ex-parle IV[1986] QB 1090, QBD; Mortensen v Peters (1906) 14 SLT 227 
17 Rv Secretary qf Statefor the Home Department, ex-parte Brind [ 1991] 2 WLR 588 
18 P. Duffy 'Engl I sh l, a\\ and the European Convention on Human Rights' (1980) I. C. M. L. Q. 29,585 
19 J. Griffith The Politics qf the Judiciary (Fontana Press, London 1997) 230 
C. Warbrick 'The European Convention on Human Rights and English Law' (1993) E. L. R. 19,34 
Soeringi, UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439 
12 S. Bailey. D. Harris and D. Ormerod Civil-Liberties, Cases andMaterials (Butterworths, London 2001) 
43 NI. Allen, B. Thompson and T. Walsh Constitutional and. 4dministrative Lm (Blackstone Press, London 1994) 
" Street in BaileN (2001 ), Op. cit at 263 
45 P. Craig 'The Courts. the Human Rights Act and Judicial Review' (2001) L. Q. R. 117,589 
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established principles of statutory interpretation and judicial review. Analysis indicates the 
employment of three approaches: 
A reluctance to defer from the intention of Parliament, as indicated from the plain reading of 
statutory language of Lords NichollS'52 Auld 
5' 
and Sedley '54 the legalistic approach adopted by Lords 
Slynn, Clyde, Hope and Hutton '55 and the court in Rv Lyons, 
56 LB Harrow v Qazi57 and RvJ, A-G 
Reference (No. 2 of2001); 58 
A cautious deference to Parliament, as evidenced in the restraint of Lord Hope, 59 and the subjection 
of Section 3 by Lord Woolf to a number of cautionary rules ; 60 
The liberal approach to interpretation of Lords Steyn '6 ' Nicholls, 
62 Carswel 1,63 Baroness Hale '64 and 
the court in R (Hammond) v Home Secretary, 
65 Middleton v West Somerset Coroner, 
66 Commissioner 
of Police v Hurst, 67 the advancement made by Lord Steyn on the heightened- scrutiny test regarding 
judicial review with a criterion grounded on the principle of proportionality, 68 and Lord Bingham's 
intimation of a need for a positive approach to HR protection. 69 
Whether a division in judicial reasoning exists regarding the application of the ECHR order 
between and/or within the higher and lower courts, this thesis narrows the focus of analysis to 
three areas where criticism of the judiciary's handling of HR has consistently risen: terrorism, 
asylum, and criminal justice. Whether the role of the judiciary can be seen as sustaining relations 
of power as analysts Simpson'O and Douzinas" would maintain, this thesis examines a number 
of examples of judicial deference where the employment of Section 3 has continued to be 
performed narrowly: 
46 G. Philipson 'Misreading Section 3' (1998) L. Q. R. 199,183 
4' R. Edwards 'Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act' (2002) M. L. R. 65,859 
"' R. Stone Textbook on Civil Liberties (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 
49 C. Gearty 'Unravel] ing Osman' (200 1) M. L. R. 64,159 
K. Starmer'Two Years of the Human Rights Act'(2003) E. H. R. L. R. 1,14 
That, in so far as possible, legislation be given effect in a way which is compatible with the ECHR 
-12 Re S (FQ [20021 UKH L 10 
51 Rv Daniel [20021 EWCA Crim 959 
54 R (Wooder) [20021 EWCA 554 
5' Rv Lambert [2001 ] UKH L37 
"' [2002] 4 All ER 1028 
S7 [2003] 3 WLR 792, declared a misinterpretation in Connors v UK (2005) 40 EHHR 9 
is [200412 WLR 1 
59 R vA [2001 ] UKHL 25 
6(' Popular Housing Regeneration Community Association Ltd. v Donoghue [2001] 4 All ER 604 
6'RvA [2002] 2 WLR 1546, reiterating Lord Clyde in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture [ 1999] 1 AC 69, 
retracted by Lord Steyn in Andrews [20021 UKHL 59; adopted in relation to the procedural concern in Cachi 1, Faluyi [20011 EWCA 
Civ 998. and Goode v Martin [2001 )I All ER 
Q Ghadian v Godin-Mendoza [2002] EWCA CIN, 1533 
63 A-G Ref (No. 4 of 2002) [2003] UKHL 56 
64 R (Kehoe) v Secretary of Statefor Work and Pensions UK [20051 UKHL 48 
"' [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2753 
66 [2004] 2 AC 182 
67 [20051 EWCA CIN, 890 
68 Rv Home Department, ex-parle Daly [2 001 ]UKHL26 
6" R (Amin) v Home Department [2003] UKHL 51 
70 A. Simpson Human Rights and the End qf Empire (OUP, Oxford 2002) 
71 C. Douzinas The End qf Human Rights (Hart Publications, Oxford 2002) 
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0 The use of a point of technicality to define an issue as falling beyond the concem of the ECHR 
regarding sentencing: R (S) v Home Secretary; 2 tariff-setting: Rv Sullivan; 73 status of criminal 
procedure: Wareham v Perbeck Council; 74 legality of a dispersal authorisation order: R (Singh) v 
Chief Constable of West Midlands; 5 state regulation of the freedom of protest and movement: R 
y76 (Haw) v Home Secretar and R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloustershire Constabulary; 
A Diceyian conviction of the common-law's ability to protect HR as evidenced in R (Pepushi) v 
Crown Prosecution Service '78 Myles v Director of Public ProsecutionS79 and R (S and Marper) v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police; 80 
0 Deference to the policy decision and/or functioning of the policy-maker in the determination of public 
emergency and/or action taken to deal with it: R (Gillan and Quinton) v Metropolitan Police 
82 
Y83 Commissioner, 81 Rv Nelson Carmona Nv Home Secretar and Ullah v Special Adjudicator and 
Home Secretary. 84 
(5) Classic and Contemporary Analysis ofJudicial Reasoning 
Whether classic-legal, or contemporary HR theory is able to explain the relationship between the 
judiciary and the ECHR, this thesis examines the ECHR firstly in accordance with positivism. 
In accordance with Kelsen, 85 the systematic analysis of law represented an accurate account of 
UK judicial reasoning. Paralleling the growth of liberalism in the nineteenth-century, positivism 
declared that morality was irrelevant to the identification of what constituted a valid law, that the 
secular principle of utility was the sole criteria for the evaluation of a legal measure, and that 
only the calculation of consequence was important, not the intention behind it. Grounded on 
empirical tradition, the reasoning of the UK judiciary constitutes a pragmatic subscription to the 
view that an individual can only be accorded such independence as considered conducive to the 
collective good. Accordingly, the key to understanding the role of law is to seek to explain not 
the reason why a judge gives a verdict, but the reason why he has authority to do so. 
Applied to the ECHR, the observation is interesting. Following the HRA, a denial of an a priori 
source of natural rights and a rejection of international law transcending the empirical reality of 
12 12005] EWHC 1957 
" [20041 EWCA Crim 1762 
74 [20051 EWHC (Admin) 358 
75, [2006] F "'CA 1118 
76 12006] FWCA Civ. 532 
77 12005] QB 678-, [2004] EWCA Ci% 1639, [EWHC] (Admin) 253 
78 [2004] EWHC 798 
79 120041 EWHC 594 (Admin) 
8" [20041 UKHL 39 
"' [2003] FW11C (Admin) 2545 
82 [2006] EWCA (Crim) 508 
13 [20031 EWCA (00 1369 
84 [2003] 1 kVLR 770 
85 H. Kelsen 'Pure TheorN of Law' (1934) L. Q. R. 474 
11 
the common-law, has dominated UK HR adjudication. 86 However, positivism remains a 
philosophy which divorces too readily the judiciary from the ethical foundations of societ". 
Although it is not unreasonable to classify judicial preference for developing HR axiom on 
existing common-law principle, and statutory enactment as a classic Diceyian treatment of 
rights, positivism does not explain the supranational development which is the ECHR. Albeit 
constitutional analysis may provide insight into the HR arrangement in which the ECHR is to 
function,, 87 what it can not do is explain the division in reasoning between, and/or within, the UK 
higher and lower courts regarding the application of the ECHR. 
The same criticism is equally valid in relation to theories based on the value of utility. In the 
words of Richards, not even Mill's attempt to redefine utilitarianism by acknowledging the 
concept of morality within the utilitarian context prevents the philosophy from rendering the 
individual a utilitarian aggregate, isolating law from society, and excluding too readily the 
influence of political and sociological factors on thejudicial mind. 88 
With regard to natural law theory, in accordance with Dworkin 89 since law in the form of moral 
principle does constitute part of legal argument, the omission by positivists to acknowledge its 
role is inappropriate. Advocating the concept of HR in the strong sense, the approach challenges 
the reasoning of the judiciary highlighted by Griffith" as either non-non-native conclusions 
drawn from established rules,, or propositions arrived at following pragmatic scrutiny of data. 
However, despite being described by Hoffman9l as one of few theories which engage with the 
reality of what the judiciary attempts to do, natural law theory is not without criticism. Not least, 
that insofar as HR remain in the UK judicial mind deontic concepts derived from the language of 
rules, there can be no conception of HR without a positive set of laws and institutions to bring 
them into existence. 92 
In contrast, the emphasis on what is perceived as a societal need to obtain equilibrium between 
the interest of the state and the individual expressed throughout the works of social theorists 
Llewellyn, 93 Henkin 94 and Donnelly, 9' does acknowledge the significance of social and 
economic conditions on the development of HR in the twenty-first century supranational state. 
However, lacking focus on how law, politics and HR interrelate, the problem with social theory 
116 H, Lauterpacht 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations' (1947) L. Q. R. LXIIII, 438; (1948) L. Q. R. LXIV, 97 
87 D. Pannick 'Dicey and Civil-Liberties' [ 19851 P. L. 611; A. Smith 'Comment on Dicey and Civil-Liberties' [ 19851 P. L. 608, Wolf- 
Phillips 'A... Look at the British Constitution' (1984) P. A. 37,4; and J. Polakiewicz 'The European Convention on Human Rights in 
Domestic Law'(1991) H. R. L. J. 12,65 
"' 1. Richards 'Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law' (1979) G. L. R. 13 
89 R. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (DuckýN orth Press, London 1978) 
' J. Griff ith The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana Press, London 1997) 
91 L. Hoffman 'Human Rights and the House of Lords' (1999) ffL. R, 62,159 
92 K. Klare *Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction' (1991) B. C. L. R. 69,67 L, 93 K. I-leNNellvii 'A Realistic Jurisprudence' (1930) CL. R. 30,431, 'The Normative, the Legal and the LaýN Jobs' (1940) Y. L. J. 49, 
1355 
94 L. I lenkin. TheAge of Rights (Columbia Universltý Press, NeNN York 1990) Introduction 
9-' J. Donnell) Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1989) 88 
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is its tendency to catalogue the need for HR protection, as opposed to explain. Although 
examination of the ECHR in accordance with social theory succeeds to develop a social 
approach to HR analysis, grounded on narrowly defined perceptions of culture, it does not 
generate the knowledge required to make defensible statement on either the dynamics of HR 
development in post-modem society, or the functioning of the ECHR's internal order in relation 
to the signatory-state. 
Section 1.3: The Casefor a Socio-legal, Political Review 
The regional protection of HR forms the subject of a diverse range of text, commentary and 
debate. Examination of the effectiveness of the ECHR in relation to the UK requires an analysis 
of social-science, jurisprudence and philosophy. In substance jurists and theorists have provided 
an overview of regional rights protection; however, focus has remained within the confines of 
their school of thought. Although each provides analysis relevant to its field of study, the ECHR 
has failed to be addressed in terms of its overall effectiveness. 
Concentrating on the procedure of ECHR rights protection, legal analysis in its definitive form, 
neglects to focus on the political objective(s) of the ECHR, with the result that in its pre- 
occupation with its legitimacy, composition and jurisdiction, it fails to acknowledge the effect of 
changing national and supranational social, economic and political objectives either on the 
nature of the rights upheld, or the status of the individual. Similarly, political argument is rarely 
indicative of the consequences of European decision-making on the legal heritage of the 
si gnatory- state, the response of the legal-practitioner and judge, and the effect of the anomalies 
produced within the legal process on the individual's ability to seek redress 
With regard to Socio-legal analysis, a general premise that a universal framework be 
ethnocentrically western, excludes such study from informed HR research. Based on a narrow 
conceptual isation of culture, the ideals of universalism and cultural-relativism do not generate 
the empirical evidence required to substantiate finding concerning the advancement of HR 
development in post-modem society. Such a weakness has led to a contemporary sociological 
approach. Seeking to develop methods of research that allow for the analysis of social 
interaction through processes of negotiation, the actor-orientated approach of Human Agency 
has placed actors at the centre of HR development. The idea that HR protection is an ongoing 
practice, socially constructed and the result of a negotiated process, does take sociological 
analysis out of its universal versus cultural-relativist stalemate. However, the rejection of 
empirical analysis, as well as an ethnographical preoccupation with society as distinct from the 
political organisation of the twenty-first century state, fails to explain the reality of the 
supranational ECHR: either in terms of the relationship between universal HR standards and 
13 
cultural practice, or the relationship between the ECrtHR, individual and s ignatory- state. 
Similarly, although jurisprudential and philosophical theory does contribute insight into the 
ob . ective of HR development, analysis too often concentrates on the task of proving theoretical 9 
models at the expense of acknowledging Europe's social, political and economic reality. 
To conclude, although each discipline serves to place the development of the ECHR into an 
authentic framework relevant to its field of analysis, employed in isolation, such analysis lacks 
the capacity to explain the evolving HR order. Only by the adoption of socio-legal political 
research, does an overall depiction of the ECHR, its influence on the legal, social and political 
realities of state-parties, as well as its impact on the individual and his actual enjoyment of HR, 
form. 
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Section 2: The ECHR and the Signatory-State 
Article 25 of the ECHR introduced the Individual-Petition Procedure. ' Effective from Julý 5 
1995, it is this right that gives rise to the volume of claims which invoke the ECHR and its 
operation throughout this thesis measured in accordance with its effect on the signatory-state. 
The right of Individual-Petition constituted a strengthening of the judicial character of the ECHR 
and the replacement of Articles 19-56 with a text establishing a European Court of Human 
Rights .2 However, held as a compromise by those who argued 
for a2 tier-order, the functioning 
of the ECrtHR invoked a number of concerns regarding its jurisdiction and composition. Not 
least, that confounded by the difficulties inherent in the ECHR's implementation: at most a 
process of ad hoc report and adverse publicity, the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR remained a form 
of dubious realism. 
Following a line of enquiry into the functioning of the ECHR grounded on the limits of critical 
reason, 3 Section 2 of this thesis examines and contrasts, the 'early' influence of the ECHR 
following its ratification on 3 May 1974 in France; its ratification on the 4 November 1950 in 
Germany; its ratification in 1954 in the Netherlands; and its lack of formal acknowledgement, 
prior to the HRA, in the UK. Whether the ECHR can be regarded as an effective form of HR 
protection, Section 2 examines whether (1) the ECHR's apparent affinity with the monist order 
of the civil law tradition does render it in relation to the UK dualist order merely an 
impracticable statement of ideal; (2) whether the constitutional arrangement and legal culture of 
a signatory-state constitutes only one decisive factor in the functioning of the ECHR order 
amongst many; and (3), whether the difficulty in the application of the ECHR order results in 
fact from those difficulties inherent in the application of the concept of a universal order of 
4567 human rights protection generally highlighted by Tridade, Llewellyn, Douzinas , Simpson, 
Bernstein, 8 Bernhardt, 9 Rosenberglo and Vasak. " 
' See: Appendix 1 
2 Hereafter, ECrtHR 
Applied in R. Gaete Political Parties and Methods of Court (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1993) 
A. A. C. Tridade 'The Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law' (1978) Archjav des Vollcerrechts 17,333 
K. Llewellyn The Common-Law Tradition (Little & Brown, Boston 1960) 
C. Douzinas The End of Human Rights (Hart Publications, Oxford 2002) 
Simpson (2002). Op. cit at 94 
Bernstein in Osborne (1991), Op. cit at 114 
R. Bernhardt Reform of the Control Machiner-\ under the European Convention on Human Rights, in R. Macdonald The European 
, ý), steinfior the 
Protection of Human Rights (Nijhoff Publications, Dordrecht, 1995) 26 
10 M. Rosenberg Constitutionalism, ldentijýv. Difference and Legitimacj, (Durham Duke University Press, Durham 1994) 
" Vasak (1965), Op. cit at 39 
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Section 2. PA Legal Obligation to Incorporate? 
The ECHR has elicited attention within international law for several reasons .12 Certainly, as an 
authority whereby an individual is permitted to instigate proceedings concluding in international 
determination, the ECHR constitutes a unique precedent. 13 However, in the absence of provision 
for its uniform application, whether the ECHR imposes a legal obligation on the signatory-state 
to incorporate its provisions into its domestic order has formed the focus of debate. 
The contention revolves around the interpretation of the text of the ECHR. Firstly, by reading 
into Article I an intent that its provisions should be secured to everyone within the jurisdiction 
of the signatory-state by the substitution of the word 'shall' secure for the word 'undertake. "' 
Secondly, by reading into its text an implied duty to afford the ECHR domestic status deduced 
from Article 13 and the reasoning that a right to a remedy instructs the signatory-state to 
incorporate the ECHR into its domestic law. 15 The opinion is not without support. Invoking the 
Travaux Preparatories to advance a theory that the ECHR was drafted with the aim inter-alia of 
achieving domestic status, Golsong16 argued that the ECHR should be given precedence over 
domestic law. A theory justified by Buergenthal 17 on the ground that Article I was drafted in 
sufficiently precise terms as to render the remedy referred to in Article 13 effective. 
However, the contention that there exists a legal obligation on the signatory-state to incorporate 
the ECHR into domestic law remains infact easier to refute. According to Vasak, 18 using the 
same Travaux Preparatories, although an intention to create rights and freedoms can be 
surmised during the ECHR's drafting, it did not follow that the ECHR was intended to create 
directly enforceable rights, or on being granted the status of domestic law: the ambit of ECHR 
protection being that of s ignatory- states, not Europeans. Certainly, that there exists no legal 
obligation to incorporate the ECHR into municipal law is indicated in the opinion and case-law 
of the European Commission and ECrtHR. Whereas in Golder v UK, 19 the European 
Commission held that the function of the ECrtHR was to safeguard a number of rights of the 
individual,, not to prescribe legal obligations, and in Swedish Engine-Drivers Case 20 neither 
Articles I nor 13 placed a legal obligation on signatory-states to incorporate the ECHR into their 
domestic order, in Handyside v UK the ECrtHR highlighted a memo filed by European 
12 Steiner and Alston (2000), Op. cit at 571 
13 A. Drzemczewski 'Principal Characteristics of the New European Convention on Human Rights Control Mechanism' (1994) 
H. R. L. J. 15,82 
Ireland v UK (1979) ECHR Series A No. 25,90 
A. Verdross 'The Status of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Robertson, the Relationship between the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Internal Law' (1970) Colleques European 3.47 
16 H. Golsong Eýffecl direct an sique le rang en 
droit interne, des normes de la ECHR des droits de Vhomme at des decisions pries 
par le organs institution per-celle ci., 72 in A. Drzemczewski The European Convention on Human Rights in Domestic Law 
(Clarendon Press. Oxford 1983) 
Buergenthal (1970), Op. cit at 233 
Vasak (1965), Op. cit at 39 
(1978) ECHR Series B No. 16,9 
(1976) ECHR Series A No. 20,18 
16 
Commission's Vice-President Sperduti stating that, far from required to incorporate the ECHR 
into their domestic order, signatories were free to choose the means of securing the rights set 
forth within. 
21 
Evident then from the above diversity of opinion, whether a legal obligation to incorporate the 
ECHR into domestic law does exist, remains an issue open to subjective appreciation. However, 
in the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary, a requirement that a signatory-state is 
legally obliged to incorporate its provisions into domestic law can not be concluded either by the 
text of the ECHR,, its preparatory work, or the practice of its parties. Although constructed on 
tenants of treaty law, the ECHR can not be interpreted in the same way as other multi-lateral 
treaties of a synallogmatic character. Even where incorporation of the ECHR would conform 
better to its telos than a separation of domestic orders, the ECHR does not constitute a 
supercession of the signatory-state. Accordingly, the impact of the ECHR rests on the status 
22 accorded it by national norm. Immune from the principle that domestic law conform to agreed 
international undertaking, or that a signatory-state will not invoke its municipal law as 
justification for failure to perform a treaty provision. As a result, the process of incorporation of 
the ECHR into as ignatory- state's domestic order can not be generalised. 
Section Z2: The ECHR and the Constitutional Arrangement of France 
Characteristic of the civil-law orders of Europe, numerous ECHR signatory-states accept 
international obligations as part of their domestic law. Determined by their monist constitutional 
arrangements, such states hold that an international treaty once ratified, has the force of law and 
may be applied by domestic courts. Such incorporation is exemplified by the constitutional 
arrangement of France. 
Article 55 of the Constitution of the Fifth-Republic (1958) provides that treaties duly ratified, 
should have an authority superior to that of national law. Grounded on a unitary order in which 
national and international law have equivalent subjects and sources, such an arrangement forms 
part of a constitutional code compatible with the telos of the ECHR. Whether such an 
arrangement is more capable of securing an individual's HR than others however, is subject to 
debate. 
To date, France has employed a total of 15 constitutional instruments, including the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789.23 A paradigm of classic liberal philosophy, Articles 
" (1976) ECHR Series A No. 24,22 
22 By express incorporation exemplified by Austria, by rendering treaty law a distinct area of practice exemplified bý Denmark', 
Sweden and Nor-\\ aý .- 
by affording the ECHR a status equal to domestic IaNN exemplified by France-, or informal acknoN\ ledgement 
formerlý exemplified by the UK 
23 Hereafter. the 1789 Declaration 
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1-17 of the 1789 Declaration catalogues a number of protected freedoms, as well as a principle 
of residual liberty. Further, whereas Preamble III of the Constitution of the Fourth-Republic 
(1946) claims to protect such political, economic and social concerns as equality of the sexes and 
union rights; the Preamble to the Constitution of the Fifth-Republic (1958) claims to 
acknowledge those fundamental HR principles ordinarily recognised by French law. Hoxvever, 
despite proclaiming anew the 1789 Declaration and Preamble III of the Fourth-Republic, the 
facifitation of a secure rights status did not prevent the clash in philosophy that arose in 1982 
regarding the 1946 Preamble's encouragement of nationalisation in contravention of the right of 
individual ownership under Article 17 of the 1789 Declaration. Despite then, such constitutional 
acknowledgement, is there evidence to suggest that France's commitment to HR does function 
beyond the mere proclamation of political ideal? What of the effect of such liberal orthodoxy on 
the infra-constitutional values not protected by the 1946 Constitution such as those enumerated 
by the ECHR? 
Although France was an original signatory, it did not ratify the ECHR until 3 May 1974. 
Accompanied by reservations to Articles 5,6 and 15(l), as well as a declaration of interpretation 
relating to Articles 10 and 63, the Fifth-Republic recognised the jurisdiction of the ECrtHR, 
signing on the 2 October 1981 the Second Additional-Protocol24 and accepting the right to 
25 i nd ividual -petition . Ratification complemented two new dimensions introduced in 1958: limits 
on the omni-competence of the legislature in the form of a rationalised Parliamentarian ism, and 
a Conseil Constitutionnel with the capability to examine the constitutionality of law and 
parliamentary order prior to their promulgation. 26 
Whether the ECHR constituted a realistic development in HR protection, Article 55 of the Fifth- 
Republic provided that treaties duly ratified would have an authority superior to that of domestic 
law. Consequently, the self-executing provisions of the ECHR were accorded a superior status to 
conflicting national law, subject to the proviso that reciprocity of application could be 
established. However, accorded what in practice amounted to only an inten-nediate position, the 
rule of precedence proved far more difficult to establish both within the French Administrative 
and Ordinary Court structures. 
2' Acknowledging the ECrtHR's authority to inform on questions concerning ECHR interpretation 
25 Dýeret No. 81-917, (198 1), Journal-Official 2783 
26 Subjecting economic, social and constitutional decisions of Parliament and Government to judicial review; \, N ith jurisdiction to 
act: 
(1) As an election court, 
(2) As an advisor to the President on the exercise of emergency provisions, 
(3) To rule on the constitutional ity of Treaties, 
(4) To examine the constitutional ltý of organic laws and parliamentary orders prior to promulgation, 
(5) To police the boundaries of the legislative competence of Parliament and the Executive by ruling Private-Member's Bills out of 
ordcr-. 
(6) To rule oil the constitutional it\ of a loi bN means of a challenge on grounds of a breach of fundamental rights 
18 
Indeed, charged with the determination of the legality of administrative acts, the general 
response of the Conseil dEtat to Article 55 of the Fifth-Republic was that it had no authority to 
question the legality of legislative action. Grounded on a constitutional principle restricting the 
court's ability to question the will of the electorate, the same sentiment was evidenced in the 
Cour de Cassation's reluctance to provide remedy or review of legislation in conflict with the 
ECHR. Despite precedence afforded treaty over domestic law, ratification of the ECHR was met 
with a reluctance of the French courts to regulate its status, grounded (arguably) on a 
commitment to the principle of the separation of power and a determination to assert its own 
judicial independence. For example, in Recueil Dalloz SirejP the Conseil d'Etat and the 
Tribunal Adminstratif upheld a law of 17 January 1975 contradictory to the ECHR. Examining 
the impact of the ECHR on domestic law, it was held that the 1975 provision was to be awarded 
priority in accordance with established precedent of the Council dEtat. In reaching its decision, 
both Courts accorded significance to the rule of lex posterior derogate legi priori 18 and held that 
as the domestic law was enacted after the publication of the ECHR, it was entitled to priority 
over self-executing treaty. 29The ruling highlighted a disparity between the status accorded the 
law of the ECHR and the European Economic Community 30 expressed by the Chambre Mixte of 
the Cour de Cassation. Concerning a violation of Article 95 EC, in Directeur Giniral des 
Douanes v Socijtj Cafes Jacques V and J Weigal And Company 19 75 the Chambre Mixte of the 
Cour de Cassation held that the EC created an order which, by virtue of Article 55 of the Fifth- 
Republic, was binding on domestic courts. In contrast, the judiciary continued to express its 
difficulty in acknowledging the telos of Article 55 of the Fifth-Republic as it related to the status 
of the ECHR. While employing an excessive process of suspending proceedings and requesting 
ministerial interpretation in Glaeser Touvier, 31 the Conseil de Cassation proclaimed its inability 
to interpret international agreement on the ground that to do so would encroach upon the 
Government's control of Vordre public international; in La Simioni Juridique the Cour de 
Sfiretý de VEtat refused to consider the relevance of Articles 5,. 6 and 13 of the ECHR on the 
ground that domestic law already granted adequate protection. 32 
Highlighting what appeared to be confusion amongst the judiciary surrounding the status of the 
ECHR, the cases intimate an arguable division in judicial reasoning. A division made more 
evident in a number of cases where the courts were called on to consider the relevance of Article 
9(l) of the ECHR to the refusal of conscientious objectors to take possession of military call-up 
27 Reciieil Dalloz Sire 
'v 
Dýbut (1980) 38 
" Unless national law stands in unequivocal contravention of treaty law, the latter supersedes 
2' Similarly. the Conseil d'Etat refused to set aside a decision of the Conseil National de I'Ordre des Wdecins on the ground that 
Article 6 was inapplicable: Recueil des d&isions du Conseil d'Etat Dibut (1978), 395 
liereafter. FC 
19 Yearbook (1976). 1126. Discussed in La Semaine Juridique 1977 nt 18435 
12 Further, \Nhereas in the case of Ouin 21 Yearbook (1978) 732 the Cour de Cassation considered Article 6 without serious regard 
for the status of treaty laN% vis-A-vis domestic legislation. in Respino-Francesco 18 Yearbook (1975) 422 and 19 Yearbook (1976) 
112, the court rejected a claim that the Code of Criminal Procedure \%as incompatible with Article 5 
19 
papers. Finding in all cases that a refusal constituted an offence under Article 133 of the Code de 
Service National 197 1, whereas in Ministire Public v Lemesle the Tribunal de Grande Instance 
de Montpellier held that the ECHR enjoyed primacy to the text on which the prosecution was 
founded, and that freedom of opinion forming part of the freedom of belief could not be 
suppressed on the ground that nothing had been stipulated as to the way in which it should be 
manifested ; 33 in Lartec v Tribunal de Grande Instance 34 reference was made to the fact that 
rights specified in Article 9(l) were rightfully restricted by domestic law where limitation was 
necessary for the protection of public order. Accordingly, the ECHR did not place any obstacle 
in the way of enforcement of the internal law which scheduled the offence committed by the 
accused. Article 133 of the Code de Service National was applied on the basis that Article 9(2) 
of the ECHR permitted limitation of Article 9(l). 
The Conseil Constitutionne P5 
Following adoption of the Constitution of the Fifth-Republic, constitutional review introduced 
the CC: an institution afforded the ability to review the constitutionality of domestic law prior to 
promulgation, and regulation of Parliamentary Assembly prior to application. Although Article 
5 of the French Civil-Code denied the Court stare decisis, 36 this did not prevent it from 
developing as an authorative communiqUj. 3' As illustrated in the impact of its 1970 decision 
concerning changes to the budgetary provisions of the EC Treaty; 38 its influence over the Cour 
de Cassation and Conseil dEtat; 39 and development of the right of privacy'40 freedom of 
movement, 41 continuity of Public Services, 42 and respect for human-beings from the beginning 
of lif . 
43 e 
Further, conferring a definite status on a number of values whose legal significance remained 
either unaddressed by constitutional text, or otherwise contested, the CC contributed to the 
clarification of a number of unwritten rights and freedoms: Specifying the ground on which their 
restriction could be justified; requiring authority to provide explanation for restriction; and 
33 20 Yearbook (1977) 744-, followed in the decision reported in Gazette du Policis (1978), 98,11 
34 20 Yearbook (1977) 746 
35 Hereafter, CC 
36 The ability to IaN down rules for future courts to follow 
37 Highlighted by Drzemczewski (1983), Op. cit at 82, the objective of constitutional value is the corollary of the implementation of 
a constitutionally recognised value. Accordingly, if an objective is recognised as having a status which cannot be altered, by 
including it within the context of legal provisions that the legislature can alter only in limited ways, it is arguable that the Conseil 
Constitutionnel has restricted the freedom of the legislature more than is (arguably) evident from the written sources of the 
Constitution 
38 CC Decision No. 70-139 DC (1970) and CC Decision No. 71-144 DC (1971) 
" Decision of the CE Ass 20 198ý, Establishments Outters, R. F. D. A. 1986,513 influencing the decisions of the Cour de Cassation 
and the Conseil d'Etat (albeit, in the main, both reIN on their own judgement) and the Cour de Cassation Criminal Division in 
Bogdon and Iuckovie (1985) Cass Crim 25.329 
40 CC Decision No. 76-77 DC 12 (1977) 
" CC Decision No. 72-87 DC 23 (1977) 
4' CC Decision No. 79-105 DC 25 (1979) 
41 CC Decision No. 74-75 DC 15 (1975) 
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ensuring that any restriction imposed did not constitute a measure disproportionate to the object 
to be achieved. As exemplified in its determination of the lawfulness of the 1986 Chirac 
Government's intention to extend the detention of immigrants refused entry to a period of three 
days. Indicating a willingness to go beyond established judicial review criteria, the CC limited 
the proposed interference to cases of emergency, and then only on the authorisation of the 
44 President of a Tribunal de Grande . 
Finally, whereas some rights and freedoms are self-executing, 45 their restriction limited to public 
necessity and subject to control by the CC, others consist of ideals more easily abridged. 46 
Despite the discretion afforded the relevant authority however, this did not prevent the CC from 
displaying the occasional activism in ensuring that the former remained proficient in handling 
the values that it was authorised to implement. For example, an ordinance of 26 August 1944 
sought to regulate groups owning newspapers by requiring greater publicity on press ownership 
and the creation of a Press Commission. Reinterpreting freedom of communication, the CC drew 
on such concerns as freedom of association and respect for others to develop a right to broadcast, 
47 based on freedom of expression and Article II of the 1789 Declaration . In the opinion of the 
CC, it was up to the legislature to reconcile the exercise of the freedom with such objectives of 
constitutional value as the legislative development was likely to infringe. 
On analysis then, it would appear that the civil-law arrangement of France constituted an order 
(in theory at least) more than capable of guaranteeing the freedom of the individual. But what of 
those infra-constitutional values enumerated in the ECHR? Whether the same degree of certainty 
could be seen in relation to the ECHR is debatable. 
For example, despite the CC's ruling in Immigration-Law Case 48 that Article 55 of the Fifth- 
Republic be accorded unequivocal effect in respect of treaties ratified by France, its general 
response to conflict arising between national law and the ECHR remained essentially 
formalistic. Reiterating concern deliberated in The Abortion-Law Case over the role of the CC 
and its impact on French sovereignty, a desire to detach itself from possible political 
confrontation formed the ground of a decision of 25 July 1991.49 Concerning an initiative taken 
by 81 members of the National-Assembly, the CC was called on to declare Article 4 of the 
French Abortion Law 1975 incompatible with ECHR Article 2, on the ground that the ECHR's 
domestic status had been secured in May 1974. Examining whether international treaty could 
" Other examples include elevation of the requirement that a criminal offence be stated in a precise manner: CC Decision No. 18-19 
DC (1981) 
Association, due-process, home, property and detention, abfidged only on grounds of public necessity 
On tile difference between *maximum' control and 'minimum' control denoting the extent to which the CC may intervene to 
regulate the legislature's dealings with particular constitutional values/principles: see J. Bell 'The Expansion of Judicial Review in 
France' [ 1986] P. L. 99,103 
CC Decision No. 84-181 DC (1984) 
CC Decision No. 80-109 DC (1980) 
'9 CC Decision No. 91-293 DC (1991) 
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forrn part of the Constitution of the Fifth-Republic, the CC ruled that it was unable to revieýN the 
constitutionality of a proposed law simply on the ground of an alleged incompatibility. 
Although treaty was superior in the hierarchy of norms, conflict between it and domestic law 
did not constitute a constitutional concern, therefore could not be determined by the Court. As a 
result, the CC refused to incorporate the ECHR into the Article 61 Fifth-Republic criteria for 
judicial review. In reaching its decision, the position of the CC was made clear: in the event of 
an incompatibility arising between the operation of France's constitutional order and the ECHR, 
as an international treaty, the latter was not a concern for the CC. 
To summarise,. as an example of the civil-law system, the French constitutional order serves to 
satisfy a high priority of legal certainty characteristic of the revenant of public opinion in 
France. Article 66 of the Fifth-Republic provides that the Cour de Cassation and Conseil d'Etat 
are accredited with the power to safeguard the exercise of the Article 25 ECHR right to 
individual-petition. With regard to the impact of the arrangement in terms of its ability to 
facilitate the protection of HR, certainly there are examples of France having been exposed by 
the ECHR for the inadequacy of such state practice as telephone-tapping5o and due process .51 
However,, highlighted by such decisions as Bozeno v France, 52 proclamations of HR protection 
in the classic civil-law tradition may well accord the concept a heightened constitutional status, 
but not necessarily a greater reality. 
The value of a constitutional commitment to HR protection was summarised by Rosenberg. 53 By 
their nature written guarantees of HR are naturally indeterminate in that they become factual 
only when their guarantee is put into practice. Whether an order of HR protection is written or 
not, it remains only a subsidiary feature of a constitutional system. Applied to analysis of the 
civil-law order of France, whether it can survive criticism that its proclamations of HR 
protection serve only as a statement of philosophie, the French performative character of 
enunciation illustrates that a statement of rights as a forward-looking grammar of action can (and 
often does) differ in application from both its subjective value and the meaning of its written 
content. 
'0 Kruslin v France (1990) ECHR Series A No. 354 
"Hv France (1989) ECHR 24 October 1989 RFDA 1989 203, conceming the length of time taken for the hearing of an 
administrative case 
5' (1986) EC HR Series A No. I 11, concerning detention and the administration's power to order a foreign national to be returned to 
the frontier as held in the Conseil Constitutionnel's decision in Entry and Residence of Foreigners (1986) Immigration Laiv . 4JD, 4 
[/ 980] 356 DC qf September 1986. concerning the lawfulness of the 1986 Chirac Government's intention to extend the detention of 
immigrants refused entry to a period of three days. the CC restricted the interference with the liberty of the individual to cases of 
emergency onlN and then upon authorisation by the President of a Tribunal de Grande: as well as the lack of reference to Article 8 
ECHR (as opposed to Article 9 of the French Civil-Code) and general lack of analysis accorded Article 10 ECHR in recentiudicial 
dealings with the right to priNacy Cogediprsse et al. v Mme Marchand, Vve Erignac et al. Cass. Civ., December 20 2000; SNC 
Prisma Presse v Smet Cass. CiN.. December 12 2000-, and Ste Hachette Fillipacchi v Smet, Cass. Civ., December 12 2000. See-. H. 
Delaney and C. Nlurphý. 'Toward Common Principles Relating to the Protection of Privacy Rights? ' 2007 E. H. R. L. R. 568 
M. Rosenberg Constitutionalism, Identity, Dýf , 
Terence and Legitimaq- (Durham Duke Univers v, Press, Durham 1994). Certainl, ý 
the (V highlights the uncertainty generally of the actual functioning of the HR role of a constitutional court 
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Indeed, since its induction the practice of CC review has found itself the subject of criticism. In 
accordance with Keeler and Stone, the CC acts as a contre-pouvoir 54 lying outside the control of 
the executive and legislature with the capability of manipulating PoliCY. 55 A number of examples 
are used to highlight the claim, including the CCs outlining boundaries concerning the power of 
the press: a concern which, lacking formal constitutional authority, came in for at least partial 
annulment; and its treatment of two examples of established French theory: collective welfare in 
public order, and the continuity of public services. According to Keeler and Stone, although the 
CC has claimed that it does not operate a power of decision synonymous to that of Parliament, 
this does not mean that it does not act in delineating obligation which Parliament is 
constitutionally bound to pursue. Whether the legal and the political are more connected than 
legal -practitioners might suggest, the conclusion is drawn that the CC cannot avoid taking an 
active role in the political process: carving out under the guise of its interpretative function, a 
framework within which Government and Parliament can operate unhindered. 
The observation is not entirely persuasive. While the function of the CC (in theory at least) is to 
conserve the balance between the organs of Government by policing the exercise of state power 
in accordance with Articles 34 and 37 of the Fifth-Republic, it is arguable that the Court's 
legalistic approach actually provides an effective schema for its neutrality. 
Further, the CC may play a part in acknowledging formal principles in relation to the operation 
of Government institutions and the protection of HR, but lacking in power of initiative is limited 
to only reacting to issues submitted to it. 56 Hardly then, the partisan politicians that Keeler and 
Stone would suggest, receiving reference only on point of law, its reasons grounded on the 
interpretation of constitutional text, it is arguable that the CC does not so much validate le mythe 
du Government desjudges 57 than merely clarify legality. As illustrated in the 1990 Parliamentary 
block of a proposal by the President of the CC that French Courts be allowed to refer to the CC 
HR questions concerning the constitutionality of loi following their promulgation; and 
circumstances surrounding the law of July 1990 regarding racism, where no political party was 
prepared to refer the matter to the CC prior to its promulgation. Regardless of the role accredited 
the CC; the system depended on the willingness of party opposition to refer the 1990 law to 
Parliament 
To conclude, although the CC has afforded a greater legalistic input into constitutional debate 
than formerly seen in earlier Republics, it is an input which has neither significantly altered, nor 
affected, the French political or philosophical approach toward the ECHR. Illustrated in the 
5-' A centre of power 
55 J. Keeler and A. Stone. Judicial Political Confrontation in Mitterrand's France, in G. Ross The Afitterrand Experiment (CUP, 
Cambridge 1987) 
56 Breaches of procedural rules constituting the main concern submitted for scrutin-y 
17 L. Fa%oureau LeHythe du Government des Judges, Colloquium-Paper October 1987. (OUP, Oxford 1987) 17 
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CC's early dealing with the ECHR, questions arising in relation to France's implementation of 
the ECHR were detennined cautiously, rulings (arguably) concerned as much with its own 
constitutional prerogative as with any serious concern for the infringement of HR. As for the 
Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de Cassation, albeit authorised to regulate the application of the 
ECHR in relation to domestic law, " both continued to maintain a reluctance to affirm the 
superiority of the former over conflicting domestic law. A reluctance, standing in contrast to its 
willingness to intervene to set standards for the scrutiny of Parliamentary legislation and the 
clarification of its own domestic constitutional text. 
Despite then, the presumed civil-law affinity between the French constitutional and ECHR order, 
such a factor may well (arguably) accord the concept of HR protection a greater degree of legal 
certainty, but not a greater real ity. 59 Rather, a great deal more cautious than its fundamental 
rights history would suggest, the French order has proved to be in fact far less capable in its 
dealing with the ECHR than for example, the (arguably) more innovative order of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
Section Z3: The ECHR and the Constitutional Arrangement of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 60 
On preliminary analysis, the constitutional arrangement of the FRG would appear an order more 
than capable of fulfilling its obligations under international law. Firstly, consisting of a written 
constitution and a Bill of Rights presided over by a constitutional court: the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the arrangement confers a definite status on international treaty 
similar to France. Secondly, the relationship between international law and the German order 
forms the concern of a number of provisions of the FRG's Basic Law. Whereas Article 24(l) of 
the Constitution authorises the FRG to assign to international agreement a degree of control over 
national sovereignty; Article 25 declares that certain rules of international law, forming an 
integral part of Federal Law, take precedence over ordinary law. With regard to the ECHR, 
signed on behalf of the FRG on the 4 November 195 0,61 the ECHR was approved in an Act of 
Ratification 1952 and, in accordance with a law of approbation, 62 afforded a status akin to 
Federal Law. A status reinforced by the Bundesverfassungsgerich? ' and the Federal 
Administrative Court: the Bundesverwattungsgericht; 64 But what of the effect of such an 
arrangement in practice? Exemplified by France, albeit the constitutional order had an impact on 
"" The Article 25 ECHR fight of individual petition 
59 Highlighted in its recent judicial treatment of Article 8 ECHR, demonstrating in the opinion of Picard, a considerable degree of 
mconsistencý, in its treatment of the right to privacy E. Picard, The Right to Privacy in French Law, in B. S. Markesmis (Ed) 
Protecting Privacy (OUP, Oxford 1999) 54 
60 Hereafter. FRG 
" In accordance with Article 59(2) Basic Law 
62 A doctrine NN herebN treaty norrns are transformed into domestic law by the legislature 
61 1 Bverfo ( 19 ý 2) 3 72 
(4 3 BN, erNN-g (1955) 48 
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the effectiveness of the ECHR, a more definite factor was the philosophy of its judiciary: its 
preoccupation with the mechanics of constitutional procedure, uncertainty over its FIR role, and 
caution in the exercise ofjudicial review. 
As an integral part of Federal law, the status of the ECHR throughout the judicial hierarchy has 
not met with any significant degree of disapproval. Competent not only to determine 
infringement of its Bill of Rights but also the ECHR, Gen-nan courts have taken their role in HR 
protection seriously and have not been slow to respond to questions raised in relation to it. 
Whereas, the Civil-Chamber of the Federal Supreme Court: the Bundesgerichtshoff has not 
hesitated to refer to the ECHR in order to reach a finding compatible with its telos. " in the 
opinion of the Bundesverwattungsgericht, 66 the ECHR, as part of Federal Law, was applicable to 
all proceedings instituted according to the principles lex specialis derogate leges generales and 
lex posterior derogate legi priori. 67 Yet,, whether such judicial determination has served to 
reinforce the protection offered by the ECHR (certainly in terms of legal certainty) remains 
questionable. 68 
Firstly, despite the secure status accorded the ECHR, not all of its provisions were applied 
precipitately by the judiciary. Whereas Article 13 of the ECHR was held by the Federal Court of 
Justice: the Bundesgerichtshof 9 not to constitute a directly enforceable right; the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht held that as the ECHR did not have the status of constitutional law, 
invocation by way of appeal could not be lawfully grounded. 'O The ECHR did not take 
precedence over Federal Law arising after the ECHR's promulgation. 
Secondly, in the event of there existing within a signatory-state an alternative HR reference, and 
in so far as nothing in the ECHR can be construed as limiting any right which may be ensured 
under the law of a signatory-state, it is can be argued that a restricting factor inherent in the 
existence of a parallel HR order, is the displacement of one order by the operation of the other. 
The observation is particularly pertinent in the case of Germany, where the existence of a 
parallel HR order is coupled with a strong praxis of judicial protection of established domestic 
rights. 
Indeed, by means of a process of Verfassungsbeschwerde. - whereby an individual can lodge a 
complaint with the Bunderverfassungsgericht in respect of an alleged HR violation, the role of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht can not be undervalued. Whereas, the FRG Constitution omitted 
0 69 Bgh (1977) 295 
66 3 Bvcr-\N, o (1955) 48 
67 As Treaty constitutes the more specific law, national law should be interpreted so far as practicable in accordance with it. Unless 
national IaNN stands in unequivocal contravention of Treaty, the latter supersedes E" 11V 1( 
H. Golsong, 'The European ConNention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in a German Court' 
195 7) 33 B. 1'. 1. L . 
317 
69 NJ W( 1964) 2 119 
70 NJ W( 1960) 1243 
25 
to clarify whether international agreements were subject to judicial review, Article 100 of the 
Basic Law provided that if, in the course of litigation, doubt existed over the status and/or effect 
of a rule of international law,, the court could obtain the decision of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Invoking the dualist transformation doctrine, whereby review is 
made not of the treaty but the legislation transforming it, the Bundesverfassungsgericht resolved 
many gaps in its own constitutional order. As a result, in its handling of the rights guaranteed in 
German law, the Court has (arguably) proved itself unparalleled in the civil-law tradition. But 
can such practice indicate an equal judicial readiness to meet the FRG's ECHR obligations? 
Illustrated by the judicial handling of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, " there is a real 
apprehension that an alternative national order for the protection of rights can weaken the 
effectiveness of an international system. Reluctant to accept that the superior nature of EC law 
prevented it from assessing European legislation against its own constitutional guarantee of 
rights, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that where an adequate standard of protection was not 
available under EC law,, it would not regard itself precluded from applying the protection offered 
by an alternative order. Further, albeit recognising the progress made in rights promotion by the 
European Court of Justice, in the case of Wunsche Handelsgesel/schaft" the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht then went on to alter its position expressed in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft by declaring that in the event of an international order failing to afford 
satisfactory protection, it would accord priority to its own Federal order, even though to do so 
could result in a breach of EC law. 
Although a case concerning the EC, the ruling is telling. Constitutional courts may take 
international obligations into consideration when authorising decisions, but it is the character of 
the judiciary which leads it to select the preferred text. Contrary to the telos of the direction 
given in De Becker v BeIg jUM73 that contracting-parties are obliged to ensure that their domestic 
law is compatible with the ECHR, although the opinion of the ECrtHR may take precedence to 
that of the national court, such authority does not have the value of res-judicata. 
Examining the early response of the German judiciary to the ECHR then, what analysis makes 
clear is that the impact of the ECHR remains dependant on the co-operation of the national legal 
order. For example, whereas according to constitutional authority the ECHR can technically be 
overruled by subsequent legislation, such a consequence can be avoided by the judiciary 
requiring that the legislature be clear when a national law is intended to depart from the 
74 initiative . 
71 2 CMLR 1974] 549 
72 3 CMLR 1987] 22 5 
73 (1962) ECHR Series B No. 48 
'4 Eurocentral 9 EG2 (1982) 112 
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However, although the impact of the ECHR in the hands of the German judiciary (the 
Bundesverwattungsgericht in particular) has been far from negligible, this is not to suggest that 
the FRG's legal order has taken the findings of the ECHR order lightly. " Certainly N,,,, ith regard 
to the findings of the European Commission, lacking the impact of res-judicata, and regardless 
of Germany's formal commitment to the ECFfR, its judiciary has not permitted itself to be 
pressed into an immediate response to its findings. Yet, it remains questionable whether such 
judicial reluctance did significantly affect the impact of the ECHR, either in relation to 
amendments made to extradition practices following the European Commission's Report of 14 
July 1976,76 or Articles 154 and 467 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure following its 
77 Report of II May 1978 . Similarly, with regard to the impact of the ECrtHR, there is evidence 
that as a result of its rulings, German authorities did take such measures to amend domestic law 
in order to accommodate the ECHR,, as those adjusting the German Court's Costs Act, so as to 
direct courts to provide persons charged with a criminal offence with the service of an interpreter 
free of charge; 78 and the existing Code of Criminal Procedure concerning pre-trial detention . 
79 
Albeit the authority of both the ECrtHR and the Commission had no executory effect in the 
sense of being directly enforceable then, it is nevertheless reasonable to argue that they remained 
persuasive. Where a controversial decision concerned the administrative measure of a public 
authority, action would be raised by the relevant authority to correct the failing insofar as 
possible. Where a decision concerned an area of domestic legislation, the Government felt itself 
obliged to introduce amendment in order to comply with the ECHR. 
Certainly, one area of German law which stood out as an innovative means by which national 
law was brought into alignment with the ECHR was that of the functioning of the principle 
Drittwirking. Approaching the application of rights similar to that relating to the public law 
relationship between public authority and the individual based on a third-party effect, an inter- 
individual application of HR was developed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. 80 Allowing the 
ECHR horizontal-effect, the development ensured that provisions of the ECHR were not only 
binding on the authorities of the signatory-state, but between individuals. 
The innovation is interesting. Although there is no evidence that the ECHR was ever intended to 
possess such third-party effect, the horizontal extension illustrated how the EC14R pen-nitted an 
innovative judiciary" the ability to restrain (to an extent) the activity of an ascendant non- 
" T. Tomuschat 'Quo-Vardis Argentoratum? The Success Story of the European Convention on Human Rights' (1992) H. R. L. J 13, 
401 
76 Following Bruckmann v FRG (1976) 6D and R, 5 7-61 
77 And Liebig v FRG (1978) 17 D and R, 20 
koc ECHR (1976) Series A No. 29: Luedicke ECHR (1978) Series A No. 27; and Belkacom ECHR (1978) Series A No. 29 
79 JVernhqff v FRG ECHR (1968) Series A No. 7 
Illustrated in the ruling of the Bundesgerichishoff 9 MW (1958) 384 
Minded either to accept the ECHR as a source of internal IaNN, or a directIN applicable interriational norm 
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governmental institution which, albeit technically fell within the bounds of ordinary law. 
nevertheless was considered inimical to the interests of German society. Yet, although nothing in 
the ECHR inhibits signatory-states from allowing for such third-party effect, the development 
should be acknowledged with caution. 
Firstly, the German constitutional order indicates an ordering of constitutional values grounded 
on the natural law theory that certain liberties of the individual are antecedent to organised 
society and beyond the reach of Governmental interference. This is reflected in its Basic Law. 
Articles 1- 19 consist of a charter of fundamental rights and an affirmation of 'personhood. ' The 
Basic Law functions as a value-orientated order based on an Article I protection of human 
dignity in which the inviolability of the dignity of man has been used as an independent standard 
of value by which to measure the legitimacy of state actions, as well as the uses of individual 
liberty. However, Article 2(1) Basic Law provides that 'everyone shall have the right to the free 
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others, or offend 
against the constitutional order or the moral code. ' Accordingly, and as a paradigm of the 
judicial approach to HR, HR are exercisable to the extent that that exercise remains within the 
framework of the political and moral order ordained by the Basic Law. Individual liberty is 
constrained by the equally important values of political order and social morality, as summarised 
by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the privacy of communications case: 'the concept of man in 
the Basic Law is not that of an isolated individual. Rather, the Basic Law has decided in favour 
of a relationship between individual and community in the sense of a person's dependence on, 
and commitment to, the community, without infringing upon a person's individual value. , 82 
Secondly, regardless of the constitutional status afforded the ECHR, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht held that its values were not to be regarded as being directly 
applicable in respect of inter-individual relations, but as 'objective criteria only' to be taken into 
83 
account when provisions of German Private Law were considered . Despite then, the innovative 
use made of the heightened status afforded the ECHR by the Bundesgerichtshoff, the order 
remained only part of Germany's Wertordnung: value-order. An order which serves to highlight 
the reality that, whether the achievement of the ECHR lays in its ability to protect rights, as 
opposed to promote, depends not on the status afforded its provisions in terms of direct and 
indirect-effect by the national legal order, but on the actual philosophical and political sentiment 
of the prevailing national judiciary. A reality made even clearer following analysis of the 
relationship between the ECHR and the constitutional arrangement of the Netherlands. 
'2 W. Murphy and J. Tanenhaus Comparative Constitutional Laiv (St. Martin's Press, New York 1977) 660 
" (1970)AJC-L (18) 305 
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Section 2.4. - The ECHR and the Constitutional Arrangement of the Netherlands 
Examining the early impact of the ECHR on domestic law, it was not surprising to PolakieNvIcz 
that in the Netherlands, a monistic country with a constitution giving precedence to self- 
84 
executing treaty provision, the influence of the ECHR was paramount . The observation 
is 
interesting. 
The relationship between international law and domestic law is regulated by Articles 60-67 of 
the Dutch Constitution: the Grondwet. Amended in 1953,1956 and 1983, a heightened status 
was accorded intemational law. Whereas, Article 60 prohibited the judiciary from ruling on the 
constitutionality of treaty law; Articles 65 and 66 instructed it to accord priority to directly 
applicable international provision. The refon-n secured the superiority of international treaty over 
domestic law. Its effect on the legal order evidenced in the general direction to legal- 
85 practitioners to incorporate the amended Grondwet into their everyday legal practice . 
However, such amendments were not without impediment. Whereas, confusion arose over the 
status of international law, the relationship between directly applicable treaty law and the 
Grondwet remained unclear. Although Article 67 of the Grondwet provided that the supremacy 
of international treaty related not only to directly applicable provision but also authority, read in 
conjunction with Articles 65 and 66, confusion became evident: did the superior status apply to 
decisions of judicial agency only, or include such quasi-judicial authority as the European 
Commission? 
Further, Article 63 of the Grondwet provided that, should the development of an international 
order require it, a treaty could deviate from the Grondwet following enactment into domestic law 
by a special two-thirds' majority of both Chambers of the States-General. As such, the Grondwet 
ascribed to its domestic legislature the charge of determining the standing of an international 
agreement. However, this is not the same as conferring on international treaty the status of 
constitutional law. As ratification of the ECHR was not enacted by a two-thirds' majority, it is 
arguable that the ECHR was not technically entitled to a superior status. 
Finally, immunity of the status of the ECHR from scrutiny by Dutch courts effectively concealed 
the disparity in opinion expressed by various national authorities at the time of the ECHR's 
ratification. Despite acknowledging ratification as an exemplary commitment to the promotion 
of HR, a formal commitment to the ECHR was considered undesirable by a significant 
proportion of the Dutch Government and States-General. Not merely on the ground that 
" Polak, ieNvicz 0 99 1 ), OP- cit at 65 
85 D. C. Fokkerim, JAIJ. Chorus, E. H. Hondius and E. C. H. Lisser 'Introduction to Dutch La-ý, N For Foreign Lawýers' (1980) 28 
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domestic law already afforded adequate protection, but that to relinquish control over HR would 
be to transfer sovereignty to international authority. 
Despite such early reservation, the ECHR and its First-Protocol were ratified in 1954 ; 
86 
the right 
87 
of ind ivid ual -petition recognised in 1960 , and the Grondwet amended 
in 1983 to accommodate 
the ECHR's operation. The amendments resulted in a revised constitution. The most significant 
provisions being Article 93: that treaties and decisions of international organisations, the 
contents of which were binding on everyone, would have this effect as from the time of 
publication; and Article 94: that domestic regulation in force in the Netherlands, whose 
application could not reasonably conform to provisions of treaties or decisions of international 
organisations, would not be applied. 
Yet, regardless of the ECHR's heightened status, the judiciary maintained a reserve toward the 
order which lasted into the 1990's. Despite its direct applicability, the ECHR was managed as a 
subsidiary source of law only. When provisions of the ECHR were invoked before the national 
courts, the opinion was often drawn that no violation of international obligation had occurred. 
According to van Dijk, judicial reluctance to seriously address the issue of ECHR applicability 
translated into a number of techniques. " Techniques which allowed the judiciary to circumvent 
the difficulties caused by the application of the ECHR either by according domestic law an 
interpretation different from its original meaning, or by inserting a new principle into domestic 
law derived from the relevant treaty provision. Other techniques identified by van Dijk included: 
0 Applying a comparable provision of domestic law and according it such a broad scope as to deny the 
self-executing character of the ECHR provision; 
Giving the ECHR provision such a restricted scope as to render it not applicable to the case in 
question; 
Giving a broad scope to the restriction allowed for in the ECHR to solve the non-conformity; 
Interpreting the provision of the ECHR and the applicable domestic law in such an 'embracing' way 
that a conflict between them is avoided. 
On analysis, the findings of van Dijk remain unconvincing. According to van Dijk the 
techniques adopted by the domestic courts was strong evidence of an underlying deten-nination 
" Signed 4 November 1950 and 20 March 1952: the Traclatenblad 1951 No. 154,1952 No. 80; and approved 28 July 1954: 
Slaatsblad van het Kunnikryk derNederlanden 1954 No. 335,942 
8' A declaration recognising the jurisdiction of the ECrtHR lodged -with the Council of Europe 5 July 1960 
88 P. Van Dijk and G. van Hoof (1990), Op. cit at 585 
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to accord the ECHR little influence. " Howeverý not only is it just as easy to argue that, disposed 
to subjective assessment, it is through exactly the same techniques that the ECHR has 
successfully functioned, exemplified by the majority of rulings of the Hoge-Raad, the 
application of international law resulted more often than not in the ECHR's favourable 
treatment. 
For example, despite lacking formal constitutional authority to annul, repeal or (otherwise) 
amend domestic law,, in a ruling of the 18 January 1980 the Hoge-Raad demonstrated little 
reserve in extending the scope of Article 959 of the Netherlands Civil Procedure Act in order to 
eliminate a statutory discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children. Influenced by 
the (then on going) ECHR determination of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR in Marckx v Belgium, 90 the 
Court went on to re-state the Netherlands's commitment to the ECHR as justification for its 
over-ruling of a decision of the Lower Netherlands District Court prior to its determination by 
the ECrtHR. 
Similarly, in a ruling of I July 198391 the Hoge-Raad displayed little reticence in its dealing with 
the Netherlands Insanity Act. The provisions in question authorised the Public Prosecutor to 
prevent a person detained on grounds of mental-health from applying to a domestic court for 
release. Examining an Official-Circular of 16 April 198092 declaring the practice in breach of 
ECHR Articles 5(l) and 6(l), the Hoge-Raad expressed little reservation for its reliance on 
Winterwerp v Netherlands9' to justify a declaration of incompatibility. 
Despite then, the judicial techniques identified by van Dijk, throughout the 1970's and 1980's 
there is evidence of Dutch Courts affording precedence to the ECHR's self-executing provisions 
over domestic law. The result,, exemplified in a ruling of the 10 October 19789' and forerunner to 
a number of similar cases,, 9' was the conferral in practice of a superior status on directly 
applicable ECHR law. 96 
In comparison, reasons for the judiciary's early reticence toward the ECHR remain 
indeterminate. Arguments advanced included fear of a demise in national sovereignty, confusion 
surrounding the ECHR's legal status and a low percentage of legal reference made concerning 
the ECHR. 9' Despite what remains only speculative explanation, there is evidence of a high level 
"' In Argus Steamship v Hanno NJ (1969) No. 10,33, the Hoge-Raad demonstrated its reluctance to hold an established domestic law 
in violation of ECHR nonii by adopting an order of review which repudiated the self-executing character of the relevant treaty 
provision 
90 (1979) ECHR Series A No. 31 
9' (1991) HRU 12 
92 
(1980) NJCM 5 233 
9-' (1979) ECHR Series A No. 23 
94 (1978) NJCM No. 144 
9' (1978) NJCM No. 5,951 (1978) NJCM No. 604. (1979) NJCM No. 8-, and 10 NYIL (1979) 484 
Adopted bN the Raad van Straat in Foerman v, khmicipalitj, qf Riderkerk (1978) NJCM No. 12 
A. Robertson *The Relationship Between the FCHR and Internal Law' (1972) Colleques-European 3,12 
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of early state acceptance of the ECHR's constitutional status. Not merely in the form of a 
declaration of the Hoge-Raad that domestic law would be scrutinised for the purpose of ensuring 
ECHR compatibil ity; 98 but the direction of an Official-Circular 16 April 1980 that pending 
legislative action the findings of the ECrtHR was to be considered as an authority on all aspects 
of legal practice which the office of Public Prosecutor was obliged to see carried out. 99 Whether, 
this intimated that a ruling of the ECrtHR could be used as a form of new evidence to re-open a 
case, was not at the time of the declaration clarified. However, there is little serious doubt that 
adherence to the direction resulted in the exertion ofjudicial influence over such reform as that 
made to the Netherlands Code of Penal Procedure regarding the limitation to detention pending- 
trial; and amendment to the application of disciplinary proceedings to the Military Criminal 
Code of Practice. 100 
In view of the above, the Netherlands's response to the ECHR may well suggest (in part) 'a 
disparate reality but, notwithstanding that becoming a party to a treaty is... like adopting a 
written constitution with judicial supervision, the impact of the ECHR, is to award judges the 
final say. If a measure can be challenged as an invasion of rights, it is for the judges to rule on 
whether it is permitted. "Ol This, Polakiewicz points out, is to transfer power from one set of 
institutions to another,, and as such, invest the national courts with a role very different from that 
which they ordinarily have under a system of parliamentary sovereignty. While it remains 
arguable whether or not the judiciary can and do act politically, what analysis of the Netherlands 
does highlight is that such a practice does not necessarily derive from a signatory-state's formal 
constitutional order. Albeit both the national Government and legislature may well hold 
unquestionable authority, regardless of a signatory-state's constitutional arrangement, a 
universal HR jurisprudence can only exist, in so far as the national judiciary is prepared to 
invoke it. 
Section 2.5. - The ECHR and the Constitutional Arrangement of the UK 
Analysis of the civil-law traditions of France, Germany and the Netherlands highlight that the 
role of municipal courts in promoting the ECHR cannot be underestimated. In the absence of 
regulation of the relationship between the ECrtHR and national order; 'it is before these courts 
that signatory-states are witnessing the development of a HR dialogue between their 
jurisdictions. ' 102 Whether such dialogue contributes to the development of a universal 
jurisprudence however, is not without debate. 
"3 Yearbook (1960) 650 
99 NJCM (1980) No. 5 
"" ErTel (and Others) vNetherlands (1976) ECHR Series A No. 32 
101 PolakleNN ic/ (199 1), Op. cit at 65 
"'2 lbid p. 405 
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The UK was one of the first signatories to ratify the ECHR and the First-Protocol of 1952. On 
the 14 January 1966 the UK recognised the right of individual-application and the jurisdiction of 
the ECrtHR. However, the relationship between the UK and the EC14R has not been 
straightforward. 103 Despite displaying a rights capability, '" without a belief in natural law, the 
UK did not embrace an ideology of universal rights easily. As a result, up until the HRA, its 
attitude toward HR promotion remained in a state of flux. Its primary contribution to the ECHR 
order being its success in persuading the Committee of Ministers that acceptance of the 
European Commission and ECrtHR should be left to the discretion of the si gnatory- state. 
In so far as such reluctance can be attributed to the UK's constitutional arrangement, 
characteristic of the civil-law order, municipal law finds justification in the rules of international 
law by a process of delegation within one normative system. 105 In contrast, the UK differed not 
only in its absence of a written constitution, but in the form of a judiciary which did not 
recognise any authority by reference to which an Act of Parliament could be scrutinised other 
than by common-law, or in accordance with obligations imposed on the UK by means of its 
membership of the EC. Accordingly, fon-nal assurance against HR abuse was not contained in 
any basic law but by the maintenance of a policy that the rights of Englishmen remain protected 
by common-law, subject to common-law and the supremacy of Parliament. As intimated in a 
submitted Note on the position of the British Government in relation to the ECHR to the 
European Secretary-General 1966. 
Comprising of the forward of proposals for the improvement of the ECHR, the Note stated in 
part- 
'7. There is-agreement that the common standards of the [ECHR] have to be maintained... 
But ... differing ... traditions in the way those standards are implemented ... have to be respected. The 
doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation has been developed ... to allow for diversity. For the support of the 
citizens of Council of European countries, for the [ECHR] and its mechanisms to be ... hearted, it is 
important that the Strasbourg institutions give weight to this principle and respect the decisions of 
local ... institutions... which are ... best placed to assess issues of this kind. ' 
106 
The report went on to suggest the adoption of a Resolution in the Committee of Ministers that 
regard be paid to differing legal traditions and that national law be respected: the suggestion 
drawn inter-alia on the belief that s ignatory- states were best placed to determine social issues in 
accordance with regional perspectives. Intimating the concern of the UK Government, the 
10-1 A Lester 'Fundamental Rights: The UK Isolated? ' [1984] PL 46, P. J. Duffy 'English Law and The European Convention on 
Hurnan Rights' (1980) 29 I. C. L. Q. 585, C. Warbrick 'The European Convention on Human Rights and English Law' (1993) E. L. R. 
34 and G. Marston 'The UK's Part in the Preparation of the European Convention on Human Rights' 1993 I. C. L. Q. 42 
104 in the form of a Magna Carta 1215. Habeas Coýus Act 1679 and a Bill of Rights 1689-, an Act of Settlement 1700, Fqual-Pay Act 
1970, Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and 1986, Race-Relations Act 1976 and Employment Act 1989 
1`5 M. Shaw International Law (CUP, Cambridge 1997) 1-44 
""' H. R. R. 1997,41,260 
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proposals highlighted two characteristics of the UK's constitutional arrangement. Firstly. in as 
much as national sovereignty remained the pillar of UK constitutional tradition, a Government 
could dilute, select or abandon such rights or liberties as it saw fit when greater interests were at 
stake. 1 0' Secondly, such measures as the UK Race Relations Act 1976 and Sex Discrimination 
Act 1986 represented no more than a form of residual liberty: the freedom which remained after 
108 legal restraints were deducted . 
Accordingly, the UK's commitment included no attempt to accord the ECHR order a fornial 
status. Illustrated in the UK's declaration 13 September 1966,1 09 one reason offered was that the 
UK's need to involve itself too seriously with the ECHR was unnecessary. "o For that reason, 
ratification of the ECHR amounted to no more than the deployment of its functioning to a 
national judiciary which, charged with a role greater than the interpretation of codified law, less 
concerned with the place of a decision than the Code itself, felt constrained from playing a role 
in the ECHR's enforcement because the initiative had not been transformed into domestic law. "' 
Yet, this is not to say that the UK courts did not have regard for the ECHR. Despite the ECHR's 
lack of internal validity, a conjunction between domestic and international law was maintained 
by a principle of judicial interpretation to the effect that international law formed part of the law 
of the land. ' 12 It was through this rule that the courts made reference to the ECHR in the event 
of a lacuna, ambiguity or controversial point of law in domestic proceedings. Several respects in 
which the ECHR was held by the judiciary to be of persuasive authority were highlighted by 
Lord Bingham in his maiden speech to the House of Lords in July 1996: "' 
0 In the interpretation of legislation the courts were compelled to presume that Parliament intended to 
legislate so as to give effect to its ECHR's obligations; 
0 Where the courts were called on to construe a statute enacted to ftilfil an ECHR obligation, the 
judiciary was to assume that the statute was intended to be effective to that end. In applying the 
common-law, the courts were to make reference to the ECHR to resolve any doubts about the rule in 
question. Where the courts had an occasion to exercise discretion, they were to act in a way which 
did not violate the ECHR; 
107 Evident in the Immigration Acts 1968 and 1971; Prevention of Terrorism Acts 1974 and 1984; the Home Secretary's power to 
extend the tariff on life-imprisonment, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1976, Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, and 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
""'Allen (1994), Op. cit at 385 
'" (1966), Implementation of Article 57 ECHR, Second-Addendum to the Council of Europe, Doc. H 69,9. See: R. Beddard 'The 
Status of the European Convention on Human Rights in Domestic LmN' 16 I. L. Q. 206 at 207 
"" The UK provided two opportunities for individuals to challenge public bodies: (1) Habeas Corpus: a procedure which did not 
involve judgement on the merits of detention, and (2)judicial review: subject to a strict time limit 
Allen ( 1994), Op, cit at 38 5 
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0 Where the courts were called on to determine the demands of public policy they were to have regard 
to international obligations as guidance; 
On occasions giving rise to matters concerning EC law, the principles of the ECHR were to be taken 
into account. 
However, despite such direction, reluctance of the judiciary to concede to the telos of the ECHR 
remained. Examining the relationship between the ECHR and the UK's constitutional order, 
reasons for such reticence becomes apparent. 
In Rv Chief Immigration Officer Heathrow Airport, ex-parte Salamat-Bibi 114 Lord Denning 
considered the ECHR to be drafted in a style so different from UK legislation, and of so wide a 
statement of principle, as to be incapable of application. Further, despite the UK being a 
signatory to the ECHR, because the initiative had not been transformed by Parliament into 
domestic law, there was neither occasion,. nor need, for the judiciary to fami liarise itself with the 
details of the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR. Lord Denning then went on that it was the issuance 
to the judiciary an involvement in the determination of policy, a concern properly the premise of 
the Government, which lay at the heart of judicial reluctance. ' 15 
Whether such explanation was rightly founded, analysis reveals that policy arguments can and 
do form part of the adjudicative process. ' 16 Whether, in making a rule or standard, or being a 
decision on an open-ended standard, in reaching a decision a judge will balance a variety of 
interests, including the elaboration of policy goals and the means of achieving them. "' While an 
ecumenical-schema may be drawn by a democratically elected body, significant inter-relations 
between goals can be developed by the judiciary in executing such policies. ' 18 The observation is 
pertinent in relation to municipal law, but what of its relevance to international law? 
Despite the absence of a mandate with which to interpret the ECHR, it is arguable that the 
ECHR has been formally recognised by the UK Courts when exercising judicial review with the 
objective of producing an expeditious remedy with ad-rem effect, as opposed to as-personam 
consequences of a judgement of the ECrtHR. 119 Whether the UK courts fulfilled this objective, 
judicial management of the relationship between the ECHR and domestic law presents an 
uncertain account. 
114 [ 197611 WLR 979-985 
"' An advancement of the unelected into the political arena detrimental to the traditional constitutional divisions of Government 
Authorit) ýa theme examined b\ E. Ewing, and C. Gearty in Freedom under Thatcher, Civil Liberties in Modern Britain (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1990) 
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Waddington v Miah 120 constituted the first reported case in which the UK Courts relied on the 
ECHR as an aid to statutory interpretation. Concerning the application of the Immigration Act 
1971, the Court of Appeal and House of Lords held Section 34 (Paragraph 1) to be ambiguous. 
In support of their finding, both Lords Stephenson and Reid claimed to rely on Article 7 of the 
ECHR and Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and concluded that it 
was hardly credible that any Government would promote retrospective legislation. The finding 
derived from two established UK principles: (1) in so far as language permits, Parliament is 
presumed to legislate in accordance with international obligations; and (2) the prohibition of 
retrospective criminal legislation. The case is uninspiring. Where a rule of international law was 
in accordance with established judicial sentiment, then the willingness of the judiciary to apply 
the rule was straightforward. But what of those ECHR rights which did not invoke the 
employment of an established principle? Analysis suggests that their ambit depended solely on 
how much recognition they were given by the Judge. 
For example, in Bird v Secretary of State for Home Affairs 12 ' Lord Denning departed from 
preferred UK practice by stating that he could be inclined to hold an Act of Parliament invalid 
on the ground that domestic law ought to be interpreted in conformity with international law. 
The departure was short lived. In Rv Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex-parte Singh' 22 
Lord Denning was swift to retract his finding. Deliberating the status of the ECHR, Lord 
Denning stated that the court could only take the EC14R into account when interpreting a statute 
which affected the rights of the individual, on the ground that it should be assumed that the 
Crown did not intend domestic law to conflict with international treaty. Declaring that he had 
gone 'too far' in Bird, Lord Denning then went on to reconcile his finding with established UK 
constitutional principle by claiming that although a treaty did not become part of English law 
until it was transformed, it could nevertheless be considered by the courts when confronted with 
problems concerning HR. 
A similar reasoning was reached in Rv Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex-parte 
Phansopkar and Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex-parte Begum. Examining 
justification for interference with respect for family life, Lord Scarman held '-we will not 
deny 
... to any man... 
justice or rights in accordance with the Magna Carta. This ... principle of 
our law is ... reinforced 
by the [ECHR] ... to which it is ... the duty of our public authorities 
in 
administering the law ... and of our courts in ... applying the law ... to have regard. ' 
123 Reiterating 
established UK principle, both cases intimated the courts' regard for the ECHR. Highlighting a 
12" [ 1974] 1 WLR 683 
121 [ 196 11 1 LR 250 
122 [197513 WIR 215 
123 [ 1975] 3 All ER 497 
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de-facto preference for applying established constitutional norm, ' 24 where application of the 
ECHR mirrored the relevant jurisprudence constante the ECHR possessed persuasive authority; 
in relation to the resolution of uncertainty in either statutory or common-law, its influence ýý, as 
less certain. 
For example, in Rv Lemon and Gay News Ltd 125 the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction of 
an appellant for publishing a libel. Although the Court did refer to Articles 9 and 10 of the 
ECHR, it is arguable that it was Lord Diplock's concern that by discarding the subjective test of 
the accused's intention that libel would constitute a crime of strict liability which proved the 
determining factor. However, although Lord Diplock did not make convincing reference to the 
ECHR in the case of Lemon, he did consider the initiative in Gleavers v Deakin and Others. 126 
Again, concerning the publication of a libel, the Court was called on to examine the appellant's 
lack of ability to provide evidence before a magistrate at committal proceedings. In reaching his 
decision Lord Diplock expressed concern over the unsatisfactory state of the UK's law of libel. 
Examining Article 10(2) of the ECHR Lord Diplock stated that freedom of expression was 
subject to restrictions, but only insofar as they were necessary for the protection of the public 
interest. In contrast, the truth of a defamatory statement was not in itself a defence to a charge of 
defamatory libel under UK criminal law: a restriction on the freedom to impart information 
which the UK had undertaken to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction. Lord Diplock went 
on to highlight that no onus lay on the prosecution to assert that the defamatory matter was of a 
kind necessary to protect the public interest. Even though no public interest could be shown to 
be affected by imparting to others accurate information regarding the discreditable conduct of 
the individual in question, the publisher would be convicted unless he could prove that the 
publication was in fact in the public interest. In accordance with Lord Diplock this was to turn 
Article 10 of the ECHR on its head: whereas Article 10 required that the freedom remain 
untrammelled by public authority, under UK criminal law a person's freedom of expression, 
whenever it involved exposing discreditable conduct, was to be repressed by public authority 
unless a jury could be convinced ex-postfacto that the exercise of the freedom was for the public 
good. Lord Diplock went on to suggest that to avoid the risk of the UK failing to comply with 
its international obligations, the consent of the Attorney-General should be sought before a 
prosecution for criminal libel was instituted, and that in deciding whether to grant consent, the 
Attorney-General should consider whether the prosecution was necessary on grounds specified 
in Article 10(2). The approach echoed the sentiment of Lord Denning's attempt to depart from 
established orthodoxy in Bird. - orthodoxy which, in the event of conflict between the ECHR and 
'2' That the ECHR could be considered on its own merit was rejected in Salamal-Bibi. Lords Denning and Roskill disagreed with 
Lord Scarman in Pan-American WorldAinva , vs v 
Department of Trade [1976] 1 LR 257 that the ECHR should be considered despite 
its unincorporated status. An opinion similarly rejected In Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority [197811 All ER 574 
[1979] 1 All ER 898 
1197912 All ER 497 
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statutory provision, dictated that the latter would prevail. The attempt constituted a rebuff of the 
transformation doctrine, an approach advanced in Gleavers and Bird to no avail. 
Yet, this is not to suggest that the UK judiciary did not on occasion engage in judicial activism. 
In Attorney-General v The BBC Lords Scarman and Frazor expressed little doubt that they were 
obliged to bear in mind the impact of their decision on intemational obligations under the 
ECHR. 12' The same approach was reiterated by Lord Denning in Schering-Chemicals Ltd v 
Falkman Ltd. 128 Examining the underling policy of the law of libel, Lord Denning demonstrated 
little reserve in holding that it should conform as far as possible with any relevant ruling of the 
29 ECrtHR. Yet,, in terms of according effective HR protection, the case remains uninspiring. ' 
Despite the acknowledgment accorded the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR, the ruling in Schering 
did little more than affinn the already established UK doctrine of prior-restraint. 
The ruling of Schering serves (in part) to illustrate the approach adopted generally by the UK 
courts. Apart from a readiness to rely on the qualifications to many of the rights enshrined in the 
ECHR,, 130 evidence pointed to a reluctance of the judiciary to set its own agenda of interpretive 
activism. As exemplified in the ruling of Lord Ackner in Rv Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex-parte Brind 131 that the judiciary were under no obligation when dealing with an 
unambiguous provision of statutory law other than to accord it full effect. Affirming the ruling of 
Lord Diplock in British Airways Board v Laker Airways Limited, 132 according to Lord Ackner, 
the interpretation of treaties to which the UK was a party, but the terms of which bad not been 
incorporated into domestic law, was not a matter which fell within the interpretative jurisdiction 
of the Court. 133 In the words of Sir Robert Megarry: albeit at times judges did legislate, they did 
so with molecular, rather than molar-motions, on the basis that no new right in UK law could 
derive from the mind of a judge. 134 Examining the role of the UK courts and the constitutional 
limits placed upon them, 135 Sir Robert Megarry then went on to proclaim it abundantly clear that 
due to the unsatisfactory state of its constitutional arrangement, the UK legal order stood little 
chance of satisfying even the moderate level of HR protection required by the ECHR. 
Examining the effect of such an unsatisfactory state in relation to two cases, the observation is 
not unreasonable. 
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In 1992, Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspaper 136 appeared to be the first finding in 
which the ECHR constituted a decisive factor in the outcome of a case. Called on to determine 
the extent of the common-law test of libel, the Court held that a local authority had no right to 
sue in defamation where the allegations went to its governing authority. To do so ran the risk of 
the Authority interfering with the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10 of 
the ECHR. Despite attempting to adopt the language of the ECrtHR, the Court did not identifý, 
the freedom as a right. Balancing the freedom of expression where political authority was under 
scrutiny and the protection of the reputation of others, the case turned on the issue of 
proportionality. In reaching its decision, the Court held that since Article 10 stated the right to 
freedom of expression and the qualifications to it in precise terms, it would be convenient to 
consider the question by reference to it. Instead of the Court using the EC14R to bolster its 
findings, the ECHR was used as a starting-point for judicial reasoning. The County Council 
appealed and the approach was discarded. 137 In reaching its decision the Court expressed the 
opinion that it did not need to rely on the ECHR, insofar as the UK's common-law was already 
consistent with the obligations assumed by the Crown under the Treaty. The statement displayed 
a confidence in the UK's legal order at odds with the findings of the ECrtHR. ' 3' Rather than a 
serious consideration of the telos of the ECHR, its case-law, or substance of the applicant's 
claim, in determining the significance of the freedom of the press and the legitimate discussion 
of public officials, it is arguable whether the finding can not more accurately be explained as 
simply the chance result of a balance of interests. 
The second case was described by Lord Goff as the balance between the interest of an 
applicant's request that he appear in Court to pursue litigation, and the public interest that he be 
kept secure. In Wynne v Home Secretary 139 the Court assumed that its task was to ensure by all 
practical means that both interests were protected. Support for this assumption was found in the 
case of Golder v UK. "O In Golder the ECrtHR upheld a right of access to the courts in order to 
guarantee the right to a fair-trial. Albeit in reaching its decision, the ECrtHR acknowledged a 
varying standard of the margin of appreciation granted to national courts in dealing with internal 
law, "' the case highlighted the need for serious regard to be accorded the nature of Article 6 of 
the ECHR notwithstanding an applicant's legal status. In Wynne however, the Court took little 
account of the nature of the ECHR when it weighed the applicant's interest against public 
expenditure and the hypothetical concern of preserving the prison authority from the risk of 
unmeritorious application. In the opinion of the Court, there had to be a realistic limitation on the 
1 "(' f 199211 QB 770 
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ability of the applicant to appear in court to pursue litigation, and decided that the national 
interest be accorded the greater weight. 
Both judgements were discouraging. Whereas, Derbyshire illustrated little more than a 
coincidence of petition with the UK Court taking little account of either the telos or case-law of 
the ECHR, in Wynne it was called on to do little more than support a finding at odds in principle 
with the ECHR. In accordance with the tenet of the ECHR,, the objective of the order was/is to 
protect a number of rights and freedoms from arbitrary interference by the signatory-state: the 
ability of the State to interfere a power ideally subject to the policing of the ECrtHR, and at no 
time to be used to the detriment of the substance of the right. Yet, in Derbyshire and Wynne the 
judiciary did exactly that. Whereas in Derbyshire the Court merely extrapolated a coincidental 
outcome of two understandings of the ECHR provision in question; in Wynne, while claiming to 
have achieved ECHR compatibility, it reached a decision which effectively defeated the telos of 
Article 6. 
To conclude, although conformity of UK law with the ECHR was alleged at the point of 
ratification in 1966 when the right of Individual-Petition was accepted, the scepticism which 
attended its inauguration continued: commitment to the ECHR remaining (arguably) an 
adherence to domestic legal sovereignty, political autonomy and prerogative of the State. 
Clearly, the UK differs in its constitutional arrangement from that of its civil-law neighbours in 
being a dualist common-law order. Whether the ECHR's affinity with the civil-law system 
renders the ECHR in relation to the UK an impracticable statement of ideals however, is not so 
straightforward. Though the UK constitutional order certainly proved a factor in colouring the 
UK's early approach to the ECHR, an equally significant factor proved to be the judiciary's own 
fixation with the discipline of law and the foundations which endowed it with validity and 
consistency. 
Section 2.6: The ECHR: An Imagining Beyond The There and Then? 
The ECHR imposes per se no legal obligation on signatory-states to incorporate it into their 
domestic order. Rather, the initiative constitutes a subsidiary collective guarantee of rights 
governing relations between individuals and national authorities: A class of traiti-loi whose 
implementation is the responsibility of the signatory-state. Analysis of the exercise of that 
responsibility results in a number of observations. 
Firstly, the effectiveness of the ECHR does not result from the process of ECHR incorporation 
into a signatory-state's domestic order, but from the accomplishment of its minimum-standards 
40 
of protection, the functioning of the right of individual-petition and the adherence to the 
jurisdiction of the ECrtHR. 
112 
Despite the motives for the development of a universal order of HR protection, the functioning 
of the ECHR remained autonomous. Decisions of the European Commission, Committee and 
ECrtHR (although persuasive) were not binding. Insofar as ajurisprudence constante between 
the rulings of the ECrtHR and the internal practice of the signatory-state existed. the ECHR 
imposed no greater an obligation on the national legal order than an ability to take decisions of 
Strasbourg into consideration when reviewing evidence relating to an alleged HR violation. 
Accordingly, an individual could have recourse before a national court where Strasbourg had 
established a violation of ECHR law; where the signatory-state inadequately executed the 
Strasbourg judgment; or where the national authority had refused to compensate the applicant in 
accordance with Article 50 of the ECHR. Further, the possibility of re-opening domestic forms 
of redress following a finding by the ECrtHR, could not be excluded from amongst the ECHR's 
(arguable) impact. Nor the ECHR's ability to imply a positive obligation on a signatory-state to 
give weight to its provisions by encouraging changes in legislation; 143 or the willingness of some 
signatory-states to take corrective action while a concern was pending in Strasbourg. 144 
With regard to the European Commission, the findings of the initiative did not bind domestic 
courts. However S6rensen 145 advocated that the Commission's decision on admissibility could 
be binding where the ECHR possessed the status of internal law. Similarly, there was support for 
the view that the terms of a friendly-settlement secured under the aegis of the Commission could 
be enforced by an individual in the national courts were a signatory not to abide by the terms of 
the Settlement. 
In contrast, the authority in domestic law of the operative powers of the Committee of Ministers 
remained uncertain. Although its decisions could be given weight by national courts, they were 
likely to carry less influence than the judgment of the ECrtHR and the Commission. This was 
probably because the Committee constituted a political body whose decisions remained 
essentially unreasoned. 
On analysis then, the ECHR would appear to have been of (arguable) significance in those 
signatory-states in which the initiative possessed either the status of domestic law, or was 
superior to lex posterior. Certainly, one development unforeseen by the founders of the ECHR 
which merits attention was the application of the ECHR to inter-individual relations developed 
142 Hanaý-side v UK (1976) ECHR Series A No. 24 
143 Afarcky v Belgium (1979) ECHR Series A No 31- Handyside v L'K (198 1) ECHR Series A No. 24 demonstrating the Courts' 
potential to respond to the \NaN in NNhich rights change in status and form over time 
14' Leenarl v, Vetherlands (1980) Rechtspraak- Vreemdelingennecht 113 No. 80,591 
"' M. Sbrensen 'The Frilargoement of the European Communities and Protection of Human Rights' (1972) European Yearbook, XIX, 
3-17 
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by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. However, the same innovation also highlights that the impact 
of the ECHR on the domestic order of those signatory-states in which it could be used as legal 
authority cannot be generalised. Its influence varied not only from state to state and from one 
court to another, but in terms of time. Thus, while the ECHR was treat primarily as a subsidiar. y 
source of law by the Netherlands up until 1970, it remained essentially peripheral in relation to 
the established constitutional order of Germany. 146 
For example, despite the ECHR's definitive status in accordance with Article 25 of German 
Basic law, in its ruling of the 14 January 1960 147 the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that 
invocation by way of constitutional appeal could not be based on the initiative. On a point of 
legal technicality it could not be said that the provisions of the ECHR took precedence over 
Federal Law arising after the initiative's promulgation. As for the development of a horizontal- 
application of the ECHR, in its ruling of 24 July 1968,148 the same Court declared the ECHR to 
be no more than 'objective criteria' to be taken into consideration in the event of discrepancy or 
conflict between the ECHR and domestic law. 
Examining the impact of the ECHR on domestic law then, analysis suggests that the form of a 
si gnatory- state's constitutional arrangement represents only one factor on the latter's ability to 
effectively consider the ECHR order. But what of the influence of the ECHR on a signatory-state 
which had not formally incorporated the initiative into its internal order? Could the ECHR's 
(arguable) affinity with the civil-law system render it in relation to the UK merely an 
impracticable statement of ideal? 
Although the ECHR was not without impact on UK law, 149 conjecture that the ECHR could 
produce expeditious remedy with ad-rem effect simply did not occur. Unlike the (arguable) 
treatment of HR in the civil-law order, in the UK fundamental rights and freedoms remained a 
concern of political argumentation. Administrative or procedural change resulting (arguably) 
from the maintenance of politically motivated state interest, as opposed to serious concern for 
the individual. 150 
The approach of the UK toward the ECHR formed a subject for discussion in Manx. "' 
According to Judge Hytner both the UK and Manx authorities appeared somewhat unconcerned 
14"Golsong (1957), Op. cit at 317 
(1960) NJW 
(1970) AJCL 18,305 
Exemplified in the Home Secretar)-'s announcement to Parliament a change in the UK Prison-Rules following Golder v UK 
(1975) 1 EHHR 524 Series A No. 18: its impact on the Contempt of Court Act 1981, following Sunday Times v UK (1979) ECHR 
Series A No. 30,197, and introduction of the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982, following Xv UK (198 1) ECHR Series A No. 
46. As NNell as, the influence of flanqý, side v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 73T Dudgeon (1981) 4 EHRR 491; and (inter-state case) Irelandv 
t'K (1978) ECHR Series A No. 25 
"' Exemplified in the deliberation of the doctrine of transformation in relation to the functioning of the UK's Immigration order 
during the early 1970's. See: Application 2991/66 4 Yearbook (1968) 788-94 ,- 
Report of the Commission 13 Yearbook (1972) 730- 
72, and. 4mekrane v UK Application 6840,74 16 Julý, 1980,20 D+R. -5-18 151 The Times Nc\\ spaper, 6 October 1981 p. 2 
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about respective breaches of international treaty obligations. The Court regarded this as an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. In the opinion of Hytner, were the ECHR to be accorded the status 
of domestic law,, incorporation of the ECHR would clarify its uncertain status and provide the 
courts with the benefit of the guidance of Strasbourg. Judicial reticence over the manner in 
which the UK courts might interpret the ECHR would be alloyed by the fact that the court would 
be technically obliged to have serious regard for ECHR jurisprudence. The assertion was not 
only conjectural, but at the time, questionable. Although UK courts were unable to prevent 
Parliament from extinguishing rights, when they did find an opportunity at common-law to voice 
an objection, they still (in the main) continued to assert a modified version of Dicey' slý2 
utilitarian concept of adjudication: acknowledging the ECHR as a quasi-objective statement of 
values to be considered only insofar as the public interest was not compromised. 
Despite the conjecture of Hytner, a form of pragmatism pervaded the UK legal order which more 
accurately explains the early findings of its courts. 153 it is an approach reflected to a degree in 
the philosophy of Kelsen's pure theory of law. 15' A structured system of legal validity based on 
rule upon rule in a progression of legal norms forming an established legal order, the most 
fundamental being a judicial commitment to its own constitutional conservatism 155 and the 
supremacy of Parliament. 156 
To summarise, the ECHR may offer the promotion of a common understanding of HR, but it is 
the character of the national judiciary which leads to their actual protection. Examining the tenor 
of judicial thought throughout a number of ECHR signatory-states, it is a reality not restricted to 
the UK common-law order. As exemplified in the passi reasoning of the Netherlands's judiciary 
resulting (arguably) in the number of judicial techniques identified by van Dijk; 157 the 
application of 14R to German Basic Law in what the Bundesverfassungsgericht repeatedly refers 
to as a militant democracy; and the ECHR's handling by the French judiciary which, more 
cautious than its HR history would suggest, (arguably) intimates a greater proximity between the 
legal and the political than popular French debate would suggest. 118 
The reality of the role of the national court in the ECHR order was surnmarised by Tridade. 159 
Acknowledging the relevance of the national court, Tridade observed its tendency to look to its 
"2 Diceý, ( 1965), Op. cit at 203 
'5' P. Atiyah Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (Stevens, London 1987) 
154 Kclsen (1934). Op. cit at 517 
... In the event of a conflict between a need to manipulate a rule in order to achieve a result compatible with the ECHR and 
adherence to the rule itsel f. the judge would strive to uphold the latter, grounded on a belief in a reciprocal contract of co-operation in 
accordance with which the judge as neutral-expositor regarded himself bound to uphold the will of the rule-maker. Criticised bý- 
Twining as an *oversimplification' in Hoiv to do Things with Rules (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1980) 183 
156 The Judiciary would not accommodate an argument that a single measure could reign over all others, least of all one deemed 
international 
157 Van Dijk (1990), Op. cit at 585 
'58 Recued Dalloz Sirey Dýbut, 30 October 1980,38: Recued des decisions A Conseil d'Etat, Dýbut 27 October 1978,395. See: J. 
Keeler and A. Stone in G. Ross TheAhtterrand Experiment (CUP, Cambridge 1987) 
15" A. A. C. Tridade 'The F\haustion of Local Remedies in International LaýN' (1978) Archiav des follcerrechis 17,333 
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own domestic authority of last-instance, rather than the jurisprudence of the ECHR's organs 
when interpreting the ECHR. Tridade went on to state that it was hoped that from the fexý cases 
where the higher courts of some states had openly consulted the findings of Strasbourg vould 
develop an awareness amongst municipal judges that would persuade courts to consult not only 
their own jurisprudence but that of Strasbourg. Certainly, analysis of the impact of Strasbourg on 
the UK reveals that, insofar as the relationship between municipal law and the ECHR was 
maintained by a maxim of judicial interpretation, the ECHR constituted merely a supplementary, 
as opposed to a decisive factor in the outcome of a case. 
Finally, regardless of whatever theory or philosophy a nation-state may profess, there can never 
be a separation between law and politics. Although within developed societies a distinction can 
be drawn between the formalities of policy and the method of its enforcement, factors operate to 
conceal the impact of politics on the legal process. Foremost is the psychological element of 
tradition which Llewellyn terms law habit. 160 A specific legal atmosphere is created and 
reinforced by a political order which overt interference with is perceived as unconstitutional. 
Analysis of the international legal scene in the context of the working of the ECHR highlights 
such a tradition operating throughout the signatory-states: in the uncertainty of the rulings of the 
French Courts, the constitutional arguments of the UK and Gen-nan Courts, and the early fudging 
of the Hoge-Raad. The tradition exists irrespective of the monist or dualist nature of the state, or 
the fact that its legal order can be characterised as being civil or common-law. In the sense that 
the confon-nity of state behaviour with its European obligations is promoted not by a vertical- 
hierarchy of international tribunals but by a process of interaction with and within national 
courts, the reality is not ideal. 
According to the early rhetoric of Strasbourg, the ECHR constituted a resolution of the 
Governments of Europe which purported to maintain a classic liberal philosophy rooted 
(arguably) in the notion of the protection of rights accorded individuals by virtue of the 
ontological fact that they were human, therefore, by definition, universal . 
16' However, in so far 
as the ECHR is utilised in different courts, in different ways, such divergence gives rise not 
merely to difficulty in applying its jurisprudence in domestic law 162 but to an (arguable) sine qua 
non 163 within the context of the primary purpose that the initiative was (arguably) meant to 
secure: the promotion of a ýuniforrn protection of certain fundamental HR among the Member 
States of the Council of Europe. ' 164 
16" K. Llewellyn The Common-Law Tradition (Little & Brown, Boston 1960) 
16 1 B. Cullen Woral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems (CUP, Cambridge 1992) 165 
162 R. Masterman *Taking The Strasbourg Jurisprudence Into Account: Developing a Municipal La-vv of Human Rights' 2007 I. CL. Q. 1.7 
907 
163 Warbrick (1989), Op. cit at 715-716 
"" As explained b\ Lord Bingham in R (On the 4pplication of Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [20061 
UKHL 15 at 13] and, according to LeNN is. 'reflected in the fact that the fifth recital of the Preamble refers to "collective enforcement" 
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Further, in accordance with its structure. the ECHR implies the significance of dialectic, as 
opposed to fixed opinion. It is a living innovation never completed but peripatetic. reflecting the 
belief that the issue of rights should be changeable according to new contingencies. In reality 
however, the outcome of dialectics is interpretative, political and in the final analysis, 
constructed. Although the ECHR may propose solidarity in the form of a universal order. in 
practice its operation serves to highlight the irreconcilability of the conflicting principles that are 
HR and the supremacy of the State. 
To conclude,, according to the ECrtHR the ECHR transcended traditional boundaries between 
international and domestic law by comprising elements of both., 6' The ECHR (arguably) created 
not only 'obligations' on si gnatory- states, but 'rights' which were intended to be enforceable by 
individuals,, establishing in the field of civil-liberties a new legal order designed to substitute for 
the systems of individual states a common European order. The opinion revolved around the 
reading into Article I of the ECHR intent by its drafters that the rights and freedoms listed 
therein would be secured to everyone within the jurisdiction of the si gnatory- state; and an 
implied duty to afford the ECHR an effective status deduced from the legal basis of Article 13. 
In practice however, the opinion could/can not be maintained. Evidenced throughout the 
ECHR's early functioning, and regardless of constitutional arrangement, in terms of the impact 
of the initiative on signatory-states, the ECHR remains an inconsistent system. The practical task 
of applying the ECHR fraught with a number of problems: 
0 (Evidenced in the UK in particular) the delegation of an undefined discretion as to the scope of the 
ECHR and its application to specific facts; 
Indeterminacy of clear political and social aim; 
The natural limitation of legal language; 
Conflict between the values of internal consistency within the signatory-state's domestic legal system 
and other values, including prevailing national, social and political concerns. 
As a result, asi gnatory- state's rhetorical commitment to HR protection was not necessarily 
matched by a realisation of those rights. Whether the ECHR was intended to function in such a 
way, is inconclusive. What is not, is that insofar as the ambit of the European HR order remained 
solely that of European states and not individuals, the ECHR would appear to have inherited a 
classic imagining of a universal political, legal and judicial reality which lay (arguably) well 
beyond the 'there and then. ' 
of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ' J. LeýNis 'The European Ceiling on Human Rights' 
[2007] P. L. 720 at 722 
165 Ireland v t'K (19 78) FCHR Series A No. 2,90-91 
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Section 3: The ECHR and the UK Government and Legislature 
The procedures of the UK Parliament for dealing with HR remained underdeveloped up until 
2000 and little is known about their impact before then. With regard to the Public Record Office, 
where information is accessible,. it reveals little attention being paid to HR, even in relation to 
legislation which related to decisions of the European Commission and the ECrtHR. With regard 
to researching concern for FIR during the passage of legislation through Parliament, where such 
regard did arise in debate the 'tenor of the doctrine of parliamentary ... supremacy was to play 
down ... responsibility on the part of Parliament to adhere to substantive standards when 
conducting its business. " Similarly, it is difficult to make a statistical assessment of the UK's 
record of HR protection on the ground that figures are inflated by the fact that the UK did not 
adjudicate breaches of the ECHR in its domestic courts, and that the majority of cases lost 
concerned the same point of challenge. 
However, Section 3 of this thesis commences from the premise that it was not credible to 
maintain that to 'incorporate' the ECHR into domestic law was unnecessary on the ground that 
its rights were already protected. By the 1990's questions concerning the attitude of the UK 
toward HR were raised in relation to such practices as executive detention, 2 the shoot to kill 
policy of terrorist-suspectS, 3 and the ban on broadcasting of political spokesmen of specific 
4 political parties . Further, rights regarding privacy, aliens and minorities could not 
found a legal 
claim. The locus-standi in respect of challenges meant that groups who sought to vindicate the 
public interest had no standing to make use of the ECHR. The ECHR concerned the conduct of 
private persons through the obligations imposed on the State. A party to civil-litigation was as 
devoid of a plea in support of his claim, as an individual facing a charge could not plead that the 
law under which he was charged was in contravention. The same applied to public authorities 
who, having refused to comply with legislative provision, attempted to challenge any 
administrative sanction applied. Even in respect of challenges arising after the UK's acceptance 
of the Right of Individual Petition, the ECHR could not be directly invoked in the UK Courts. 
Examining the impact of the ECHR on the UK Government and legislature, Section 3 of this 
thesis analyses the effect of the order on such areas of HR concern as asylum, terrorism and 
various aspects of criminal justice. Whether the UK's treatment of the individual does support a 
claim that a universal humanity can not exist empirically, Section 3 examines the structure, and 
then functioning, of the HRA, and asks whether the reality of the ECHR can remain anything 
other than a raison-d'etre of the signatory-state. 
D. Feldman 'The impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process' (2004) 15 S. L. R. 25.2,95 
Ireland v Uk (1978) 2 EHRR 25 
3 VcCann v UK (1995) 21 EHHR 97 
'Rv Home Department, ex-parte Brind [ 1991 ]I AC 696 
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Section 3.1: The Casefor the Human Rights Act 1998 
In response (in part) to a lack of process for the safeguard of HR in the execution of policy, a 
number of Private-Member Bills took the concern of HR seriously enough to consider not 
merely proposals for the introduction of a Bill of Rights, but also incorporation of the ECHR 
6 into UK law. ' The Bills constituted a campaign to improve the quality of liberty in the UK . 
Acknowledging dissatisfaction with the paradox that while in principle the rule of law might 
protect the liberty of the individual, in practice such liberties were vulnerable to executive, 
legislature and judicial erosion, 7 the case for the HRA was made in the HR Bill Rights Brought 
Home. 8 
Highlighting the effect of the ECHR's non- incorporated status in terms of delay in taking a case 
to Strasbourg, the Paper was of the opinion that the rights guaranteed by the ECHR should be 
delivered under common-law. Evidence of such need was said to lie in the number of cases in 
which the European Commission and ECrtHR had found there to be an ECHR violation, and the 
inadequacy of the UK framework within which it could be tested. 
According to the Standing Advisory Committee, the observation was not without foundation. 
The UK had within the ECHR order a significant number of statutory HR violations by no less 
than 80 domestic laws. 9 In an attempt to improve the arrangement for legislative scrutiny prior to 
enactment,, the Cabinet Office had issued a number of Circulars in 1987 urging Government 
departments to consider the effect of ECHR jurisprudence on any proposed measure. 10 No 
further direction was given beyond the instruction that in the event of uncertainty, the 
department should solicit ad hoc guidance from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The 
effect was nominal. Analysis of subsequent legislation revealed that unresponsiveness to the 
rights enshrined in the ECHR, on the part of those responsible for policy, remained evident in 
the treatment of certain individuals. For example, years after a HR deficiency in the functioning 
of Sections 61 and 62 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 became apparent, in Weeks v UK" and 
Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v UK, 12 the discretionary power of the Secretary of State to deny 
release of detainees serving life-sentences, was held by the ECrtHR to constitute a violation of 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR. Despite the ruling in Xv UK 13 that executive discretion be replaced by 
Discussed in M. Zander A Bill of Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997) Chp. I 
l. argclN focused on the question whether rights N%ere better protected by Parliament, the elected representative of the people: a 
republican approach, or a non-representative judiciary: the liberal approach 
7 Lord Sedley 'Human Rights. A2 1' Century Agenda' [1995] P. L. 386, Lord Woolf 'Drolt-Public - English Style' [19951 P. L. 3861 
Lord Bingham 'The European Conýentlon on Human Rights: Time to Incorporate' (1993) L. Q. R. 109; Lord Browne-Wilkinson 'The 
Infiltration of a Bill of Rights' [1992] P. L. 397: and Lord Scan-nan English Lair - The New Dimension (Stevens, London 1974) 
' Command Paper. Human Rights: Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, (1997-1998) (Cm 3782) (TSO, London) 
9 HC Standing Committee's Annual-Report (1986-1987) (Col. 298) (TSO, London) 
10 Discussed in A. Bradley 'The Judge Over Your Shoulder' [ 1987] P. L. 485 
11 (1987) ECHR Series A No. 11 
12 (1990) l-CHR SeriesA No. 190 
13 (1981) 4 FHRR 
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an independent tribunal, the official response was the retainment of executive discretion in the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991. 
The cases are interesting. The attitude of the UK toward the HR concerns in X, Weeks and 
Thynne indicates not only a disinclination to comply with European obligations to impugned L- 
legislation, " but also the role of Parliament to ensure that legislation did not unduly censure 
individual rights and freedoms. The observation formed a subject for discussion by Stone., ý 
Examining the extent to which Parliament could act as a custodian of HR protection, Stone 
identified a number of limitations on the extent to which Parliament could/can fulfil this role. 
First, is the danger of incremental infringement. Parliament may accept that one type of control 
is necessary. Its existence in one area may then justify its application to another in a way that 
may involve a more significant infringement of liberty. Examining comparisons to be made 
between the ability of the police to access material under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 
1986. ) the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary-Provisions) Act 1989, and the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984,16 according to Stone, the ability of the police to obtain access to 
confidential information provided just such an example: 
'The [PACE] gave the police powers in certain situations to obtain a court order to compel people who 
hold ... confidential information which is relevant evidence in relation to a serious criminal offence to hand 
it over. Subsequently, similar powers were included in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 and the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary- Provi s ions) Act 1989. In both cases the powers given looked... to be 
the same as those contained in [PACE]. However, there were differences. In neither case under the later 
Acts, did the material have to be evidence: it had simply to be likely to be useful to police investigations. 
Moreover, whereas the procedure under [PACE] involved an inter-partes hearing, where the person from 
whom the information is sought could challenge the application by the police, in relation to both the other 
powers the hearing was ex-parte. Thus, the later powers involved a clear further encroachment on civil- 
liberties, but one that was probably made easier by the fact that the first step in that direction had already 
been taken in the 1984 Act. ' 17 
Secondly, is the fact that Parliament may easily be panicked into reacting without regard for 
individual liberty by a situation of perceived emergency. Highlighting the swiftness of the 
passage of the Official-Secrets Act 1911 through Parliament, according to Stone, Parliament 
played no role as a guardian of civil-liberties either in its justification of Section 2, or its 
restraint on the freedom of expression for some 80 years. 
HC Deb (1991) 186 (Col 360). HC Deb (1991) 193 (Cols 902-904)-, and HC Deb (1991) 195 (Col 309-3 10) (TSO, London) 
Stone (2004), Op. cit at 9 
16 Hereafter, PACE 
" Stone (2004). Op. cit at 10 
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The tendency of Parliament to be panicked into reacting without regard for individual liberty 
was raised by the civil-rights group Liberty, according to whom both the Immigration Act 1968 
and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 were passed by Parliament during periods of national 
panic, and in whose opinion had there been a Bill of Rights in force at the time, the question as 
to whether such legislation did breach fundamental rights would at least have been aired in 
Parliament and/or a domestic court. 18 Certainly in the opinion of Oliver, it was not unreasonable 
to suggest that in periods of polarised politics and divided opposition, Parliament could well be 
persuaded to legislate in breach of civil rights, particularly when the Government desired to 
avoid the accountability that such rights could promote. 19 
Finally, prior to the HRA, the concern of the individual was protected by legislative provision 
from which a liberty could be inferred and rules shaped by common-law. The approach, 
20 highlighted by Lord Goff in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), stood in 
contrast with that of the ECHR which listed in general terrns the rights it purported to guarantee. 
With regard to the role of the UK judiciary, although a power of review proved effective in the 
protection of common right and reason, other than the extra-judicial attempts of Lords Browne- 
Wilkinson, 21 SedleY22 and BinghaM23 to raise the level of rights consciousness within 
Parliament, grounded on an unwillingness to immerse themselves with issues of policy, the 
24 courts (in the main) were not inclined to develop the law in the field of HR protection . 
Forming the focus of the Paper Rights Brought Home, the Bill regarded the enablement of UK 
courts to rule directly on matters of ECHR concern to be the way forward toward effective 
scrutiny of domestic legislation. Coupled with the belief that time had come to enable 
individuals to engage their ECHR claims without the delay involved in taking a case to 
Strasbourg, the aim of the Government was straightforward: to make more accessible the rights 
which the individual enjoyed under the ECHR. Whether the HRA has done so, is subject to 
debate. 
Section 3.2. - The Mechanics of the Human Rights Act 1998 
The HRA entered into force on 2nd October 2000. The provisions of the ECHR given effect are 
listed in Section I (I) of the HRA and set out in Schedule 1. Rights which are excluded include 
the Article 13 right to an effective remedy in domestic law, on the ground that the Government 
Liberty. 4 People's Charter (Liberty, London 1991) 13 
D. Oliver Government in the 1,, 'K (OUP, Oxford 1991) 149 
1990] 1 AC 109 at 283 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson (1992). Op. cit at 397 
22 Lord SedleN (1995), Op. cit at 386 
23 Lord Bingharn (1993). Op. cit at 109 
2' Evidenced in the ruling of Lord Denning in Rv Secretary Qf State, for HomeAffairs, ex-parte Hosenball [197711 WLR 766: Lord 
Donaldson inAttorne , v-General 
v Guardian Neit, spapers (, N'o., ) [1990] 1 AC 109-, and observations of Sir I Laws 'is the High Court 
the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights" [1993] P. L. 60 
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considered enactment of the HRA to be a sufficient measure to meet the obligation in Article 1. 
and the rights in the 4 th 7 1h and 12 th Protocol S. 21 In accordance with Section I of the HRA. 
ECHR rights have to be read with the permission in Article 16 of the ECHR to allow restrictions 
on the political activities of aliens; the prohibition in Article 17 on the use of ECHR rights to 
subvert other rights; and the Article 18 prohibition on the use of permitted restrictions for 
improper purposes. The way in which the ECHR impacts upon domestic law is through the 
imposition of two obligations: the first, in respect of statutory interpretation; the second, public 
authority. 
The HRA assigns the practice of national courts examining standards developed by the ECHR 
on a formal level. Section 2(l) provides that a court or tribunal determining a question which has 
arisen in connection with the ECHR must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration, 
or advisory-opinion of the ECHR order. Section 3(l) provides that insofar as it is possible 
legislation must be given effect in a way which is compatible with the ECHR. However, Section 
3(2) continues that this does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of 
incompatible primary legislation; or the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of 
incompatible subordinate legislation, if primary legislation prevents removal of the 
incompatibility. Section 4(2) empowers the UK court if it is satisfied that a statutory provision is 
ECHR incompatible to make a declaration of that incompatibility. The ability to do so applies to 
proceedings in which a court detennines whether a provision of subordinate legislation, made in 
the exercise of a power conferred by primary legislation, is compatible with an ECHR right. If 
the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible and that the primary legislation concerned 
prevents removal of the incompatibility, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility. 
Section 4(6) provides that a declaration does not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given, nor is it binding on the parties to the 
proceedings in which it is made. 
Clearly, the HRA does not incorporate the ECHR into domestic law in the way that the EC Act 
1972 incorporates the EC Treaty: Although certain provisions of the ECHR enjoy a defined 
status, there is no question of the ECHR becoming part of substantive law. The HRA empowers 
the higher courts to make a declaration of incompatibility but, lacking in coercive effect, does 
not prevent the operation of the legislation in question. The reality of the practice is exemplified 
in Rv Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex-parte H . 
2' The Court of Appeal held that the statutory 
requirement in question breached the ECHR right to liberty. Under Section 4, the Court was able 
to declare the provision incompatible, but was unable to halt the reverse burden of proof practice 
until Parliament decided to remedy the breach. Accordingly, Section 4 provides little incentive 
25 Concerning the treatment of aliens in relation to e\ile and expulsion 
2" [20011 MHLR 48 
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for an applicant who can lose out to legislation which breaches the ECHR, and where the 
decision in question does not provide grounds for an appeal. 
With regard to the second obligation, Section 6 of the HRA provides that it is unlmNful for a 
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with the ECHR, unless legislation renders 
it impossible to do so. The concept of public authority was considered in Popular Housing 
Association Limited v Donoghue . 
2' The Court of Appeal held that reference in Section 6(3)(b) to 
any person certain of whose functions are of a public nature did not mean that any person acting 
on behalf of a public authority constituted a public authority: Section 6(3)(b) would not apply 
where the nature of an act was private. Further, as the definition of public authority in Section 
6(3)(b) was defined in functional ten-ns, public authority was such that it would need to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. According to Lord Woolf, the distinction between public 
and private law developed for the purpose of deten-nining which bodies were subject to judicial 
review, could offer direction as to the meaning of public function. 28 However, the HRA serves a 
different object from the practice of judicial review. 
Section 6 creates 2 categories of public authority: the first, an authority which is public in 
relation to all its activities; the second, an authority which is public only in relation to a 
particular function. Whether proceedings can be instituted on the basis of an alleged 
infringement of an ECHR right, is dealt with by Section 7. In accordance with Section 7(l), an 
individual who claims that a public authority has or proposes to act in contravention of Section 6 
can bring proceedings against the public authority concerned. ECHR case-law indicates that the 
applicant must have been affected by the alleged infringement. In accordance with Section 8, the 
court may grant such relief as it considers appropriate. However, damages can only be awarded 
where a court has power to do so in civi I -proceedings and is satisfied that it is necessary, taking 
into account the availability of alternative remedies. On analysis, the conditions as to damages 
constitute the least disconcerting limitation of the Act. The objective of the HRA is the 
protection of the individual vis-a-vis the state. What the HRA and ECHR order do not do, is 
initiate a law concerning the breach of the ECHR as between individuals. The consequence of 
limiting liability under the HRA is that its provisions have vertical, and not horizontal, effect. 
Yet, this is not to suggest that the ECHR is incapable of innovation. Although the ECHR is 
concerned with rights as between the individual and the state, Bailey argues that there is a 
possibility of the HRA being interpreted so as to require its application by the court to claims 
brought against private persons, on the basis that the courts are public authorities under Section 
21 [20011 ENVC. A Civ 585 
21 [2001] All ER 621 
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6 . 
29The approach was supported by Wade, who suggested that the application of the HRA could 
technically result in horizontal -effect. 
" The possibility was tested in Douglas i, Hello: " 
Considering the absence of a right to privacy in UK law, the Court considered applying the 
ECHR horizontally. The possibility was rejected. Indicating its preference for development of 
the common-law, the court decided to circumvent the question of horizontal-effect by 
developing privacy rights in the context of established law on breach of confidence using its 
power under the HRA. The reasoning behind the decision was clarified in Venables 1, News 
Group Newspapers . 
32 According to Dame Butler-Sloss, the obligation to apply the ECHR did 
not encompass the creation of a free-standing cause of action that could be used by one private 
person against another. Examining the handling of the HRA in relation to privacy, Stone 
identified 2 judicial approaches: the first, involving a narrow interpretation of the Section 6 
requirement that the court accord credence to the ECHR in relation to the conduct of legal 
proceedings; the second, a broader interpretation, that although Article I ECHR is excluded 
from the HRA and cannot be used to obtain a remedy, the same result can be achieved by the 
recognition of new rights and obligations as being in the spirit of the ECHR to the extent of 
according the HRA horizontal-effect. 33 
34 The approach was considered more fully in Av UK. In Av UK, the ECHR order was called on 
to examine the UK defence of reasonable chastisement. The applicant applied to the European 
Commission alleging that the UK had failed to protect him from ill-treatment amounting to 
inter-alia a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The Commission referred the case to the ECrtHR 
which ruled that because the law relating to reasonable chastisement did not provide protection 
against Article 3 treatment, the Government had failed to secure the right of the victim not to be 
sub . ected to inhuman and degrading treatment. As a result of the ruling, the Government 
considered amending the law relating to parental chastisement but, following the finding in Rv 
H35 that the directions given to a jury in relation to the defence already met the Government' s 
ECHR obligation, decided that no action was necessary. 
Finally, Section 19(l) of the HRA provides that a Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in 
either House of Parliament must, before its Second Reading, make a statement that (in his view) 
the provisions of the Bill are ECHR compatible, or make a statement that although he is unable 
to make a statement of compatibility, the Government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed 
29 Bailey (2001), Op, cit at 7 
3() W. Wade 'Horizons of Horizontahtý' (2000) 116 L. Q. R. 217 
31 [200012 All ER 289 
[200111 All FR 908 
Stone (2004), Op. cit at 38 
(1999) 27 EHRR 61 L- as NNell as Zv UK (2001) ECHR 29392/95 
35 [200211 Cr App R7 
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with it. No such obligation exists in respect of an amendment introduced during the passage of a 
Bill. 
The reality of Section 19 was examined by Feldman. According to Feldman, the operation of 
Section 19 was thought to have a definite impact on the UK legislative process in the sense that 
'the need for a minister to make a... statement about compatibility with [the ECHR] concentrated 
the minister's mind and those of his ... advisers ... on the [HR] implications of the BiI1., 
36 
Counter-arguing the popular criticism that Section 19 was an insufficiently rigorous measure, 
Feldman argued that it was reasonable for a minister when considering the HRA to apply a 
balance of probability, recognizing that it was for the courts to decide questions of compatibility. 
Highlighting two occasions on which a minister had made a Section 19(l)(b) statement: the first, 
in relation to the correction of a Bill which had been thought likely to have resulted in a violation 
of the ECHR later to become the Local Government Act 1999; and the second, concerning 
proposed retention of a ban on political advertising in the broadcast media in a Bill later to 
become the Communications Act 2003, Feldman argued that the employment of Section 
19(l)(b) in both cases demonstrated a positive approach to the concern of compatibility taken by 
ministers in relation to their respective legislative programme. In justification of Section 19, 
Feldman continued that the HRA envisaged that in some circumstances it would be necessary for 
Parliament to legislate incompatibly with the ECHR. Accordingly, rather than question whether 
Parliament's ability under Section 19 to legislate incompatibly was proper, it was more sensible 
to question when such a measure could be considered legitimate. In this context, legitimacy had 
a number of dimensions. Whereas legislation could be democratically legitimate if it reflected 
popular will as mediated through the electoral Parliamentary process, legislation would be 
legally legitimate if it met standards of formal legality; and morally legitimate if it complied 
with the demands of an acceptable system of ethics. For both courts and Parliament, the ECHR 
formed part of the matrix of standards relevant to assessment, but their roles differed. While it 
was for the courts to decide whether legislation was compatible with the ECHR, it was up to 
Parliament to decide whether it was legitimate to legislate in a manner which had a substantial 
risk of being incompatible. The observations are interesting. Whether Section 19 constitutes 
quite the constitutional development Feldman claims however, is debatable. 
Firstly, although Feldman went on to justify the application of Section 19 by highlighting factors 
against the alternative of including on the face of a Bill safeguards against ECHR abuse, he did 
so by advancing an argument for the need for some 'form of safeguard where the right to be 
protected was not included in the HRA. Secondly, Section 19 only applies to a Bill at the time 
that the statement is made. There is no provision in relation to subsequent amendment. Thirdly, 
Feldman (2004), Op. cit at 97 
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despite Feldman's opinion that, added to 'the incentive that subordinate legislation... is normally 
invalid 
.... to the extent of any incompatibility with 
[an ECHR] right ... at least 
in sensitive areas, 
there is evidence that ... scrutiny 
in departments is no less careful than for B illS,, 37 reiterating the 
(then) Home Secretary's approach to the compatibility of the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed- 
Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2001,38 there is no equivalent of a Section 19 statement. 
Fourthly, albeit Parliament is required to pronounce on the face of an Act whether it is 
compatible with the ECHR, it is not obliged to ensure that it is. Thus, although a Section 19 
statement may well indicate that 'it was not Parliament's intention to cut across [an ECHR] 
right' and is in 'no doubt ... based on the best advice that is available, ' nevertheless, in terms of 
impact, remains no more than an expression of ministerial opinion. 39 
Whether the HRA does constitute more than the deployment of parliamentarianism for the 
purpose of maintaining a commitment to the supremacy of Parliament then, its functioning 
(arguably) underlines the importance that is continued to be attached to the belief that a British 
citizen has the freedom to do as he pleases subject to the conditions set down in statute or 
common-law. Despite the introduction of obligations in relation to statutory interpretation, 
public authority and legislative drafting, it remains open to the UK Government to decide how to 
deal with the findings of the ECHR and refuse to remedy incompatibility should it decide to do 
so. As highlighted by the Government's response to concerns raised over the omission of the 
ECHR's 7"' Protocol from the HRA. Although White Papers on the HR Bill recognised areas of 
incompatibility with the ECHR in existing legislation, compelled by criticism regarding the 
seriousness of the UK's commitment to the ECHR,, the Government's response was to state that 
it would consider any amendment to remove inconsistency, but only when a suitable opportunity 
arose. This remains the position in relation to decisions of the ECrtHR. The ECrtHR may 
highlight incompatibility requiring correction, but remedial action is something which the UK 
Government can not be compelled to introduce, or Parliament to make. Whether analysis of 
Governmental concern can dispel the myth advanced by Lord Reid that it was inconceivable that 
Government or Parliament would enact legislation which ran contrary to the ECHR, 40 insofar as 
both remain autonomous to enact incompatible legislation, it is questionable as to what 
safeguards the HRA has provided, in particular in such areas of increasing HR concern as 
terrorism, asylum and criminal justice. 
" lbid p. 104 
18 HL 66-1, HC 332-1(2000-2001) ( TSO, London) 
R vA [200113 Al I ER I at 24 
40 Waddington vAhah [19741 1 IAIR 683 
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Section 3.3: The Impact of the HRA 1998: Legislative Encroachment on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
There is little doubt that in the twenty-first century virtually all countries making up the EU have 
voiced commitment to the respect of the individual with numerous countries accepting 
international obligation. However, insofar as such universality remains dependent on the 
solidarity of sovereign Governments, the reality of a universal order remains fundamentally 
Burkean: the provisions of national law and politics of greater persuasion than international 
undertaking. With such a premise in mind, this thesis examines the impact of the ECHR on the 
UK Government and legislature by means of the HRA and, insofar as the universal protection of 
HR can be said to constitute the last haven of sui-generis positivism, questions how far the 
ECHR has survived political association. 
Section 3.3.1: Terrorism 
Although not an area failing technically within ECHR control, the UK's treatment of terrorism is 
significant for a number of reasons. An area in which concern has arisen in relation to the rights 
of the individual and the value of the ECHR order, the treatment of the terrorist-suspect 
highlights a reality which not only strikes at the universality at the heart of the ECHR, " but 
raises a number of questions, including what can be expected of a universal order of HR 
protection. 
An omission throughout the EC14R is the absence of a precise definition of the class of 
individual it is meant to protect. In relation to the ability of the HRA to protect the individual 
against the exercise of executive power, the question of 'laws subjects' is important. According 
to Douzinas, 'the modem subject reaches [his] humanity by acquiring... rights of citizenship 
which guarantee [his] admission to the universal human nature by excluding from that status 
others with no rights. The citizen has rights to the extent that he belongs to the common-will and 
to the state. 142 In the words of Bernstein, 'citizenship is the reality that stands between and 
mediates the abstract particularity of personal identity and the abstract universality of HR. 
[Accordingly] when liberal states claim that they abolish privileges and protect universal rights, 
, 43 they mean that privileges are now extended to a group called citizenry. The observation 
highlights an anomaly at the core of the ECHR's ability to deliver to everyone the rights 
guaranteed therein. By its early philosophical pronouncements, the ECHR would appear to have 
Insofar as the debate about HR and the upholding of human dignity can be claimed to be In reality little more than a process of 
're-lec, itimation' of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the s' L, I- ignatory-statesý 
N. Lewis 
Human Rights. LaN% and Democrac,, in an Unfree World in T. Evans Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal (MUP, 
Manchester 1998) 
4- Douzinas (2002), Op. cit at 105 
Osbome (1991). Op. cit at 114 
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44 been intended to be universal. However, analysis of the impact of the ECHR reveals that 
vulnerable to the exercise of executive power its concept of humanity is a ranked status, not only 
in terms of one standard for citizens and another for the peoples of non signatory-states, but 
between such different class of persons as those remaining at liberty and those lawfully 
detained. 45 
Since the passage of the HRA, (arguably) one of the most controversial examples of executive 
encroachment on the rights and freedom of the individual has been the treatment of terrorism. 
Following the terrorist attack in the US of II September 200 1, the concern of terrorism has 
attracted considerable debate not only between those in support of the suspension of rights in 
combating the threat to security and those against it, but also over the role of the ECHR and 
HRA. Examining UK strategy for dealing with terrorism, this thesis examines the effect of the 
UK's response to the threat in the form of the Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act 2006. 
The Terrorism Act 200046 
47 (1) Section I (as amended by Section 34 of the Terrorism Act 2006) 
According to Gearty, the law and practice of counter-terrorism was, and is,, not concerned solely 
with narrow questions of criminal activity in pursuit of a range of ideological objectives: 
'terrorist related activities are within the remit of the practitioners of counter-terrorism, but so is 
much besides. 48 This was the case even when the main focus of counter-terrorism was the 
secessionist inspired violence of the Irish Republican Anny. Terrorism was defined in Section 
20(l) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 198949 as the use of violence 
for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any 
section of the public, in fear. Insofar as the breadth of the definition impacted negatively on civil 
liberties, the definition of terrorism was particularly wide and imprecise. Whereas the terms 
'violence' and 'political ends' were undefined, neither the requirement of putting a section of the 
public in fear was an essential ingredient of Section 20, nor a particular level of violence or 
intensity of fear specifically required. 
Lewis (2007), Op. cit at 722 
Douzinas (2002), Op. cit at 316 
'6Hereafter, TA 2000 
47 Hereafter. TA 2006 
48 C. Gearty Civil Liberties (OUP, Oxford 2007) at 44. See also: the concern raised by S. Huntington 'The Clash of 
Civilizations'(1993) 72 F, 4 22, C. Walker 'The Legal Definition of Terrorism in United Kingdom Law and Beyond' [20071 PI 
332, and C. Campbell 'War on Terrorism and Vicarious Hegemons' (2005) 54 I. C. L. Q 321 that powerful polities have long sought 
to exercise hegemonic control over the depiction of emergencies; as well as, concerns raised in relation to the manipulative ability of 
terrorism to bolster claims to the legitimacy of counter-force as examined by 0. Fiss 'The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of 
Law' (2006) O. JL. S 235, and L. K. Donohue Terrorism and Counter- Terrorist Discourse in V. V. Ramraj, M. Hor and K. Roach 
Global . 4nii-Terrorism and 
Polio, (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 16. For an alternative understanding of the role of counter-terrorist 
legislation See: C. Walker 'Intelligence and Anti-terrorism Laws in the UK' (2006) 44 C. L. S. C 387 Z-1 
"Hereafter, PTA (TP) Act 
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The definition of terrorism in Section 20 of the PTA(TP) Act formed the focus of the Lloyd 
Enquiry. Although the enquiry concluded that there was a need for a permanent form of counter- 
terrorism law in the UK, the review considered that terrorism should be re-defined as *the use of 
serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use such violence, to intimidate or 
coerce a Government,, the public or any section of the public, in order to promote political, social 
or ideological objectives. "' Other recommendations advanced included the proposal that 
terrorism be viewed as part of mainstream criminal law; 51 that the special power of arrest on 
suspicion of terrorism be removed, and that the prohibition on the admissibility of intercept 
evidence be lifted. 'Had [such proposals] been adopted, an important start would have been 
made in the taming of the [arguable] subversive power of counter-terrorism by the harnessing of 
its ... capacity for repression to the criminal law (with all the procedural and evidential disciplines 
that this would necessarily have entailed). "5' The proposal was not accepted. The definition 
proposed was too broad since it included the use of serious violence for social objectives, and 
too narrow in that it did not cover forms of damage to property. 53 
Section I of the TA 2000, as amended by Section 34 of the TA 2006, provides: 
) Terrorism means the use or threat of action where: 
(a) The action falls within sub-section (2); 
(b) The use or threat is designed to influence the Government or an international Governmental 
organisation, or to intimidate the public or sections of the public; and 
(c) The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. 
(2) Action falls within this sub-section if it: 
(a) Involves serious violence against a person; 
(b) Involves serious damage to property; 
(c) Endangers a person's life, other that of the person committing the action; 
(d) Creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or 
(e) Is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system. 
The broad Section I definition effectively extends the meaning of terrorism to cover actual or 
threatened conduct involving either serious violence against the person or damage to property 
where the intention was/is to influence the Government, an international Governmental 
organisation, the public, or for the purpose to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. 
Had 'the definition stopped there, terrorism law would have had only a peripheral relationship 
" Lord Lloyd. Lloyd Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism, (Cm. 3420), (TSO, London 1996) 
51 That certain offences be classified as terrorist offences, including ordinarN crimes A ith a terrorism dimension, as well as a number 
of defined terrorist crimes such as directing a terrorist organisation and preparation of an act of terrorism 
12 Geartý (2007), Op. cit at 46. See also: concerns raised bN H. Fenwick Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Third Edition) 
(Rout led ge-Caven di sh. London 2002) 403, the objections of Mr Simpson MP to the proposed Section I TA 2000 definition of 
terrorism in HC Debate. 15 11arch 2000 (Cols. 399 and 394) (TSO, London 2000), and concerns relatin,. O., to counter-terrorist 
measures generally expressed bý B. Saul Defining Terrorism in International Law (OUP, Oxford 2006) Chapter 1. For an 
alternative ieNN of the definition of terrorism See C. Walker 'The Legal Definition of Terrorism in United Kingdom Law and 
Beyond' [2007] P. L 331 
53 Legislation against Terrorism, .4 
Consultation Paper (Cm 4178) (TSO, London 1998) 
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with civil liberties, belonging more ... to criminal, than public 
law. But it did not. Action was 
also to be regarded as terrorist if with the ... 
intention (identified in Section 1(1)), it either 
endangered a person's life... created a serious risk to the health or safety of the public... or was 
designed 
... to interfere with ... an electronic system. 
[Accordingly, and insofar as violence ýNas 
no longer an essential feature of the definition] terrorism law burst its original banks in the 
criminal law and overflowed in the direction of direct-action,, civil-disobedience, and political 
protest generally. -)54 The observation is not unreasonable. 
Firstly, despite the Government's clear statement that it had no intention of suggesting that 
matters that can properly be dealt with under normal public order powers should in future be 
dealt with under counter-terrorist legislation, " in accordance with amendments made to the 
definition of terrorism introduced in the TA 2006, Section I effectively allows a number of 
groups and associations to be re-defined potentially as terrorist. Danger to property, violence or 
a serious risk to safety that can be described as ideologically, politically or religiously motivated 
may arise in the context of many forms of public protest, including anti-war, environmental and 
industrial disputes. 56 
Secondly, direct action by such groups as environmental activists and anti-war protestors may 
be viewed as forms of expression and as having the same role as political speech. Accordingly, 
to label such forms of action 'terrorist' as Section I does, is not only to devalue the term, but to 
take a stance toward the treatment of public protest which is (arguably) more characteristic of 
totalitarianism than a democracy. " 
Thirdly, although Section I does not itself create new terrorism-related offences, it nevertheless 
leads to the questionable criminalization of the acts and omissions of a far wider range of 
persons, some of whom do not in fact technically fall within the definition of terrorist. " 
Certainly, the definition of terrorism provides the foundation for a very wide range of broad 
special offences in the TA, and for those subsequently introduced under the Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001 and the TA 2006, '9 as well as, the application of special terrorism 
" Gearty (2007), Op. cit at 47. See also: C. Walker A Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Blackstone Press, London 2002), J. J. 
Rowe QC, 'The Terrorism Act 2000' (2001) Crim. L. R 527, and P. Wilkinson, Implementations of the Attacks of 91 ]for the Future 
of Terrorism in M. Buckley (ed) Global Responses to Terrorism: 971, Afghanistan and Beyond (Routledge, New York 2003) 
55 Legislation against Terrorism: A Consultation Paper (Cm 4178) (TSO, London 1998) at Paragraph 3.18 
56 Lord Carlile of Bcrriew QC proposed in March 2007 that the definition of terrorism should be more narrowly focused to what 
most citizens would regard as terrorist purposes. That action or threats of action should be regarded as terrorism only if designed to 
intimidate the Government, rather than influence the Government. In December 2007, Lord Carlile remained disappointed that the 
proposal was not included in the Consultation Papers concerning changes in counter-terrorist legislation: Possible Measures for 
Inclusion in a Further Counter- Terrorism Bill, and Options for Pre-charge Detention in Terrorist Cases, published by the 
Government 25 July 2007. Lord Carlde of Berriew QC, Report on Proposed Measuresfor Inclusion in a Counter- Terrorism Bill 
(Cm. 7262) (TSO, London 2007). See also: R. Stone Civil Liberties and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2004) 101 
H. Fenwick Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Routledge-Cavendish. London 2007) 1374 
Insofar as the definition has allowed the application of those special terrorist offences of the TA 2000 (as amended by the TA 
2006) of directing terrorist organisations. preparatory and possession offences, the incitement, encouragement and glorification of 
terrorism. and failure to report a suspected act of terrorism, to what could have been defined prior to Section I of the TA 2000 as 
non-criminal actions 
5" See: C Walker (2007). Op. cit at 331 
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sanctions under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 not dependent on charging a person ýN ith 
a specific offence and without actual proof of an offence. 60 
Reiterating the concern expressed by Fenwick, 61 the consequences of the functioning of such a 
broad and imprecise definition of terrorism in terms of its effect on HR and civil liberties, 
including the underlying philosophy behind it, was surnmarised by Gearty: 
'The risk to civil liberties, lies not in empowering law enforcement agencies to deal with the kind of 
violent action that is planned by those who would engage in such ... activity for political ends. The threat 
lies ... in the way in which the underlying perspective of those involved in counter-terrorism leads to their 
dealing with terrorist suspects in a way that is entirely different from the manner in which they treat their 
'ordinary' criminal antagonists. There is a further risk as well ... of counter-terrorist action having a 
negative effect on political freedom which extends well beyond the actions... of those whom the public 
would recognize as terrorist according to... ordinary ... understanding of the term. This 'chill' factor 
affects not only the freedom of those political activists who are brought within the definition of terrorism 
by the breadth of the term... but also the rights of those on the margins of such groups who find their 
freedoms curtailed by an over-energetic reading of the law. ' 62 
(2) Section 3 (as amended by Section 21 of the TA 2006) 
The proscription of organisations has long been part of counter-terrorism law in respect of 
Northern Ireland. The TA 2000 extended the reach of the power of proscription beyond the 
affairs of Northern Ireland into the area of domestic and international terrorism. As a response 
to the terrorist attacks of II September 2001, twenty-one organisationS63 were classified as 
proscribed organisations for the purpose of Section 3 of the TA 2000,64 a further four added to 
65 66 67 the list in 2002, fifteen added in 2005,, and two added in 2006 . 
Section 3(l) of the TA 2000 
provides that 'for the purpose of this Act, an organisation is proscribed if it is listed in Schedule 
2, or it operates under the same name as an organisation listed in that Schedule. ' The power to 
proscribe (or de-proscribe) is exercised by the Secretary of State under Section 3(3) where he 
68 'believes' that an organisation is 'concerned' in terrorism . Such a 
belief is not required to be 
reasonable, or grounded on objective evidence. An organisation does not have to be involved in 
acts of terrorism or in the preparation of such acts, it is enough that it is either believed to 
promote or encourage terrorism, or is 'otherwise' concerned in terrorism. 
" Fenwjck (2007), Op. cit at 1374 
61 Ibidp. 1374-1376 
62 Gearty (2007), Op. cit at 46-47 
63 Which includes all emanations. manifestations and representations of the Irish Republican Army, whatever their relationship to 
each other, as part of the inferred intention of Parliament derived from the language of the TA 2000: RvZ [2005] UKHL 35 
(4 Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 200 1, SI 2001/1261 
`3 Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2002, Sl 2002/ 2724 
' Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2005, S1 2005/ 2892 
(, 7 Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2006. Sl 2006/ 2016 
" 
'Scction 3(4) 
TA 2000 
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Proscription is a strong and far-reaching power. Apart from its impact on such rights and 
freedoms as speech, assembly and association which can be abrogated entirely, the proscription 
of an organisation can lead to the criminalisation of a number of activities associated NNith it, 
including membership of a proscribed organisation, support for its causes, and the wearincy of 
any symbol of allegiance to a proscribed group, the penalty for which (including a maximum 
sentence of 10 years imprisonment) is harsh. However, it is the reality highlighted by Gearty 
which raises the greatest concern regarding the practice of proscription, that 'if the price of 
keeping [civil liberties] is vigilance, then one of the things that it is necessary to be vigilant 
about is the preservation of a well-based sense of indignation at how wrong it is to turn people 
into criminals merely because of the fact of their association with others. 69The observation is 
not unreasonable. 
The power of proscription functions more widely than the ambit of Section I of the TA 2000. 
Organisations which do not themselves fall within the definition, but which are in anyway 
concerned in terrorism, can be proscribed. Under Section 3(5) an organisation is defined as 
being 'concerned in terrorism' if it (a) commits to or participates in any acts of terrorism; (b) 
prepares for terrorism; (c) promotes or encourages terrorism; or (d), is 'otherwise' concerned 
with terrorism, which following amendment by Section 21 of the TA 2006, includes the 
glorification of acts of terrorism whether in the past, the present, or in any general form of 
praise, celebration or cognate expression. Coupled with the breadth of Section 1, Section 3 
permits the proscription of organisations that would not normally be prescribed in practice, 
'including organisations which are fighting against undemocratic and oppressive regimes and, 
in particular, those which have engaged in lawful armed conflict in the exercise of the 
internationally recognised right to se I f-detenn i nation of peoples (where the UK is bound in 
international law to recognise the right and to refrain from offering material support to states 
engaged in the suppression of the exercise of the right by military, or other coercive means). "O 
Certainly, in accordance with the way that Section 3 has been judicially applied in respect of 
Section I of the TA 2000, Governments that constitute a dictatorship, a military junta, or a 
usurping power, are included within the protective structure of the Act. " 
Secondly, the practice of proscription results infact in a considerable extension of the definition 
of terrorism, insofar as persons who do not themselves fall within the arnbit of Section I can be 
classified as terror i st- suspects, or suspects concerned with terrorist activity. Accordingly, by 
making it possible to proscribe a wider range of persons, the TA 2000 potentially curtails a 
number of proscription-related activities which prior to the TA 2000 would not have been 
69 Gearty (2007). Op. cit at 157. See also: Fenwick (2007), Op. cit at 1384 
7" R (On theApplication of the Kurdistan Workers'Party and Others) v Secretary of Statefor the Home Department [20021 EWHC 
Admin 644, Paragraph 47 
71RvF [20071 FWCA Crim 243 
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considered related to terrorism. For example, Section 12(l) provides that it is an offence to 
solicit support other than money, or property, for a proscribed organisation. Under Section 12(2) 
it is an offence for a person to arrange, manage, or assist in arranging or managing a meeting 
which he knows is (a) to support a proscribed organisation; (b) to further the activities of a 
proscribed organisation; or (c) to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong 
to a proscribed organisation. Section 12(4) defines a meeting as one which is held either in 
public or private at which three or more persons are present. Although where the accused is able 
to put forward evidence sufficient to raise a doubt as to whether he had no cause to believe that 
any address would be in support of such an organisation, the court must assume that the defence 
is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not; because Section 
12(4) is so narrowly drawn a person who assisted in arranging a public meeting, even if 
consisting of only three people, not knowing that the member of the proscribed organisation 
would speak in support of the organisation, would commit an offence. The fact that the 
provisions of the TA 2000 can, and effectively do, allow for the criminalization of a person, 
whose conduct may not necessarily be blameworthy, is particularly pertinent in relation to 
Section II of the TA 2000. 
Section I1 (1) provides, that it is an offence to belong to a proscribed organisation 'punishable' 
by a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment, no mens rea required. Section 11(2) provides 
that it is an offence for a person charged with an offence under Section I l(l) to prove that the 
organisation was not proscribed on the last (or any) occasion on which he became a member or 
began to profess to be a member, and that he has not taken part in the activities of the 
organisation at any time while it was proscribed. The effect is to impose a reverse burden of 
proof on the defendant once the prosecution has discharged its burden in showing that he was a 
member of a proscribed organisation, even if he was unaware that it had been proscribed. 72 The 
burden is placed on him to prove that the organisation was not proscribed when he was a 
member. Whether the placing of such a burden on a defendant who had/has arguably not been 
engaged in any blameworthy conduct constituted an infringement of the presumption of 
innocence in breach of Article 6(2) of the ECHR, formed the focus of Attorney-General's 
Reference (No 4 of 2000). 71 
In Attorney-General's Reference (No 4 of 2000), 
74 
the defendant was indicted on two counts 
under Section H. It was accepted that Section 11(2) imposed an evidential burden on the 
72 However, highlighted by Fenwick (2007). Op. cit at 1390, the UK judiciarý has engaged in reading down under Section 3 of the 
HRA legal burdens to evidential ones order to create Convention compliance with Article 6. See also: V. Tadros and S. Tierneý 
'The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act' (2004) ffL. R 402,1. Dennis 'Reverse Onuses and the Presumption of 
Innocence. In Search of Principle' (2005) C. L. R 901, and A. Ashworth 'Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence' (2006) 10 
LJE. P 241 
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defendant, but that in the instant case there was no case to answer. The Attorney-General 
referred the case to the Court of Appeal which held that the ingredients of the offence were set 
out in Section I1 (1) and that Section 11(2) imposed a legal burden, rather than an evidential 
one, compatible with Article 6(2) and Article 10 of the ECHR. The case reached the House of 
75 Lords . The Court held that the ingredients of Section II (I) were contained within that section 
and did not require participation in the activities of the organisation while proscribed; therefore 
Section 1](2) did not add to the ingredients of Section II (I). The Court of Appeal's decision on 
that point was correct. Parliament had intended that Section 11(2) imposed a legal burden on the 
defendant, as was clear from Section 118 which listed a number of sections which imposed an 
evidential burden. However,, 76 insofar as a person who had not engaged in any blameworthy 
conduct could come within Section II (I) and the presumption of innocence infringed by 
requiring him to disprove involvement in the organisation at the time in question, the 
application of Section II (I) would constitute in fact an unfair conviction. Bearing in mind the 
difficulties that a defendant would have in proving the matters contained in Section 1 ](2), and 
the serious consequences for the defendant in failing to do so (the possible imposition of a 
maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment) the imposition of a legal burden on the defendant 
did not constitute either a proportionate or justifiable response to the threat of terrorism. 
Although national security considerations would always carry significant weight, they did not 
absolve states from their duty to ensure that basic standards of fairness were observed. If 
Section 11(2) was held to impose a legal burden if the defendant failed to prove the matters 
specified in Section 11(2), the court would have no choice but to convict him. As Section 11 (2) 
infringed the presumption of innocence, it was appropriate that Section 11(2) be read down 
using the interpretative power under Section 3 of the HRA, so as to impose an evidential burden 
instead of a legal one. 
Finally, Section 5 of the TA 2000 makes provision for the functioning of the Proscribed 
Organisations' Appeals Commission" as a forum in which proceedings under Section 7 of the 
HRA against the Secretary of State in respect of a refusal by him to exercise his power of de- 
proscription, are brought and determined. The framework allows for legal representation and 
obliges the relevant authorities to implement the Commission's rulings. However, despite 
POAC involvement, the reality of the proscription process remains that a person is first 
criminalised, and then the case against him only inquired into should he decide to challenge the 
proscription order. Accordingly, the functioning of the proscription process has the effect of 
outlawing even previously lawful activity without recourse to a court or independent tribunal, 
'5 [2004] EWCA Crim 76" 
76 Although it is not a defence to prove that the defendant did not know that the organisation was proscribed, or that it was engaged 
in activities covered bý Sections l(l) and 1(3)ý 
Rv Hundal (Autar Singh, - Rv DhalAval (Kesar Singh) [200412 Cr App R 19 
77 Hereafter, POAC 
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except retrospectively after proscription has occurred. Further,, insofar as the poxý er of 
proscription remains unregulated by the TA and sub ect only to the Parliamentary Affirmative j 
Resolution Procedure, the process of proscription represents little more than an order whereby a 
person can become subject to a considerable range of criminal offences, and such fundamental 
freedoms of speech, assembly and association severely curtailed, by means of an exercise of 
executive decision. 
The reality of the functioning of the proscription process, was encapsulated in the ruling of R 
(On the Application of the Kurdistan Worker's Party and Others) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, R (On the Application of the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran and 
Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, and R (On the Application of Ahmed) 1, 
Secretary of Statefor the Home Department. 78 
In R (On the Application of the Kurdistan Worker's Party and Others), the Kurdistan Worker's 
Party, '9 People's Moiahedin Organisation of Iran 80 and the Lashkar e Tayyabah 81 soughtjudicial 
review of (1) the decision of the Secretary of State to lay the 2001 proscription order before 
Parliament; (2) the legality of the 2001 proscription order; (3) the lawfulness of the relevant 
proscription provisions of the TA Act 2000; and sought declarations to the effect that (1) the 
inclusion of the organisations in question in the list of proscribed organisations was unlawful; or 
alternatively (2), that the relevant proscription provisions of the TA 2000 and the consequential 
criminal sanctions imposed under Sections 11-19 of the TA 2000, were incompatible with 
Articles 10 and II of the ECHR and Article I of the First Protocol. 
The Court held that Parliament clearly intended that the POAC was the appropriate forum with 
which claims relating to proscription should be raised for the purpose of Section 7 of the HRA. 
The argument that an alternative procedure should be exhausted only if it was as extensive in its 
scrutiny as judicial review was dismissed. 82 The POAC constituted a specialist tribunal 
comprising of procedures designed to deal with claims relating to proscription which included 
exclusion from the prohibition on the disclosure of intercept communications. However, in 
reaching its decision, the Court highlighted what in practice amounted to, and continues to 
amount to, a number of flaws in the process of proscription. 
With regard to the PMOI, an application for de-proscription was refused by the Secretary of 
State. An application for permission to apply for judicial review was lodged. The PMOI 
described itself as a resistance movement committed to the establishment of a secular, pluralist 
78 [2002] FWHC Admin 644 
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and democratic Government, respect for HR, and the internationally recognised norms of state 
behaviour. Accordingly, its inclusion in a list consisting of organisations commi tted to the use 
or threatened use of violence, constituted an interference with its civil right to a good reputation 
under Article 8 of the ECHR, and a breach of its right to the enjoyment of its ECHR freedoms 
without discrimination under Article 14. 
Whether the claims were or were not in fact without foundation, a considerably wide range of 
organisations meet the broad Section I of the TA definition of terrorism. No check or serious 
scrutiny on the Secretary of State's decision to proscribe is provided in the TA 2000 itself. 
When Parliament is asked to approve or dis-approve a proscription order, it is required to do so 
in its entirety. In the instant case Parliament was asked to proscribe all twenty-one organisations 
listed in the proscription order which included Al-Qaeda, or none at all. Thus, despite the PMOI 
having disarmed in 2003 to become a political organisation dedicated to the reform of 
Government in Iran, and despite its having significant Parliamentary support across parties at 
Westminster, as the individual circumstances of the PMOI could not be Parliamentary 
scrutinised, the PMOI was proscribed along with the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda. 
Accordingly, and highlighting the concern 'that the UK Government occasionally is inflexible 
in its attitude to changing situations around the world with reference to proscription, ' 83 an 
organisation which posed no specific threat to the UK, insofar as its concern was an oppressive 
regime abroad, was classified as terrorist as the technical result of inclusion on a list of terrorist 
organisations. The lack of detailed Parliamentary scrutiny accorded the individual 
circumstances of an organisation to be proscribed, amounting to what Fenwick termed 'a lack of 
real' democratic control of the proscription process, was further highlighted in the claims of 
both the PKK and LeT. 
With regard to the PKK, again an application for de-proscription was refused by the Secretary 
of State. The PKK described itself as a political party committed to the non-violent 
establishment of a Kurdish identity. The PKK claimed that, although the Secretary of State had 
notified Parliament that such non-statutory factors as: (1) the nature and scale of the 
organisation's activities; (2) the threat that the organisation posed to the UK; (3) the threat that 
the organisation posed to UK nationals overseas; (4) the extent of the organisation's presence in 
the UK, and (5) the need to support other members of the international community; 84 would be 
included in any exercise of the process of proscription, they did not amount to either an 
adequate or intelligible criteria for the exercise of the wide executive discretion provided under 
Section 3 of the TA 2000. The claim is not unreasonable. Whereas an organisation that is to be 
" Lord Carfile, Report on the Operation in 2005 qf the Terrorism Act 2000. Paragraph 43, (TSO, London 2006) 
14 Factors in Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman Investigations, July 2004-March 2005, Part 2, (A. 26W) (TSO. 
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proscribed is not made known in advance, the actual decision to proscribe is invariabIN 
grounded on classified UK and foreign intelligence available usually only to the Secretary of 
State. Further, despite the claim of the Secretary of State that the decision to proscribe can be 
viewed as sufficiently precise and accessible as to be prescribed by law for the purpose of 
Articles 10 and II of the ECHR, given the limited scrutiny accorded to Parliament, the lack of 
opportunity for an organisation prior to proscription to make representations, and the complete 
statutory discretion accorded the Secretary of State as to which organisations failing within the 
definition of terrorism should be proscribed, (highlighted by the LeT) the oversight accorded the 
proscription process remains in fact no more a safeguard against disproportionate interference 
with the rights of Articles 10 and II of the ECHR, than the decision to proscribe remains no 
more than the sole exercise of executive discretion. The reality remains, coupled with the 
predominantly executive nature of the process of proscription, 'the circumstances relied on for 
the proscription... [are] ... doubtfully able to 
justify the very serious interferences with the 
[ECHR] rights of the individual claimants, in particular the 'chilling' effect on free speech The 
basis for proscription is, in general, too imprecise to satisfy the requirement that the 
interferences with the rights to freedom of expression and association be both prescribed by law 
and proportionate. ' 85 
(3) Section 44 
One controversial legislative development post the HRA is the increase in power conferred on 
the state in relation to the stop, search, and arrest of terrorist-suspects. 86 By virtue of Section 44 
of the TA 2000, an extended power of stop and search provided for the random search of 
vehicles and persons on the ground that it appeared expedient to a police officer to carry out a 
stop in order to prevent an act of terrorism. The first challenge to Section 44 formed the focus of 
R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. "_ A decision, described by Gearty, as 
'particularly disturbing' insofar as it serves to highlight the 'danger' of counter-terrorism 
discourse leading to a 'collapse of [national] tensions in the direction of security and away from 
civil-liberties. ' 88 The applicant had been subject to a random stop and search on his way to 
attending a public demonstration. The applicant soughtjudicial review of the use of the power. 
Whereas Article 5 of the ECHR was not considered at the hearing (presumably on the ground 
that the detention was not sufficiently serious to engage it) the Court took the view that the threat 
of terrorism was sufficient to justify infringement of Articles 8,9,10 and 11. Examining Section 
" Fenwick (2007). Op. cit at 1405- See also the concerns raised in relation to the value and role of proscription generally: C. Walker 
The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (MUP, Manchester 1992); H. Fenwick (2002), Op. cit at 409- and Lord Jellicoe, Review 
of the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 (Cmnd 8803) (TSO, London 1983) 
" Other concerns include the breadth of Sections 59 and 87, and the proscription of some ftirther 21 organisations by the TA 2000 
(Proscribed-Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2001 SI 2001 Vo. 1261, despite objections against such extension: (Cmd 264) (TSO, 
London 1987) 
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44 the court rejected the suggestion that the provision should only be used in relation to threats 
in relation to specific locations. Although it was decided that the wording of the TA 2000 NNas 
such as to make it clear that it was expected to be used in a less decisive way than Section 60 of 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the ruling in R (Gillan) highlighted a number of 
HR concerns over the application of Section 44. 
Firstly, highlighted by Bowling and Phillips, the TA 2000 extends what is seen by certain 
sections of the population as a discriminatory state power. 89 Section 44 empowers a uniformed 
constable to stop a vehicle or person and search for articles of a kind which could be used in 
connection with terrorism. A power so broadly defined as to impose little restriction on the kind 
of search that an officer can carry out. 9() 
Secondly, The TA 2000 provides no safeguard against abuse or excessive use of the power other 
than guidance under Section 2 of PACE as to the requirement of certain information to be given 
to a person who is stopped, and a requirement that the exercise of the power be recorded. 91 The 
lack of safeguard formed the focus of Stone and Pettigrew. 92 Examining the impact of Section 44 
on public confidence, 93 both analysists concluded that the power could only be justified were it 
subject to independent monitoring. The negative impact that the power had on public confidence 
was grounded on a suspicion that generalisation (in terms of race and age) formed by the police 
as part of their decision to carry out a stop, suggested that certain persons could find themselves 
subject to unwarranted police attention. Although PACE (Code of Practice A) stated that stereo- 
typed images were not to be relied on as a basis for suspicion, the disparate number of stop and 
searches amongst certain groups was sufficient, in the opinion of Stone and Pettigrew, to 
indicate an ethnic bias in the mind of the police. 
Thirdly, in accordance with Section 19 of the HRA, the Government attached to the TA 2000 a 
statement that it considered Section 44 to be compatible with the ECHR, insofar as it did not 
'9 B. Bowling and C. Phillips Racism, Crime and Justice (Longman Press, Harlow 2002) Chp. 5. See also: Home Office Statistics On 
Race and The Criminal Justice System (2002-2003) 27 (Home Office, London 2003); and Metropolitan Police Authority Report of 
the Scrutiny on MPS Stop and Search Practice (Metropolitan Police Authority, London 2004) 29, indicating an upward trend in the 
police stop and search of certain racial sections of the community 
90 L. Lustgarten 'The Future of Stop and Search' (2002) C. L. R. 603 
9' Home Office Statistics on stop and search which does not require reasonable suspicion indicated the increasing frequency in which 
such power was used. In 2002-2003,32,500 stops were made under Section 44, compared to 10,000 in 2001-2002: Home Office 
Statistics, Arrestsfor Notifiable Offences and the Operation of Certain Police Powers (2002/03) HOSB 17/03, Tables PB, PC (Home 
Office, London) 
V. Stone, and N. Pettigrew 'VieN% of the Public on Stop and Search' (2000) P. R. S. 129,68 
For examination of public attitudes generally to civil-liberties and terrorism post 2000, See: M. Johnson and C. Gearty, 'Civil- 
Liberties and the Challenge of Terrorism' in A. Park. J. Curtice, K. Thomson. M. Phillips and M. Johnson (Eds) British Social 
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involve a degree of interference with personal liberty so as to fall within the scope of Article 5. 
Although it is arguable that the power does not technically breach Article 5, insofar as a person 
is obliged under Section 47 to be searched or questioned, the exercise of Section 44 can be said 
to constitute an encroachment on personal liberty as ordinarily understood by the meaning 
arbitrary interference. According to Stone, Article 5(l)(c) provides that a deprivation of liberty 
on reasonable suspicion is legitimate provided that the detention relates to the commission of an 
offence and is for the purpose of bringing the suspect to court. 94 Accordingly, any exercise of 
Section 44 lacking in such intent, could well amount to a sufficient deprivation of liberty as to 
fall within Article 5.95 
(4) Section 41 
Up until the TA, different legal regimes to counter-act terrorism existed in relation to Northern 
Ireland and the UK. Whereas the Northem-Ireland (Emergency) Provisions Acts 1973,1975, 
19789 19875 1991) 1996 and 1998, introduced a number of emergency powers, the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary-Provisions) Acts of 1974,1976,1984 and 1989,96 enacted a number of 
measures subject to annual review as a response to both terrorist attack and a reasonably 
perceived threat. Under the Emergency Prevention of Terrorism and Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary-Provision) regimes 97 a wide power of arrest, including arrest without warrant, was 
conferred on state officialS. 98 As a response to what the Government considered an increasing 
threat of international terrorism, the TA 2000 repealed the EPA and PTA regimes. The Act 
followed the publication of a Consultation Paper which concluded that the threat from terrorist 
organisations warranted a body of counter-terrorist powers drawn from both regimes as 
permanent legislation. " Accordingly, on the ground that terrorism was a different order in tenns 
of the methods engaged for inducing terror and the extent of harm it caused, the power of the 
state to affect a lawful arrest of a person suspected of terrorist involvement was extended. 
Section 41 (1) of the TA 2000 provides that a constable may arrest without warrant any person 
whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist. For the purpose of the TA 2000, a terrorist is 
defined in Section 40 as a person who has committed an offence under Sections I 1,12,15 18, 
94 Stone (2004), Op. cit at 87 
9' D. Mead 'Stop and Search and the European Court of Human Rights' (2005) J Civ. Lib. 5 (1). The observation is questionable. 
Albeit the credibility of the Section 19 statement is open to discussion, there remains (at the time of writing) no significant ECHR 
case-law which deals directly with the technicality of Section 44. Further, while a claim that an exercise of a Section 44 power 
involved treatment contrarN to Article 3 or a breach of Article 8 is more likelý to be considered where an officer can be shown to 
have acted in a ýNaý beyond \Nhat is permitted, by analogy with the ruling of the ECrtHR in Lmvless v Ireland (1961) 1 EHRR 1, and 
Brogan v L7K (1989) 11 EHRR 117, the use of Section 44 with a view to confirming suspicion is not likelý to be found to involve 
the degrec of deprivation of liberty as to engage Article 5 
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54 and 56 to 63 of the TA 2000; or, a person who has been concerned in the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. The distinction is significant. Insofar as an arrest 
is based on reasonable suspicion of a person having committed an offence, the arrest constitutes 
a standard form of power. However, where reasonable suspicion relates to the commission. 
preparation or instigation of terrorism, the power is different. 'Although acts of terrorism 
will ... 
involve the commission of an offence... the police need have no particular offence in 
mind; nor ... the 
level of involvement of the person arrested. He need not be a principal 
accessory, conspirator or attempter. Being 'concerned in' [the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism] is... wider than any of these. "00 Whereas Sections 40 and 41 
confer powers of arrest analogous to Section 14 of the PTA 1989, by virtue of Section 40(l)(b), 
they extend the power to persons not suspected of a specific crime with the result that an officer, 
having arrested a suspect, can question the arrestee with a view to obtaining information about 
terrorist activities, as opposed to acquiring evidence necessary for a charge to be brought against 
him. Relevant to analysis of Section 44, the lawfulness of the exercise of the power formed the 
subject of a number of ECHR and UK rulings. 
Examining the requirement that an arrest be grounded on relevant consideration, in Chapman v 
Director of Public Prosecutions"' the Court held that an arrest effected by an officer who lacked 
evidence to prove that he thought that an arrestable offence had been committed, would render 
the arrest unlawful. In contrast, in Holgate Mohammed v Duke, 102 the Court held that where an 
officer detained an arrestee under the EPA regime in the belief that to do so would induce the 
arrestee to respond to questioning, such a purpose did not constitute an improper use of power. "' 
In view of the above,, the arrest of a terrorist-suspect by an officer for the purpose of general 
intelligence gathering should be considered ultra-vires. Certainly according to the requirements 
to be applied to determine the lawfulness of a general power in Kenlin v Gardiner' 04 and Rv 
Brown, 105 where an officer does not regard an arrest as a first step in the criminal process, then 
any arrest will be unlawful. But what of the possibility of an arrestee bringing a successful HRA 
challenge to Section 41? 
Regarding the lawfulness of an arrest made under Section 14 of the EPA 1978, in Murray v 
Ministry of Defence' 06 the Court was satisfied that the officer was able to show reasonable 
suspicion that the arrestee had committed the offence for which he had been arrested, and that 
questioning which followed was lawful, even though it was not confined to the offence in 
Stone (2004), Op. cit at 99 
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question. But how can an arrestee establish what the officer's purpose for the arrest xNas? In 
Brogan v UK10' the court held that the fact that an officer did not obtain sufficient ex idence to 
charge the arrestee at the time of arrest did not render it contrary to Article 5(l)(c). The ruling 
makes it near impossible for an arrestee to bring a HRA challenge to Section 41, made even 
more pertinent in the light of the statistics of the Home Office Report 2001 which revealed that 
out of 39 suspects arrested in connection with international terrorism, only 8 were charged xvith 
an offence under anti-terrorism legislation. 108 This leads on to highlight another concern in 
relation to Section 41: the requirement of reasonable suspicion. 
The power of arrest under Section 41 (1) is conditioned on the presence of a reasonable suspicion 
that the arrestee is involved in an offence. The significance of the concept was highlighted by 
Stone: 'the concept of reasonable suspicion is central to the operation of discretionary police 
powers, and therefore crucial to the freedom of the citizen. It is disappointing that it remains... 
a ... concept which is not properly explained ... by definition, or example, in the relevant 
legislation or codes of practice and is dealt with only to a limited extent by case-law. ' 109 
The application of the power to arrest on suspicion in accordance with Section II of the EPA 
1978 formed the subject of Fox v UK"O Section II provided that an officer could arrest any 
person whom he suspected of being involved in terrorism and detain for a maximum period of 
72 hours without charge. The ECrtHR held that the arrest of the suspects on suspicion of 
involvement in terrorist activities constituted a breach of Article 5. Although, the fact that an 
arrest was made under a power which required no degree of reasonable suspicion did not make 
the arrest itself unlawful, the telos of Article 5 was such that a requirement of reasonable 
suspicion (presupposing the existence of facts which would satisfy an objective observer that the 
person concerned may have committed an offence) was necessary to justify an arrest. "' 
Following the ruling in Fox, and a suggestion that a requirement of reasonable suspicion be 
adopted in the event of an arrest without a warrant, 112 the arrest power was abolished under 
Section 6 of the EPA 1987, leaving the power of arrest to be made either under Section 14 of the 
PTA 1989, or a specific power conferred by PACE. However, highlighting the significance of 
the concept of reasonable suspicion, in the sense that it formed the basis of a ground in which 
detention could occur within Article 5, both the functioning of the concept and the ECrtHR 
ruling in Fox formed the focus for further consideration in OHara v Chief Constable of the 
10, (1989) 11 EHRR 117 
108 Home Office Report: Statistics on the Operation of Prevention of Terrorism Legislation, (Issue 16/01,2001) (TSO, London) 
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Royal Uster Constahulary. 113 Section 12(l) of the PTA 1984 provided that conditional on the 
presence of reasonable suspicion, an officer could arrest without warrant a person whom he had 
grounds for suspecting was concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism. Examining Article 5, the Court distinguished the test of reasonable suspicion to be 
applied in relation to that of Section 12, from the test applied in Fox. In the opinion of the Court, 
the test which Section 12 laid down related to what was in the mind of an officer when the 
power of arrest was exercised. Lord Hope stated that he could see no conflict in principle 
between the approach taken and the judgment of the ECrtHR. Whereas in Fox, Section II of tile 
EPA 1978 constituted a breach of Article 5, in the sense that although the arrest was grounded 
for the purposes of UK legislation on a bona-fide suspicion, the suspicion of the officer did not 
presuppose the existence of facts which would satisfy an objective observer that the person 
concerned may have committed the offence, the requirement in Section 12 that reasonable 
suspicion had to be in the mind of an officer when carrying out a power of arrest, satisfied the 
required Article 5 safeguard for protection against arbitrary arrest. The position of the ECrtHR in 
O'Hara was as follows: 
The reasonableness of the suspicion on which an arrest must be based, fon-ns part of the 
safeguard against arbitrary arrest laid down in Article 5(l)(c): 
'This requires the existence of facts ... which would satisfy an objective observer that the person 
concerned may have committed the offence, though what may be regarded as reasonable will depend on 
all the circumstances. ' 114 
However, 
'... the standard imposed by Article 5(l)(c) does not presuppose that the police have sufficient evidence to 
bring charges at the time of the arrest. The object of questioning during detention is to further the criminal 
investigation by way of confirming or dispelling the concrete suspicion grounding the arrest. Thus, facts 
which raise a suspicion need not be of the same level as those necessary to justify a conviction, or even the 
bringing of a charge. ' 115 
The ruling indicates what should form the basis for the exercise of an arrest under the HRA in 
accordance with Article 5. Yet, exemplified by consideration of the concept in Cumming v Chief 
Constable of Northumbria Police' 16 which held that arresting one of a group of persons likely to 
have committed an offence could constitute reasonable suspicion for arresting all, fails to 
acknowledge the difficulties of applying the concept. Apart from the problem whether a 
113 [1997] 1 All ER 129 
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definition of reasonable suspicion can ever be provided, in the sense that the term must be both 
sufficiently flexible to allow an officer to operate effectively, yet sufficiently rigid to ensure the 
protection of rights, it appears unrealistic to formulate standard grounds of reasonable suspicion 
as long as it remains impossible to guarantee its separation from state prejudice, opinion and 
befief. ' 17 Regardless of the ruling of the ECrtHR in Guzzardi v Italy' 18 that the power of arrest 
could not be used to justify a policy of general prevention directed against an individual or a 
category of individuals, there is no guarantee that an officer in deciding whether there is a 
reasonable suspicion will adhere to the concept without bias toward a particular section of the 
population. 
According to Stone, ' 19 justification for Section 41 depended on the balance between the scope of 
the power and the problem against which it was directed. Examining Section I of the TA 2000, 
the definition of terrorism differs from that previously defined. Restricted to acts connected with 
the affairs of Northern Ireland and international terrorism, Section 20 of the PTA 1989 and 
Section 58 of the EPA 1996 defined terrorism as the use of violence for political ends. In 
contrast, albeit by the inclusion of a requirement of serious violence the TA 2000 did give the 
definition of terrorism a narrower scope, by the inclusion of religious and ideological causes, 
Section I significantly extended it. The extension gives rise to two concerns. 
Firstly, in terms of compatibility with Article 5, is the practical difficulty with the Government's 
position that: 
'An arrest power without an explicit link to a specific offence is compatible with Article 5 (1)(c), citing 
the decision in Brogan where, in the circumstances of the case, (where the applicants were suspected of 
being members of a proscribed-organisation), the [ECrtHR] held that their arrest under Section 12 of the 
PTA 1982, was not in breach of Article 5. However, it has been pointed out that the Court noted in Brogan 
that the definition of acts of terrorism was... in keeping with the idea of 'offence' and that after arrest the 
applicants were asked about specific offences; the definition of terrorism is now broader that a person 
arrested might not of course in another case be questioned so specifically. It is accordingly doubtful that 
there is compliance here. ' 120 
Secondly, insofar as the TA can be used to suppress political protest for the purpose of securing 
a political end, the theoretical capability of Section 1, coupled with the extended proscription of 
some 39 organisations to assist in the suppression of action, lays (arguably) far beyond the 
concern of preventing terrorism. Examining the functioning of UK anti-tefforist powers, 
"' BaileN (2001). Op. cit at 192 
(1980) 3 EHRR 333 
Stone (2004). Op. cit at 73 
IN Bailey (2001). Op. cit at 587 
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Dickson 121 claimed that beneath every state restriction of the rights of the individual lay a 
political motivation: the pacification of the perceived demands of the electorate by a 
Government determined to preserve its own authority. Applied to the TA 2000, whether it can be 
said that the concern of terrorism is being exploited for its symbolic significance. is 
indeterminate; What is not, is the little balance given the TA at both the Governmental and 
Parliamentary level between its operational efficiency as an anti-terrorist necessity, and the need 
to protect an increasing class of individual from state erosion of established freedoms and HR. 122 
The A nti- Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 
On 15th October 2001 the Home Secretary announced the introduction of the Anti-Terrorist 
Crime and Security Bill 2001. Introducing a series of measures to attack the operative capability 
of suspected-terrorists, the purpose and functioning of the initiative gave rise to particular 
concern. After the removal of a number of controversial provisions, in December 2001, the Bill 
was hastened through Parliament as the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 200 1.123 
However, constituting an advancement of the coercive and investigatory powers of the State 
introduced in the TA 2000, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and the Criminal 
Justice and Police Act 2001, two factors which gave rise to controversy was the increase in 
power to exchange confidential information, and the detention without-trial of international 
suspects. 
(I) Detention Without- Trial ofInternational Suspects 
The rationale behind the introduction of the ATCSA was intimated by the House of 
Commons. 124 According to state intelligence there were persons with international terrorist 
connections whose presence in the UK was contrary to the interests of national security but 
against whom there was insufficient evidence to bring prosecution. Although non-nationals 
could be deported on the ground of securing the public good, 125 such action would not be 
possible if a person faced treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. 126 The response of the 
UK was the extension of state power over the control of non-nationals, including the ability to 
detain without charge on the basis of a perceived link with terrorism. 127 
12 1 B. Dickson 'Northern Ireland's Emergencý Legislation' [19921 P. L. 592 
'22 In (arguable) contrast to the Parliamentary "prevention , of the enactment of a IaNN against the 'glorifying' as opposed to the 
'encouragement of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2006, which would have effectively prohibited in advance considerable areas of 
political discussion concerning past acts of political violence 
12 1 1--lereafter, ATCSA 
" HC Deb (2001) (Co[ 924) (TSO, London) 
125 Rehman v Home Department [2 00113 WLR 87 7 
'2" Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413 
127 Sections 21 -27 ATCSA 
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Section 21 of the ATCSA provides that where the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that a 
person is involved with terrorism, and whose presence in the UK he reasonably believes is a risk 
to national security, he may issue a certificate indicating that that person is suspected of being an 
international terrorist. Such a person can then be the subject of immigration or deportation 
proceedings in accordance with Section 22, even though deportation would be unlawful; or 
detained in accordance with either the ATCSA,, 128 or the Immigration Act 1973 . 
129 The only 
means of challenge to the issue of a certificate is by appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission 130 with a further right of appeal on point of law to the Court of Appeal. 
Eight months into its operation, the legality of the ATCSA's detention provisions came up for 
challenge before the SIAC. Concerning a Section 23 internment of 12 non-national suspected- 
terrorists, the applicants claimed that detainment without trial in accordance with Section 23 
constituted a breach of Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR. In order to allow for such detainment, the 
UK had made use of Article 15 and Section 14 of the HRA to derogate from Article 5(l). The 
effect was to detain non-nationals regarded as a threat to national security, but unable to be 
removed from the UK without trial,, charge, or proven suspicion of criminal conduct, in high- 
security conditions. The SIAC declared Section 23 incompatible. The declaration formed a 
subject for consideration in A (and Others) v the Home Secretary. 13 1 Adopting a different 
approach to the question of legality, the Court disagreed with the decision of the SIAC. 
Following the reasoning of the House of Lords in Rehman 132 that any threat to security was best 
assessed by the Home Secretary, whether the state had justification to derogate was a judgment 
for the Government to make. As for the applicants' claim that Section 23 constituted a breach of 
Article 14, as non-nationals had only the right not to be removed contrary to Article 3, 
application of Section 23 was not discriminatory. Both the reasoning of the Court, as well as the 
functioning and purpose of Section 23, remains questionable. 
Analysing the functioning of Section 23 in terms of compatibility with Article 14 of the ECHR, 
the distinction made by the Court between the right of a national to remain within the UK and 
the lawful right of the non-national not to be removed contrary to Article 3, was wrong. 
Highlighted by Waldham 133 justification for detention under Section 23 was that the individual 
had such a suspected connection with terrorism as to render him a threat to national security but, 
because of his nationality, was unable to be lawfully removed from the UK. Yet, the way that 
Section 23 operated was to render the legal circumstance as to why such a person could not be 
lawftilly removed from the UK irrelevant to the purpose of detention. 
128 Schedule 2. Paragraph 16 
129 Schedule 3, Paragraph 2 
"" Hereafter. SIAC 
13' [2002] EWCA CIN 1502 
132 [2001] 3 WLR 877 
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The functioning of Section 23 formed the focus of criticism by the Privy-Council Review 
Committee Report 2003-2004,134 the Carlisle-Review 2003 135 and a number of Parliamentary 
Committees 136 who went so far as to find the defacto internment of a class of persons contrary to 
ECHR standards. Characteristically, the criticism was summarily dismissed by the Home 
Secretary, who maintained that the power of detention remained necessary in the interest of 
security. Yet, insofar as UK and non-nationals are subject to different treatment, prima facie 
discrimination does exist. Whereas a UK national would have to be subjected to trial on a charge 
of one of the offences arising under the TA 2000 before detainment could be executed, such a 
requirement does not apply to the non-national. Providing that Sections 21-23 of the ATCSA can 
be defined as the determination of a criminal charge, the functioning of Section 23 represents a 
discriminatory removal from non-nationals a number of due-process safeguards, including the 
presumption of innocence. 
The functioning of Sections 23 of the ATCSA formed the focus of A (and Others) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department. 13' A ruling, according to Gearty, 'rightly celebrated as a high 
point in the story of the judicial protection of unpopular and uninfluential minorities' by its use 
made of Section 4 of the HRA. 138 In a majority decision, the court held that Section 23 of the 
ATCSA was incompatible with the UK's ECHR obligations. On the ground that it was neither 
proportionate, nor compatible with Article 14 of the ECHR, insofar as it discriminated against 
the appellants in their en . oyment of the right to liberty on the basis of their national origin. J 
In reaching its decision, the court examined justification for the derogation from Article 5(1), 
and criticised the Government's use of Article 15 and Section 14 of the HRA. In the opinion of 
Lord Hoffman, Section 23 amounted to an interference with the established liberty: freedom 
from arbitrary detention antithetical to the traditions of the people of the UK. According to Lord 
Hoffman, the UK had an unbroken history of living in accordance with values which showed a 
recognisable continuity. Although the Government had a duty to protect the lives of its citizens, 
it could not destroy 'existing' constitutional freedoms. Accordingly, whether Section 23 was 
justified on the ground that there existed a public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
within the meaning of Article 15, the public interest had to be carefully balanced with the right 
to liberty. In the words of Lord Hope, the right to liberty was a right, not a privilege, to be 
enjoyed without discrimination in accordance with Article 14 of the ECHR. Although the 
executive and the legislature were accorded a margin of discretion in matters relating to national 
security, it remained an essential safeguard that minorities, however unpopular, had the same 
"' HC (2003-2004) (Col. 100) (TSO, London) 
135 Lord Carlisle (2004) Anti-Terrorism, Crime and SecurityAct 2001, Part 11, Section 28, Review 2003, in Ewing (2004), Op. cit at 
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rights as the majority. Due to the gravity of the interference on the right to liberty and the lack of 
evidence to support its discriminatory application, the indefinite detention of foreign nationals 
without trial was held not to be shown to be strictly required to deal with the emergency in 
question, insofar as the same threat from British nationals whom the Government were unable or 
unwilling to prosecute, was being met by other measures which did not require them to be 
detained indefinitely without trial. The court allowed the appeal. 
Finally, the TA 2000 includes a number of offences such as the direction of terrorist 
organisations and the provocation of terrorism in another country punishable by maximum life- 
sentence. However,, highlighted by the Home Affairs Select Committee, if a person 'cannot be 
charged with offences which are defined as widely as these, then there can be little justification 
for certifying them under Section 21 and removing their liberty. ' 139 
With regard to the purpose of Section 23, both the role of Parliament and the use made of the 
ECHR order during the introduction of the ATCSA, formed the focus of criticism. Not least, that 
insofar as the concern of terrorism could be seen to highlight the limitation of Parliamentary 
control over the legislative activity of the Government, the question in relation to the 
introduction of the ATCSA was not so much whether it was decided that the rights of the 
individual should give way to the need to prevent terrorism, than whether the issue of HR was 
considered at all. According to Stone, 140 it is for this reason that it is impossible to take 
Parliament seriously as a HR guardian other than at the most general level. It is also for this 
reason,, difficult to take seriously the direction of the HRA that Parliament pay attention to the 
ECHR when legislating, when the will of the Government is so visibly retained. In this sense, it 
is questionable whether a distinction can be drawn between the promotion of HR and their 
effective protection at the parliamentary level. In accordance with Section 19 of the HRA, the 
ATCSA was declared compatible with the ECHR. According to Fenwick, 141 the impression 
created was that the ATCS Bill had undergone a process of Parliamentary assurance that the Bill 
had met ECHR standards when it had not. Fenwick then went on to suggest that the underlying 
values of the ATCS Bill were not subjected to parliamentary scrutiny, partly as a result of the 
appearance afforded them by Section 19, and partly by the open-ended nature of the ECHR and 
a doctrine of appreciation rendering it susceptible to a minimal interpretation which (in the case 
of the ATCS Act) masked its own erosion. The observation is not unreasonable. 
In Handj, side v UK"' the ECrtHR stated that the role of the ECHR was subsidiary to that of the 
national order and that since the signatory-state was better placed to determine the balance 
13' HC (2001-2002) (Col. 35 1) Paragraph 26 (TSO, London) 
"Stone (2004). Op. cit at 10 
"' H. Fenwick 'The Anti-Terrorist Crime and Securitý Act' (2002) 65 MI. P, 5,728 
142 (1976) 1 EHRR 737 
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between individual rights and societal interests, it would operate a restrained vieýN of anv 
balance struck. According to Fenwick, 'in order to render the Section 19 statement compatible. 
ECHR requirements were minimised by placing ... emphasis on the new powers of interference. 
Having adopted minimal-interpretations of those requirements the Government [then] went on to 
make the Section 19 statement on ... a 
better than even chance of achieving compatibility. Thus, 
it is likely that compatibility was not in fact achieved in respect of the [ATCS] Bill before it 
reached the [House of Lords] but this was not discerned by ... the [House of Commons] who 
afforded the Section 19 statement more weight than it deserved. 1 43 Labelling the House of 
Commons reaction to the ATCS Bill a 'classic' response to measures adopted in the face of an 
emergency, Fenwick highlighted the statement of Lord Stoddart that it was a matter of concern 
that a Bill containing 126 clauses should have been sent to the House of Lords without most of 
them having been properly considered. The statement strikes a blow to Dicyean conviction of 
the efficacy of Parliament as a guardian of established HR and liberties. Whether the House of 
Lords might have been more open to HR consideration, neither the scrutiny afforded, nor the 
UK's constitutional arrangement were such as to prevent the overriding will of the Government 
from introducing (arguably) the most controversial anti-terrorist measures post the HRA. 
Secondly, whereas the ECrtHR has never found that a claim for derogation is unjustified on the 
ground that a state of emergency does not exist, in determining whether the derogation applies 
only to the extent strictly required by the exigency of the situation; its jurisprudence suggests a 
reliance on the discretion of the signatory-state. Following the terrorist-attack on the UK in July 
2005, the focus shifts from not whether a state of public emergency within the meaning of 
Article 15 of the ECHR can be justified, but whether in terms of proportionality, the derogation 
applies only to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation. Although the nature of 
terrorist activity in terms of scope and effect may well justify Sections 21-23 of the ATCSA, in 
terms of proportionality whether the detention provisions can be said to apply to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, is less credible. 144 
The enactment of the detention provisions was justified by the Government as a necessary 
response to terrorism and the need to address the lack of provision to deal with persons whose 
presence as suspected-terrorists in the UK was contrary to the interests of national security, but 
whose deportation would place the UK in breach of its obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the 
ECHR. 145 In practice however, the ATCSA extends far beyond affecting only those persons it 
was purportedly aimed at. Section 21(l) provides that where the Secretary of State reasonably 
believes that a person's presence in the UK constitutes a risk to national security and reasonably 
Fenwick (2002). Op. cit at 730 
F. F'Nving 'The FutIlItN of the Hurnan Rights Act' [2004] P. L. 829 
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suspects that he is a terrorist, he may issue a certificate in respect of that person indicating that 
they are for the purpose of the ATCSA a suspected international terrorist. In accordance with 
Section 21(2) a suspected international terrorist is defined as a person who is, or has been, 
concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism; is a 
member of an international terrorist group; or has links with an international terrorist group. 
Section 2](5) accords the definition of terrorism the same controversial definition as that in 
Section I of the TA 2000. A definition whose breadth catches within its scope such unrelated 
persons as political, environmental, and industrial protestors. 
That the ATCSA goes further than required by the exigencies of the situation, to the extent that 
the power of detention could just as equally have been introduced for the purpose of subjecting 
persons already subject to immigration restrictions to further control, was highlighted by 
Fenwick: 
'Under Section 23(l) persons failing within Section 21 can be subject to detention in respect of 
immigration controls [under the Immigration Act 1971 and Immigration and Asylum Act 1999] despite 
the fact that the action specified in Subsection (2) cannot result in their removal from the UK ... by (a) a 
point of law which ... relates to an international agreement, or (b) a practical consideration. 
No ... explanation of these terms is offered. Provision under (a) presumably relates to Article 
3 [ECHR] 
and other equivalent provisions, while the practical consideration could relate inter-alia to the fact that 
there appears to be no safe country which will take the person, or to the fact that Britain does not have an 
extradition agreement with the country from which the person came. Such persons can then be detained 
under the existing provisions of the 1971 Act allowing for detention of persons liable to examination or 
removal and detention pending deportation. ' 146 
Prima-facie then, there appears to be 4 categories of person who could find themselves subject 
to the ATCSA's detention provisions, albeit all except the first fall beyond the ATCSA's 
intended scope: 
(2) Persons falling within Section 21 who are at risk of Article 3 treatment in their own country, and 
where there appears to be little prospect that they could be deported to a safe third-country; 
(3) Persons falling within Section 21 who are at risk of Article 3 treatment in their own country, but who 
could be deported to a safe third-country; 
(4) Persons falling within Section 21 who are unlikely to be at risk of Article 3 treatment in their own 
country; 
(5) Persons falling within category (1) above, willing to take the risk of Article 3 treatment in another 
country, rather than be subjected to indefinite detention. 
14" Fenwick (2002). Op. cit at 735 
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Sections 21-23 of the ATCSA confer on the state the power to lawfully detain without-trial a 
significant category of non-nationals, including those already subject to immigration control. 
The decision to detain by certification is left to the discretion of the Secretary of State. Although 
a challenge may be brought in the SIA Commission, an absence of qualifying clause renders the 
process of certification immune from independent assessment, including scrutiny by trial. Giving 
rise to the application of due-process on a racially discriminatory basis, prior to certification 
there is no requirement that the Home Secretary should ascertain either the willingness of a 
detainee to leave the UK, or whether there is a risk that the detainee could be subjected to Article 
3 treatment if removed. Nor is it necessary for the Home Secretary to receive legal direction 
regarding the possibility of bringing a detainee to trial rather than relying on the detention 
provisions, or ensure that a safe country is found. Insofar as the ATCSA allows the Government 
to detain persons whether they would willingly be returned to another country or not, the 
application of Sections 21-23 gives rise to the reservation that the detention amounts to a breach 
of Article 3, by placing detainees in a position of being possibly subject to the risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment. 
Finally, following certification that the detainee is, in the opinion of the Home Secretary, an 
international terrorist, the Act makes provision for a number of safeguards including the 
designation of power to the SIAC to hear challenges to the ATCSA. Apart from the criticism 
that the provisions only protect the detainee following a decision of the Home Secretary to 
detain, the extent of their effectiveness is debatable. For example, regarding the subjection of 
Sections 21-23 to review by means of a sunset-clause, albeit in accordance with Section 29(7) of 
the ATCSA Sections 21-23 ceased to have effect on the 10 November 2006, the reality of the 
clause in terms of its effect on the individual is exemplified by the treatment of the detainees in 
A (and Others) . 
147 Despite the statutory rhetoric, in the words of Clayton 'detention without-trial 
is in effect internment... reminiscent of the use of immigration powers during the Gulf war when 
some 176 Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese and Yemeni nationals were served with deportation notices 
and detained... However, neither in this situation nor in the Gulf war was there a declaration of 
war and so the ... legal powers and mechanisms connected with war cannot be invoked. In the 
current situation the war is said not to be against a nation but against terrorism, war against an 
abstract noun seems a dangerous basis for the removal of HR. ' 148 
With regard to the SIAC, albeit it was likely that Strasbourg would view the SIAC procedure as 
providing a form of control proportionate to the demands of the situation, the functioning of the 
SIAC, in terms of both the compatibility of its procedure with the ECHR and the protection it 
affords the individual, is not without criticism. 
14' 12 0021 F WCA Civ 15 02 
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Firstly, if certification and detention under Sections 21-23 can be regarded as constituting a 
criminal charge (as opposed to a preventive measure) the procedure of the SIAC can be said to 
breach the requirements of Article 6 in two respects: 
(1) In respect of the detention process prior to the SIAC's involvement and the due-process requirements 
of Article 6, by the continuance of what is technically an unfair trial; 
(2) By the operation of such procedural factors as a lack of provision that the detainee be informed of the 
charge against him, the denial of a right to defend himself or choose his own legal counsel, and the 
delivery of evidence against him in closed session. 
Secondly, although the SIAC is able to examine appeals, application for bail, and challenges to 
derogation from Article 5, the impact of its appraisal is limited. Under Section 25 of the ATCSA 
a detainee can appeal to the SIAC which has the power to cancel the certificate if it finds that 
there were either no grounds for reasonable belief that the detainee's presence in the UK 
constituted a risk to security, or reasonable suspicion that the detainee could be considered a 
terrorist, but can not prevent the re-issue of a certificate on any ground. Although it is arguable 
that such a re-issuance may be justified where there are grounds to suggest that the detainee 
represents a threat to the security of the nation, where the detainee is an asylum-seeker, then 
detention begins to fall beyond the purpose for which Sections 21-23 were purportedly intended. 
In accordance with criticism levied, not merely against the functioning of the ATCSA and its 
impact on HR, but the actual purpose for its introduction, the most disconcerting concern 
regarding the UK's anti-terrorism regime is the little value shown the democratic values 
underlying the ECHR by a Government (and arguably legislature) prepared to utilise the order in 
order to afford Sections 21-23 a misleading appearance of HR compliance. Insofar as indefinite 
detention without-trial has become the basis of an increasing order of state internment, it is 
unarguable that such measures 'should be subjected to the most rigorous tests for 
proportionality, [that] an immediate and ... serious 
[terrorist] threat should be evident... [and 
that]... measures adopted ... go no 
further than necessary to meet it. ' 149 
(2) The Exchange of Confidential Information 
Section 17 of the ATCSA authorises Government departments, the police, courts, tribunals, and 
any person certain of whose functions are of a public nature to obtain and exchange confidential 
information acquired for one purpose to be used for another. By virtue of Section 17(2) the 
power extends to some 66 statutory powers authorising disclosure of information for the purpose 
"' Feim ick (2002), Op. cit at 725 
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of any actual, initiated or pending criminal investigation, whether in the UK or elsewhere, and 
determination of whether investigation should be initiated, or bought to an end. 
The power of obtaining and exchanging confidential infon-nation under Section 17 formed the 
focus of criticism by the Privy-Council Review Committee 2003-2004. Voicing concern over a 
lack of independent oversight against state abuse, the Committee went on to question the use of 
the power for purposes other than terrorism. Highlighting that, whereas only 21% of disclosures 
made by Customs and Excise related to terrorism, only 4% of Section 19 ATCSA Inland 
Revenue disclosures were so related, 150 the Committee criticised the potential of Section 17 to go 
far beyond the need to deal with suspected-terrorists. Unlimited to the concern of terrorism, or 
serious crime from which a connection to terrorist activity can be construed, Section 17 allows 
for the exchange of confidential information even before determination of whether an 
investigation should be initiated: thus, even before suspicion has arisen, or grounds to believe 
that the information exchanged relates to a security risk. 
The Government justified its introduction of Section 17 on the ground that as terrorists were 
invariably concerned in crime, such a measure would render the detection of terrorists more 
practicable. 15 1 The justification is interesting. If an anti-terrorist measure with no connection 
with terrorism can be justified, then any measure introduced under the guise of securing the 
national good could become common place. The Government's response to criticism regarding 
the breadth of Section 17 was to claim that an individual could make use of the HRA. However, 
'to suggest that a person wrongly treated by the [ATCSA] can successfully rely on Article 8 as a 
safeguard is disingenuous insofar as there are both procedural and substantive problems in doing 
so. 152 In the sense that there is no way that an individual can be informed of a Section 17 
disclosure, the obvious argument against the practicality of an individual relying on the HRA, is 
that an Article 8 claim could only be brought up at trial were the individual is solely reliant on 
the court's approach toward its Section 3 HRA interpretative obligation, the effect of which, 
even if successful, would not provide him with relief. 
The Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005 
The Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005 153 proposed (arguably) the boldest state interference with 
established fundamental rights and freedoms post the ATCSA, the most controversial being the 
proposed extension of the period of detention of terrori st- suspects from 14 to 90 days; and the 
deportation of Islamic extremists. 
'-"' The NeNNIon Committee Report (2003-2004) HC Deb 100 Paragraph 157 (TSO, London) 
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(1) Extended Detention of Terrorist-Suspects 
The AT Bill 2005 proposed to extend the period which suspected-terrorists could be detained 
without charge from 14 to 90 days. The proposal gave rise to an unprecedented degree of 
Parliamentary, cross-party, judicial, academic and public criticism, all of which voiced serious 
concern over the HR effect and legality of the proposal. 
The Government's justification for the extension of the 14 day period of detention without 
charge was four-fold. Firstly, the right of the UK citizen to be afforded protection from terrorism 
outweighed any concern for the rights and freedom of the terrori st- suspect. Secondly, the 90 day 
period was necessary as the most effective way of dealing with terrorism. Given the nature of 
terrorism, the extra time proposed was necessary in order to identify and investigate suspects and 
their contacts, decrypt data, and conduct what was often lengthy inquiry across different 
countries and jurisdictions. Thirdly, given such a compelling case for the extension of the period 
of detention by security forces, there was a real risk that the UK electorate would be disturbed 
were the Government to ignore their recommendations and opt for a lesser period which would 
place the interest of the suspect above that of the state. Fourthly, the proposed 90 day extension 
period was not out of step with other Western nations. The justification was not entirely 
convincing. 
Firstly, although the potential of terrorists to cause major disruption and damage to a nation 
cannot be underestimated, part of the function of Government is to put such risks into context. 
To seek extension of the period of detention of terrorist-suspects from 14 to 90 days, is to return 
to the pertinence of arguments lodged against Sections 21-23 of the ATCSA that powers of 
detention must be subject to judicial approval and that allegations that people are dangerous 
must be proved before a criminal court. 
Secondly, comparative examination of Germany, France and Italy renders the claim that the 
proposed 90 day extension period was not out of step with other western nations debatable. 
Whereas in the UK, once the period of detention expires, investigation of the suspect ceases, in 
Germany, France and Italy officials are at liberty to continue questioning beyond the expiry of 
the initial period. The reason for this ability is that characteristic of a number of European states 
the detention of suspects is placed directly into the hands of an investigatory magistrate. Thus, 
whereas in Germany, a person suspected of terrorist involvement is required to appear before a 
judge within 48 hours of his arrest and once remanded in custody his detention subject to judicial 
review every six months; and in France, a suspect can be held for a period of 48 hours which can 
only be extended by a further two periods of 24 hour duration on the authorisation of a 
81 
magistrate; in Italy, under a decree passed in July 2005, a terrorist suspect can only be detained 
for a maximum 24 hours before being brought before a magistrate. 
Regardless of the Government's justification, Parliamentary criticism of the 90 day proposal 
remained. Whereas, in the opinion of Attomey-General Lord Goldsmith, justification for 
extended detention could not been made, others felt sufficiently incited by the Government's 
single-minded determination to pursue the extension to forward a number of constitutional 
reminders. Albeit acknowledging that previous investigation into terrorism had on occasion 
collapsed due to lack of effective investigation, Lord Carlile called for more judicial oversight of 
the detention process. Questioning 'whether what [was] proposed in the [2005] Bill would be 
proof to challenge under the [HRA] given the length of extended detention envisaged, ' 
according to Lord Carlile, 'a more searching system [was] required to reflect the seriousness of 
the state holding someone in high-security custody without charge for as long as three 
months. ' 154 The same call was reiterated by Liberal-Democrat Home-Affairs spokesperson Mark 
Oaten who pointed out that even where other countries did hold suspects for significant periods, 
there was always one common safeguard in operation: participation by an independent 
judiciary. 155 
On the ground that extension of the existing detention period was disproportionate to the threat, 
counter-productive and an incitement to terrorism, the proposed 90 day provision was defeated 
in the House of Commons on the 9 November 2005 by some 322 votes to 291. Commenting on 
the Government's defeg, a number of public opponents of the pre-charge 90 day extension plan 
claimed that, in spite of the effort of the Government to turn the concern into an issue of party 
tribalism, the finding of the House of Commons re-instated a general trust in the functioning of 
Parliament. Certainly, following Liberty's criticism of the AT Bill 2005, the defeat of the 90 day 
provision was considered heartening in the sense that it was not the courts that had defeated the 
proposal but Parliament. Yet, whether Parliamentary rejection was a result of regard for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, or an attempt to detach itself from the 
controversy surrounding the Government and its policy, the degree of suspicion raised over the 
attempt by the Government to enforce its 90 days provision, can not but give rise to questions 
regarding the motivation behind the relatively unprecedented degree of protest. Certainly, with 
regard to the manner in which the Government attempted to force the AT Bill 2005 onto the 
statute book, lacking in even cursory debate on its wider HR implications, the AT Bill 2005 was 
left open to the allegation of gesture politics in what has increasingly become in the general 
opinion of the media, the Government's tradition of knee-jerk legislation. 
'rhe independent Newspaper. 13 October 2005 p. I 
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With regard to the parliamentary response to the AT Bill 2005, albeit (arguably) motivated by 
what appeared a very open concern with its wider HR implications, the degree of protest raised 
is just as easily explained as not so much concern with the 90 day internment of terrorist- 
suspects, than a dissatisfaction with the Government's impatience with the Parliamentary 
process, disregard for the rule of law, and attempt to stretch its power at Parliament's own very 
real constitutional and public expense. 
(2) The Deportation oflslamic Extremists 
Examining the findings of the Foreign Office Report published on 13th October 2005, the 
Shadow Home Secretary stated that if the Government wanted to look abroad for viable counter- 
terrorist solutions,, it could do no better than follow the example of its international neighbours 
and set about the deportation of Muslim extremists. ' 156 The suggestion is interesting. 
On 7th September 2005, the Home Secretary called for the production of a dossier examining the 
relevance of the role of the ECHR in relation to UK counter-terrorism measures, in particular the 
practice of deporting terrorist-suspects. Consisting of a memorandum of understanding on the 
treatment of terrorist-suspects generally, and a number of justifications for their deportation to 
countries with poor HR records, the dossier was published as the Home Secretary headed to 
Strasbourg on 7 September 2005 to argue his case at the European Parliament. According to the 
Home Secretary, it was inconceivable that any desire to deport non-nationals would be met with 
hostility by any EU authority where an assurance from the country to which the detainee was to 
be deported that the detainee would not be subjected to Article 3 treatment was in place. 
However, because the threat to UK security was such that it was necessary to consider the 
continuing relevance of the ECHR, were a policy of deporting suspects to countries with poor 
HR records to be found to be incompatible, then the UK would have no option than to seek 
derogation from the ECHR, including Article 5. 
In comparison with its ECHR neighbours, the approach of the UK toward the concern of 
deportation, coupled with the not dissimilar (though certainly more harshly orated) Italian 
approach to the concern of individual rights, is interesting. 
In France, except for persons granted political asylum, any non-national (including those with 
long-term residence permits) who pose a threat to public order or national security can be 
automatically subject to deportation. In Germany, since January 2005, the Government can 
lawfully deport a person for hate-preaching as well as engage a number of powers to restrict the 
political activities of non-nationals. However, where an expulsion of such a person would 
"' lbid, P. I 
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constitute a violation of ECHR law,, such persons can be alternatively dealt with by appropriate 
supervision orders. Similarly, whereas in Norway non-nationals can not lawfully be deported to 
a country where they could be sub ected to Article 3 treatment, neither in Spain, where persons 
can be detained up to 40 days pending deportation if they have participated in any activity 
deemed prejudicial to the state, and proceedings officially halted if the person then claims 
asylum, nor Sweden, where persons for reasons of national security can be subjected to lawful 
expulsion, is a person lawfully subjected to deportation to any country where he could run the 
risk of being subject to a death penalty. 
In contrast, in Italy, a person suspected of promoting terrorism can, as from July 2005, be 
deported on the order of a Police-Chief, as opposed to a court of law. The deportee can appeal 
against the deportation order but only from the country to which he has been deported. Grounded 
on a strong national sentiment that works against the telos of the ECHR, the legislative reform 
allows for the swift deportation of suspects, as well as an extended period of detention during 
which police can question without charge. The July 2005 change in the law was a result of a 
campaign by Italy's far right Northern League Party to deal with Islamic fundamentalists. 
Constituting in the words of the Italian Government a crackdown on terror-suspects, and 
analogous to the sentiment of the UK Government expressed throughout 2005, the measures 
serve to highlight the vulnerability of the universalism that lies at the core of the ECHR order to 
the overriding secular concerns of the signatory-state. 
To summarise, following on the criticism directed at the ATCSA, the AT Bill 2005 constituted 
perhaps one of the most controversial counter-terrorist proposal to date. As well as extended 
detention without trial and the deportation of Islamic extremists, other proposals included orders, 
curfews, electronic-tagging and restrictions on contact with named individuals. Reflecting the 
style of the incumbent Government, the Home Secretary admitted counter-terrorism was a 
sensitive area but remained assured that any 14R concern would be overcome. However, 
exacerbated by the Government's controversial handling of the AT Bill 2005, such confidence 
did not prevent it from becoming on the 9th November 2005, the first Labour Government defeat 
as a result of backbench rebellion since Callaghan's Administration March 1979. 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(1) The Control Order Regime 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 15' received Royal Assent on the II March 2005. 'An Act 
to provide for the making against individuals involved in terrorism-related activity of orders 
'5-7 Hereatler, PTA 2005 
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imposing obligations on them for purposes connected with preventing or restricting their further 
involvement in such activity, ' 158 the PTA 2005 constituted a replacement of the repealed Part 4 
of the ATCSA; an arguable political reaction to the ruling against indefinite detention of non- 
nationals only in Av Secretary of State for the Home Department159 and the legal and political 
criticism raised generally in relation to the extended detention of terrorist-suspects proposed in 
the AT Bill 2005. The PTA 2005 introduced two forms of control capable of imposing 
obligations on any individual suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity, irrespective 
of nationality, or terrorist-cause: 160 
1. The derogating control order: made by the High Court or Court of Session on application from the 
Secretary of State; amounting at its extreme to a breach of Article 5 of the ECHR and requiring derogation 
under Article 15; 
2. The non-derogating control order: involving the implication of restraints and obligations deemed not to 161 f I constitute a possible breach of Article 5, ollowing an application by the Secretary of State to the High 
Court or Court of Session for permission to make such an order where he: (1) has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity; and (2) considers that 
it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to 
make an order imposing obligations on that individual. 
Highlighted by Fenwick 162 and Gearty, 16' and raised in the rulings of Judge Sullivan in Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v JJ and 5 Ors 164 and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v MB, 165 Judge Ouseley in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF, 1 66 
Judge Beatson in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Mahmood Abu Rideh and J 
(Interested Party), 167 and the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
JJ and 5 Ors, 168 the control order regime can be criticised on a number of grounds. 
1. That the restrictions imposed on an individual suspected of terrorism-related activity under a non- 
derogating control order when taken together can, and on occasion do, amount in fact to a deprivation of 
liberty under Article 5; 169 
2. For the weak and unfair standard of judicial review of the lawfulness of the Secretary of State's 
decision to make an order constituting an arguable breach of the right to a fair trial in Article 6; 170 
3. For constituting an arguable departure from the normal criminal law in its provision for the imposition 
of restraints on persons on the basis of a suspicion that would not necessarily/normally forrn the basis of a 
criminal charge; 17 ' and an arguable breach of the fair trial requirements of Article 6; 172 
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4. For giving rise to the concern of a 'drift towards a... bureaucratic kind of authoritarianism, with 
individuals lost to public view by non-derogating control orders maintained in perpetuity as much bY 
repressive momentum, combined with over-cautious risk-assessment, as by any genuine and continuing 
societal need; ' 173 
5. For constituting a return to the exclusion order under which a number of Irish persons were expelled 
from Britain on suspicion of terrorism without proper due-process, criticised by the (then) Shadow Home 
Secretary, Tony Blair. 174 
On analysis, the criticisms are not unreasonable. 
With regard to the first criticism, that the restrictions imposed on an individual suspected of 
terrorism-related activity under a non-derogating control order when taken together can, and on 
occasion do, amount in fact to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5, was highlighted in the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF, 175 the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v JJ, KK, GG, HH, NN and LL, 176 and Secretary of Statefor the Home Department v 
JJ (5 Others). 177 
In AF, the Court was called on to consider the application of a non-derogating control order 
made against an individual who had been arrested along with a number of Libyan nationals who 
had already been deported on grounds of national security. The controlee was released without 
charge and served with a control order later replaced with one that prevented him from leaving 
his home for more than ten hours a day; imposed electronic tagging; restricted him to a certain 
geographical area when out of his home; and required the prior identification and approval of all 
unauthorised visitors during the curfew hours. The court held that the degree of restrictions 
placed on the controlee was such as to amount in fact to an Article 5 deprivation of liberty. In 
reaching his decision, Judge Ouseley acknowledged that, although the decision of the Secretary 
of State in the instant case was well balanced,, freedom from arbitrary detention by the 
authorities was of fundamental importance. The distinction between a deprivation of liberty and 
a restriction on movement was one of degree and intensity. In determining whether a case fell on 
one side of the line or the other,, the court had to start with an examination of the actual situation 
of the individual controlee in question and take into account a range of criteria such as the type, 
duration, effect and manner of enforcement of the restrictions imposed. "' Accordingly, the 
cumulative effect of the control order had to be fully examined. 
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The relevance of the cumulative effects of the restrictions imposed was made clear in Secretat-j, 
179 
of State for the Home Department v JJ, KX, GG, HH, AIN and LL . 
In JJ, Judge Sullivan had 
little hesitation in ruling that the restrictions in question imposed on the controlees constituted 
the 'antithesis of liberty' amounting to a deprivation contrary to Article 5; that the restrictions 
and obligations imposed constituted derogating control orders which the Secretary of State had 
no power to make, and which having been made without having sought and obtained derogation 
under Article 15, constituted a clear breach of Article 5. In reaching his decision, Judge Sullivan 
stated firstly, that a basic distinction was to be drawn between mere restrictions on liberty of 
movement and the deprivation of liberty and that the former, governed by Article 2 of Protocol 
4, did not amount to a breach of Article 5. This, according to Judge Sullivan, was clearly spelt 
out in a number of ECrtHR rulings, including that of Guzzardi v Italy., 80 Secondly, the 
distinction was one merely of degree or intensity of restrictions, not of nature or substance. 
Thirdly, the court must start with the concrete situation of the controlee(s) in question and take 
account of a range of criteria such as the type, duration, effect and manner of implementation of 
the measure(s) in question. Fourthly, account must be taken of the cumulative effect of the 
various restrictions. 181 
The Secretary of State appealed. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ (5 
Others) 182 the Court of Appeal had little hesitation in finding that Judge Sullivan had been right 
to have held that the purported non-derogating control orders in question constituted derogating 
control orders which the Secretary of State had no jurisdiction to make, insofar as the cumulative 
effect of the restrictions imposed were so severe as to amount in fact to an Article 5 deprivation 
of liberty; and that, although it was questionable whether the provisions of Section 3(10) and 
Section 3(12) of the PTA 2005 were designed to deal with a challenge to a control order on the 
ground that it was ultra vires, Judge Sullivan had acted well within his jurisdiction when he 
decided to quash the orders, rather than modify their restrictions. 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal held that the approach adopted by Judge Sullivan 
was correct. In considering the question of what constituted a deprivation of liberty, the extent 
to which the obligations in the control orders enabled the controlees to live a normal life had to 
be examined. The starting-point had to be the concrete situation of each controlee. Examining 
the effect of the orders, Judge Sullivan had taken as a starting-point the actual impact of 
restricting the controlees to their homes for some eighteen hours a day, as well as a range of 
other factors which were thought to interfere with the controlees' 'everyday lives, ' including the 
impact of the particular physical restraints that were imposed on the controlees when allowed to 
"9 [20061 F\N*IiC 1623 (Admin) 
180 (1981) 3 EHRR 333 
181 [20061 F"'C-A Ci\ 1141 Paragraph 3", 
1 R2 [2006] EWCA ON 1141 
87 
leave their homes and the extent to which their cumulative effect prevented the controlees from 
pursuing a 'life of choice. ' In the opinion of the court, the controlees' concrete situation ýNas the 
antithesis of liberty and more akin to detainment in open prison. For the eighteen hours in which 
the conrolees were to remain in their homes,, their homes were subject to random searches in the 
manner of a prison. Moreover, unlike in open prisons, the controlees had no access to an appeal 
mechanism by which they could challenge any refusal of consent under the obligations contained 
in the control order. 183 
With regard to consideration of the purpose for which the control orders had been imposed, 
according to the court, on an accurate understanding of Davis v Secretary of Statefor the Home 
Department' 84 it could not be accepted that any doubt should be resolved in favour of the 
Secretary of State. In Davis, the restrictions in question had been imposed both for the purpose 
of protecting the public and the individual's own interests, and each purpose had to be 
considered when assessing the cumulative impact of the restrictions. If the purpose was similar 
to purposes for which states ordinarily imposed detention in prison, then this would be an 
indication towards the restriction constituting a deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, and in 
accordance with the ruling in Guzzardi v Italy, 185 the more likely that the restriction was imposed 
in the interests of the individual,, the less likely would the courts regard them as a deprivation of 
liberty. As there was no indication in JJthat the control orders had been imposed in the interests 
of the controlees, the control orders were quashed, but a stay imposed pending appeal. The 
Secretary of State appealed. 
Iii Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ (and Others) " 86 Lords Hoffman and 
Carswell dissenting, it was held that: (1) neither Judge Sullivan, nor the Court of Appeal, had 
erred in their legal reasoning. The cumulative effect of the restrictions and obligations of the 
control orders in question had resulted in the controlees living in solitary confinement for an 
indefinite detention. Although the area open to them during their six non-curfew hours was not 
objectionable, insofar as their lives remained wholly regulated by the Home Office Guzzardi v 
Italy 18' and Engel v Netherlands'88applied. (2) As the Secretary of State was not accorded the 
power to make the control orders in questions, the control orders in question were a nullity. 
Defects could not be cured by amending specific restrictions and obligations. (3) That it was 
clear, according to Lord Hoffman, from the unqualified nature of the right to liberty and its place 
in the scheme of the other qualified ECHR rights, that it dealt with literal physical restraint. In 
order to preserve the distinction between the unqualified right to liberty and the qualified rights 
'" Gu: zardi v ltaly (1981) 3 EHRR 333 
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of freedom of movement, communication5 association and so forth,, it was essential not to give 
an over expansive interpretation to the concept of deprivation of liberty. Av Secretary of State 
for the Home Department"' was considered. The controlees' situations could not be compared 
with that of persons in prison. Even if it was accepted that the control order violated the 
conrolees' right to liberty, there was no conceptual reason why the court could not modify the 
order so as to make it lawful, and the judge's failure to accept that he had such power had been 
an improper exercise of his discretion. 
The approach adopted by both Judge Sullivan, and the Court of Appeal in JJ, was followed in 
Secretary of Statefor the Home Department v E. '90 In 2005 a control order was imposed on the 
controlee which confined him to his residence between 7pm and 7am; prohibited any 
unauthorised visitors to the residence, or any pre-arranged meeting outside of it; and prohibited 
him from possessing any fon-n of mobile communication, including mobile telephones and 
internet access. The court held that although the Secretary of State did have reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that the controlee had been involved in terrorism-related activity, the cumulative 
effect of the restrictions and obligations imposed in the control order constituted a breach of 
Article 5. In reaching its decision, the Court adopted the approach of Judge Sullivan and the 
Court of Appeal in JJ (5 Others), and held that since the PTA 2005 did not empower the 
Secretary of State to make a control order which would in effect amount to an Article 5 
deprivation of liberty, the court was well within its jurisdiction to quash the control order under 
the power accorded it by Section 3(12)(a) of the PTA 2005. 
Both the approach of the Court in E toward the relevance of the cumulative effect of control 
orders, and the engagement of Section 3(12)(a) of the PTA 2005, formed the focus of Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v Mahmood Abu Rideh and J'9' The controlee appealed 
against the conferral of a non-derogating control order and applied for a supervisory hearing 
under Section 3 of the PTA 2005. In 2001 the controlee was detained under the ATCSA,, during 
which time his pre-existing mental health problems worsened. In 2005 the controlee was 
released and made subject to a non-derogating control order, the terms of which confined him to 
his home for some twelve hours a day; instructed him to report to the relevant monitoring 
authority some four times a day, as well as when he left and returned to his home; placed a 
number of restrictions on visitors to his home, pre-arranged meetings with persons outside of his 
home, and on his use of communications equipment; and subjected his home to random searches 
by the police. A new order was imposed which revoked the former requirement to seek 
authorisation for any pre-arranged meetings outside of his home, but which required that prior 
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authority was sought and granted for any employment for which he received payment. The court 
held that the cumulative effect of the restrictions imposed by the control order had deprived the 
controlee of his Article 5 right to liberty, and the order was quashed. In reaching his decision, 
Judge Beatson held that the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence clearly highlighted the 
requirement that a distinction had to be drawn between mere restrictions on the freedom of 
movement,, and an actual deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, the cumulative effects of the 
restrictions imposed, as well as consideration of the controlee's pre-existing mental health 
problems, were relevant factors in considering whether the control order had crossed that 
boundary and deprived the particular controlee in question of his liberty. 
With regard to the court's exercise of the power accorded it by Section 3(12)(a) of the PTA 
2005, in passing the PTA it was clear that Parliament had intended that the Secretary of State 
should not have power to make a control order which had the effect of depriving a controlee of 
his liberty in breach of Article 5. As the cumulative effect of the control order in question had 
done exactly this, and as the Secretary of State had no power to make the order, then following 
the finding of the Court of Appeal in JJ (5 others), it was well within the power accorded the 
court under Section 3(12)(a) to quash the order. 
With regard to the second criticism, Section 3(l) of the PTA 2005 provides that unless a non- 
derogating control order is considered urgent, the Secretary of State must not make an order 
against an individual except where, having decided that there are grounds to make such an order, 
he has applied to the court for permission to make the order and has been granted that 
permission. Where the Secretary of State makes a non-derogating control order without the 
pen-nission of the court, he must immediately, within seven days, refer the order to the court, and 
the function of the court on the reference is to consider whether the decision of the Secretary of 
State to make the order he did was obviously flawed. 192 Section 3(2) of the PTA 2005 provides 
that where the Secretary of State makes an application for permission to make a non-derogating 
control order, the application must set out the order for which he seeks permission, and the 
function of the court is to consider whether the decision that there are grounds to make that order 
is obviously flawed; the court may give that permission unless it deten-nines that the decision is 
obviously flawed; and if it gives pen-nission, the court must give directions for a hearing in 
relation to the order as soon as reasonably practicable after it is made. In accordance with 
Section 2(6) of the PTA 2005, the Secretary of State may renew a non-derogating control order, 
(with or without modifications), for a period of 12 months if he considers that it is necessary, for 
purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for an order 
imposing obligations on the controlled person to continue in force, and considers that the 
"' Sections 3(3) and 3(4) of the PTA 2M 
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obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with 
preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity. Further, it is 
'immaterial' for the purposes of determining what obligations may be imposed by a control 
order made by the Secretary of State, whether the involvement in terrorism-related activitý, to be 
prevented or restricted by the obligations is connected with matters to which the Secretary of 
State's grounds for suspicion relate. '9' 
According to Gearty, 'this curious formulation of the PTA 2005 [was/is] the result of much 
Parliamentary energy having been expended on the question of who exactly should be making 
these orders: the answer for the sponsors of the measure remains the minister, while for its critics 
it is in practice the courts. But this concession to Parliamentary opponents of the proposal 
exacted a high price in the very light standard of review that the court can then bring to the 
question of whether to grant or refuse permission. ' 194 Coupled with a number of HR concerns 
regarding the actual functioning of the control order regime, the observation is not unreasonable. 
Firstly, the function of the court is to consider whether the Secretary of State's decision that 
there are grounds to make the control order in question is obviously flawed. However, since the 
court can only refuse permission when the decision is found to be obviously flawed, it is unlikely 
at that stage that pen-nission will be withheld. Section 3(6) provides that on a reference under 
Section 3(3)(a) if the court determines that the decision of the Secretary of State to make a non- 
derogating control order against the controlled person was obviously flawed, it must quash the 
order; if it determines that that decision was not obviously flawed but that a decision of the 
Secretary of State to impose a particular obligation by that order was obviously flawed, it must 
quash that obligation and (subject to that) confirm the order and give directions for a hearing in 
relation to the confin-ned order; and in any other case, must confirm the order and give directions 
for a hearing in relation to the confirmed order. Highlighted by Fenwick, the use of the term 
'obviously flawed' makes it unlikely that a control order would be refused at the permission 
stage. 195 
Secondly, in accordance with Section 3(5), the court may consider an application for permission 
under Section 3(l)(a) and a reference under Section 3(3)(a): (1) in the absence of the individual 
in question; (2) without his having been notified of the application or reference; and (3) without 
his having been given an opportunity (if he was aware of the application or reference) of making 
any representations to the court. Any opportunity of the controlee to engage with the process 
comes after, rather than before, the actual control order is made. 
I') A Section 2(9) PTA 2005 
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Finally, once a control order is confirmed, the court must then give directions for a hearing in 
relation to the order as soon as reasonably practicable after it is made, at which, and in 
accordance with Section 3(l 0), the function of the court is to determine whether the Secretary of 
State's decision that the requirements of Section 2(l)(a) and (b) were satisfied for the making of 
the order; and whether his decisions on the imposition of each of the obligations imposed by the 
order, was flawed. In accordance with Section 3(11), testing for such defects is to be made by 
reference to the principles applicable on an application forjudicial review. Namely, following a 
special procedure involving the (arguable) protection accorded the use of closed material and the 
use of a special advocate, determination of whether the decision in relation to the making of the 
control order was flawed,. and whether the decision to impose the obligations in question was 
flawed. Highlighting in particular the (arguable) weak and unfair standard of judicial review of 
the lawfulness of the Secretary of State's decision to make an order, whether the procedures in 
Section 3 of the PTA 2005,, were/are in fact incompatible with the Article 6 right to a fair trial, 
formed the focus of Secretary ofStatefor the Home Department v MB. 196 
In MB, the Secretary of State had obtained pennission on a without notice application to make a 
non-derogating control order to restrict the ability of an individual suspected of terrorist 
involvement from travelling outside of the UK. In accordance with Section 3 of the PTA 2005, 
the court was required to follow a special procedure which involved the use of closed material 
and a Special Advocate. At a full hearing Judge Sullivan considered the closed material and held 
that the control order remain in force. He further held that the procedure under the PTA 2005, 
whereby the court merely reviewed the lawfulness of the Secretary of State's decision to make 
the order on the basis of the material available to him at that earlier stage, was unfair, and made a 
declaration of incompatibility with regard to the law under which the order was made under 
Section 4(2) of the HRA. According to Judge Sullivan, 'to say that the [PTA 2005] does not give 
the [controlee] in this case ... a 
fair hearing ... would be an understatement. The procedure under 
the [PTA 2005], whereby the court merely reviews the lawfulness of the Secretary of State's 
decision to make the order upon the basis of the material available to him at that earlier stage, 
[is] conspicuously unfair. The thin veneer of legality which is sought to be applied by Section 3 
of the [PTA 2005] cannot disguise the reality ... that the controlee's rights under the 
[ECHR] are 
being determined not by an independent act in compliance with Article 6(l) of the [ECHR], but 
by executive decision-making, untrammelled by any prospect of effective judicial 
supervision. "" 
With regard to the third criticism, according to Gearty 'the control order regime [constitutes] a 
major departure from the normal criminal law in that it provides for the imposition of quite 
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severe restraints on persons on the basis of a suspicion that would not necessarily form the basis 
of a criminal charge and after a process that, like the ASBO regime that preceded it, lacks many 
of the vital safeguards associated with the criminal trial. ' 198 Despite the summary given in the 
Explanatory Notes to the PTA 2005 that the purpose of the Act was to provide only for the 
making of what are defined as preventative orders designed to restrict or prevent the further 
involvement by individuals suspected of being involved in terrorism-related activity in such 
activity; "9 or the finding of the Court of Appeal in Secretary of Statefor the Home Department v 
M 200 201 B9 and Re MB, that proceedings under Section 3 of the PTA 2005 did not technically 
constitute criminal proceedings, insofar as they did not involve determination of a criminal 
charge, the observation is not in fact unreasonable. 
In MB,, 202 the Court of Appeal held that Judge Sullivan had erred in holding that the provisions 
for review by the court of the making of a non-derogating control order by the Secretary of State 
did not comply with the requirements of Article 6(2) of the ECHR. Section 3(10) of the PTA 
2005 could not be read so as to restrict the court to a consideration of whether, when the 
Secretary of State made the initial decision, he had reasonable grounds for doing so. A purposive 
approach to Section 3(10) had to enable the court to consider whether the continuing decision to 
keep the order in place was flawed, therefore Section 3(l 0) had to be read as requiring the court 
to consider whether the decisions were flawed at the time of the court's determination. Section 
3(10), when read alongside Section 11(2) of the PTA 2005, did not restrict the court to a 
standard of review that fell short of that required to satisfy Article 6. Proceedings under Section 
3 of the PTA 2005 did not involve determination of a criminal charge. Section 3(10) did not 
require the court to apply a low standard of proof. The court had only to deten-nine whether there 
existed reasonable grounds for suspicion, not whether a fact had been established according to a 
specified standard of proof. The procedures in question represented a determination of civil 
rights and obligations. Accordingly, the question to be determined was whether the procedure for 
determining whether reasonable grounds for suspicion did exist in fact satisfied the fair trial 
requirements of Article 6. As both relevant Strasbourg authority and UK law acknowledged that 
it was often necessary in the interests of justice to make use of closed material, and the PTA 
2005 made provision for the engagement of a special advocate, alongside a number of well 
established rules of court, the Secretary of State's appeal should be allowed, and the validity of 
the non-derogating control order reconsidered. 
'9" Geam (2007). Op cit at 120 
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In conjoined appeals, the appellants M and F in Re MB203 appealed against the decisions in 
MB204 and A '1-205 that the procedures contained 
in Section 3 of the PTA 2005 were not 
incompatible with Article 6. Examining whether the procedures provided for by Section 3 of the 
PTA and Part 76 of the CPR were compatible with Article 6, the Court held that (1) non- 
derogating control order proceedings did not involve the determination of criminal charge 
insofar as there was no assertion of criminal conduct, only a foundation of suspicion, and no 
identification of a specific criminal offence; (2) that the control order regime was itself 
preventative, as opposed to punitive or retributive; and (3) that the actual restrictions and 
obligations imposed, had to be no more restrictive than was necessary to achieve the control 
order's preventative purpose. 206 However, in reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that 
in any given case in which a controlee was at risk of being subjected to an order containing 
restrictions which, either in terms of severity or in terms of their cumulative effect, could amount 
to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5,, the application of the civil limb of 
Article 6 did entitle him to such procedural protections as was commensurate with the gravity of 
the potential consequences. 207 And, whilst the court could not be confident that Strasbourg 
would always hold that every control order hearing in which the special advocate procedure 
provided for in the PTA 2005 would satisfy Article 6 it should, with strenuous effort, be possible 
to accord the controlee in question an ECHR satisfactory measure of procedural justice. 
According to the orthodox view apparent from both MB208 and Re MB209 then, in the context of 
control order proceedings, the use of sanctions almost and practicably indistinguishable in their 
impact from criminal sanctions outside the criminal process, does not constitute the equivalent of 
a criminal charge. However, for a number of reasons, it is arguable that the proceedings could 
and should be viewed as criminaL, rather than civil. 
Firstly, breach of an obligation imposed by a control order without reasonable excuse, will be a 
criminal offence punishable following conviction on indictment, with a prison sentence of up to 
five years or a fine, or both; or following summary conviction, to a prison sentence of up to 
210 
twelve months (or six months in Scotland or Northern Ireland), or a fine, or both . 
Secondly, although in Benham v UK21 1 the ECrtHR held that although Regulation 41 of the 
Community Charge (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations did not in accordance with 
domestic law create a criminal offence, nevertheless it should be accounted criminal for the 
203 [2007] UKHL 46 
204 [2006] EWCA 1140 
2115 [2007] EWHC 65 1 (Admin) 
2"6 Av Secretary ofStatefor the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502 
N7 Engel vNetherlands (1979) 1 EHRR 647 
208 [20061 FkVCA 1140 
201) [20071 UKHL 46 
210 I-xplanatory Notes to PTA 2005, Chapter 2, Sumniarý- No. 6 
211 (1996) 22 EHRR 293 
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purpose of Article 6, insofar as (1) the proceedings against the applicant were brought by the 
public authorities; (2) the proceedings clearly involved some punitive elements which the 
bringing of them implied fault on the part of the applicant; and (3) the relevant penalty applied 
was severe. 
Thirdly, although it was recognised by Fenwick that if control order proceedings were to be 
viewed as the determination of a criminal charge, then this would be to effectively undermine 
the ability of the Home Secretary to employ the control order scheme since the safeguards under 
Article 6(2) and (3) would be applicable, nevertheless Article 6(1) and (2) does not require proof 
beyond reasonable doubt, insofar as a wide margin of appreciation has been conceded to national 
courts in respect of the burden of proof. Accordingly, although 'as a matter of domestic law 
proceedings viewed as criminal in character would require proof beyond reasonable 
doubt 
... these would 
be proceedings deemed criminal due to the autonomous [ECHR] meaning 
of the 'criminal charge, ' therefore the domestic requirements of criminal proceedings would not 
necessarily apply. 212 
Fourthly, and as in the case of Part 4 of the ATCSA, the non-derogating control order regime 
functions on a low standard of proof, namely that of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, no 
criminal or civil action is necessary to subject a controlee to the restrictions and/or obligations 
contained in the control order. Highlighted by Fenwick, 'the subjection of [controlees] to control 
orders broadens the definition of terrorism ... since it places a number of persons in the position 
of being terrorist suspects and makes them subject to a range of sanctions ... despite the fact that 
they may not ... fall within the Section I TA 2000 definition since they have not themselves taken 
part in terrorist activity, and that only a very low level of proof is needed that they are in any 
way associated with terrorism.... The 2005 measures thus remain controversial in human rights 
terms, since ... they rely on interfering proactively with the liberty of suspects 
before any 
offences have been committed, or where it appears difficult to prove that they have been 
committed. 213 Such observations lead on to highlight the reality of the functioning of the control 
order regime, amounting infact to the fourth and fifth criticisms. 
In accordance with Sections ](9) and Sections 1(3) of the PTA 2005, the suspicion of terrorism 
does not need to be of specific acts, and the restrictions and/or obligations pen-nitted in a control 
order can be any that the Home Secretary considers necessary for purposes connected with 
preventing or restricting involvement of the conrolee in any form of suspected terrorist activity. 
Further, the suspicion of terrorist activity which can justify the Home Secretary's subjection of 
the control order to indefinite renewal, in accordance with Section 2(6) of the PTA 2005, does 
212 FenNN A (2007), op. cit at 1342 
213 Ibid, p. 1439 
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not have to be the same as that which underpinned the original decision. Section 2(9) of the PTA 
2005 provides: that it is 'immaterial for the purposes of determining what obligations may be 
imposed by a control order made by the Secretary of State, whether the involvement in 
terrorism-related activity to be prevented or restricted by the obligations is connected ýý ith 
matters to which the Secretary of State's ground for suspicion relate. ' Albeit, Section 7(l) and 
Section 10 of the PTA 2005 provide specifically for matters relating to review. criticism raised 
generally regarding the actual HR impact of what Gearty terms an essentially executive 
governed process of control, 214 serves to highlight not merely the logic of the dismissal of the 
effectiveness of the Section 19 HRA statement of ECHR compatibility by Lord Hope in R 17 A, 215 
but a number of very real flaws in the functioning of the control order regime. The precise nature 
of those flaws, and the courts response to them, was summarised by Fenwick. 216 
Despite the fact that the PTA 2005 had been declared ECHR compatible, the rulings in JJ and 5 
0 '217 0 '21 j2 19 and E22 rs JJ and 5 rs 8 and Mahmood Abu Rideh and 0 highlighted the need of the 
court to impose on the control order regime a Convention compliance which it clearly failed to 
achieve when the PTA 2005 passed through Parliament. While the exercise of a clear engaged 
judicial HR role, its purposive handling of both Parliamentary intent and relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, as well as the degree of serious consideration accorded the cumulative effect of 
the restrictions imposed by the control order in question, characterised the rulings in JJ and 5 
0 
'221 
0 
'222 j 
223 M 25 rs JJ and 5 rs and Mahmood Abu Rideh and and E, 224 in 7ý the Court 
effectively improved (to an extent) the procedure for reviewing the making of a non-derogating 
control order by its application of the right to a fair trial under Article 6. As a result of the 
ruling, the procedure adopted in control proceedings must now (1) adhere to Article 6; (2) the 
court itself must consider whether there were reasonable grounds for suspicion; and (3) such 
exercise must differ from that of deciding whether a fact had been established according to a 
specified standard of proof. A decision, according to Fenwick, which 'has built in a greater 
[albeit moderate] safeguard against unfair proceedings and miscarriages of justice than was 
present under the [PTA 2005] as interpreted without reference to Section 3 [of the fiRA]. "226 
214 Gearty (2007), Op. cit at 119 
215 [2001] UKHL 25. 'These statements may serve a purpose in Parliament. They may also be seen as part of the Parliamentary 
history, indicating that it was not Parliament's intention to cut across a Convention right ... 
No doubt they are based on the best 
advice that is available. But they [remain] no more than expressions of opinion by the minister, ' [20011 UKHL 25 Paragraph 69. 
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Yet, problems remain. One being that the court merely has to consider whether reasonable 
suspicion could be arrived at on the basis of the relevant material, meaning that control orders 
can be imposed on a standard of proof well below that of the civil standard. A low standard 
indeed considering the actual punitive effect of the restrictions and obligations of the control 
order imposed on the controlee. However, it is in relation to the rulings concerning the related 
issue of 'torture evidence' that the functioning of the control order gives rise to arguablýý the 
greatest HR concern. 
Judicial supervision of control orders is conducted by applying established judicial review 
principles to the control order regime. Following the decision in MB, 227 in order to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 6, the court must consider whether there was reasonable grounds for 
suspicion as the basis for imposing the order. This means that the court has to inquire into the 
evidence relied on by the Secretary of State which would appear to indicate that if the controlee 
raises the possibility that the material relied on was in fact obtained by torture, the court should 
inquire into the matter. However, as relevant House of Lords ruling decided, if the court is left in 
doubt as to whether the evidence was obtained by torture, it can nevertheless receive the 
evidence in question and take account of it in finding that reasonable suspicion was arrived at. 228 
Accordingly, the evidence on which the decision to impose a control order is based could well 
include evidence obtained by torture, so long as the inquiries that the court is able to make, are 
unlikely to demonstrate to that standard of proof that the evidence was so obtained. 
Further, insofar as inhuman and degrading treatment is not specifically covered by any House of 
Lords ruling, it would appear that evidence obtained by these methods could be well be 
accepted. Although Section 76(2)(a) of PACE demands that the procedure should prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the evidence was not obtained by the use of treatment in breach of Article 
3, Section 76(2)(a) does not apply to the control order regime, insofar as its proceedings do not 
constitute the determination of a criminal charge. Accordingly, where evidence may have been 
obtained by inhuman or degrading treatment as opposed to torture, and there is doubt as to the 
method that was used, the evidence can be accepted, with the result that in relation to methods of 
obtaining evidence, persons subject to control orders are placed in what Fenwick terms a 'doubly 
invidious position' in terms of due process. Not only does the evidence in question only have to 
be sufficient to found a reasonable suspicion, it can also be rightly obtained by methods which in 
relation to a criminal trial would have rendered it inadmissible. 229 
To summarise, the PTA 2005 represents a change from the reactive response to the threat of 
terrorism and the essentially incremental and nuanced development of counter-terrorist measures 
22-1 [20061 EWCA Civ 1140 
22'. 4 (and Others) v Secrelaty qf Stalefor the Home Department (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71 
'29 Fen%N ick (2007). Op. cit at 1462 
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evidenced in the TA 2000, toward an increasingly proactive model of legislative development 
first seen in the ATCSA. Whether the control order regime as a whole, and despite the 
functioning of an increased supervisory judicial role, does operate as a deprivation of libertý, due 
to the frequent severity of the restrictions imposed, 230 insofar as the regime remains in fact an 
executive process of certification which lays outside of the criminal justice order and the due 
process safeguards associated with it, in the final analysis as the courts have worked to accord 
the PTA 2005 Convention-compatibility, the control order regime can not avoid the observation 
advanced by Gearty, that the real concern of the functioning of the PTA 2005, lays not with its 
ability to address the threat of terrorism, but the 'real danger of a drift towards a ... 
bureaucratic 
kind of authoritarianism, with individuals lost to public view by [the functioning of an 
essentially executive order] of non-derogating control, capable of being maintained in perpetuity, 
as much by repressive momentum, combined with over-cautious risk-assessment, as by any 
genuine and continuing societal need. 23 1A return, in effect, to the underlying telos of the 
functioning of the Exclusion Order: 232 a process strongly criticised by Tony Blair, during his 
office as Shadow Home Secretary. 233 
The Terrorism Act 2006 234 
The TA 2006 provides an extensive range of counter-tefforist offences which adds to the 
offences under the TA 2000 and builds on a range of preparatory offences introduced in the 
ATCSA. The TA 2006 introduced in particular, two broadly defined offences of preparation of 
terrorist acts and terrorist training (Sections 5-8), and the encouragement of terrorism (Sections 
1-4). 
(1) Preparation of Terrorist Acts and Terrorist Training 
Sections 5,6 and 8 introduce a range of offences relating to the preparation of terrorist acts. 
Section 5 provides that a person commits an offence if, with the intention of committing acts of 
terrorism or assisting another to commit such acts, he engages in any conduct in preparation for 
giving effect to that intention. Although the offence requires intention, the actus reus is 
considerably broad. It is irrelevant whether the intention and preparation(s) relate to one or more 
particular terrorist acts, acts of a particular description or terrorist acts generally. A person found 
guilty of an offence shall be liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment. Section 6 
provides that a person commits an offence if he provides instruction or training in any skills in 
2-'o The Joint Committee on Human Rights Counter-terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Draft Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(Continuance in force of sections I to 9) Order 2007, Eighth Report of Session 2006-07, HL Paper 60, HC 365, (TSO, London. 
2007) 
2.31 Geartý' (2007), Op. cit at 119 
D2 Under which a number of Irish nationals ýN ere expelled from Britain on suspicion of terrorism without proper due-process 
233 Home Office Legislation against Terrorism: A Consultation Paper (Cm. 4178) (TSO, London 1998) 
11 2,4 Hereafter, T-A 2006 
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connection with the Commission, or preparation of acts of terrorism, or to assist in the 
235 
commission or preparation by others of such acts or offences. The offence advances the 
Section 54 TA 2000 offence of weapons training, punishable by a maximum penalty of ten years 
imprisonment. Section 8 provides that a person commits an offence if he attends at any place, 
whether in the UK or elsewhere, used for terrorist training. The requirements of Section 8 are 
satisfied in relation to a person if, he knows or believes that instruction or training is being 
provided at a place of which he attends for purposes connected with terrorist or Convention 
offences,, or throughout the period of attending at such a place he could not reasonably have 
failed to understand that instruction or training was being provided there for such purposes. In 
accordance with section 8(3), it is immaterial for the purposes of Section 8 whether the person 
concerned receives the instruction or training himself and whether the instruction or training is 
provided for purposes connected with one or more specific acts of terrorism or Convention 
offences, or acts of terrorism or Convention offences generally. A person found guilty of such an 
offence is liable on conviction on indictment to a terrn of imprisonment not exceeding ten years 
or to a fine,, or both; and on summary conviction in England and Wales to a ten-n of 
imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, 
or both. 
Sections 9 to II of the TA 2006 introduce a new range of offences involving radioactive devises 
and materials and nuclear facilities and sites. 236 Section 9 provides that a person commits an 
offence if he makes or has in his possession radioactive material with the intention of using that 
devise or material in the course of or in connection with an act of terrorism, or making it 
available to be so used. It is irrelevant whether the act to which such an intention relates to a 
particular terrorist act, an act of a particular description or for acts of terrorism generally. A 
person found guilty of such an offence shall be liable on conviction on indictment to life 
imprisonment. Section 10 provides that a person commits an offence if he uses a radioactive 
device or material in the course of, or in connection with, the commission of an act of terrorism 
or for the purposes of terrorism. A person commits an offence if in the course of or in connection 
with the commission of an act of terrorism or for the purposes of terrorism, he uses or damages a 
nuclear facility in a manner which causes a release of radioactive material, or creates or 
increases a risk that such material will be released. A person found guilty of such an offence 
shall be liable on conviction on indictment to life imprisonment. Section II provides that a 
person commits an offence if, in the course of or in connection with, the commission of an act of 
terrorism or for the purposes of terrorism, he makes a demand for the supply of a radioactive 
2`5 In accordance NNith Section 6(3), skills include the making, handling or use of a noxious substance or substances of such 
description", the use of anN method or technique for the purposes of terrorism; the design or adaptation of any method or technique 
for the purpose of terronsin or in connection with the commission or preparation of an act of terrorism or any ECHR offence 
216 As well as, a Section 12 offence of trespassing on a nuclear si Cý ite 
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device or material, for a nuclear facility to be made available, or for access to such a facility to 
be given, and supports the demand with a threat that action will be taken if the demand is not 
met, in such circumstances that it is reasonable to assume that there is a real risk that the threat 
will be carried out. A person found guilty of such an offence shall be liable on conviction on 
indictment to imprisonment for life. 
As well as the introduction of new offences,, the TA 2006 expands the existing provisions of the 
TA 2000 in relation to penalties. Section 57 of the TA 2000 provides that a person commits an 
offence if he possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
his possession is for a purpose connected with the preparation, instigation or commission of an 
act of terrorism. In accordance with Section 13 of the TA 2006, a person guilty of an offence is 
now liable on conviction on indictment to fifteen years imprisonment. Section 2 of the Nuclear 
Material (Offences) Act 1983 237 provides a number of offences relating to nuclear material 
involving preparatory acts and threats. Section 14 of the TA 2006 provides that a person guilty 
of an offence under Section 2 of the NM(O) Act 1983 shall be liable on conviction on indictment 
to imprisonment for life. Similarly, Section 53 of the Regulatory of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000238 introduced the offence of contravening notice relating to encrypted information. Section 
15 of the TA 2006 increases the maximum penalty for contravening notice to encrypted 
information in the case of national security to a term of five years imprisonment, and in any 
other case to two years. 
The TA 2006 introduces and advances an extensive range of counter-terrorist measures of a 
preparatory nature aimed at strategists who plan or assist in the planning of terrorist activities but 
do not themselves participate in their execution. The provisions of the TA 2006 effectively allow 
for state intervention in relation to the criminalisation of both perceived potential terrorists and 
their supporters. Certainly, insofar as the TA 2006 advances a counter-terrorist process whereby 
sanctions follow the conviction of crime, rather than administrative decision, such intention is 
not without support. 239 Whereas, the Joint Committee on Human Rights was swift to state that 
prevention outweighed any form of 'after the event' pursuit, according to Walker not only is it 
inevitable that law should be used instrumentally in counter-terrorist strategy, but right that it 
should, insofar as states have a duty to protect life . 
240 However, 'whilst good intelligence and 
early intervention are important, it should be recalled that in a liberal democracy at least, the 
ultimate test of success or failure of activities against terrorism is the maintenance of public 
support while at the same time respecting the fundamental values on which legitimacy and 
... Hereafter, NM(O) Act 1983 
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consensus cohere such as respect for individual rights. "" The observation is particularly 
relevant in relation to two controversial offences under the TA 2000 and TA 2006 regime: (1) 
the advancement of Section 18 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1989242 by Section 19 of the TA 2000 and the imposition on persons an obligation to report to a 
police constable any infon-nation of a terrorist nature; and, (2) the introduction of a Section I TA 
2006 offence of encouraging terrorism. 
A Positive Obligation to Report Information 
Section 18 of the PT(TP) Act made it an offence to fail to report information to a police 
constable which might be of material assistance in preventing an act of terrorism, or in assisting 
someone else to carry out such an act. Despite criticisms raised by Lord Lloyd as to the practical 
value of the provision and recommendation that it should not be included in any permanent 
legislation, such an offence was included in Section 19 of the TA 2000.243 Section 19 provides 
that a person commits an offence where he does not disclose to a police constable as soon as 
reasonably practicable his belief or suspicion, as well as the information on which it is based 
including that which comes to his attention in the course of a trade, profession, business or 
employment, that another person has committed an offence under Sections 15-18 of the TA 
244 2000 . Section 3 813. ) 
inserted by Section 117 of the ATCSA, creates an even broader provision. 
Section 38B makes it an offence, subject to a defence of reasonable excuse, for any person to fail 
to disclose to a police constable any information which he knows or believes might be of 
material assistance in preventing an act of terrorism or securing the application or conviction of a 
person involved in such an act. As well as Section 3813, the ATCSA also inserted Section 21A 
into the TA 2000. In accordance with Section 21A, a stricter duty to disclose information is 
applied instead of, rather than in addition to, that of Section 19. Section 21A provides that if a 
persoii believes, suspects, or has reasonable grounds for believing or suspecting that another 
person has committed an offence under Sections 15-18, and the basis for that belief or suspicion 
came to him in the course of a business in the regulated sector, he will commit an offence if he 
does not disclose such information to a constable as soon as reasonably practicable. Raising 
similar criticisms to that advanced against the offence of directing terrorism, 245 as a result of the 
functioning of Sections 19,21A and 38B, a considerably wide range of people, including 
ordinary citizens, banks and businesses, who are not part of any proscribed group or organisation 
24 1 Ibid p. 336. See also: K. Neilsen 'The Moral Justifiability of Terrorism (State and Otherwise)' (2003) O. H. L. J 427, and Campbell 
(2005), Op. cit at 3 53 
24 2 Hereafter, PT(TP) Act 
2" Lord Llovd (2006), Op. cit at paragraph 12.7 
211 Section 15 provides that a person commits an offence where he invites another person to provide money or other property, or 
receives or provides moneN or other property. which he knows or reasonablN suspects will be used for the purpose of funding 
terrorism. Similar proN isions are made in relation to the use and possession of such money and property in Section 16, in relation to 
funding arrangements in Section 17. and money laundering In Section 18 
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covered by Section I of the TA 2000, are potentially criminalised for failing to disclose relevant 
information. Similar to the functioning of Section 58 of the TA 2000, which advances tile 
Section 16B of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 offence of collecting, recording or 
possessing information which might be considered useful to terrorism, and the functioning of 
Section 56 of the TA 20005 246 the most controversial effect of such counter-terrorist changes is 
both their potential to effectively subject any journalist or accountant who has records of 
infon-nation relating to funding activities of terrorist groups, either at home or abroad, to a 
maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment; and their very real ability to subject 'ordinary 
citizens, ' 247 who function well beyond the activities of those whom can be classified as terrorist 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term, to a maximum penalty of five years 
imprisonment. 248 
Secondly, examining both the broad scope of the functioning of Section I of the TA 2000 and 
the extended range of offences as a result of the TA 2006, highlighted by Gearty, 249 Walke r250 
and Fenwick, 251 the definition of terrorism should not depart far from what are accepted 
legitimate boundaries of criminal law and process. Examining the current 'incrementally 
extended' range of offences, according to Fenwick, violent terrorist acts infringe a number of 
criminal law provisions without the need for recourse to the special terrorist offences. 
Accordingly, 'it might be asked looking over the vast list of provisions, whether special terrorist 
offences have realistically any 'real' value. ' 252 Whether the TA 2000 as amended and advanced 
by the TA 2006 can be said to be more of 'symbolic' than 'actual' impact, according to Walker 
'where the [TA 2000 generally] may be condemned as lax ... is not so much in the terms of its 
core elements of method, purpose and target [but rather] in the circumstances of how these 
components are applied.... To cater for this aspect, there should be emphasis upon not only the 
types of seriously threatening and destabilising offences being perpetrated, but also the nature of 
the perpetrators, for it is that context which renders less capable normal criminal justice 
processes and thereby justifies special laws. ' 253 Walker then goes on to state that, one example 
when special terrorist laws might be justifiable, is where action occurs in the context of a 
secretive and organised group where it is the collective paramilitary nature of the association 
which makes its actions so particularly threatening to society and difficult to detection and 
control by the police. According to Walker, it is this additional element of context which 
provides an answer to questions as to when special laws should be triggered by terrorism. 'A 
24(, Where the offence of directing at any level a terrorist organisation is not confined to proscribed groups, and lacks any 
requirement of knowledge regarding the nature of the information or any requirement that the person Intending to use it is intending 
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response may .... be justifiable when terrorism 
is emanating from a collective of people ýýith 
capabilities to act on an organised, co-ordinated and sustained basis and to engage in 
sophisticated plans and operations ... By contrast [lone 
individuals] - .. lack the capacity to create a 
threat ... of a kind which necessitates special laws. Even organisations which seek political 
change and use violence to achieve it, but do not have the sophistication, size or threat of the 
likes of Irish paramilitary groups, should be tackled through normal laws rather than special 
laws. ' 254 Applied to analysis of the advancement of the range of preparatory offences, the 
observation is interesting. 
Examining the roles of politicians and judges in relation to the concern of human rights, 
terrorism and risk-assessment, Feldman questioned the claim advanced by the incumbent 
Government that the threat of terrorism made it essential to discard what was claimed to have 
been at some time in the second half of the twentieth-century a liberal consensus toward the 
treatment of offenders and terrorist suspects, and its decision to accord national security a higher 
priority than liberty. 255 Examining both political and legal justification for a more repressive 
approach to anti-tefforism law, Feldman could find no evidence of (1) a feasible 1960s-1970s 
consensus among liberals on matters of social policy, law and order that focused on either 
offender's or suspected terrorist's rights; 256 or, (2) a more serious threat of terrorist activities 
than that which existed during the 1960's and 1970's from a number of prominent Irish terrorist 
organisations. Accordingly, as the current risk of terrorism is (arguably) exaggerated, there 
remains no definite long-term perspective to provide a sense of proportion. The observation is 
interesting, Although as Feldman highlighted, 'it is true that one person's right to life may 
conflict with another person's right to liberty, in the sense that it may be necessary to 
interference with liberty to protect life, 257 the shift away from freedom toward security which 
underlays the TA 2000 and TA 2006 regime can not but give rise to the question whether 
preparatory offences which impose both a positive duty and the risk of criminalisation on 
persons who remain technically what Fenwick terms 'ordinary' citizens, are proportionately, if 
258 not reasonably, related to the aim of protecting life and security . 
Finally, demonstrating little concern with the (arguable) rights and liberties of the 'ordinary' 
citizen, Section 19 and Section 3 8B of the TA 2000 and Sections 21A and 21B provide that it is 
a defence for a person charged with an offence under the relevant Section, to prove that he had a 
reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure in question. Certainly, highlighted by Fenwick 
under Sections 19 and 3813, this could effectively allow a journalist to raise a number of ECHR 
25' Ibid p. 347 
255 D. Feldman 'Human Rights. Terrorism and Risk: The Roles of Politicians and Judges' [20061 PI 364 
25o 
" %Nell as, equality, discrimination and the understanding of the social causes of criminalit) 
2'" Feldman (2006). Op. cit at 371. See also: Walker (2007). Op. cit at 346 
238 Fenwick (2007). Op. cit at 1413 
103 
Article 10 points under the HRA, and the defence of reasonable excuse under Sections 19 and 
38B accorded a wide interpretation in order to protect investigative journal iSM. 259 Section "I A 
and Sections 19 and 38B all have to be interpreted compatibility with Article 6(2). However, 
although Section 118 eases the burden of proof on defendants in accordance with the 
presumption of innocence under Article 6(2), it does not cover Sections 19,38B or 21A. 
Accordingly, and highlighting a legal flaw in the functioning of the TA 2000 and TA 2006 
regime, 260 the ruling in Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney General's 
)26 Reference (No 4 of 2002 ' becomes relevant. Firstly, insofar as requiring a journalist to prove 
reasonable excuse stands Article 10 'on its head, ' since freedom of expression is not viewed as a 
defence under Article 10 the justification for the interference operates in a sense as a defence 
negating the potential breach. Secondly, insofar as such a defence can, and should, be read down 
so as to impose on the defendant an evidential burden only. Certainly, given the burden that is 
being placed on groups of citizens, including those working in the financial sector, by these 
offences,, it is arguable that requiring a defendant to prove a defence of reasonable excuse, could 
be viewed as requiring him to disprove a substantial element of the offence, so as to engage the 
principle from Attorney-General's Reference. ' 262 
(2) The Encouragement of Terrorism 
The breadth of the Section I TA 2000 definition of terrorism, as amended by Section 34 of the 
TA 2006, 'compounds the perceived latitude of several new offences in the TA 2006, the most 
contentious relating to the indirect incitement (including glorification) of terrorism under Section 
1(2) of the TA 2006. -)263 
Section I of the TA 2006 provides that it is an offence to indirectly encourage acts of terrorism 
which includes the glorification of such acts. Constituting a considerably broad offence, 
encouragement applies to a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all members of 
the public to whom it is published, as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to 
the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, or Convention offences. In 
accordance with Section 1(2), a person commits an offence if he (a) publishes a statement to 
which Section I of the TA 2006 applies or causes another to publish such a statement; and (b) at 
the time he publishes it or causes it to be published, he (i) intends members of the public to be 
directly or indirectly engaged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or 
instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences; or (ii) is reckless as to whether members of 
25' Ibid p. 1414 
2"" As NNell as, the relevance of thejudiciary in protecting individual rights 
2"' [2005] 1 All ER 237 
Fenwick (2007), Op. cit at 1414 
Walker (2007), Op. cit at 33 1. See also: A. Jones, R. Bowes and H. D. Lodge The Terrorism Act 2006 (OUP, Oxford 2006). and 
D. Barnum 'Indirect Incitement and Freedom of Speech in Anglo-American law' (2006) E. H. R. L. R 258 
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the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to 
commit, prepare or instigate such acts or offences. Section 1(3) provides that for the purposes of 
Section I of the TA 2006, the statements that are likely to be understood by members of the 
public as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or 
Convention offences include every statement, which (a) glorifies the commission or preparation 
(whether in the past or the future, or generally) of such acts or offences; and (b) is a statement 
from which those members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being 
glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances. 
Section 1(7) provides that a person guilty of an offence under Section I of the TA 2006 shall be 
liable (a) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a ten'n not exceeding seven years or 
to a fine, or to both; (b) on summary conviction in England and Wales to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding twelve months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; 
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both. 
The offence of indirect encouragement of acts of terrorism which includes the 'glorification' of 
such acts, constitutes a considerably broad offence, insofar as it is neither confined to glorifying 
acts of terrorist violence which amount to serious criminal offences,, nor necessitates the 
requirement of incitement. 264 The breadth of the offence of encouraging terrorism, as originally 
drafted, fon-ned the focus of the Joint Committee on Human Rights Third Report (2005-2006). 265 
Following the HR implications of the terrorist attacks and attempted attacks in London on 7 and 
21 July 2005, the Report considered the HR implications of various counter-terrorism measures 
which had been taken by the Government in the wake of those attacks. Recognising that 
reconciling the requirements of security and public safety with HR standards was likely to be a 
dominant theme in Parliament's work,, the Committee conducted an inquiry into counter- 
terrorism policy and human rights. The findings in relation to the (then) proposed offence of 
indirect encouragement of terrorism, were as follows. 
According to the Joint Committee, any criminalisation of the publication of statements engaged 
directly the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 of the ECHR. However, whereas 
restrictions on direct incitement to violence are clearly compatible with Article 10, restrictions 
on indirect incitement to commit violent terrorist offences would only be capable in principle of 
264 Contrary to Section 51) of the TA 2000 for example, which provides that a person commits an offence if-. (a) he incites another 
person to c ornmit an act of terrorism wholly or partl\ outside of the UK; and (b), the act would if committed in England and Wales 
constitute one of a number of otTences listed in Section 59(l)(2) which includes (i) murder; (ii) wounding ýNith intent, an offence 
under Section 18 of the OtTences Against the Persons Act 1861; (iii) Poisoning under Sections 23 or 24; (iv) use of explosions under 
Section 28 and 29. and (v) endangering life b\ damaging propertý under Section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Section 
59(3) of the TA 2000 provides that a person guilty of an offence under Section 59 shall be liable to aný penalty to which he would 
be liable on conviction of the offence listed in Section 59(2) which corresponds to the act which he incites 
'('5 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-lerrorism Polic -v and 
Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and Related Matters, Third 
Report of Session (2005-2006). HL Paper 75- 1, HC 561 -1 (TSO, London 2005) 
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being Convention compatible provided that they were necessary, defined ý, N ith sufficient 
precision to satisfy the requirements of legal certainty, and proportionate to the legitimate aims 
of national security, public safety, the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of 
others. According to the Joint Committee, the main issue to be considered was whether the 
proposed new offence of encouraging terrorism was both necessary and sufficiently precisely 
defined as to satisfy the requirements of legal certainty and proportional ity. 266 
With regard to the requirement of necessity, the Joint Committee examined the Home 
Secretary's claim that there existed a gap in the existing law which made it difficult to prosecute 
incitement to terrorism of a general nature, as opposed to incitement of a specific terrorist act. In 
its analysis of the claim, the Joint Committee acknowledged that: (1) incitement to violence, 
including terrorist violence, was already a criminal offence in UK law; (2) that incitement to 
commit an act of terrorism overseas was a criminal offence by virtue of Section 59 of the TA 
2000; (3) Solicitation to murder was an offence under Section 4 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861; (4) Incitement to racial hatred was a crime under the Public Order 1986; and 
that in the light of such a wide range of criminal offences already available, whether a new 
offence of encouragement was actually necessary. Acknowledging that recent prosecutions such 
as that in Rv El-Faisa P67 clearly illustrated the particular width of the offence of soliciting to 
murder and the scope of behaviour sufficient to constitute the offence as identified in Rv 
MS 
'268 01 the Joint Committee concluded that, although there were a number of uncertainties 
about the scope of such existing offences, thus clarification of the law in principle was 
justifiable, in view of the breadth of the offence of solicitation to murder and of common law 
incitement, the strict necessity for a new offence of encouragement remained questionable. 269 
With regard to the requirement of legal certainty, the Home Office did acknowledge that the 
description of the offence of encouragement of terrorism could be regarded as insufficiently 
imprecise as to engage the requirement of Article 7 of the ECHR that the criminal law should be 
as sufficiently precise and accessible as to enable an individual to know in advance whether his 
conduct was/is criminal. However,, concluded that the description of the offence was Article 7 
compatible because the constituent parts of the offence were clearly laid in a publicly accessible 
piece of primary legislation, and the consequences of action falling within the offence were 
clearly formulated in the clause. The Joint Committee was not without reservation. 
Firstly, the 'glorification of terrorism' was included in the offence of encouragement of 
terrorism. Glorification was defined in the Bill to include any form of praise or celebration. 
2"" Ibid p. 16, Paragraph 20 
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According to the Joint Committee, the legal certainty concern was that terms such as 
glorification, praise and celebration were too vague to form part of a criminal offence "N'hich 
could be committed by speaking. Although the Home Secretary drew a distinction between 
270 
encouraging and glorifying on the one hand and explaining or understanding on the other , 
in 
the opinion of the Joint Committee the difficulty with the distinction was that it was not self- 
executing. Whereas, the content of any comment in question would have to be carefully 
analysed, including the context in which it was spoken, there would still be enormous scope for 
disagreement between reasonable people as to whether a particular comment was merely an 
explanation or an expression of understanding, or amounted to encouragement, praise or 
glorification. 271 
Secondly, highlighted by the Joint Committee, a second source of legal uncertainty regarding the 
scope of the new offence of encouragement was the functioning of the breadth of the definition 
of terrorism itself. The offence relies on the definition in Section I of the TA 2000 and concerns 
the use or threat of terrorism designed to influence a Government or to intimidate the public or 
sections of the public for the purposes of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause any 
where in the world. Although the Government accepted that the effect of the clause was to 
criminalise expressions of support for the use of violence as a means of political change, it 
defended its scope on the ground that there was nowhere in the world today where resort to 
violence, including violence against property, could be justified as a means of bringing about 
change. According to the Joint Committee, the argument was not convincing. Throughout 
history there were plenty of examples, and certainly present day resistance movementsl Whose 
aims and acts have been justified and supported by individuals who, although would not be 
considered terrorists, would now be liable to prosecution under the terms of the offence of 
encouraging terrorism. Accordingly, the new offence would (and does) make it a criminal 
offence to vocalise support for any 'serious' form of opposition to regimes viewed by the 
speaker and others in the international community as tyrannous and illegitimate. 272 
Thirdly, according to the Joint Committee, the final sources of uncertainty about the scope of the 
offence of encouragement of terrorism stemmed from the lack of any requirement in its 
definition that there be an intention to incite the commission of a terrorist offence and that the 
273 
statement must cause a danger of a terrorist offence actually being committed . According to 
the scope of the offence, the state of mind which had to be proved by the prosecution was the 
270 The last mo would not be caught by the new offence because they did not amount to encouraging, glorifý'Ing, praising or 
celebrating 
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knowledge or belief that members of the public were likely to understand the statement as a 
direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to acts of terrorism, or having reasonable 
grounds for such belief. a requirement which fell particularly short of a specific intention to 
incite the commission of a terrorist offence. Although the Joint Committee agreed ýýith the 
Home Secretary that a good reason for not restricting himself to a requirement of intent was that 
to have done so would have been to have made it more difficult to secure convictions, it 
nevertheless argued that insofar as it would have provided a necessary safeguard against the 
offence being of too broad an application, there was good reason for its inclusion. As a general 
rule, every crime requires a mental element, the nature of which depends on the definition of the 
crime. The mental element required to constitute serious crime is an intention to bring about the 
elements of the crime in question or recklessness. Recklessness arises in this context where the 
act in question involves an obvious and serious risk of causing injury or damage and either the 
defendant fails to give any thought to the possibility of there being such a risk, or having 
recognised that there is some risk involved, he nonetheless goes on to take it. 
Following this description of one test of subjective recklessness, the Joint Committee then went 
on to examine an amendment proposed by the Government that the state of mind to be proved by 
the prosecution be that the person publishing a statement, or causing it to be published by 
another,, intended the statement to be understood by members of the public as a direct or indirect 
encouragement or other inducement or was reckless as to whether or not it was likely to be so 
understood. In the opinion of the Joint Committee however, such a formulation constituted not a 
subjective, but an objective test, with the result that insofar as people could be able to say that 
they did not realise what the effect of their actions would be, it would be ý incredibly difficult to 
prosecute people who genuinely were encouraging other people indirectly to commit terrorist 
acts. '2 " Accordingly, it was necessary for the offence either to have been restricted to intention 
or, if it was to be extended beyond intention, only to the recklessness of knowing or being aware 
of but indifferent to the likelihood that the statement would be understood as an 
encouragement. 275 
Finally, with regard to the concern of proportionality, there is nothing in the definition of the 
offence of encouragement which would require the prosecution to prove that the statement in 
question gave rise to any danger that an act of terrorism might be thereby committed. Such an 
absence gives rise to two concerns. 
Firstly, highlighted by the Joint Committee, it is essential that in relation to such an offence as 
the encouragement of terrorism, that there be a public interest defence to protect the right to 
2" Hazel Blears MP. as quoted bN the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism 
Bill and Related. 11atters, Third Repori of Session (2005-2006), HL Paper 75-1, HC 56 1 -1, Paragraph 32 (TSO, London 2005) 
27 -' A sutýjective test of recklessness rather than objective 
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freedom of expression against unnecessary interference. Certainly, most of the offences which 
impinge on freedom of expression in the TA 2000, including Sections 19(3), 38B(4), 35(5)(b) 
and 58(3), include a reasonable excuse defence the availability of which constitutes a significant 
factor in determining whether a criminal restriction of freedom of expression is proportionate. 
According to the Joint Committee, in light of the concerns about the impact of the resultant 
uncertainty on freedom of expression, either a reasonable excuse or public interest defence 
should have been included in the offence in order to render it less likely that it could, and would, 
be found to be Article 10 incompatible. 276 Coupled with an amendment to introduce a 
requirement of intent or objective recklessness, the offence of the encouragement of terrorism 
was, in the opinion of the Joint Committee, not sufficiently legally certain to satisfy the 
requirement of Article 10 that interference with freedom of expression be prescribed by law 
because of (i), the vagueness of the glorification requirement; (ii), the breadth of the definition of 
terrorism; and (iii), the lack of any requirement of intent to incite terrorism or the likelihood of 
such an offence being caused, as an ingredient of the offence. 
Finally, giving rise to what is, without doubt, a highly controversial concern regarding the 
consequence of the over-breadth of the offence of encouragement; it is arguable whether the new 
offence could prove in practice to be sufficiently discriminatory in its application as to give rise 
to questions under Articles 10 and 14. According to Fenwick, certain statements made by the 
Muslim population could well be regarded as 'glorification' if addressed to a Muslim audience, 
but not if addressed to a non-Muslim audience due to the requirement under Section 1(3)(b) that 
the audience could reasonably be expected to infer that what was/is being glorified, is conduct 
that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances. "' Fenwick then went on to illustrate 
the point with a controversial example of two public statements of opinion consisting of similar 
content and sentiment relating to the motivation of Palestinian 'terrorists, ' and seriously 
questions the possibility that a person, because of his faith and ethnicity could, and would, be 
more likely subject to arrest for the encouragement, including the 'glorification, ' of terrorism. 
To conclude, the extension of existing anti-terrorism powers and the creation of new ones (some 
in circumstances unconnected with terrorism) characterise the UK's post HRA counter-terrorist 
regime. Insofar as prevailing policy impinges on the rights and freedoms of the individual, in 
abandoning the democratic ideal in the name of extending the reach of investigatory techniques, 
and the power of the state to deal with such underlying political problems as asylum, the 
disregard shown by the counter-terrorist regime not only toward HR generally, but also 
established processes of democratic legality, would appear, in the opinion of Simpson, to have 
276 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-terrorism PohQ, and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and Related Matters. Third 
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rendered the ECHR not so much a HR instrument, than more an (arguable) -charter for 
repression. !, 
278 
Whether the Parliamentary event of 9 November 2005 was a response to an erosion of 
established liberties, or a Government's affront to the supremacy of Parliament and the rule of 
law, the defeat raises questions as to the practicality of the universalism at the core of the ECHR. 
Examination of UK counter-terrorism policy highlights a series of anomalies which advance the 
argument that the ECHR constitutes infact only a too] in the promotion of rights, as opposed to 
any form of protection. As a construct of political engineering, the ECHR specifies a series of 
mostly negative rights designed to prevent State interference with its citizen's private domain. 
However, the ECHR's circumvention of rights by means of exemption and derogation, can not 
avoid the observation that its pretence at universalism conceals a case of cultural-relativism 
where rights remain the preserve of the signatory- state. Regardless of a State's rhetorical 
commitment to the ECHR then, there is no assurance that that commitment will accord certainty 
against breaches of its provisions. In practice, the State is capable of extinguishing such of the 
initiative's rights and freedoms as deemed necessary for the furtherance of its own concerns. A 
capability, following in the vein of the UK's handling of terrorism, no where more visibly seen 
than in the closely related treatment of asylum. 
Section 3.3.2: Asylum 
The origin of UK immigration law rests on the internationally acknowledged right of a nation to 
exclude non-nationals on whatever terms it sees fit. Arising from a process of defining that right 
and giving substance to it, immigration has been concerned with regulating the circumstances of 
those to whom entry will be granted, not with the protection of their rights. In the context of 
asylum, any process committed to the protection of HR constitutes a modem phenomenon in 
terms of UK law, requiring reassessment of concepts of control and sovereignty. In this sense, it 
is argued that the HRA marks a new era in FIR protection. Certain rights can be relied on as the 
ground for legal argument, offering greater equality of arms between the individual and the 
State. However, post the HRA, the relationship between HR and asylum has remained awkward. 
As a matter of legal definition, the order has continued to move toward 'greater procedural 
... Simpson (2002), Op. cit at 94. The argument is grounded on a premise that the ECHR order has effectively allowed domestic 
terrorist legislation to function relatively unhindered by allowing signatory-states a wide margin of appreciation. The possibility of 
anti-terrorist legislation being used as an (arguable) too] for repression formed the focus of the Lloyd Inquiry into Legislation against 
Terrorism, (Cm. 3420) (TSO, London 1996). According to the Lloyd Enquiry, the subject of terrorism should be viewed as part of 
mainstream criminal law. which should include the re-classification of ordinary crimes with a terrorist dimension, and the 
development of a set of clearly defined terrorist offences, subject to the same HR safeguards regarding due process (no detention 
without trial, and no arrest without reasonable suspicion) and evidence, as characterises the criminal law. Other recommendations 
included the suggestion that the special poNNer of arrest on suspicion of terrorism, an activity not in itself an offence, be abolished, 
along' with its potential for use as a tool for repression. See also: the concerns of T. Kapitan, the Terrorism of Terrorism in J. P. Serba 
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integration of asylum claims but not greater harmonization: the intention ... of... 
integration 
[being] not to recognise the ... continuum 
between asylum and migration but to facilitate the 
removal of failed asylum-seekers. 
279 
Examining the impact of the ECHR on the executive and legislature, this thesis analyses the 
effect of the order on a number of asylum aspects. Whether 'by reason of their ... contact with 
the vital forces of their countries, state authorities are ... in a better position than the 
international 
judge to give opinion on the ... content of [asylum] requirements, ' 
280 Section 3 of this thesis 
examines the delivery of ECHR protection in accordance with the HRA. 
Human Rights and UK Asylum Policy 
Although Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of HR 1948 recognises the right to seek 
asylum, it also recognises that as a matter between States, the right involved in a claim for 
asylum is the right of the State to grant asylum, not the right of the asylum-claimant to receive 
it. 28' However,, Article 33(10) of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 
provides that no contracti ng- state shall refouler a non-national to the frontier of a territory where 
his life or freedom would be threatened. Thus, although a State does not have an obligation to 
grant asylum, '... it does have an obligation not to return someone on its soil to persecution. ' 282 
With regard to the protection accorded by the Geneva Convention, in order for a claim to be 
brought, a claimant has to satisfy the requirement of Article I(A) that owing to a well founded 
fear of persecution in his country of nationality, he is unable to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
residence, is unable to return to it. However, although the obligation in Article 33(10) applies to 
claimants in the process of seeking asylum, the obligation is limited to claimants within the 
territory of the relevant contracti n g- state. Coupled with the absence of an obligation to grant 
asylum, the limitation facilitates a State's ability to develop the reach of its asylum policy, with 
the result that the success of the Geneva Convention's individual-application process remains a 
matter for the contract ing-state. 
183 Up until 1993, the UK's immigration order excluded any significant regard for asylum . 
However, from 1993 onwards, a process of application referring to the principle of non- 
refoulement was acknowledged in the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 ; 
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and amended by the Nationality, Immigration 
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and Asylum Act 2002 , and Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 1-004. 
However, forming the focus of debate, such provision continued to remain the subject of 
criticism: not least for what has become a merging of the treatment of terrorism and asylum or 
an affront to non-refoulement, but (arguable) disregard for the rights and freedoms of the 
individual. 
Writing in 1986, Bevan identified a number of themes underlying UK immigration policy: lack 
of planning; consideration of Commonwealth and international law; bipartisan politics; use of 
language; and concern for civil-liberties, race relations, and integration. 290 Attach to the list a 
preoccupation with public fear over the social and economic security of the State, and the impact 
of these themes lead to a post 2000 regime of controversial policy and purpose. 
Indeed, throughout the 1990's concern over abuse of the immigration system attracted 
considerable public attention. The Government responded by introducing legislation aimed at 
controlling asylum. The first was the AIA Act, which introduced a measure to deal with 
dishonest claims known as the short-procedure. Satisfying the Government's concern to be seen 
to be dealing with unmeritorious claims, the theme underlined similar provisions of the Al Act, 
including the creation of an offence of obtaining leave to remain by deception, the subjection of 
applications to restricted rights of appeal, and a policy of removal of the claimant to a country 
designated by the executive as likely to pose no risk of subjecting him to persecution. 
Similar provisions followed in the IA Act, the NIA Act and the AI(TC) Act. Section 2 of the Al 
Act introduced an executive power to remove claimants before their appeal was heard if they 
had travelled through a country regarded as safe. Other measures continued to focus on counter- 
acting obtaining asylum by deception by creating a Section 5 offence to deal with persons who 
engineered entry into the UK for profit, and the imposition of a Section 8 practice of withholding 
welfare-benefit from claimants. 
Despite reservation expressed over the statutory erosion of the right to seek asylum, 
291 
the IA 
292 Act continued tile trend . Repealing provisions of the Al Act, the IA Act introduced a number 
of procedures to discourage illegal-entry and deal swiftly with claimants while their claims were 
being considered, including a greater use of detention centres. However, whereas a lack of 
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judicial supervision of the detention process and a right to bail had the effect of according 
claimants even lesser treatment than that accorded persons detained under a criminal offence, the 
denial of welfare provision cast doubt over the Act's compliance with the principle of non- 
refoulement by making life so practicably impossible for the claimant, that the better choice was 
to return and risk persecution. 
Regardless of criticism, the IA Act was followed by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Bill 2001. Justified as a response to the need to relieve the 72,430 asylum applications per year, 
the Bill was defined as an initiative to end the practice of individuals making an unfounded 
293 
application and then residing in the UK while the process of appeal occurred. The proposals 
included amendment to the British Nationality Act 1981 and the requirement of citizenship; a 
narrowing of the grounds of Appeal to points of law only; and the placing on claimants a number 
of restrictions to justice, including a questionable burden of proof. Other risks to established 
freedoms included the creation of greater security measures relating to the detention, release and 
removal of individuals,, the development of Accommodation Centres, and such proposals as 
extended powers of search and entry without warrant, and the confiscation of citizenship. 
Indicating little regard for the individual claimant, the changes were incorporated into the UK 
system by means of the NIA Act; an act which, according to Mckee, arguably 'went so far 
beyond denying the asylum-claimant any form of HR interest, as to deny him any status at 
all. -)294 
Aimed at sorting out the shambolic asylum order created by the NIA Act, the Government 
responded with the introduction of the AI(TC) Act. Whether its amendments rendered it 
anything near an anti-shambles act however, was open to question. For example, Section 2 of the 
AI(TC) Act attempted to address the concern of claimants entering the UK without a lawful 
travel document by rendering it a criminal offence to enter the UK without a valid immigration 
document. However, due to circumstances in which a claimant is forced to flee, and by the 
common practice of an agent who demands that any documentation be returned to him on entry 
to the UK, the ability of the claimant to satisfy the requirement of Section 2 remained practically 
impossible. 
Similarly, with regard to the process of asylum, Section 26 altered the previous 2-tier system to a 
I -tier with the introduction of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. However, retaining a right 
to judicial review of the Tribunal's decision on a ground of error of law only, the provision made 
no alteration to the former ground which was similarly restricted. Rather, exacerbated by the 
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absence of legal-aid to fund appeals, 295 and the readiness of I ega I -practitioners to consider 
instituting appeals, far from simplifying the system of appeal, the amendments only succeeded in 
rendering the process even more uncertain. Whereas, Section 27 provided that the onb. ' recourse 
for an unfounded HR claim was an out of country appeal once the claimant has been removed 
from the UK, in accordance with Section 28 where a claimant arrived with entry clearance from 
a British diplomatic post abroad and the immigration official at the port of entry cancelled the 
visa, there would no longer be an in country right of appeal. 
In terms of HR protection then, the AI(TC) Act is disappointing, insofar as its provisions have 
little positive impact on the treatment of the asylum-claimant. For example, in accordance with 
Section 8,. failure by a claimant to produce a valid travel document either at the port of entry or 
within 3 days without reasonable explanation, will damage the claimant's credibility. Examining 
the wording of Section 8, it is not unreasonable to suggest that its operation would appear to 
overstep the constitutional boundary between the role of legislation and the judiciary, by 
prescribing the way in which the issue of credibility should be dealt. 
Finally, on 7th February 2005, the Government published its 5 year plan. 296 Envisaging a 
reduction in the number of asylum-claimants entering the UK, the proposals concentrated on 
speeding up the removal of failed claimants. Building on the control and surveillance policy of 
the NIA Act and the AI(TC) Act, claimants awarded the status of refugees would be given 
limited leave for 5 years provided conditions in their own country did not improve. With regard 
to control on the entry of claimants to the UK, all future applicants for naturalisation would 
undergo assessment on their command of the English language, knowledge of life within the 
UK, and ability to integrate with the community. In respect of satisfying the interests of security, 
extending restrictions on requirements of entry clearance, all visa applications would be 
fingerprinted by 2008 and information in travel documents checked against UK data-bases 
designed to prevent entry of claimants who could pose a risk to security. With regard to asylum- 
claimants having secured lawful entry into the UK, whereas after entry controls would include 
an increased enforcement of provisions against illegal working, the practice of those having 
settled sponsoring family members would no longer be permitted, until the claimant had been 
settled in the UK for not less than 5 years, or granted full British citizenship. 
It was during this climate of control and surveillance that the HRA was introduced, and an 
asylum claim theoretically capable of forming the basis of legal argument. Whether such has 
translated into practice however, is best assessed by examining the impact of the ECHR order in 
295 Which up until 3rd April 2005, franchised firms were able to obtain through the Legal-Services Commission 
2" Controlling our Borders: NfakingMigration IYork-for Britain (2004-2005) (Cmd. 6472) (TSO, London) 
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areas where HR claims have arisen most: the removal and detention of claimants, and their 
treatment throughout the asylum process. 
The ECHR and the UK Asylum Order 
(1) Removal ofAsylum-Claimants 
Article I of the ECHR provides that a signatory-state is obliged to ensure that the rights and 
freedoms of the ECHR must be secured to everyone within its jurisdiction. An asylum-claimant 
can make a HR claim against treatment arising from the asylum process; there is no requirement 
of lawful presence. Although Article I was not included in the HRA, the statute contains no 
provision excluding persons on grounds of status. Section 7 provides that its provisions are open 
to anyone who would be a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the ECHR. Section 6 of the 
HRA makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with the 
ECHR, including a failure to act. What then is the position of a claimant against whom direction 
for removal has been issued,, who attempts to rely on the ECHR? 
Although since 1993 there is a statutory process of asylum application, when an application is 
refused there is no right of appeal against the refusal as such, only against the associated 
immigration decision. An appeal against a decision on the basis that the decision infringes a HR 
is made not using the HRA, but the NIA Act. Under Section 84(l)(c) a claimant may lodge an 
appeal against a decision to remove him with the relevant adjudicator, on the ground that 
removal is unlawful under Section 6 of the HRA. However, the ability to remove an asylum- 
claimant remains a power exercised within a statutory regime governed foremost by the 
Immigration Act 197 1, as amended by the IA Act and the NIA Act. 
There are 2 powers of removal: that of immigration-officers to remove claimants having been 
refused leave to enter, or having been found to be illegal entrants; and that of the State to remove 
those having overstayed their leave, obtained leave by deception, or breached a condition of 
leave. The relationship between HR protection and the exercise of both powers is interesting. 
Schedule 2, Paragraph 8(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 provides that where a claimant is 
refused leave to enter he may be removed on the direction of an immigration-officer. Section 92 
of the NIA Act affords such claimant a right of an in country appeal where he holds either a 
valid entry clearance or work permit, is an EEC national, or has made an appeal grounded on 
HR. Further, whereas Section 77 of the NIA Act provides that a person who has claimed asylum 
shall not be removed until their claim has been determined, Section 78 provides that a claimant 
who is entitled to pursue a right of an in country appeal, shall not be removed while that appeal 
is pending. Both provisions are subject to exceptions. By virtue of Section II of the IA Act, the 
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Secretary of State may order the removal of a claimant to an EU member-state under a standing- 
arrangement. 
Secondly, Section 12 deals with the removal of claimants to countries other than those covered 
by Section II which as EU members, or listed in the Asylum (Designated Safe Third Countries) 
Order 2000, are unlikely to subject the claimant to ill-treatment. In the majority of cases the 
claimant will not be entitled to remain in the UK while his claim is decided. One exception is 
that removal under Sections II or 12 can not take place where the claimant has lodged an appeal 
on the basis that the decision to remove is unlawful under the HRA. However,, whereas by virtue 
of Section 93 of the NIA Act, the Secretary of State has the power to certify that an appeal 
against removal based on HR is unfounded, in which case the claimant will loose his right of in 
country appeal and be removed from the UK; by virtue of Section 94(7), the Secretary of State 
has the power to remove the claimant's right to an in country appeal where it is proposed that he 
be removed to a country where there is no reason to believe that his ECHR rights will be 
breached. Highlighted by Clayton, the use of the words in Section 94(7) 'no reason to believe' is 
telling: Suggesting 'a different standard of protection from that in the [Geneva Convention] ... at 
its lowest, it would enable the Secretary of State to make a decision simply without assembling 
all the evidence, ' 297 while at its highest, constitute an affront to the rationale of asylum itself, 
including the obligation of non-refoulement. 
However, the wording of Section 94(7) is not the only concern to be raised against the NIA Act. 
Section 94(3) provides that if the Secretary of State is satisfied that a claimant is entitled to 
reside in a state listed in Section 94(4) he shall certify the claim. Whereas the use of the word 
'shall' creates a duty on the Secretary of State to certify, thus limits the scope forjudicial review 
of the exercise of discretion,, there is a presumption that this duty will be exercised unless the 
Secretary of State is satisfied that there are reasons to the contrary. The burden of proof is on the 
claimant to show that the claim is not unfounded. 
Secondly, analogous to the issue of a Home Office certificate under the ATCSA limiting the 
SIAC from considering an appeal where a claimant's removal is imminent, the ability of the 
Secretary of State to certify a claim as unfounded, coupled with a practice of identifying certain 
countries as safe, brings into practice a dependence on generalized statements which rests 
awkwardly with the requirement to prove that the particular claimant is at risk. 
Thirdly, with regard to the functioning of Sections 93 and 94 of the NIA Act, whereas under the 
IA Act the removal of a claimant could not be ordered while a HR appeal was pending. 
following Section 78 of the NIA Act, such a direction can now be given. Added to the fact that 
297 Clayton (2004), Op. cit at 407 
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the issue of certification is primafacie unchallengeable, inclusion of a country on the list of safe 
countries unquestionable, and the ability of the Secretary of State to certify extended so as to 
include part of a state safe in relation to specific groups of claimants, the NIA Act serves to 
illustrate the reality of any attempt to afford universal HR credible protection in an area 
dominated by national politics. Although the NIA Act acknowledges a right of appeal on HR 
grounds, it continues to maintain the State's unchallengeable position in the asylum process. In 
this sense, any practicable effect of the HRA remains subjugated by the politically perceived 
need of the time: to control asylum. A sub ugation evidenced in the removal under Section 10 of j 
the IA Act of a full right of in country appeal formerly accorded a number of offences previously 
characterised as grounds for deportation under the Immigration Act 1971. What then is the real 
effect of the HRA on the concern of removal? 
The Value ofArticle 3 
One frequent argument in relation to removal of the asylum-claimant is that it could constitute a 
violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. On first appearance, it would appear that Article 3 would 
respect the fundamental value that no one should be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The Article is an absolute right in that it cannot be breached, even in 
the event of a state of emergenCY298 and irrespective of the claimant's condUCt. 299 In relation to 
the politically charged area of asylum however, the absolute nature of Article 3 is not quite so 
straightforward. 
Firstly, not all forms of han-nful treatment invoke the protection of Article 3. With regard to 
torture, the term attaches meaning only to deliberate treatment causing serious suffering; with 
regard to inhuman treatment, treatment must reach a minimum-level of severity of physical or 
psychological harm; and with regard to degrading treatment, the debasement must obtain a level 
of seriousness relative on the circumstances. 
Secondly, the ECHR governs the conduct of signatory-states in relation to what is acknowledged 
by the ECrtHR as a margin of appreciation: the right of a signatory-state to control the entry, 
residence, expulsion and removal of non-nationals. In accordance with Article 3, the signatory- 
state is obliged to safeguard asylum-claimants in respect of whom there are grounds for 
believing that there is a risk of their being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
if removed from the state. A signatory-state will be found to be in breach of Article 3 if it seeks 
to remove a claimant to a country where there is such a risk, or where removal itself constitutes 
treatment contrary to Article 3. If the substance of a claim is made out then asylum status will 
be granted and Article 3 adds nothing to the claimanVs protection. Where a claim fails and there 
, gs 
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is a need for an inquiry into whether the claimant's removal from the signatory-state NNill 
constitute a breach of Article 3, Article 3 then becomes relevant . 
300 However, in practice, 
direction for an asylum-claimant's removal can be given by the Secretary of State without any 
independent intervention. The effect of the HRA is that such power can be mitigated by a right 
of appeal, orjudicial review which can suspend a removal. Post 2000, an Adjudicator is obliged 
to consider the effect of removal on the claimant and restrained from affecting a removal where 
301 its execution could subject the claimant to the risk of an ECHR violation . One of the 
features 
of the UK's constitutional order is that the judiciary remain independent from the executive. 
However, insofar as the argument to support a premise that Article 3 should remain no more 
than a consideration to be balanced against the greater public interest is evidenced throughout 
UK case-law,, the judiciary has continued to exert its own influence over the absolute nature of 
Article 3. Whereas in Ullah v Special Adjudicator and Dv Home Departmen? 02 the Court 
reasoned that the ECHR could not have been intended by its signatories to curtail the 
international right of a state to remove non-nationals ftom its own territory; in Nv Home 
Departmen ? 03 the reasoning in Ullah and D was accorded the status of established principle. 
Serving as an indication that the HRA does not necessarily generate delivery of HR protection, 
the judiciary in all three cases held that the initiative could not be treated as having been 
intended to constrain a state's right to deal with its own national concerns. 
Indeed. ) examining the UK judiciary's handling of the absolute nature of Article 3 post 2000 is 
interesting. The popular understanding of the ECHR as a 'living instrument' implicit in the 
ECHR order would appear to indicate reasoning not averse to a lowering of the threshold of 
304 
seriousness required to invoke Article 3. In contrast, in a climate domineered by concern over 
the effects of asylum and economic migration, the reasoning of the UK Judiciary has differed 
significantly. Highlighting a disparity in the application of Article 3, in Mal v UK the ECrtHR 
was called on to examine the UK's approach toward the relevance of a medical report in support 
305 
of an asylum-claimant's allegation of his having been subjected to Article 3 treatment . 
Because the report had not been presented at the claimant's initial interview, it was refused 
admissibility as evidence, on the ground that its late submission went to a lack of credibility. The 
ECrtHR held that,. although the UK authority had expressed doubts as to the authority of the 
report, they nevertheless had failed to provide evidence to substantiate them. The approach 
constituted a departure from the relevance attached to the concern of credibility from that 
applied by the UK Court, where doubt alone was held to constitute lawful reason for refusal. 
3R (11hanjahahi.: i) v Inimigration Appeal Tribunal [20041 QBD Admin 
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Another way in which the UK departed from ECrtHR reasoning in relation to the application of 
Article 3 was exemplified in its response to the ruling in Dv UK306 Called on to examine the 
likely subjection of a claimant to the risk of inadequate medical treatment in the country to 
which he was to be removed, the ECrtHR held that removal of a claimant in an advanced state of 
AIDS in receipt of terminal-care to a country where treatment was not available, constituted a 
breach of Article 3. In contrast, and grounded on the reasoning in U11ah and D, in Nv Secretarl, 
of State for the Home Department307 the Court of Appeal advanced a distinction regarding the 
application of Article 3 between the type of treatment which was likely to occur in the country to 
which a claimant was to be removed, and that which would result from a lack of medical facility 
in the receiving country. The Court held that the ECHR was not intended to interfere with a 
state's ability to make whatever immigration order it saw fit, therefore any impact which the 
ECHR would have,, would be limited to only that form of treatment which could be termed 
positive, and even then, in exceptional circumstances. The effect of the ruling is obvious: 'There 
is no doubt that [D] was an extreme case. However in distinguishing it as [it] did ... the Court of 
Appeal [seemed to move] away from the established [ECrtHR] doctrine in Soerring v UK that it 
is the expulsion which is the breach. The ECrtHR in Soerring expressly disavowed any claim to 
judge the [HR] standards in the receiving country. In these cases the [UK] Court parted company 
with the ECHR and in R (Bagdanavicius) ... 
held that it was necessary, by way of a standard, to 
consider the application as if the ECHR was in force in the receiving country. 308 
The Value ofArticle 8 
The second common ECHR basis of challenge in respect of asylum is Article 8. Paragraph 1, 
provides that everyone should have a right to respect for his private and/or family life, home and 
correspondence . 
309 The functioning of Article 8 invokes the imposition of a positive obligation 
on the signatory-state to exercise respect for the personal life of the asylum -claimant, 
310 as well 
as, what is referred to in ECO Dhaka v Shmin BOX, 31 1 as a negative obligation to refrain from 
interfering. 
Applied to removal, even where an application for asylum has failed, a claimant may raise the 
312 
right to remain grounded on Article 8. In practical terms, where the claimant has built up a 
personal life in the UK prior to determination of his claim, consideration should be given not 
only to his long term ability to remain, but to the circumstances surrounding the stage that his 
application has reached. Certainly, where children have been born to the claimant during his 
306 (1997) 24 EHRR 423 
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residency, this will affect his claim per se. In such a case, a claim will be based on both a fear of 
persecution either in the country of origin or prior residence in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention, and a ground that removal could result in a breach of Article 8. Ideally, it is a rare 
instance in which removal of a claimant after his having been resident in a signatory-state for a 
significant period of time, 313 or dependent on a family already lawfully resident in the signatory- 
state 314 will not constitute interference with his personal life. However, unlike the absolute 
nature of Article 3, the right under Article 8 is qualified in that it can be interfered with in 
accordance with law and as necessary to protect a greater state interest. 
According to Blake, 315 examining the broadness of the qualification, despite the argument that 
immigration control is not of itself an end capable of justifýing an interfering measure, but a 
medium through which other legitimate aims may be pursued, 316 respect for Article 8 does not 
prevent the signatory-state from developing lawful provision which conflicts with a claimant's 
317 personal life . As a matter of international principle, a state has the right to regulate its own 
immigration concerns. Accordingly, and acknowledged in the ruling of the Court in Abdulaziz, 
Cabales and Balkandali, 318 the ECHR order accorded signatories a wide margin of appreciation 
in the way in which control was implemented. Highlighted by Rogers 'the repercussions of [the 
reasoning in Abdulaziz] was that [signatory-states] would ... be afforded a margin of appreciation 
at the point when it was to be determined whether an obligation existed in the case of a positive 
obligation; whereas in the context of a negative obligation, it would only play a role at the stage 
of determining whether a breach of the obligation was justified. 0 19 Applied to the concern of 
removal, protection arises only from the claimant's ability to satisfy a burden of proof that his 
removal will constitute an unjustified interference insofar as there is an insurmountable 
obstacle,, 320 or some other reason why a removal would render it impossible for him to establish 
his personal life elsewhere. 
Following Abdulaziz, determination of a claim concerning Article 8 was carried out by the 
weighing on a case-by-case basis the effect of the interference on the right in question. The 
balance was achieved by determination of whether the removal of a resident non-national with 
personal ties corresponded to a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aim 
to be pursued. 32 ' The approach formed the focus of Boughanemi v France. 322 Called on to 
examine application of Article 8 to the expulsion of a long term resident non-national following 
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the commission of a criminal offence, the court considered that a more certain handling of 
Article 8 was to invoke the position that the right to a personal life was a right to be 
unconditionally acknowledged, unless the interference in question was one specified in 
Paragraph 2. Applied to the facts in Boughanemi, the approach led the Court to regard the 
removal of an integrated non-national as an Article 8 breach, which could only be justified 
where the non-national had been found guilty of a serious criminal offence. 
Hailed as a landmark in HR protection, the reasoning in Boughanemi constituted what was 
regarded as a move toward satisfying the telos of the ECHR as advocated in Boldjoudi v France: 
a fact-specific consideration of the harm to be inflicted by removal of the claimant, as opposed 
to an examination of the underlying purpose of the intervening measure. 323 The approach 
received support in both Boujlita v France 32' and Bouchelkia v France, 325 as well as 
acknowledgement in the ECrtHR's clarification in Ciliz v Netherlands of the object of the ECHR 
to protect foremost the rights of the individual. Representing in the opinion of Rogers, redress of 
the imbalance between the weight accorded a state interest and the concern of the individual, 326 
the ruling in Ciliz constituted a relieving of the burden placed on the claimant to prove 
insurmountable obstacles, toward greater emphasis on the obligation on the signatory-state to 
justify its interference. 
For example, called on to examine the effect of an expulsion of a claimant following his proven 
involvement in the commission of a criminal offence, in Boultif v Switzerland27 the ECHR order 
admitted to its tendency to accord limited consideration to what could constitute an 
insurmountable obstacle, and in reaching a decision whether the claimant's family could be 
expected to follow him to the country where he was to be expelled, laid down a list of factors to 
be considered: 
The nature and seriousness of the offence in question; 
The time elapsed since the offence was committed, and the conduct of the claimant during that time; 
Effect of an expulsion on the claimant's family; 
Factors which could render the claimant's private life unworkable. 328 
In terms of the impact of Article 8 on the rights of the non-national then, the approach of the 
ECrtHR from Boughanend onwards, coupled with a broad interpretation of personal life, 
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suggests a move by the ECrtHR away from the dominance of the interest of the signatory-state 
toward greater emphasis on the claimant. 329 In contrast, the impact of the ECHR on the UK 
courts has proved far less certain in terms of the protection accorded the non-national. Whereas. 
the nature of Article 8 is such that the burden of proof alters when different factions of the 
provision are raised; insofar as emphasis is laid on the principle of proportionality, the standard 
of proof is different to that which common-law lawyers are ordinarily familiar. 330 
How to apply Article 8 to the long term non-national resident formed the focus of Nhundu and 
Ch1wera. 331 In accordance with the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, in order to satisfy the telos of 
Article 8, a step-by-step assessment of whether the interference constituted a violation of the 
claimant's personal life should be adopted which included asking: 
(1) Whether the relationship to which the claim related constituted a personal relationship; 
(2) Whether the act/omission constituted an interference with the claimant's personal life; 
(3) Whether the interference was justified as a legitimate attempt to pursue a purpose necessary in a 
democratic society; 
(4) Whether the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 
The approach stood in contrast with the reasoning of Rv Home Department, ex-parte 
332 Mahmood. Called on to determine whether the Secretary of State's refusal of an application 
forjudicial review of a decision to remove a claimant constituted a violation of Article 8, the 
Court held that where a personal life was established, removal would not constitute an 
unjustifiable interference where the claimant could continue that life in the country to which he 
was to be removed. In reaching its decision, the Court declined to consider either the question of 
legitimate aim, or the application of the principle of proportionality, but went on to lay down a 
number of principles which a court ought to adopt when determining conflict between a 
proposed removal and Article 8: 
When examining the relevance of ECHR guidance, the decision-maker would be advised to uphold 
the rule of international law that a state maintains a right to control the movement of non-nationals; 
(2) Article 8 does not impose an obligation to respect the choice of residence of a claimant; 
329 A fouslaquini v Belgium (1991) 13 EHRR 802 
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(3) Removal of a family member where others are lawfully resident, will not infringe Article 8 where 
there are no insurmountable obstacles to the family residing together in the country to which they are 
to be removed; 
(4) Knowledge on the part of the claimant's spouse, at the time of marriage, that the claimant's right of 
residence was precarious, automatically works against a finding that removal violates Article 8; 
(5) Whether an interference with Article 8 is lawful will depend on all the facts of the case, as well as the 
circumstances prevailing in the country whose action is impugned. 
The ruling in Mahmood constituted a classic Diceyean example of common-law reasoning. 
Grounded on what appeared to be its understanding of the ECrtHR's ruling in Abdulaziz of the 
need for the claimant to show that there were reasons why he should not be expected to establish 
his personal life other than in the UK, the Court reasoned that the concerns of legitimate aim and 
proportionality were issues best left to the state. The reasoning was based on acknowledgement 
of the margin of appreciation accorded to signatories in the exercise of a positive obligation. 
Following the argument that by admitting into its order such a principle, the ECHR needed not 
333 to be applied uniformly, but varied in its application according to needs and conditions, in the 
opinion of the Court, the right of a signatory-state to control its own immigration concerns 
proved the exception to the protection ordinarily afforded by Article 8.334 
Both the approach of Mahmood, and its reasoning, was followed in Baljit-Singh . 
33' According to 
BaIjit-Singh, unless there were exceptional reasons as to why the claimant should not be 
removed, removal on facts similar to Mahmood was lawful. The reasoning of the Court was not 
without criticism. 
Apart from a lack of concern with the construction of the principle of proportionality by the 
ECrtHR, the logic of Mahmood disregarded the formulation of the principle expressed by the 
ECrtHR and advanced by the Privy-Council in de Freitas v Ministry ofAgriculture. 336 Called on 
to determine whether the immigration measure in question constituted an Article 8 violation, de 
Freitas advocated a 3-point approach which the relevant authority should adopt in the 
determination of an Article 8 claim: 
Whether the legitimate aim in question was sufficiently important as to justify limiting the claimant's 
right or freedom in question; 
(2) Whether the interfering measure was designed to meet the legitimate aim in question; 
Rv Director qf Public Proseculions. ex-parte Kelbine [ 1999] 4 All ER 80 
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(3) Whether the means used to impair the right or freedom was no more than necessary to accomplish 
the legitimate object. 
The 3-point approach held particular appeal for Clayton . 
33' Firstly, whereas the first point 
applied to removal would satisfy the question as to whether the interfering measure complained 
of was necessary in a democratic society, the second and third points would prove more than 
effective in determining the question of proportionality. 
Secondly, in accordance with the telos of the ECHR, it is arguable that while examining the 
application of Article 8, the UK should render its treatment consistent with the fact specific 
handling of the concern of proportionality characteristic of ECrtHR jurisprudence, as opposed to 
the mere assessment of the rational connection between the legitimate aim to be achieved in the 
limitation of an individual's right, and the measure taken to achieve it. 
Thirdly, in BaIjit-Singh, the reasoning of the court was based on the premise that the non- 
national and his family would be removed unless there were exceptional reasons. Although in 
both cases the ruling was influenced by the fact that the claimant was fully capable of making an 
entry clearance application as a spouse in the country to which he was to be removed, such logic 
is problematic: 'The fact that there is ... alternative course of action for the person to be removed 
is not of itself decisive of the question of whether removing him is proportionate to the aim to be 
pursued. [Rather] it is [merely] a factor to be taken into account... ' 338 
Regardless of international commitment then, the treatment of non-nationals remains primarily a 
matter of state concern. Accordingly, decisions regarding removal can be explained not only by 
what is at stake for the claimant, but what is at stake for the signatory-state in the maintenance of 
immigration policy. The HRA is appraised as the means by which a failed asylum-claimant may 
be able to remain within his state of refuge on the basis of preserving his HR. On analysis 
however, this is more often than not because of the risk of the state committing a breach of 
Article 3. Enshrining one of the fundamental values of liberal democratic society, Article 3 is 
strictly enforced by the ECrtHR which prohibits interference in absolute ten-ns irrespective of the 
existence of a state of emergency or the claimant's conduct. Although it is arguable that once a 
finding that a removal would invoke Article 3, then this is ordinarily conclusive of the issue, in 
contrast, the effect of Article 8 is far less certain. The approach adopted by the UK continues (in 
the main) to have little regard for the telos of the ECHR 339 In the case of a removal, it is arguable 
that the individual is removed not only as a means of facilitating the public good, but also for 
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being one of a group in relation to whom there is a statutory provision which serves to procure a 
particular policy aim. "' 
(2) Detention 
Power to detain asylum-claimants to be removed, or seeking entry to the UK, is contained in 
Schedules 2 and 3 of the Immigration Act 1971, and Section 62 of the NIA Act. Detention is 
used where there is a reasonable belief that a claimant will fail to keep the terms of his 
temporary admission or release; where time is necessary to confirm the basis of a claim-, or 
where it is necessary to effect a lawful removal or deportation. Prior to 2000, detention was used 
as a last resort for enforcing a refusal of leave to enter, Government policy preferring to grant 
temporary admission subject to conditions or release. In March 2000 however, a change was 
introduced in relation to asylum. Where it was thought that an application could be dealt with 
quickly then a claimant could be detained at a Reception Centre for a period of 7 days with a 
view to resolving his status. The change represented one of a number of alterations reflecting the 
Government's seeming determination to increase its control over asylum. Accordingly, detention 
formerly governed by the Immigration Act 1971, was extended by means of specific provision 
for the use of detention centres. 
With regard to the second category of detention, the power to detain an asylum-claimant is a 
general administrative power exercisable by Chief Immigration-officers and the Secretary of 
State. Auxiliary to immigration control, the power to detain in accordance with Schedule 2 of the 
Immigration Act 1971 is accorded Chief Immigration-officers over immigrants on entry to the 
UK pending their subjection to examination, and/or their removal. Prior to the NIA Act, the 
Secretary of State was responsible for all in country decisions to grant or vary leave to remain, 
deport, or detain pending deportation. However post 2000, the power was extended. By virtue of 
Section 62(l)-(7) of the NIA Act, the Secretary of State is accorded the power to either grant the 
claimant leave to enter, or to order his detention pending examination or the decision to remove. 
Examining the effect of the increase in executive power is instructive. 
Extending the power of detention, 341 the NIA Act granted the Secretary of State power to detain 
where he had grounds to suspect that he might make a decision to refuse leave to enter, or a 
direction to remove. In the opinion of Clayton, this was 'strange indeed: raising the Kafkaesque 
spectre of detention ending at the point where the Secretary of State decides not to make a 
decision, or of a person being detained when the Secretary of State suspects that he is about to 
grant leave to enter... The use of the word 'suspect' is also peculiar, suggesting a kind of L- 
340 Vandi v Home Department [20021 UKIAT 05755 
141 BN broadening the grounds for remoNal and abolishing former restrictions on the power to detain pending removal in relat' L- I ion to 
claimants in respect of whom direction for removal had already been given 
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ý 342 introspective self-policing by the Secretary of State . Albeit, the 
intention of the drafting 
seems to have been to make the power to detain as wide as possible without invoking these 
extremes, in accordance with the drafting of the NIA Act, the possibility for invocation of such 
extremes remain. 
Further, examining the tenor of the NIA Act, it is arguable that the detention of a claimant is 
analogous to the treatment of criminal detention, except the asylum order permits detention of 
claimants who are neither charged, nor suspected of any criminal offence. Such treatment raises 
questions about the lack of policy criteria for the respect of the rights of the claimant. 
Throughout the asylum order the power to detain is discretionary. Any restraint on that 
discretion in the form of guidelines does not have the force of statutory authority. As a result, 
although failure to have regard to guidelines may give rise to a challenge in administrative law, a 
lack of statutory control over the exercise of discretion facilitates an unquestionable domination 
of the asylum order by the State. 
Such lack of control was analysed by Weber. 343 Examining the practicality of Immigration 
Directorate Instructions to Immigration-officers on the subject of detention, Weber highlighted 
the tendency for replacement of consideration of the merits of a case with routine decision- 
making and the development of local trends to expedite claims. Grounded on an implied 
direction to Officers not to examine the need of the claimant, but the swiftest way to deal with 
his claim,, the application of detention policy highlighted a contradiction at the core of the 
asylum order. In accordance with instructions, Immigration-officers were directed to consider 
not only the length of detention that a claimant would be subjected to, but his likelihood of 
removal. Such considerations were to go to the Officer's decision whether to detain the 
individual in question. Technically, the Immigration-officer was charged with the task of 
forming a personal judgment as to the substance of a claim: whether the claimant was likely to 
be removed from the UK, and if so, whether sooner rather than later. 
The amendments (arguably) reflected the post 2000 objective of the Government to increase its 
hold on asylum. However, highlighting the state's ability to devise almost unlimited stratagem to 
deal with a claimant, one controversial exercise of the power of detention was its application to 
the most technically complex form of asylum-claimant: the family unit. 
Despite the fact that by its nature the family unit gives rise to its own considerations, a policy 
change indicating greater pre-occupation with public hostility toward asylum-claimants and their 
perceived impact on housing, health-care and employment, underlined the Government's move 
W2 ClaNlon (2004). Op. cit at 440 
, 43 L. Weber Deciding to Detain (Cambridge Institute of Technology. Cambridge 2000) 
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344 to increase the detention of asylum families . The result was an 
increased demand on 
authorities to make readier use of detention, an alteration to criteria concerning the handling of 
the family unit, and the putting into effect a will to bring the treatment of the family into line 
with that of the individual claimant. 
The policy stood in contrast not only with the telos of the ECHR, but the use of detention prior 
to 2000 as a last resort to be exercised as near to the family's removal as possible. Examining the 
Government's rejection of opposition against amendment to the NIA Bill, which would have 
prohibited the detention of young persons for more than 10 days, the impact of the UK's 
reservation to Article 22 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 345 formed 
the subject of criticism by Blake. 346 
Article 22 of the UNCRC provides that state-parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure 
that a child seeking refugee status shall receive protection and assistance in accordance with any 
international HR instrument to which the signatory-state is party. The implications of the UK's 
reservation can be highlighted as follows: 
0 To exclude the principle that decisions concerning children should be taken in their best interest, as 
required by the Children Act 1989, and the UNCRC; 
0 To assert the primacy of executive discretion in the implementation of a system of asylum control. 
Examining the underlying policy considerations, Blake concluded that it was inconceivable that 
any relevant authority could contemplate even short term detention of the child asylum-claimant 
for the sake of administrative convenience. Yet,. the new policy of child detention constituted an 
interference with Article 8, and a disregard of the guidance given in the Operational 
Enforcement Manual which recognised a right to a family life and advised that detention should 
only be used where it was necessary to achieve one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 8. 
Accordingly, 'the October 2001 policy change toward more detention of families [raised doubt] 
as to whether detention [was] being used only where strictly necessary, particularly given that 
the ... change was not based on evidence, 
but a minister's recognition. ' 34' This, according to 
Clayton, seemed dangerously to elevate executive discretion over all other counter-veiling 
factors. However, the elevation of executive discretion constitutes only one reason amongst 
many for concern. 
344 Letter from the Home Office to Immigration Services Detention Polic% Unit, 18"' June 2002, quoted in E. Cole 'The Detention of 
Asylum-Seeking Families in the UK' (2003) LA. N. L. (17), 2,96-113 
, 4i Hereafter, UNCRC 
Blak-e (2003), Op. cit at 170 
,4' Clayton (2004). Op. cit at 447 
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Firstly, it is arguable that the risk of absconding is being used as justification for the detention of 
families, and young persons without detailed or meaningful assessment of the risk. Standing in 
violation of the ECHR requirement that detention be used only where necessary to achieve one 
of the aims set out in Article 8, throughout the asylum process a claimant can just as easily be 
detained because the facilities for detention are available, as opposed to the result of a full 
enquiry in accordance with the principles of necessity, proportionality, and appropriateness of 
detainment. "' 
Secondly, in April 2004, amendment to the funding arrangements for asylum was introduced 
with the purpose of reducing costs. Forming the focus of general criticism, reduction in the 
amount of financial assistance available for legal work has resulted in the withdrawal of 
previously well established legal-practitioners from the field of immigration practice leaving a 
dearth in expertise, with obvious consequences for the claimant. 
Thirdly, in accordance with powers afforded under the Immigration Act 1971, IA Act, NI Act 
and NIA Act,, asylum authorities are empowered with the ability to detain an asylum-claimant 
who seeks asylum in the UK. No judicial review of the decision to detain is required. Whether 
such lack of independent oversight constitutes a bar to the ability of the detainee to effectively 
challenge any state decision, this thesis examines the position of an asylum-claimant who 
questions the lawfulness of his detention in ten-ns of its justification and/or its duration, as well 
as his apparent inability to seek independent review, and the effect of the FIRA on the UK's 
ECHR commitment to extend to everyone within its jurisdiction the protection of those 
fundamental rights and freedoms set down in Section I of the ECHR. 
A decision to detain an asylum-claimant is not a decision as to a refusal, or a grant of leave of 
entry. Accordingly, a decision to detain is not appealable under Section 82 of the NIA Act. 
However, this is not to suggest that detention is never subject to review. Although detention is 
not subject to statutory control, a number of principles governing the lawfulness of detention in 
terms of duration and the exercise of discretion to detain,, have developed at common-law. "' 
However, albeit such safeguards do exist, their effectiveness remains a matter of debate. For 
example, whereas the process of judicial review remains relevant in relation to the exercise of 
state authority, the use of habeas corpus to challenge the lawfulness of asylum detention is 
limited. Section 140(l) of the IA Act permits detention where there is a reasonable suspicion that 
direction for removal of the asylum-claimant may be given. Unless there is no reasonable 
suspicion, or detention is excessively long, the question turns from whether the detention was 
"' Cole (2003), Op. cit at 100 
149 For example. NNliereas the lawfulness of detention can be challenged by way of habeas corpus, in accordance with Schedule 2 of 
the Immigration Act 1971 (regarding asý lum), and Section 54 of the IA Act (regarding deportation), the asylum-claimant has a right 
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firmIN on the asylum authority 
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unlawful, to whether the jurisdiction to detain was exercised appropriately. Similarly, difficulties 
in the claimant's ability to apply for bail (from his obtaining suitable legal representation from a 
depleting pool of specialist legal-practitioners, to his satisfying conditions of bail, recognisance 
or sureties) renders the process as likely to effectively address the lawfulness of detention, as the 
operation of habeas corpus is likely to give rise to full and frank analysis of the effect of a 
decision on the rights and freedoms of the asylum-claimant. 
The Value ofArticles 5 and 6 
The ECHR evinces a concern against the arbitrary use of state detention mirrored in Article 9 of 
the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 9 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. Article 5 of the ECHR deals with the right to personal liberty and 
security, commencing with the presumption that everyone has such a right, except where the 
state exercises the authorised purpose of interfering either to prevent unauthorized entry, or to 
execute detention of a person against whom lawful action is being taken with a view to their 
removal. Article 5 subjects such interference to the requirement that it be in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law; and annexes to it a number of due-process rights: including the 
right to be informed of the reason for detention; to a hearing within a reasonable time; and the 
right to initiate legal -proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of any decision to detain. 
Although not intended to subjugate the principle that a state has power to control the entry of 
non-nationals, unlike the qualified rights of the ECHR, whose sanctioned purposes for 
interference is expressed in terms of prevailing national policy, the purposes for interference 
sanctioned by Article 5 are more specifically defined by the ECHR order. Thus, concerning a 
challenge by an applicant to a deportation order grounded on national security, in Chahal v 
UK 350 the lack of judicial involvement in the deportation process constituted a breach of Article 
6. Under the Immigration Act 1971 there was no impartial right of appeal against a deportation 
order. Although the deportee was availed with an opportunity to make representation, the 
process involved only the inclusion of the opinion of an advisory panel of three advisors 
appointed by the Home Office. Although, following Chahal, the procedure was amended by the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, what remains of interest in Chahal is the 
approach of the ECrtHR. 
Examining the ECHR requirement of impartial judicial authority, the ECrtHR maintains that 
Article 5(4) requires that everyone deprived of liberty is entitled to an impartial and speedy 
review of the lawfulness of deprivation. According to the ECrtHR, the principle of lawfulness 
inherent in Article 5 requires that deportation proceedings be carried out with all due diligence to 
150 (1997) 231 HiRR 413 
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protect the applicant against arbitrariness. Accordingly. the approach of the ECrtHR is to accord 
Article 5a narrow interpretation, in which regard for what may constitute the public interest is 
not necessarily conclusive. The approach stands in contrast to the reluctance of the court in Rv 
Home Department, ex-parte Hosenball to look behind the Home Secretary's assertion that in the 
event of 'conflict ... between the interests of security ... and the 
freedom of the individual ... the 
balance between [the] two is not for a court of law... [but] the Home Secretary. 351 
Further, regarding the definition of lawfulness accorded by the ECrtI4R, whereas detention must 
be carried out in accordance with a substantive process of law, 352 the quality of that process must 
be compatible with the rule of law 353 and satisfy the general principle against arbitrariness. 354 
Thus, concerning a question of procedural fairness, in Conka v Belgium the ECrtHR held that 
where the purpose for detention given to a detainee is misleading, unclear or imprecise, then 
insofar as the purpose contravenes the principle against arbitrariness, detention constitutes an 
indirect breach of Article 5. The facts of Conka are interesting. A notice requesting claimants to 
attend police stations for the purpose of up-dating details regarding their applications for asylum 
was issued by the Belgium police. When the claimants attended they found themselves served 
with orders for removal, detained and then removed. Criticised by the ECrtHR as state- 
engineered fraud, the notice issued was held to constitute action leading to detainment by 
deception. The facts of Conka echoed the findings of Weber's 2000 analysis of the UK asylum 
order. 355 Examining a number of cases where claimants were called to attend an interview to 
hear the result of their asylum decision, the statements of some of the immigration-officers 
involved revealed a discomfort with the lack of information given to the interviewees at the time, 
some of whom where not even aware of the purpose of the interview. 
To summarise,, since the 1990's a development in the process of asylum is the increase in the use 
of detention. Although the basis for detainment has not significantly changed since the 
Immigration Act 1971, both the IA Act and NIA Act have resulted in an advance in the use 
made of the detention centre. The development stands in contrast with the telos of the ECHR 
order, in particular the concern that detention be carried out with full consideration of its effect 
on liberty. In contrast to the practice of judicial review, the EC14R order (arguably) places a 
(requirement' on the signatory-state to uphold the fundamental rights and freedoms of everyone 
within its jurisdiction. The responsibility for ensuring compliance is on public authority. 
Accordingly, Section 6 of the HRA provides that a public authority which behaves in a way 
which is incompatible with the ECHR acts unlawfully, unless required to do so by primar,, 
15, [ 1977] 3 All ER 452 at 461 
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legislation. As the decision to detain an asylum-claimant is an administrative decision, it is 
subject to challenge under Section 6. However, the impact of the ERA on the legislature remains 
limited. With the exception of the House of Lords acting in its judicial capacity, Section 6(3) 
excludes from the definition of public authority both Houses of Parliament, as well as those 
persons exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament. Accordingly, neither 
the enactment of legislation, nor proceedings for contempt falls within the scope of the HRA. A 
parliamentary department can not be sub ected to a challenge on FIR grounds merely because by j 
its failure to act it creates a lacuna in UK law. Parliament may be obliged to consider whether its 
legislation is compatible with the ECHR, but is not obliged to comply with its provisions. 
Insofar as this aspect of parliamentary sovereignty is retained, what impact has the enactment of 
the HRA in terms of protecting the asylum-claimant? 
Highlighted by Lord Mustill in Tv Home Department, 356 the right of a claimant to seek asylum 
in UK law is a matter of executive discretion. Post 2000, a new category of detention was 
introduced based on the power of the Secretary of Sate under Section 4 of the IA Act to provide 
for the detention of claimants temporarily admitted, released from detention, or released on bail 
under the Immigration Acts. Designed to deal with claimants temporarily admitted, the 
'Oaklington regime' consisted of the detainment of claimants whose applications were 
considered capable of being decided swiftly at a detention centre, a fear of absconding not 
required as a pre-condition for detention. 
On September 7th 2001, this form of detention was challenged in R (Saadi) v Home 
Department. 357 Concerning detention pending examination of 4 Iraqi Kurds (one who on 
entering the UK had claimed asylum upon arrival) the challenge in Saadi was based on 2 
grounds. Firstly, that detention of all 4 claimants was unlawful in accordance with the 
Immigration Act 1971; and secondly, that detention offended against Article 5 of the ECHR. On 
the first ground the Judge Collins held that the power to detain all 4 claimants fell lawfully 
within Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 1971, which permitted the immigration authority to 
detain pending examination. Provided that detention was exercised in accordance with law, it 
was for the Home Department to decide on the circumstances in which it should be used. With 
regard to the second ground, the question for the Court was whether detention of the claimants 
for the purpose of enabling a speedy decision came within the wording of Article 5(l)(f). Article 
5 (1)(f) permits restriction of the right to liberty in the event of a lawful detention to prevent a 
claimant from effecting an unauthorised-entry, or against whom action is being taken with a 
view to removal. The Administrative Court held that the detention regime in the circumstances 
relating to Saadi constituted a breach of Article 5. The finding was summarised by Judge 
[ 1996] 2 All ER 865 at 868 
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Collins: 'the detention in question can not be justified ... that 
it can speed up the process of 
determination of applications generally ... and assist other applicants. 
It is plain that detention can 
not be justified on the basis that it might deter others from seeking to enter by making false 
claims for asylum. Once it is accepted that an applicant has made a proper application for 
asylum and there is no risk that he will abscond ... it is impossible to see 
how it could reasonably 
be that he needs to be detained to prevent his affecting an unauthorised entry. ' 358 
The Home Secretary appealed. The Court held that the power of the state to detain under the 
circumstances was lawful under domestic law. Article 5 could not have been intended to 
override the international principle that a state had the right to control the right of entry of non- 
nationals. The interpretation of Judge Collins would be to place an obligation on the Secretary of 
State to grant temporary admission whenever an asylum claim was made, absent the likelihood 
of the asylum-claimant absconding. In reaching its decision the Court highlighted the finding in 
Chahal that Article 5(l)(f) did not require that detention be necessary to prevent either 
absconding or the commission of an offence. All that was required was that proceedings should 
be executed with due diligence. Accordingly, detention under the Oaklington regime was 
proportionate in achieving the objective(s) legitimised by Article 5(l)(f), regardless of whether 
the decision was justified under domestic law. 
The lawfulness of the claimant's detention formed the focus for consideration by the House of 
Lords. Advancing from the premise that the detention of all 4 claimants pending examination 
accorded with Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 197 1, the question for the Court was whether a 
policy of using detention for the purpose of effecting a speedy process fell within the wording of 
Article 5(l)(f). 
Examining the objective(s) of the Oaklington regime, the Court held that the purpose for 
detention was neither arbitrary, nor disproportionate. The obective of using the process of 
detention to effect a speedy decision on the claimant's right of entry in the instant case, and to 
the benefit of others awaiting determination, fell within the scope of Article 5. In reaching its 
decision, the Court rejected the argument that in order to satisfy Article 5 detention could only 
be used for the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry. Adopting the finding in Chahal that 
it was lawful to detain an individual in respect of whom action was being taken with a view to 
their removal, deportation, or extradition, regardless of whether such detainment was necessary 
to prevent his committing an offence or absconding, the Court held that all that was required was 
that it be carried out with due diligence. 
158 [2001] 4 All ER 961 at 977 
132 
The reasoning of the House of Lords differed from that of Judge Collins. Satisfying both the 
Home Office and Executive, the House of Lords applied literally the reasoning that every right 
of entry of a non-national was unauthorised, until rendered authorised. Constituting the first HR 
case following the introduction of the HRA to examine asylum detention, the reasoning of the 
House of Lords in terms of rights protection was discouraging. Grounded on the concern of 
sovereignty, the lawfulness of detention was determined without significant regard for the telos 
of the ECHR. Although the detention in question engaged Article 5, it nevertheless had a 
legitimate objective under Article 5(l)(f), and the procedures used were not disproportionate to 
the achievement of that objective. 
(3) The Treatment of the Asylum-Claimant 
The Value ofArticle 3 
Regardless of the HRA, insofar as policy continues to outweigh any serious regard for the 
asYlum-claimant, the exclusion of parliamentary process from Section 6 of the RRA, renders the 
effectiveness of the ECHR a matter of political will. However, this is not to suggest that the 
ECHR is without significance. In accordance with Section 3, the UK judiciary is accorded the 
power to determine what exactly a legislative provision requires. Forming the subject of debate 
between the Home Office and the UK judiciary, objection voiced over the constitutional role of 
the judiciary under the HRA is revealing. 
Questioning whether there was such a thing as public policy in the UK asylum order, the Home 
Secretary declared that he was tired with the situation where the Government initiated a response 
to a concern of national interest, Parliament debated it, legislation developed it, and the judiciary 
then undermined it. The statement referred to the rulings in R (J) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department 359 and R (Q and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 360 
Rulings, in the opinion of the Home Office, which constituted little more than a challenge to 
Parliament. 
Justified as an attempt to introduce rigour into the UK asylum order, on January 8 2003, the 
Government put into effect the Section 55 of the NIA Act requirement that in order to qualify for 
financial assistance, a claim for asylum had to be made as soon as reasonably practicable 
following the claimant's arrival in the UK. The words reasonably practicable were defined by 
the Government to mean upon immediate arrival at a port of entry and before any award of 
ternporary admission. Less that one year after the introduction of Section 55, in R Q) and R (Q), 
its lawfulness was called into question. The Court concluded that the prohibition of support 
359 [20031 COI 15 1/2003 
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where a claim was not made as reasonably as practicable, was unla'xful. The reason for the 
finding was stated in R (Q). In the opinion of the court, the application of Section 55 had led to 
the claimants suffering flawed decisions, in the sense that their reasons for not claiming asylum 
as soon as reasonably practicable required at least enquiry into the particular pressures on them, 
including what they had been officially told about the process of claiming asylum. Judge Collins 
went on that although he was aware that his ruling in the instant case would weaken the 
anticipated effect of Government policy, nevertheless Parliament could not have intended that 
claimants should be faced with the choice of either returning to persecution or face destitution. 
The Home Secretary appealed. Despite the argument that the functioning of Section 55 
constituted a response to increasing public concern in which the Government had to take tough 
decisions in the short term for the long term benefit of society, the appeal was dismissed. Lords 
Phillips, Sedley and Clarke ruled that not only was the procedure to work out whether a claimant 
had just arrived in the UK impracticable, the absence of a right to challenge the decision was 
un ust. Since the late application of two of the claimants was not deemed to have received fair 
consideration, the Home Secretary's appeal against the decision of the High Court was 
dismissed. 
On January 7 2003, a number of HR organisations issued a joint statement on the effect of 
Section 55. The statement expressed concern with the effect of the deprivation of in country 
asylum-claimants of the right to support, and criticised the punitive philosophy of the 
Government. In the opinion of the Joint Statement, the effect of Section 55 was to render certain 
claimants destitute, regardless of whether they reasonably believed that they did not need to 
apply for asylum immediately on arrival. 
The punitive philosophy of Section 55(l) formed the focus of Home Department v Limhuel, 
Tesema and Adam. 361 The Secretary of State appealed against a decision granting relief by way 
of judicial review to 3 asylum-claimants contrary to a Home Office decision not to provide 
support. As a response to the refusal, it was argued that there was nothing in the opinion of the 
Secretary of State's decision to prevent his taking action under Section 55(5) of the NIA Act, 
which provided that nothing in Section 55(l) prevented the exercise of a power in order to avoid 
a potential ECHR breach. In all 3 cases, the Appeal was dismissed. The Court held that, whereas 
in two of the cases the refusal to assist a claimant who had failed to find alternative means of 
support constituted a breach of Article 3, in the third case, in order to qualify for Section 55(5) 
support, the claimant had to produce evidence of a level of suffering verging on the threshold of 
362 severity laid out in Pretty v UK . While declaring that there was no error of law in 2 of the 
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decisions in which the Court (applying the criteria in Pretty) had concluded that ,N ithout support 
the claimants would become subject to treatment sufficient to engage Article 3, the Court held 
that overshadowing the facts of the case was the reality that there were some other 666 claimants 
who, as a result of Section 55, were likely to be subjected to treatment which would take thern 
across the severity threshold. Accordingly, the underlying policy of Section 55 was unlawful. 
There was no reason to interfere with the decision of the Administrative Court that the Secretary 
of State should have provided the claimants with support in order to avoid a breach of his ECHR 
obligation. 
The Home Secretary was dissatisfied. In Rv Home Department, ex-parte Adam, Limbuela and 
Tesema 363 Lord Bingham summarised the Home Secretary's appeal as revolving around the 
question in what circumstances did the State become obliged to provide support where it was not 
satisfied that a claim was made as soon as was reasonably practicable. In reaching its decision, 
the Court examined the policy behind Section 55(5). According to Lord Bingham, the provision 
constituted a response to what the Government perceived to be an increase in asylum claims 
detrimental to the well-being of the State. Grounded on the premise that while some claimants 
were genuine refugees the overwhelming majority were economic migrants, in the opinion of 
Lord Bingham, the object of Section 55 was to discourage unmeritorious claims by encouraging 
firmer dealing with asylum-claimants. Section 55(l) revoked the former ability of the Home 
Secretary to provide support for claimants and their dependents who, in accordance with Section 
59 of the IA Act, he was not satisfied had made a claim as soon as was reasonably practicable. 
However, in the words of Lord Bingham, the legislation did not end there. The prohibition in 
Section 55(l) is qualified by Section 55(5). Although Paragraphs Section 55(5)(B) and (c) were 
not pertinent in the present case, they nevertheless indicated Parliament's recognition that the 
prohibition in Section 55(l) could lead to a breach of a claimant's ECHR rights which, in 
accordance with Section 6 of the HRA,, the Secretary of State was obliged to acknowledge. 
Accordingly, it was unlawful that the treatment of the late asylum-claimant could merit what 
could only be described as 'mountainish inhumanity. ' Upholding the finding of the Court of 
Appeal, the Court stated that it was not developing a duty to house the homeless, but upholding a 
duty to prevent destitution caused by public policy. 
To summarise, insofar as a signatory's dedication to the ECHR constitutes a guard against the 
excessive use of state power, the UK judiciary's criticism of the underlying policy of Section 55 
in R i, Home Department ex-parte Adam, Limbuela and Tesema served to ensure that not even 
the actions of the Home Secretary fell beyond lawful scrutiny. Whether such scrutiny can be 
defined as effective protection of the rights and freedoms of the asylum-claimant however, either 
30 [20051 UKHE 66 
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in ten-ns of the development of judicial principle, or the effect of any pronouncement on the 
Government, remains questionable. Regardless of criticism, the withholding of state support 
continued to be justified by an executive which, in contravention of its attempt to produce 
seamless provision for the dealing with unmeritorious claims, followed its appeasement of 
French Ministers to close the Sangatte Refugee Camp by granting exceptional leave to remain to 
some 1,200 refugees, removing the Asylum Claimant's Employment Concession, and declaring 
an intent to abandon altogether its ECHR obligations, if measures proved necessary to stem the 
tide of claimants entering the UK. 
Although asylum decisions will invariably be taken by a state authority, therefore open to 
challenge under Section 7 of the HRA, the facility for a non-national to challenge a decision on 
HR grounds remains an executive structured programme of state control. Yet, the risks of 
executive involvement, including its impact on established constitutional arrangements, as 
voiced by the ECrtHR in Procola v Luxembourg 364 and Mc Gonnell v UK, 36' as well as the 
House of Lords in Davidson v Scottish Ministers, 366 remains only one of many concerns to the 
non-national. 
For example, Part I of the NIA Act, which amends the British Nationality Act 198 1, 
demonstrates the exclusive power of the State to determine who its nationals are. Rather than 
birth and parentage, the Government has concentrated on the determination of nationality by 
means of assessment of the suitability of the claimant for UK citizenship grounded on his 
participation and value to the State. Coupled with an asylum policy reflecting little concern with 
the telos of the ECHR,, the international principle of non-refoulement or the UN Convention on 
367 
the Rights of the Child, such amendment brings home the reality advanced by Arendt , 
DouzinaS368 and (arguably) Burke, 369 of the practicalities of the application of a universal 
standard of HR protection. Although the ECHR has served to highlight the concern of the 
asylum individual, 370 the UK's treatment of asylum serves to show how HR do infact attend the 
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kind... Publication of the final report was accompanied by controversv... European Governments moved before publication to 
downgrade proposals that the EU should set up a special department headed bý a new Commissioner to co-ordinate [HRI work 
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principle of nationality and, despite its generality, excludes from the Community of its oxNn 
371 
subjects all those who do not belong to the nation-state . 
Despite the Government's endeavour to bring rights home by means of the HRA then, analysis 
of its impact on the asylum-claimant continues to give rise to a number of concerns. Not least: 
0 The increasing power of the Executive to act without judicial oversight; 
9 The difficulty of a detainee to challenge asylum decisions, including the reduction in April 2004 of 
public funding for legal work resulting in a dearth of specialised legal expertise; 
0 The increasing linkage in policy and law between asylum and terrorism. 
Yet, such concerns do not stop there. Beyond the treatment of the non-national, and underlying 
recent legislative developments in criminal justice, lays arguably the most controversial 
executive use made to date of the concepts of community, security and national interest. 372 
Namely, justification of the ability of the state to exert even further control over possibly the 
most vulnerable individuals in the field of criminal justice: children and young persons lawfully 
detained. 
Section 3.3.3: Treatment of the Child and Young Person 
(1) The ASBO 
373 Forming part of the Government's law and order strategy, the Anti-Social Behaviour Order , 
introduced in Section I of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998,374 has provided police and local 
authorities with unprecedented control over anti-social behaviour. The statistical reality of the 
ASBO formed the subject of a Paper by Professor Scraton. 375 Examining the 'automatic 
imposition' of the ASBO, resulting between April 1999 and March 2004 in a 98.3% rate of 
issue, according to Scraton such data could not but give rise to concern over the effect of a 
measure whose political imperative appeared to be the fast-track of the majority of those subject 
to it into custody. On analysis, such concern is not unreasonable. 
throughout Europe. References to the inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees and details of deaths of asylum-seekers in 
police custody in the initial report Nýere deleted from the final version. But the report did conclude ... that Europe's "strong rhetoric" 
on [HR] xN as not matched bý the reality. " (Douzinas 2004, Op. cit at 125-126) 
"' Simpson (2002), Op. cit at 94 
172 D. Garland The Culture of Control (OUP, Oxford 2000) 
37, 'Hereafter, ASBO 
374Hereafter. CD Act 
3"5 Scraton Regulating . 4nti-Social Behaviour: 4 Critical Perspective, Presented to the IASD Annual Conference, Cavan 5" 
November 2004 
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According to Ashworth and Redmayne, one sign of Government ambi, ý, -alence about HR in their 
application to criminal justice is the ASBO. Both the ECHR and ECrtHR 376 'adopt the approach 
that, where proceedings are in substance criminal because of what is at stake ... they should 
be 
treated as criminal for the purpose of the safeguards that the [ECHR] applies to those charged 
with criminal offences ... The whole point of the ASBO was 'to circumvent this ... 
Thus, the 
Government promoted the measure as a way of avoiding the 'problem' of the criminal process: 
an application is made to a court under civil procedure, and if they find evidence of anti-social 
behaviour they may make an order imposing conditions on the defendant. ' 377 According to 
Ashworth and Redmayne, the development highlights a recent tendency affecting the criminal 
process: 'Not too long ago it was a mark of enlightenment to suggest that some forms of 
misconduct should be taken out of the criminal law and dealt with only through civil processes. 
Now it seems, that the route is being exploited as a means of avoiding the protections of criminal 
procedure, while ensuring that, by means of making breach of the civil order an offence of strict 
liability with a high maximum penalty, severe sanctions are available. 378 
Certainly, as a policy leading to the marginal isation, and arguable prevention of re-integration of 
the stigmatised child later into main stream society, objection to the long term effect of the 
ASBO,, including its compatibility with the ECHR, has continued throughout its functioning. Yet 
its use, as well as such related practice as the vilification of juveniles subject to it in the national 
press, has remained constant. The Government's response, a denial of the possibility that the 
regime could lead to the excluded child finding itself enticed onto the ladder of criminality. 
According to Professor Williamson, 379 such a response was not surprising. Analysing the 
political climate surrounding the ASBO, according to Williamson, the initiative represented no 
more than an example of the tyranny of policy momentum to full damaging effect: the 
detainment (at the time of Williamson's writing) of some 3,000 under 17 year olds. The opinion 
re-iterated the criticism of the Government's method of Government by the former Deputy 
Political Secretary and former Head of Policy, whose experience in Government led them to 
believe that the ASBO represented merely a knee-jerk reaction of little substance other than the 
380 media inspired detennination to satisfy public interest . Whether on the ground of securing the 
greater good the ASBO regime can be justified, both the quantity and quality of criticism is 
disconcerting. 
3" Engel N Netherlands (1979) 1 EHRR 647 
177 A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne The Criminal Process (OUP, Oxford 2005) 14 
378 lbid, p. 14 
379 Williamson Social Justice, Children, Crime and the Community. Report of October 2005 (Howard League for Penal Reform, 
London 2005) 
180 The Independent Newspaper 2 September 2005 p. 17 
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Following the significance afforded the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child 
382 1989"' and the European Charter in Costello Roberts v UK , it can 
be argued that the UK is 
obliged to demonstrate greater willingness to respect the rights and freedoms of the child. 
Examining the UK's response to problems arsing forrn the functioning of the ASBO however. 
383 the argument is debatable. 
Article 3 of the UNCRC provides that in dealings concerning the welfare of a child undertaken 
by a public body, the best interest of the child should remain a primary consideration. The telos 
of Article 3 is developed further in Article 24 of the European Charter which provides that in all 
actions relating to children, whether taken by a public authority or a private institution, the 
child's best interest will remain the primary consideration. 
The significance of the UNCRC, ECHR and European Charter formed the focus of Kv Advocate 
General. 384 Concerned with the delay between the charging of a child offender and his being 
brought before a court, the Privy Council held that the reasonable time limit requirement should 
be read in the light of the UNCRC and the Bejjing Rules, 385 insofar as the FIRA placed an 
obligation on the Court to have regard to the rulings of the ECrtHR and relevant international 
provision. Accordingly, the obligation required that criminal proceedings be carried out with due 
expediency and in accordance with the ECHR. Reason for the finding was adopted from R 
(Howard League) v the Secretary of State. 386 Examining the relevance of Article 3 of the 
UNCRC and Article 24 of the European Charter, the Court in Howard League held that although 
neither provision was legally binding, both could be consulted insofar as they elucidated the 
content of FIR recognised throughout Europe. Accordingly, where a child's (arguable) rights 
were engaged in a decision, then the decision-maker was obliged to have regard to the best 
interest of the child. 
The application of the welfare principle fon-ned the subject of R (A) v Leeds Magistrates and 
City Council. 387 Concerning the imposition of an ASBO, the Court held that if it was contended 
that the best interest of a child required that an ASBO should not be issued, or if so, in terms 
different from those proposed by the Local Authority, it was for the child to provide both an 
explanation of his case and any relevant evidence. In the opinion of the Court, the phrase the 
best interest of the child was not a 'magic talisman' which if not pronounced would invalidate 
the order made. Albeit a court was obliged to consider the interest of the child when deciding 
Hereafter, LTNCRC 
(1999) 27 EHRR 611 
Certainly in the opinion of AshNNorth and Redmayne, 'in this country, the spirit underlying the UNCRC does not pervade 
GoNernment pronouncements on wuth Justice. ' Ash-vNorth and Redmayne (2007), Op. cit at 377 
38' [2004] 1 AC 104 
115 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 1985 
1200311 FLA 484 
[20041 FWHC 443 (Admin) 
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whether to make an ASBO, the imposition of an order could never be precluded. The ruling 
represented a classic Diceyean handling of the tension between the policy of a politically 
charged Government initiative and its effect on the individual. Certainly, throughout its 
deliberation of the ASBO regime, it is arguable that the promotion of the rights of the individual, 
in accordance with the telos of the ECHR, has remained no more visibly foremost in the judicial 
mind, than considerations of policy. 
For example, in Wareham v Purbeck District CounciP88 the Court was called on to determine the 
lawfulness of an ASBO application against a 19 year-old, and whether failure by the authority to 
consult the youth prior to application rendered the proceedings contrary to Articles 6 and 8 of the 
ECHR. The Court held that it did not. Where an authority was contemplating whether to apply 
for an ASBO, it was not under a legal duty to consult the individual concerned. The decision was 
justified on the ground that what occurred prior to court proceedings was no more than a 
decision to make an application, and that when an application was made, the subject was given 
adequate opportunity to be heard. The decision of an Authority not to invite the subject to be 
heard prior to a decision to apply for an order could be distinguished from those circumstances 
in which a decision not to consult would give rise to invocation of the ECHR. 189 In reaching its 
decision, the Court examined the policy objective of the ASBO regime and found it to fall within 
the ECHR exception of a measure intended to protect public safety. 
Similarly, in R (T) v Manchester Crown Cour? 90 the policy of the ASBO regime formed a 
determining factor in the deliberation of the concern in question. The case concerned a refusal to 
permit an appeal against the terms of an ASBO which had been originally consented to at the 
time of its imposition by the 14 year-old subject to it. The Court held that the denial was 
unlawful. Consent to an ASBO, or its terrns, did not debar any future exercise of a right to 
forward an appeal. In reaching its decision, the Court held that consent could not constitute the 
'trump-card' on which an ASBO depended. Although the Court recognised that it would be to 
the detriment of the subject, were consent to the terms of an ASBO at the time of issue to debar a 
future appeal, greater was its concern over the frustration that an alternative finding would have 
on the ASBO's policy objective: to protect the public good. 
The reasoning behind the rulings of Wareham and R (T) was not out of character with that 
generally of the UK court. Whatever could have been expected of the HRA, the effect of the 
regime on the individual remained (not uncommonly) the lesser interest to be weighed against 
that of the state. Whereas. the Court was only too aware that to have placed a legal duty to 
consult on an authority seeking to make an ASBO application would have been to place too 
[20051 EWHC 358 (Admin) 
Venema vNetherlands (2003) 1 FLR 
[2M] EWI IC 1396 (Admin) 
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onerous a burden upon it; by treating the issue of consent as a factor in relation to the matters 
required to be proved and the value judgment that a Court must exercise in deciding whether an 
order was necessary, the ruling re-enforced the most controversial concern regarding the ASBO 
regime, the power of the State. 
Finally, that the Court will not go so far as to acknowledge a right of the individual to challenge 
an ASBO is evident in the ruling of Wv Director of Public Prosecutions . 
39 1 The case concerned 
the validity of an ASBO imposed on a 14 year-old which prohibited him from committing any 
criminal offence, and the possibility of such an invalidity being used as a defence in related 
proceedings. Although an ASBO can prohibit behaviour that would amount to the commission 
of a criminal offence,, the Court held that the width of the prohibition was not only too wide, but 
unnecessary for the purpose of protecting society. Distinguishing the order from one relating to 
the commission of a specific offence, 392 the court grounded its finding on the principle of legal 
certainty. 393 But in doing so, limited the scope of any challenge to circumstances where an 
ASBO was in violation of established principles of UK justice, on the ground that to allow an 
alleged invalidity to be raised as a defence would be to open the floodgates. 
To summarise, along with prevailing Home Office policy regarding the treatment of terrorism 
and asylum, insofar as 'it appears that the Government has been able to by-pass the protections 
for criminal charges and to open up a way of dealing with crimes ... that avoids the [ECRR] 
394 395 
safeguards, ' the ASBO constitutes a particular challenge to the telos of the ECHR. The 
Government's determination to be tough on juvenile crime, whatever the long term cost, and the 
judiciary's approach toward the ASBO grounded on a belief that the initiative, as a civil 
remedy, 396 is both ECHR and common-law compliant, 397 renders the success of any challenge 
uncertain. 
(2) Detention of the Child and Young Offender 
Contrary to Home Office policy, in R (Howard League) v the Secretary of State 398 the court held 
that the protection accorded the child under the Children Act 1989399 did apply to those held in 
custody. If (in the opinion of the Court) there were Young Offender Institutions which were not 
living up to the standards which the CA 1989 (were it to apply) would require, and children were 
-'9' [2005] EWCA Civ 1333 
192 RvP [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 63 
393 Rv Chiýf Constable ofAvon and Somerset (2001 ]I WLR 340 
194 Of liberty and due-process: Ashworth and Redmayne (2005), Op. cit at 14 
3'5 As would any application of it as a waý of imposing political confonnity on pain of criminal sanction. A possibIlIq,, following R 
(Singh) v Chiqf Constable of West Midlands Police [20061 EWCA 1118, regarding the application of a dispersal order introduced in 
the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. not wholly unreasonable: Gearty (2007). Op. cit at 112 396R 
(, I IcCann) v Manchester Croit-n Court [200311 AC 787 
397 R (M v Secretaiý, of Statefor Constitutional Affairs [2004] 1 WLR 2298 
[2003] 1 FLR 484 
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being subjected to the unacceptable treatment depicted by the Report of the Chief-Inspector (as 
raised), then it could only be a matter of time before an action was brought under the HRA by a 
child detained in a Young Offender Institution. The case highlighted 3 concerns: 
(1) The exclusion of children and young persons held in detention, from mainstream child protection; 
(2) The conditions of detention, and necessity for Government and Local Authority to safeguard the 
welfare of the child and young person; 
(3) The influence (if any) of the ECHR on prevailing policy. 
The policy that children and young persons be detained without protection against FIR violation, 
formed the subject of the Carlile Report 2006. 
In 2006,, Lord Carlile led an Inquiry into the treatment of children and young persons held under 
State punitive control . 
400 The rationale for the investigation was that international recognition of 
the need to protect the welfare of juveniles should apply to all children and young persons 
whether at liberty, or not. According to the Howard League, children and young persons in 
custody were entitled to protection before, during and after detainment, in accordance with any 
treaty to which the UK was a signatory, as well as the telos of the UNCRC, European Charter 
and (arguably) the ECHR. Examining the functioning of 3 types of institutions: the Young 
Offender, Secure Training Centre, and Local Authority Secure Children's Home; the Inquiry 
concentrated on the impact of a number of methods of physical control, including restraint, 
solitary confinement, and strip-search. The findings are discouraging. 
Examining the treatment of children and young persons in custody, according to the Carlile 
Report, throughout January 2004 to September 2005, the use of physical restraint was used some 
5J33 times. Out of that number, some 7,020 children were restrained while detained in Secure 
Training Centres and 3,359 in 8 Special Local Authority Units. Apart from the fact that the 
practice often proved counter-productive, injury requiring medical treatment was not 
uncommon: some 296 cases having been recorded between April 2000 and February 2002. 
Greater statistics were uncovered in relation to the institutionalised practice of strip-search and 
the unmonitored practice of segregation which led, in its commonest form, to a child being held 
in a bare-cell without counselling, supervision, or access to the assistance of an advocate for up 
to 20 days or more. 
Highlighting an atmosphere antipathetic to young persons prevalent throughout all 3 institutions, 
the contention of the Inquiry was that the lawful treatment of the child constituted a morally 
""' Lord Carlile (2006), The Carlile Report (The Howard League for Penal Reform, London 2006) 
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impoverished regime of systematic neglect and misuse. Questioning where, in an era where the 
Respect Agenda had become a tenet of public policy, was the respect due from state authorit\ to 
the most vulnerable of young persons in society, the Report forwarded a number of suggestions, 
including the proposal that the Police and Crown Prosecution Service be more willing to 
prosecute numbers of staff in a] I pritnafacie cases of abuse. 
According to the above findings, the Carlile Report delivered a disturbing analysis of a closed 
world of juvenile secure estate, which in other circumstances, would have more than likely 
rendered those responsible sub ect to criminal investigation. Yet, its findings were not new to 
legal -practitioners, HR organisations, and trusts dedicated to the protection of the welfare of 
offenders generally. One such organisation was the Prison Reform Trust which, critical of 
placing children behind bars, highlighted what it regarded as the continuing failure of the 
Government to address the conditions of detainment faced by offenders aged between 18 and 21 
years . 
40 ' According to the Trust, such lack of official regard was not merely immoral, but 
unwise. Young offenders were a key issue for concern not simply because they reputedly carried 
out most of what the Home Secretary termed bulk crime, but because of the recidivism rates 
which revealed that out of the number of 18 to 21 year olds detained, an approximate three- 
quarter would be re-convicted and detained within 2 years of release. The Report then went on to 
highlight the cost of such disregard on society generally, intimating how the deprivation 
experienced by the young offender during his detention often contributed to the resentment 
expressed at his re-offending. Echoing sentiments similar to that of the Carlile Report, the Trust 
highlighted the need for understanding in the Government's handling of the issue. Far less 
convincing however, was the significance in terms of impact it attached to the effect of the 
perceived 'increasing judicial acknowledgment' of the rights of the child, as opposed to the 
young offender. 
For example, following formal investigation into the Feltham Young Offender Institute, and 
inspection of the Olney Young Offender Institute in July 2001, the (then) Chief-Inspector of 
Prisons reported that the practices exercised in both, amounted to a dangerous order of excessive 
control and neglect. 402 Similar criticism in respect of the damaging effect of solitary confinement 
was raised in R (BP) v Home Department, 403 but what of its impact? 
In R (BP) the Court held that although the practice of segregation in the juvenile order did not 
constitute a breach of Articles 3 or 8 of the ECHR,, the detainment of a 17 year-old with a history 
of self-harm did constitute contravention of the Young Offender Institute Rules 2000. In 
reaching its decision, the Court made reference to Howard League which imposed on persons 
"" Report of the Prison Reform Trust (2003) Re-Forming Children's Services (The Prison Reform Trust, London 2003) 
"02 Home Office, Report into Onley Young Qffender Institute Onlev 9-13 July 2001 (Home Office, London 2001) 
403 1200' 1 EWI IC 196,3 Admin 
143 
entrusted with the care of a child or young person, an obligation to have regard for their best 
interests (as recognised by the ECrtHR, encapsulated in the UNRC and European Charter) and 
the need to take steps to protect them against any treatment of the kind capable of invoking the 
ECHR. Beyond promoting the immediate plight of the Juvenile offender, the impact of Hou, ard 
League on Government policy, remained minimal. 
For example, post the HRA the criminal justice order saw reform primarily in the range of 
sentences applicable to the young offender, and the introduction of the Parenting Order, 
Reparation Order, Action-Plan Order and Detention and Training Order. Further, whereas in the 
case of the 12 year-old offender where the criteria of Section I of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 
is made out, a Youth Court can now order his detention in a Young Offender Institute and any 
time spent in custody is no longer taken into account when determining a date for release, 
amendment to the jurisdiction of the Youth Court is extended so as to allow it to impose 
custodial sentences of up to 24 months in length. Similar developments include the replacement 
of the former system of cautioning an offender with the new regime contained in Sections 65 and 
66 of the CD Act; and an increase in the power of Magistrates to impose custodial sentences on a 
wider range of offender, including children aged between 12 and 16 years charged with medium- 
level offences who, by virtue of Section 130 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, can 
now be subject to imprisonment while on remand. 
Whether, such developments can be said to represent the determination of a Government to 
pacify foremost public concern and remove juvenile offenders from society, regardless of the 
long term consequences, whereas in accordance with the Government's short term solution the 
number of child offenders subject to custody continues to increase, the perceived long term 
effects of detaining children continues to be challenged on grounds of humanity. 404 A reality 
only too readily recognised by the Howard League, and the Prison Reform Trust, as well as the 
Children's Society, the National Association for Youth Justice, and the Children's Alliance for 
England, whose research (post the HRA) into the reality of the Government's treatment of the 
young, makes it all the more harder to purport that the obligation placed on the judiciary to 
follow the reasoning of the ECrtHR and explore more widely the international acknowledgment 
of the rights of the child, has had any real effect. 
Section 3.3.4. - Treatment of the Adult Offender Lawfully Detained 
Tension between the concern of the State and the interest of the non-national,, child and young 
offender, indicates a realitv that in the event of FIR impinging on the procurement of political 
goals, executive indifference will give way to disregard. Analysis of the treatment of the adult 
"" Report of the Howard League for Penal Reform Out For Good: The Resettlement Needs of Young Men in Prison 31 May 2006 
(The Howard Leacoue, London 2006) 
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offender lawfully detained, provides similar example, except for its ability to highlight not the 
capability of the state (as in the case of the non-national) to deny the individual any form of HR 
where there is no legal duty to do so, but to interfere, and even remove, formerly established 
freedoms of the UK national. 
(1) Prisoner Correspondence 
The consolidated Prison Rules 1964 consisted of a multi-tiered hierarchy of regulations. 
Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, the Rules invoked a number of findings against the UK 
Government by both the European Commission and ECrtHR. The findings concerned the 
interference of the State in a prisoner's ability to correspond: a restriction which had no parallel 
in any other ECHR signatory- state. 
Under the Prison Rules,, the Secretary of State could issue instructions to censor prisoner 
correspondence. Compatibility of the power with the ECHR formed the subject of Golder v 
UK . 
40' The court was called on to determine whether refusal to permit a prisoner contact with a 
solicitor with a view to initiating defamation proceedings, constituted a breach of Articles 6 and 
8. The court held that it could. Although, a prisoner's ability to access justice was not absolute, 
justification for refusal was without foundation. The PR was amended by the Prison 
(Amendment) Rules 1972. The effect was to accord the prisoner ability to correspond with a 
legal advisor, but only in respect of proceedings to which he was already party. In the opinion of 
the ECrtHR, the amendment was inadequate. In order for the UK to meet its ECHR obligation, 
prisoners were to be accorded the ability to correspond, regardless of whether it related to 
existing action or not. Again, the provision was amended. The Prison (Amendment) Rules 1976 
provided that a prisoner could correspond for the purpose of obtaining advice concerning action 
by which he could become a party to civil proceedings, but then went on to qualify the 
concession by the requirement of ministerial discretion. 406 The ability of a prisoner to seek legal 
advice fon-ned again the focus of Silver v UK. 407 In accordance with Statutory Order 17, a prison 
authority could prevent a prisoner from seeking advice with a view to instigating proceedings 
where an issue raised internally was considered not to warrant legal advice. The prisoner alleged 
that the Order constituted a breach of the ECHR. Examining Article 6, the European 
Commission and ECrtHR held that it did. Although a right of access was not an absolute right, 
ministerial control under Statutory Order 17 was discriminatory and excessive. With regard to 
Article 8, the Government justified censorship on the ground that it fell within Article 8(2): as a 
restriction necessary for the prevention of disorder. The prisoner challenged the justification, and 
40 (197 1) ECHR Series A No. 18 
"' The qualification constituted a regard for the FCHR made more pertinent by the Home Secretary's refusal to accord Goverriment 
time to debate the amendment. HC Deb (1976) 909 (Cols. 611-612) (TSO, London) 
4o' (1980) FCHR Series B No. 15 
145 
argued that whereas the requirement that a restriction be in accordance with law should be 
objectively determined, the control accorded the minister was insufficiently defined as to render 
it unaccountable. 408 The European Commission and ECrtHR agreed. Whereas the requirement 
that grievances be settled internally before a prisoner could seek advice was unnecessary for the 
prevention of disorder, the discretion accorded the Secretary of State was excessive. the Prison 
Rule unaccountable, and the interference unnecessary. 
The Government responded with the introduction of a number of Statutory Orders and the Prison 
(Amendment) Rules 1983. Amendment allowed for less control of prisoner correspondence, but 
continued to restrict access to legal advice. As a result, the European Commission continued to 
receive some further 30 UK applications. 409 
The operation of the Prison Rules on a prisoner's ability to correspond provides an example of 
the UK's attitude toward the telos of the ECHR as it was allowed to impact on one aspect of 
prison life prior to the HRA. An attitude best described as a blatant disregard of the Resolution 
of the Council of Europe and Committee of Ministers Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners. 
In accordance with the Preamble to the Standard Minimum Rules, the Committee of Ministers 
directed that Governments be guided by the principles set out in its text, which included the 
application of Articles 6 and 8. In response to the adverse Strasbourg reaction to the UK's 
treatment of prisoners, the utilisation of the Rules fon-ned the subject of parliamentary debate. "O 
The question asked was whether in fulfilling its ECHR obligations, the UK had ensured that 
ECHR standards had been met. Despite concern raised over the issue of prisoner correspondence 
and access to legal advice, the Secretary of State declared that they had. Four years later 
however, while refusing to review a departmental circular, the same Department announced its 
decision to abandon altogether the Standard Minimum RuleS41 ' The declaration was unusual. 
The treatment of persons lawfully detained was one area of HR concern where it could be 
presumed that the HRA would have impact, insofar as it could afford the individual facility to 
question conditions of detention. Instead, indicating only marginal improvement in the 
accountability of executive action, the ability of a prisoner to correspond has continued to 
highlight in one particular area of HR concern, the actual success of the HRA in bringing respect 
for the ECHR rights and freedoms of the individual home. 
41"' A concern raised in HL Deb (1977) 387 (Col. 2078) (TSO, London) 
""' Including that of Campbell v UK (1984) ECHR Series A No. 80. As Rule 49(2) had denied the prisoner adequate facility to 
prepare for a defence and the ability to secure assistance of his oNNn choosing, both the European Commission and ECrtHR declared 
its functioning a breach of Articles 6(3)(b) and 60)(c) 
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For example, in R (Daly) v Home Department 412 the House of Lords disagreed with the Court of 
Appeal's refusal of an application for judicial review of Home Office policy set out in the Prison 
Rule Security Manual, on the basis that the power granted authorities to search any cell for 
correspondence suspected of being a risk to prison security constituted an interference with the 
prisoner's ability to correspond. The finding was based on 2 grounds: that the rule infringed the 
common-law principle of legal professional privilege; and that the executive decision constituted 
an Article 8 interference. In reaching its decision, the Court highlighted not merely the precise 
relevance of the HRA,, but also the distinction to be drawn between the reasoning of the ECrtHR 
and the common-law,. as well as, the review criterion to be adopted when considering a question 
of ECHR compliance. 
The ruling in Daly was reached by an application of common-law principle derived from 
common-law authority and an orthodox approach to judicial review. Distinguishing the approach 
between the ECrtHR and the UK, the court went on to confirm its HRA obligation, and added 
that it be carried out in accordance with an approach laid down by Lord Steyn. Examining the 
common-law approach toward the standard of judicial review based on the Wednesbury criteria 
of reasonableness, 413 and the ECHR standard grounded on proportionality, 414 according to Lord 
Steyn, the test to be used was whether the measure was necessary in a democratic society and 
proportionate to the legitimate aim to be pursued. 415 Although the ruling may have introduced 
the concept of proportionality to the review of executive action however, both the constitutional 
limitation of the HRA, and the role of the national court was made clear. Although, by means of 
the HRA, the court had been accorded a greater role to ensure that the interests of the individual 
were not abused by executive power, it nevertheless remained bound to defer to the executive. 
Accordingly, the power of the court remained one of review, not decision. The purpose of the 
HRA was to accord the judiciary ability to give formal notice of any impediment to the relevant 
executive department so that it could initiate legislative action. 
"2 [2001 ] UKHL 26 
4" Associated Provincial Picture 11ouses v Wednesbury Corporation [ 1948] 1 KB 223 
414 de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Agriculture (1999) 1 AC 69 
"5 The traditional approach to reasonableness within judicial review based on Wednesbury is limited in scope. The question to be 
asked under the Wednesbury test is whether any authority in the place of the decislion-maker could reasonably have come to the 
same conclusion. It is a test of rationality, with limited concern with the actual content of the decision, or whether it operates fairly 
on the person whom it affects. According to Lord Steyn, a more rigorous review is needed which takes into particular account both 
the proportionalitN of the decision in question, and whether a restriction is infact necessary in a democratic society: (1) A revleýN to 
assess the actual balance which the decision-maker has struck, not merelý whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable 
decisions. (2) attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded interests and considerations; and (3) application of the 
principle that the more substantial the interference with HR. the more the court should require justification for interference with 
them 
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(2) Extended Licences 
A provision allowing for the release of detainees on-licence to the three-quarter point, except 
those serving less than 12 months, was introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1991.11 
6 Section 
44 empowered the Court to extend the licence period to the end of the sentence. In accordance 
with the Crime and Disorder Act 1988, the licence period could be extended beyond that of the 
sentence: thus a person on-licence could be recalled to prison during the licence period. Both 
provisions fon-ned the subject of amendment in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 
2000 : 417 Section 85 concerning offences committed after 30 September 1998, and Section 86 
418 committed before 30 September 1998; as well as a focus of concern in Rv BR . 
Concerning the functioning of the Powers of the CC(S) Act, the prisoner questioned whether an 
extended licence constituted a criminal penalty and whether Section 86 applied to an offence 
committed prior to the introduction of the extended licence in the CJ Act. Despite its 
retrospectivity, the Court held that the extended licence did not constitute a criminal penalty in 
the sense referred to in Article 7 of the ECHR,, but a preventative measure, therefore could be 
used in relation to an offence prior to its statutory introduction. 
The finding is debatable. The impact of the extended licence remains a form of suspended 
sentence of imprisonment. A reality made even more apparent in relation to the practice of recall 
of prisoners on-licence. Called on to examine a recall of a prisoner on-licence, in R (West) v 
Parole Board'19 the Court held that the practice was not a concern which amounted to 
determination of a criminal charge. Although, Lord Hale disagreed on the ground that the eight 
months and two week period of detention served by the detainee in question could only be 
regarded as criminal, the Court remained unmoved. Both cases are interesting. Not least because 
the distinction between punishable and preventative penalties, effectively served to justify 
measures which, in terms of retrospectivity, were ECHR incompatible. 
(3) Release o the Prisoner On-Licence )f 
A further area of criminal procedure which clearly questions the impact of the ECHR order on 
persons lawfully detained was/is highlighted in R (Uttley) v Home Department. 420 The House of 
Lords was called on to determine the impact of Article 7 on changes to the system of early 
release of prisoners on-licence. The prisoner had been convicted in 1995 of criminal offences 
committed prior to 1983 and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. In accordance with provisions 
Hereafter, CJ Act 
Hereafter, CC(S) Act 
[2003] EWCA Crim 2199 
419 [2002] EWCA Ov 1641 
420 [20041 UKHL 38 
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at the time that the offences had been committed, had the prisoner been sentenced in 1983 he 
could have obtained remission of the last third of his sentence, been eligible for parole after one- 
third, and been on-licence until the expiry of two-thirds of the sentence. However, in accordance 
with changes to the procedure introduced by the CJ Act, the prisoner was released after serving 
two-thirds of his sentence in 2003, but released on-licence which continued until he had secured 
three quarters of his sentence. The Court of Appeal ruled that Section 33 of the CJ Act which 
had made the prisoner's release subject to licence, constituted a breach of Article 7. In reaching 
its decision, the Court held that a licence amounted to punishment; insofar as it contained the 
risk of re-call to custody and a number of restrictions on the prisoner's freedom. In its 
understanding of the CJ Act, the Court reasoned that there was an implicit acceptance that its 
provisions constituted a punitive measure insofar as its transitional provisions provided that the 
licence period would end at the two-thirds point of the sentence. The Secretary of State 
appealed, submitting that the applicable penalty should be interpreted as the maximum penalty 
prescribed by law for the offence in question and that the penalty applicable in Uttley had 
remained unchanged. The House of Lords found for the Home Secretary. In reaching its 
decision, the Court examined the requirement in Article 7, that no heavier penalty be imposed 
than the one that was applicable at the time when the offence was committed, and interpreted it 
to mean the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the offence in question at the time when it 
was committed, and not the penalty that would probably have been imposed at the time. As the 
maximum penalty for the offence had not altered as a result of the CJ Act, the Court did not have 
to make comparison between the sentence which the prisoner had received and the penalty he 
could have received. 
The finding is not without criticism. In ruling against the Court of Appeal's decision the House 
of Lords appeared to go against the telos of Article 7. In making the prohibition one against 
increasing the maximum penalty applicable, the Court ignored the relevance of the penalty 
imposed. 
. 
421 A similar deliberation underlined the decision in R (Wright) v Home Department , where the 
Court was called on to examine a refusal to permit the applicant compensation in relation to a 
period of questionable detainment. The applicant had been a prisoner serving a sentence of life- 
imprisonment for murder. He had been detained in prison for a period including that between 
June 1993 and his release on-licence in November 1999. The Home Secretary had refused to 
release him from custody despite a decision by the Parole Board that he be recommended for 
release. The applicant questioned the refusal on 3 grounds: 
421 [2004] FWf IC 3084 (Admin) 
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(1) As the Home Secretary had no longer been entitled to fix the tariff in the case of a mandatorý, life- 
sentence, the period complained of could not be lawfully justified; 
(2) The decision was retrospective for the purpose of Article 7; 
(3) The fact that the period complained of had been prior to the introduction of the HRA was 
unimportant, as there was a free-standing right to compensation for unlawful detainment implicit in 
Article 5(5) of the ECHR. 
The application was dismissed. The Court ruled that Article 5(5) was such that it was dependent 
on actual contravention of Article 5, and since there had been no breach, no compensation was 
payable. 
To summarise, the relevance of the ECHR in relation to prisoners, has involved a number of 
cases finding their way to the House of Lords and the ECrtI4R. Whether the quantity of 
questions raised can support an argument that the executive has sought to retain control over the 
detained individual, the quality of questions raised do indicate a void in its awareness of the 
impact of policy on formerly perceived fundamental freedoms. Two such examples include 
questions concerning determination of the minimum period to be served to meet the 
requirements of punishment of those receiving mandatory life-sentences for murder; and the role 
of the Home Secretary. 
(4) TariffSetting and the Role of the Home Secretary 
Following a gradual transfer of control of the tariff element of the life-sentence to the trial judge, 
and the decision of release to the Parole Board, the final element of the life-sentence to be 
transferred to the judiciary is the setting of tariffs for those receiving a mandatory life-sentence 
for murder committed on, or after, 4th April 2005. In accordance with the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 '422 mandatory life-sentencers detained under tariffs fixed by the Home Secretary prior to 
2003, are able to apply to the High Court to have their tariff re-fixed by a judge without oral 
hearing. Whether the statutory language of the CJ Act 2003 'without oral hearing' constituted a 
contravention of Article 6 of the ECHR fori-ned the focus of R (Hammond) v Home Secretary. 423 
The Court held that it could. In order to satisfy Article 6, some circumstances would necessitate 
the admittance of oral evidence characteristic of a public hearing before a court. In reaching its 
decision, the Court deliberated 21 points of law: whether, in order to satisfy Article 6, 
deten-nination of a tariff required an oral hearing at first instance, and whether statutory 
provision could be interpreted so as to accord it an implied condition. 
422 fiereatler, C. I Act 2003 
4 'ý, ' [2005 12 PLR 218 
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With regard to the first point, the Court ruled that the requirement of fairness inherent in the fair- 
trial provision of Article 6 required that a prisoner applying to the High Court to have a tariff re- 
fixed was entitled to an oral hearing at first instance. With regard to the second, in accordance 
with the HRA the language of the CJ Act 2003 could be stretched so as to accord it ECHR 
compatibility. The Home Secretary disagreed. Although it could sometimes be necessary for a 
judge to hear oral evidence in order to secure a fair-trial for the purpose of Article 6, since the CJ 
Act 2003 allowed for a process of appeal, any hearing ordinarily satisfied the requirement, albeit 
not at first instance. The House of Lords was unconvinced. 424 In order to satisfy Article 6, the 
ability of a prisoner to avail himself of an oral hearing was required at first instance. 
Accordingly, the Court was right to read into the provision an entitlement of the prisoner to an 
oral proceeding in accordance with the requirements of the ECHR. The objections raised by the 
Home Secretary were dismissed. 
With regard to the role of the Home Secretary, in jurisprudential terms release on parole was a 
privilege in the sense that it was for the Home Secretary to determine when a prisoner would be 
considered for parole. However, just as the ECrtHR intimated that the setting of the tariff was a 
sentencing exercise governed by Article 6, the House of Lords ruled firstly, that the setting of the 
tariff for a mandatory-lifer was a sentencing exercise and so should be for a court of law; and 
secondly, that the release of mandatory-] ifers should be equated to the provisions for 
discretionary-lifers and so be a matter for the parole board. Accordingly, the obvious executive 
response should (arguably) have been to diminish the degree of executive power. 425 Instead, the 
mandatory life-sentence was reinforced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, along with a policy of 
imposing higher tariffs than those previously adopted. 
The involvement of the Home Secretary in the process of release of the life-sentence prisoner 
formed the focus of Clift v Home Department. 426 The release of the life-sentencer is primarily a 
matter for the Parole Board. However, for prisoners who receive a determinate sentence, 
discretionary release on parole remains a matter for the Home Secretary who (although in the 
case of prisoners serving less than 15 years imprisonment has delegated his power to the Parole 
Board) in relation to those serving 15 years or more, has retained control. Whether the 
distinction constituted discrimination for the purpose of Article 14 of the ECHR formed the 
question for the Court. Article 14 prohibits discrimination whenever a circumstance is such as to 
bring it within the ambit of the ECHR. Insofar as the Home Secretary's involvement in the 
process subjected prisoners serving 15 years or more to a more demanding process, the Court 
held that their treatment did constitute discrimination for the purpose of Article 14 but, due to 
'2' 12005] UKHL 59 
'25 And the issue of legislative guidance as to the actual leý el of the tariff left to the judiciary 
[2004] 3 All ER 338 
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the nature of the offence, was justified. Giving rise to a number of questions regarding the 
content of the ECHR, insofar as its exceptions affect the fundamental rights of the prisoner. the 
ruling highlights the classic doubt of the cultural-relativist as to the possibility of the 
implementation of a universal HR order . 
42' A difficulty further illustrated in the application of 
the ECHR to the practice of the penalty of additional-days imprisonment being added to a 
prisoner's stay. 
(5) Penalty ofAdditional-Days Imprisonment, and the Role of the Special Advocate 
In Ezeh and Connors 428 the court was called on to consider whether the impact of a penalty of 
additional-days imprisonment being added by a prison disciplinary adjudication to a prisoner's 
stay, was such as to render it a breach of Article 6. The Court held that it was. The effect of such 
a decision necessitated adjudication before a judge. An attempt to build on the ruling was made 
in Bannatyne v Home Department . 
429The question for the Court was whether in circumstances 
similar to those of Ezeh, the prisoner was entitled to a public trial, as opposed to a hearing in the 
presence of an independent adjudicator in closed prison. The Court held that it was not. Article 6 
was subject to the requirements of public order which included the practical difficulties of 
organising such adjudication. Accordingly, the provision of an independent adjudicator was 
sufficient to comply with the requirement that the hearing be fair. 
The balance between the interest of the prisoner lawfully detained and the practice of an 
established procedure justified on a ground of public necessity formed the focus of R (Roberts) v 
Parole Board. 430 Concerning application of the ECHR to the life-sentencer, the Court was called 
on to determine the lawfulness of the use of special advocates to deal with sensitive information. 
The facts were as follows. The prisoner was convicted of murder in 1996 and his punitive term 
of imprisonment set at 30 years. At the time of the hearing the prisoner was in the post-tariff 
stage of detention, but was returned to closed prison following allegations of his involvement in 
drug dealing. The information regarding his alleged involvement was forwarded to the Parole 
Board. Both the prisoner and his solicitor were denied access to the information which was 
passed on to a special advocate. Following an unsuccessful challenge of the practice, the 
prisoner appealed to the House of Lords. The question for the Court was whether the Parole 
Board had the power to appoint a special advocate in the absence of clear statutory authority, 
and whether the procedure satisfied Article 5. In both cases the Court held that it did, but not 
without reservation. Focusing on the effect of the use of a special advocate on the rights of the 
prisoner, Lord Bingham questioned the fairness of a process whereby a decision concerning an 
42 ' The practical separation of the HR concern of the individual and the concerns of the state 
'2' [20041 PLR 95 
'2' 120041 EWHC 11)21 
4.30 [2005] UKHL. 45 
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individual's liberty could be grounded on evidence which remained undisclosed to the prisoner 
and his I egal -representative. Since the power to appoint a special advocate could not be implied 
into the rules applicable, the power to depart from the requirement of fairness could only be 
authorised by statutory provision. In the absence of authorisation, and as a fundamentally unfair 
process, the Special Advocate procedure constituted a breach of Article 5. The finding stood in 
contrast with the majority, in whose opinion, it was essential to focus not on the concern of the 
prisoner, but the practicality of the Parole Board having to achieve a decision in the best interest 
of the State. Although the procedure constituted a violation of Article 5, insofar as it permitted 
evidence to be kept from the prisoner and his legal-representative, the use of the special advocate 
was necessary to satisfy the greater need to protect the public. 
To summarise,, the treatment of prisoners raises a number of concerns regarding the practical 
effect of the ECHR. Although there is little doubt that since its inception, the ECHR has gone 
some way in promoting the concern of the prisoner (permitting greater access to courts for 
example) its effect on the prison experience remains relatively unchanged. The ECHR may be 
capable of influencing Parliamentary discussion, but incapable of effecting significant change 
either in terms of executive action, or Parliamentary stance. According to von Hirsch and 
Ashworth,, one of the functions of the State in delivering a just criminal order, should be its 
ability to respond to harm caused by the individual offender in a way which satisfies the 
demands of justice, while simultaneously acknowledging him as a 'rational citizen' and adopting 
a fair, proportionate and consistent process . 
43 1 However, post the FIRA, the Government has 
responded to an increasing public and media concern over the perpetrators of crime with a 
number of reforms to alter the order grounded on a perceived consensus throughout Parliament 
of a need to place greater emphasis on the interest of the Community, the victim of crime, the 
witness and the informant . 
432 Whether such a re-balance can be used to support an argument that 
criminal justice has been rendered a zero-sum game, whereby the interest of the community is 
achieved at the expense of the offender, certainly it is arguable that criminal justice has fast 
become. 
) 
in the words of Ashworth and Redmayne, a greater 'focus for political posturing, 433 
with all the danger of a reduction in the seriousness accorded the HR of the offender, including a 
right to proportionate punishment commensurate with his actions, which such posturing can 
arguably suggest. 434 
For example, in September 2001, the Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) (No 2) Bill 2001 faced its 
second defeat in the House of Lords. The main objection raised was its transfer of the offender's 
A, N oil Hirsch and A. Ashworth Proportionality in Sentencing (OUP, Oxford 2005) Chapter 2 
As declared in the 5 Year-Strategic Plan: Cutting Crime, Delivering Justice: A Strategic Planfor Criminal Justice (2004-2008) 
August 2004 (TSO, London) 
41 ' Ashworth and Redmayne (2007). Op. cit at 57 
D. Downes and R. Morcgan. The Skeletons in the Cupboard: The Politics of Lalv and Order at the Turn of the Millennium in M. 
Maguire. R. Morgan and R. Reiner The Oýford Handbook of Criminologv (3rd Edition) (OUP, Oxford 2002) 
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right to elect trial by jury in cases triable either way into the hands of the Magistrates Court and 
the latter's ability to consider such circumstances as the existence of a previous conviction, or 
the consequences of a possible conviction, on the well-being of the defendant and his 
dependents. Apart from opposition raised in the House of Lords, the proposal invoked 
considerable unrest amongst academics and legal-practitioners generally, including the Bill's 
earlier supporters. Whereas, according to Zander, the reality of such a restriction could well 
hinder the offender's ability to defend himself against inaccurate assumption; Lord Bingham 
declared it an impracticable interference with judicial discretion, unworkable in the sense that 
were a magistrate obliged to decide at the outset where a case was to be heard, such practice 
would require him to consider all the facts, including previous conviction . 
135However, resulting 
in a number of equally questionable amendments to evidential provisions regarding previous 
convictions,, misconduct, character and hearsay, 436 as well as DNA Collation, 437 the double 
jeopardy rule and measures of re-trial, it is the Criminal Justice Act 2003 438 which has continued 
to provoke criticism of a perceived increasing imbalance between the criminal justice order and 
the offender. 
Applying mainly to offences committed on, or after 4 April 2005, the CJA 2003 introduced a 
number of changes to the sentencing regime. One development included the conferral on 
magistrate courts greater powers of custodial sentencing, including an increase in discretionary 
power to sentence from 12 to 18 months for a single offence, and the introduction of a number of 
changes to the range of custodial sentences available, including a new category of life-sentencer. 
In accordance with Part 2, the category of life-sentencer is extended firstly, by the introduction 
of a life-sentence for those persons who commit 2 designated serious offences, and secondly, by 
a Section 224 indeterminate sentence of life-imprisonment applicable where the offender is 
deemed a danger to the Community. A measure, now fon-ning the focus of the Lockyer Review 
following judicial criticism of its underlying policy in Wells v Parole Board (2007) and Walker v 
Parole Board (2007) '439 So 
ill-conceived from the start, that its implementation in the opinion of 
Garside, has proved nothing less than 'corrosive of the principles of a just, proportionate, and 
effective sentencing framework. 440 
Further, responding to public criticism of the seemingly light sentences dealt out by courts, the 
CJA 2003 introduced a range of sentences including the Custody Plus, 441 Custody Minus, 442 and 
135 M. Zander (2001), Op. cit at 1880 
13' Forming the focus of criticism by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Criminal Justice Bill: Further Report (2 "d Report of tý 
Session 2002-2003) (HC, London) 
"' Forming the focus of criticism bý the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Criminal Justice Bill: Further Report (11, h Report of 
Session 2002-2003) (11C, London) 
438 Hereafter, CJA 2003 
439 12007] FxA'HC 1835 (QB) 
410 Director of Criminal Studies. King's College London. reported in the Times Newspaper 8 May 2004 p. 4 Z-- I 
441 '1-\\ eive months imprisonment is combined \\ A post release supervision for twenq--six weeks 
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the Intermittent Sentence. "' Forming an exacerbation of the existing use by Magistrates of the 
short custodial sentence, the underlying rationale of the plea before venue procedure introduced 
in the CJA 2003 suggested a policy of reform designed foremost to reduce the number of cases 
in the Crown Court. On analysis however, the procedure had no such effect. While the incidence 
of defendant elections for Crown Court did decline, little change in magistrate decisions to send 
cases to the Crown Court meant that they still continued to send an approximate 10% to 12% of 
either way cases to the Crown Court for trial, or sentence. In accordance with the findings of the 
Auld Report 1999, out of all the either way cases tried in the Crown Court which resulted in a 
conviction,, some 44% resulted in the imposition of a non-custodial sentence and a further 12% 
444 in a custodial sentence of less than 6 months . Although the figures did include a minority of 
defendants who did elect for trial in the Crown Court, despite the introduction of the plea before 
venue procedure, the Magistrates court remained responsible for sending more offenders to 
prison then the Crown Court. 
Whether such experience constitutes a feasible indication of the risk that the Government is 
running by increasing magistrate use of the custodial sentence, the excessive use of custodial 
sentencing does constitute a viable concern. Whereas in 2006 England and Wales topped the 
Prison League Table for Western Europe, imprisoning some 145 per 100,000 of the population, 
compared with 88 in France and 97 in Germany, statistics on UK criminal sentencing revealed 
that in February 2007 the number of prisoners serving indeterminate sentences was 8,700, with 
445 
an average of 140 prisoners a month being given an indeterminate public protection sentence . 
One aspect of the custodial sentence, its increasing use in relation to women for non-violent 
offences, formed the focus of the Fawcett Society, according to whom, in March 2004 there was 
some 4,500 of the female population serving time in prison: representing an increase of some 
194% during the last 10 years, compared to a 50% increase in the imposition of custodial 
sentences on men. 446 Published in the same month,. the Government's response to the criticism 
was the introduction of the Women's Offending Reduction Programme. An attempt to encourage 
greater diversion in the treatment of women at the pre-court stage, including use of 
accommodation centres and support services for drug and alcohol abuse. Apart from the cost 
placed on community providers and the actual availability of such services however, the 
diversions advanced by the Programme seemed somewhat removed from the concern expressed 
442 A sentence of less than twelve months custody suspended for six months to two years, combined with supervision in the 
community 
"' A sentence of up to twelve months sen, ed intermittently 
444 The Auld Report, The 4uld Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales 2001 (The Lord Chancellor's Department, 
London) 
445 H oward League, Howard League for Penal Reform ývmposium on Criminal Sentencing, 10 May 200 7 (Howard League for Penal 
Reform, London) 
416 The Fawcett Society. Report of the Fmicetl Society's Commission on Women and the Criminal Justice System, 31 March 2004 
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by the Corston Review of March 2007, that a continual increase in the number of the female 
prison population, with no equivalent rise in the number of women committing more offences. 
could only lead to the reality that a population effectively ignored in penal policy was becoming 
447 
all the more in need of serious attention . 
A second aspect of the increased use of the custodial sentence was/is not merely the increase in 
the prison population, but its impact on certain persons being sent to prison. Research by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on [HR] into the consequences of imprisoning the mentally-ill in 
standard facility prisons, concluded that whereas prior to the excessively punitive political 
climate of 2003, in 2002 there were an approximate 95 suicides committed by such prisoners 
during incarceration, post 2003 this number rose to 189 by 2005.448 The statistics followed 4 
months after the publication on 13 January 2005 of the Management of Offenders and 
Sentencing Bill, whose aim, insofar as it attempted to address the problems of mental health and 
the likelihood of such prisoners re-offending, remained characteristically the protection of the 
public. 
In view of the above, both policy and political discourse concerning the increasing use of the 
custodial sentence and the HR of the individual offender post the HRA, represents a continuing 
ideological shift from the focus on the underlying causes of crime which, according to 
Livingstone, Owen 449 and Feldman, 450 (arguably) characterised the 1960's and 1970's criminal 
justice order. A shift beginning with refon-n of the right to silence in the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 and an attempt to remove the right to elect jury trial, and ending (so far) 
in such ambivalent regard for the application of HR to the criminal process, as the introduction 
of the controversial ASBO. 451 
Examining possible motivation for the shift, one reason for the seeming nullification of the 
interest of the individual offender in favour of the concerns of the community, could be its value 
in securing public confidence in the circuits of political and media exchange. Whether such an 
incentive can reasonably explain the rationale behind recent changes to the criminal justice order 
however, certainly the changes which so far have been made, have been at the expense of that 
category of citizens which, insofar as it remains on the fringe of mainstream society, the 
incumbent Government would appear increasingly prepared to accord ever diminishing account. 
Whether or not engineered to reinforce first and foremost the retributive sentiments of society, 
such a shift toward the emotional response of popularist politics has resulted in an arguable 
"' Report of the Home Office, The Corston Report: .4 Review of Women With Particular t'ulnerabilities in The Criminal Justice 
Si, stem, 13 March 2007 (Home Office, London) 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights Sixth Report (2005-2006) (Hansard , London) S. I-IN ingstone and T. Owen Prison-Laii, (OUP, Oxford 1993) Chapters 6 and 10 
45" D. Feldman Civil-Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (OUP, Oxford 1993) 
45 1 AshNNorth wid Redmavne (2005). Op. cit at pp 11-14 
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descent into a zero-sum relationship between the individual offender and the greater community. 
As a result,. whatever can have been expected of the impact of the HRA, it appears unlikely that 
there can be any political room for a serious debate of HR in a climate which places control so 
far above the concerns of the individual offender, that any concern for the invocation of his 
rights and interests, is regarded as an affront to the community. 
Section 3.4: UK Policy and Human Rights, the Last Haven of Sui-Generis Positivism? 
The ECHR represents a classic construct of the twenty-first century nation-state: a declaration of 
popularly perceived universal rights and freedoms which is more uncertain in practice than it is 
absolute. Insofar as the ECHR's circumvention of its declarations allows its signatories to take 
measures to suspend the rights and freedoms contained therein, it cannot avoid the argument that 
its attempt at universalism conceals a case of cultural relativism whereby HR remain the premise 
of the signatory-state. 
The reality of a universal order of HR protection and the reach of liberalism is summarised 
throughout the work of Simpson, 452 and Bernstein. 453 When liberal states proclaim to protect 
universal rights they mean that the privileges of such are acknowledged only insofar as they are 
conducive to political good, and then only in relation to individuals who are accorded the status 
of citizen. The observation is particularly pertinent in relation to the UK Government's (and 
arguably Legislature's) treatment of three areas of HR concern: asylum, terrorism and various 
aspects of criminal justice. 
Post the HRA,, the objective of UK asylum policy has been politically pursed regardless of cost 
454 
to the individual, his family and/or dependents . The object of reform of the asylum order was 
to reduce the cost and burden of unfounded asylum claims, speed up the removal of economic 
migrants, and formulate definite measures to counteract the risk of terrorism. Experience of the 
reform has witnessed the delivery of numerous induction and accommodation programmes, 
conditional and restricted support services, and a particularly controversial detention and 
removal process of claimants perceived as a threat to national security. In the House of 
Commons 15 October 2001, the Home Secretary declared such measures paramount for the 
protection of the nation from insecurity. A justification which, at the expense of respect for the 
rights and freedoms of the asylum individual, was used to drive forward the greater 
empowerment of the Home Secretary to detain and/or remove the claimant and/or his family 
from the UK; the introduction of a conditional process of state support for the claimant and/or 
his family: including the imposition of reporting and residence requirements; the introduction of 
4ý2 Simpson (2002). Op. cit 83 
'" Osborne (1991), Op. cit at 119 
434 S. Chak-rabarti 'National securit-v and Human Rights' in K. Economides (and Others) 'A Symposium on the 2005 Hamlýn 
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a system of deportation and appeal conducted from either the claimanVs native country, or the 
country through which he had travelled to the UK; as well as a number of amendments to the 
British Nationality Act 1981 to accommodate a policy of conditional nationality. 
Further, drafted in conjunction with the UK Department for Constitutional Affairs, one of the 
measures carried out by the Home Secretary included the abolition of the Immigration Appeal 
455 Tribunal and its replacement with a single-tier system . 
In accordance with the new order. 
judicial review of any decision made by the authority was restricted to requests for rulings of the 
Court of Appeal on points of legal principle only. Although the Tribunal had for a long time 
constituted an arguable drain on the resources of the Legal Services Commission, its abolition 
constituted a disturbing development in terms of the impact on the asylum-claimant. In 
accordance with the single-tier system, judicial review of any decision made by the authority 
was restricted to requests for rulings of the Court of Appeal on points of legal principle only. 
The measure constituted an affront to HR on two grounds. Firstly, in relation to the ECHR 
requirement for a clear and just process of appeal, restriction on judicial review amounted to 
discrimination against the asylum-claimant. Secondly, the abolition of a mode of appeal in 
relation to questions of error of law, natural justice, irregularity or jurisdiction, a contravention 
456 of the telos of both the ECHR and the HRA . 
Insofar as such asylum policy has resulted in the greater erosion of the non-national's (arguably) 
universally acknowledged 'rights' and liberties, it becomes apparent in the language of 
Osbome, 4" Bernstein 4'8 and Simpson, 459 that HR do attend the principle of nationality, and 
despite its generality, excludes from the community of its own subjects all those who do not 
belong to the nation-state. The ECHR may declare a universality of rights protection on behalf of 
the universal man, but insofar as the negative freedom which the UK has continued to draw from 
its provisions is used to close society, the UK's response to asylum serves to illustrate that it is 
the separation between the national and non-national which has continued to dominate HR 
thought. Applied to the concern of terrorism, the observation becomes increasingly persuasive. 
'55 Assessed in F. Klug and H. Wildbore 'Breaking New Ground, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Role of Parliament 
in Human Rights Compliance' (2007) E. H. R. L. R. 231 
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the GoN ernment removed the asylum-seeker's employment concession which, up until the 23 July 2002, allowed claimants to apply 
for Aork should their application not be decided bý the Home Office within 6 months of their arrival in the UK 
15 7 Osborne (199 1), Op. cit at 114 
4 5' Bernstein in Osborne (1991), Op. cit at 119 
" Simpson (2002). Op. cit 83 
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Post the HRA, the Government's response to the threat of terrorism has resulted in a myriad of 
legislative development, amendment and debate . 
460 Although it is arguable that the ability of a 
signatory-state to derogate from the ECHR in times of national emergency highlights its appeal 
as a 'living instrument' to acknowledge HR as constructs, which by their nature alter in form, 
content and social function, the extent to which the UK has extended the use of exclusion, as 
well as the defining conditions which enable it to operate, illustrates the same order's 
questionable ability to prevent a signatory-sate from lawfully exceeding its provisions. 
Amongst criticism of the impact of the anti-terrorist measures on the rights and freedom of the 
individual,, rests the general charge that underlying the Government's attempt to counter the 
concern of national security, lays a motive to regain control of asylum by a discriminate placing 
of the non-national beyond the concern of HR protection. Although such discrimination reflects 
a change of direction in policy evident throughout ECHR signatories generally, "' it is the way, 
as much as the nature,, in which the UK has responded to terrorism, which gives rise to a number 
of concerns including whether, having entered the era identified by Douzinas, 462 HR can 
themselves be characterised as a form of legitimisation of state power: an ersatz ideology. 
Certainly, there can be few less suspicious statutory- initiatives, in terms of their effect on the 
power of parliamentary scrutiny, than the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 463 and the Inquiries Act 
2005, which extended the powers of ministers while making them less answerable to 
Parliament. 464 Introduced as the CC Bill, initiatives proposed included the expansion of the 
circumstances in which emergency powers could be used; abolishment of the need to declare a 
state of emergency as a precondition of use; and the conferral on ministers greater powers to 
introduce emergency regulations, including a power to prohibit activity not even specified in the 
Bill. Indicating the Government's 'wearying of the HRA, ' one matter of interest was its 
conferral on the CC Bill the status of secondary legislation on condition that it was convinced 
465 that the courts would not challenge the efficiency of the impending Act . 
Further, in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, following a minister's declaration 
of a state-of-emergency, property can be seized and/or destroyed without compensation, courts 
460 Justified on the ground of national security, the new order of counter-terrorism has made provision for the extension of police 
powers of stop and search (including a defacto random practice), arrest and interrogation; the extension of state power to detain 
indefinitely without trial any individual suspected of terrorist involvement; the empowerment of ministers to seize personal assets 
and freeze bank accounts, confiscate or destroy property, prohibit movement, assembly and protest within specific areas and at 
specific times, the creation of a number of offences including breach of order restricting movement, being a member or supporter of 
a proscribed organisation, or wearing any item signifying such support, as well as the extension of the power of exchange of 
confidential information between Government departments and any relevant public body 
"' Toward curtailing the movement of the non-national which promises a less secure status for his rights and freedoms, as well as a 
cr greater willingness to exclude 
by reason of the threat posed by terrorism 
462 Douzinas (2002). Op. cit at 100 
Hereafter. CC Bill 
Or, such proposals as those of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill 2006, whose original draft would have allowed 
ministers to effectively make law without reference to Parliament 
4o ý Ewing (2004). Op. cit at 839 (fn) 59 
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or tribunals set-up, and assemblies prohibited or confined to a specific area on suspicion that an 
emergency might occur. Only after 7-days is Parliament able to consider the situation. If the 
minister is found to have acted wrongly his action may be subject to assessment by Government 
investigation in accordance with the Inquiries Act 2005, but as findings are presented directly to 
ministers (not as they once were to Parliament), a minister maintains the right to set the terms of 
the inquiry, withhold information, suppress evidence, and either close or terminate the hearing 
without explanation. Despite universalist claims to the contrary then, it would appear that HR 
remain constructs of political determination, shaped by the need to counteract whatever concern 
an increasingly multi-cultural state creates. In this context, the influence of the ECHR on the 
national governing authority remains questionable and effective scrutiny of the impact of 
executive action on the rights and freedom of the individual increasingly superficial. 466 
Indeed, on July 3rd 2006, Parliament was sufficiently concerned by the effect of the practice of 
indefinite detainment without trial of terrorist-suspects, and concerted attempts by politicians to 
stifle criticism, as to call for the establishment of an independent body to report to Parliament on 
the need for such measures. Adding little to the debate other than its reassertion of the need for a 
greater time limit to facilitate interrogation, the Government responded to the criticism with the 
launch in November 2006 of a campaign to recast the HRA: whereby the Courts would be 
prohibited from overruling executive decision when to do so contradicted the interpretation 
accorded the ECHR by other signatory-states. Examining the Government's claim that the 
ECHR stood between the Government and its first duty: national security, it is arguable that far 
from a fear that the ECHR served as an impediment to public safety, the real motive for wanting 
to change the HRA was that it gave (in theory at least) greater-credence to the rule of law in 
safeguarding the rights of the non-national from the will of the state. The intimation that beneath 
the Government's intention to radicalise the HRA lays an unstable authoritarianism, whereby 
exaggeration of the threat to national-security could even be used to justify measures which have 
no relevance to tackling terrorism, is disturbing. Certainly, the use of the Serious Organised- 
Crime and Police Act 2005 467 to suppress the relatively formerly 'free' practice of protest at the 
centre of political power, gives rise to the particular criticism that, insofar as the Government's 
response to the threat of terror appears to have resulted in the exchange of freedom for security, 
the SOCPA represents (from an arguable civil-libertarian perspective) little more than an 
advancement of the technical ability of the State to curb public-protest, either by the use of 
police power in accordance with the TA 2000 and SOCPA, or the prohibition of specified 
activity by means of the ASBO. 
Stone (2004). Op. c it at 10 
Hereafter, SOCRA 
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Yet, according to Gearty, the criminalisation of free-protest constitutes merely a third phase in 
468 
the history of the freedom of public protest and internal security in the UK .A move axN,, ay 
from the discretionary power of the police to keep order and their reliance on a 'protean 
common-law' as a basis for action, toward the legalisation of the control of public protest by 
means of statutory control . 
46' As a result, as police discretion has fallen away, the police have 
come to deploy their power under various statutes in preference to their previous commitment to 
a one-size-fits-all common-law. Two developments have pushed this process along. The first, 
'the introduction of the [ECHR] into UK law [via the HRA]: the restrictions on protest that this 
charter permits must as a basic prerequisite be prescribed by law ... [in which case] the common- 
law has been severely cut back by the demand of forseeability that is entailed by the new 
European yardstick. The second ... the judges themselves, 
increasingly impatient with police 
invocations of broad common-law discretionary powers and more inclined to note the plethora 
of parliamentary laws that now cover the field and to counsel the authorities to rely on these. "'O 
Whether the reality of a move from discretion to law, is the greater placement of civil liberties 
protection more fully into the democratic process as Gearty suggests, or simply a technical 
transfer of control from one state limb to another,, examining the Government's treatment of 
asylum and terrorism, it becomes clear that a universal-concem for the individual cannot prevail 
against national-politics. Firstly, it is precisely during periods of perceived national emergency 
when the need for protection is heightened, that the Government is most unwilling to accept any 
restraint on its power. Secondly, HR and freedoms do attend the principle of nationality, which 
exclude from protection all those who do not belong to the sign atory- state. Observations which 
do raise the specific concern: is the concept of HR protection becoming the last-haven of sui- 
generis positivism, and if so, a raison-d'etre of the si gnatory- state? 
Post the HRA the UK has seen a plethora of controversial criminal justice reform. Certainly one 
example is the Criminal Justice Act 2003.471 In accordance with amendments in the Criminal 
Justice Bill 2003, evidence of bad character was accorded, in Part 10 (Chapter 1) of the CJA, a 
far wider use and definition. Section 82(A) defines evidence of bad character as behaviour, or a 
disposition to behave, which in the opinion of a Court, could be viewed with disapproval by a 
reasonable person. The amendments are objectionable for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, Part 10 effectively creates a risk that defendants could be convicted on evidence of past 
offences for which they had already been tried, or of a disposition toward such conduct. 
Although, evidence could be put before a jury where the judge was satisfied that there was no 
... Gearty (2007), Op. cit at 185-187 
469 A process having been \Nell undem aý since the early part of the twentieth-centur\ 
"" Gearl-N (2007). Op. cit at 186 
47 1 Hereafter, CJA 
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risk of prejudice to the defendant, evidence of bad character can only work against the 
defendant, insofar as knowledge of previous conviction will prejudice a jury. Secondly, insofar 
as the CJA introduces the requirement of obtaining leave from the court before the admission of 
such evidence, the task of determining the relevance of past conduct will now lie with the judge 
and not the jury: constituting a direct interference with the ability to cross-examine. Thirdly, Part 
10 gives rise to the very real risk of replacing the police practice of establishing evidence to link 
the accused to the crime of which he is accused with reliance on previous conviction, and a 
reality that the police could well pursue known offenders in the knowledge that their past 
conduct could lead to a successful conviction. 
Similar concerns can be raised in relation to both statutory interference with the rule of double 
jeopardy, and the practice of drug-testing and treatment. In accordance with Part 9 of the CJA, a 
Public Prosecutor is accorded the power to apply to the Court to request the quashing of an 
acquittal and the order for a retrial on grounds of new evidence against the defendant where the 
interest ofjustice demands. The provision eliminates the doublejeopardy rule in relation to drug 
offences, offences against the person, and terrorism, with the effect that in the event of their 
failing to secure a conviction, the police are granted a power of search and seize on the ground 
that new evidence may be found. Apart from the prosecution being allowed the advantage of 
knowing details of the defendant's case, the basis of the retrial (grounded on a pre-trial finding 
that there is new evidence to justify a second hearing) can only lead to the increased likelihood 
of the retrial starting off on a presumption of guilt as opposed to innocence. 
With regard to drug-testing and treatment, in accordance with the CJA a new paragraph 6A of 
Schedule I is inserted into the Bail Act 1976. The paragraph provides that a separate decision 
that there is no risk of the commission of a further offence by a drug dependant defendant must 
now constitute part of drug assessment. Unless the ECHR can be constructed as a living- 
instrument, the requirement will stand in breach of Article 5 which does not allow detention on 
grounds that it is in the defendant's own good. 472 
Grounded on the idea of preventative and rehabilitative detention, such examples highlight an 
increasing concern central to the new punitive order. 473 Although the practice of reliance on risk- 
assessment has been part of the UK sentencing framework for some time, risk-assessment is 
4'2 Further measures include the direction to the court, under Paragraph 9A Schedule I of the Bail Act 1976, when considering the 
possibilit-N of the defendant committing a further offence if awarded bail, to give attention to the fact that at the time of commission 
the defendant was on bail for an earlier imprisonable offence. This sets out what can be described as a low hurdle. As does the 
extension of the prosecution right to appeal against the granting of bail under the Bail Amendment Act 1993 to all imprisonable 
offences, and a new Section 14 abolishing the residual power of the court to grant bail, except In cases where there is an appeal 
pending by NN aý of case stated. AlthOLIgh the alternati Ne method of appeal to the Crown Court is deemed adequate in accordance with 
Articles 5 and 6, the exclusion of consideration of appeals against bail conditions of curf6N, tagging, and conditions to reside a%%ay 
from a specific area. raise valid concerns regarding the effect of such developments infiact on civil liberties 
ý\shN%orth and Redmayne (21005). Op. cit at 14 
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expanding. 474 A practice, which relies on an assumption that the system can reliably identify 
potential offenders, made worrying firstly, by the fact that risk-assessment tools are still in a 
state of evolution, whereby even supposedly objective tests invariably involve subjective 
assessment at the point of scoring with the result that various health professionals can reach very 
different scores on the same offender; and secondly, that many traditional elements of mitigation 
are features which will produce higher scores on the risk assessment toll by the probation officer. 
To summarise, broadening of the definition of bad-character, erosion of the double-jeopardy rule 
and interference with the presumption of innocence, constitutes only part of a policy which, 
according to Liberal-Democrat spokesman Heath and Marshal I-Andrews Mp, 475 demonstrates 
the increasing (arguable) 'authoritarianism' at the heart of the Government's approach toward 
the wider concern of HR: a rebalance of the criminal justice order in favour of the state- 
compliant. 
Yet! ' the Government remained dissatisfied at the pace of change. In July 2006 another review 
resulted in the drawing up of another Criminal Justice Bill whose central theme constituted an 
extension of that already seen so far: a rebalance of the criminal justice system in favour of the 
law-abiding majority. Insofar as proposals affected the individual, the enforcement of licence 
conditions for offenders in the community, either post release from prison, or serving 
community orders, remained a priority. The strategy set out plans for the introduction of new 
powers to ensure that courts operated to a presumption that offenders who breached bail, and/or 
offended while on bail, would be remanded in custody. Targets for the time by which an 
offender who breached his licence conditions was returned to custody were also amongst 
measures of control proposed, as well as a power of probation officers to vary the punishment of 
an offender already served, should he be found to be in breach of his conditions, without having 
to approach a court. 
A second theme of the 2006 planned reforms was the notion of summary justice to improve the 
speed and effectiveness of the Magistrates and Crown Court. Proposals included the introduction 
of a 24-72 hour period of bringing an offender to justice. Undermining some of the most 
fundamental principles of due-process, according to measures proposed, those pleading guilty 
%Niould be sentenced by crown-prosecutors and police, at the expense of the fon-ner open- 
judgment of those charged with an offence, impartial judicial-sentencing of those found guilty 
and acquittal of those found to be innocent. More important than protecting the innocent from 
being wrongly convicted it seemed, was/is the incumbent Government's determination to pursue 
"' The CJ Act 2003 takes the sentence for public protection introduced in the CJ Act 1991 and the automatic life-sentence for a 
second serious offence introduced in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 further. bý ensuring that those who commit one of a number of 
serious offences NNHI be subject to a risk assessment to determine whether there is a risk of harrn from further offences, with an 
assumption that there is such a risk if the offender has a preN ious conviction for a similar offence 
', 5 Independent Newspaper 2Q June 2006 p. 2 
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its rebalance of the criminal justice order in favour of the law-abiding majority by the 
replacement of the independent magistrate, with an unseen agent of the state. 
To summarise, the implementation of policy post the HRA, has resulted in a transparent and 
(arguably) consistent erosion of the HR concern of the individual by a plethora of measures in a 
law and order agenda to control potential, as well as actual offenders, to coerce drug-users into 
treatment, ensure that courts hand down severer sentences, control communities, criminalise 
political protest, and ensure that the state compliant take a privileged place at the heart of the 
476 system . According to Feldman, such policy stands in (arguable) contrast to the 
law and order 
philosophy prevalent throughout the 1970's and 1980's during which, in a process highlighted 
by Douzinas, 477 prisoners and offenders were (arguably) admitted to what was described by 
Livingstone and Owen as a 'second class humanity. 078 The recognition of the rights of the 
offender was due to recognition of the value of the individual which led to a demand that state 
interference required justification: the burden of proof resting on those who would interfere to 
show that such interference was necessary. The philosophy represented a clear expression of 
Mills 1859 essay on liberty that the only purpose for which power could be rightfully exercised 
over an individual against his will was to prevent harm to others. 
In contrast, a philosophy of what is politically perceived to be in the best interest of the 
majority/State has gained overwhelming ground with the incumbent Government. Accordingly, 
the idea that the individual is impelled to act by social or economic force is no longer feasible. 
The prevailing political climate is one of rights and responsibilities: the power of the state to 
interfere with the customary freedom of protest, assembly, speech and expression (indefensible 
from a civil-libertarian perspective) justified on the basis of reasserting the greater authority of 
the state. Insofar as the convicted prisoner, the anticipated offender and the anti-social juvenile 
remain on the fringe of the controlled society, the functioning of the criminal justice order post 
2000 gives greater significance to the question regarding the free and subjected subject raised by 
Douzinas: when does respect for established liberties and HR end? Insofar as the drive of the 
Government to be tough on crime continues to have a damaging effect on the rights and liberties 
of the individual, the answer would seem to be when they are raised in relation to the wrong kind 
of citizen: the 'state non-compliant. ' 479 
With regard to the role of Parliament, the extent to which it has been able to act as a guardian of 
HR post the HRA, has continued to remain inherently hindered. Firstly, by a process of 
incremental infringement exemplified not merely by the examples given by Stone, regarding 
"" The latest development being the introduction of Clause 26 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007, which proposes to 
abolish the Court of Appeal's ability to quash a criminal sanction 
"' Facilitated (in part) b\ the heightened awareness of the need for HR protection bN the ECHR. Douzinas (2002). Op. cit at 184 
478 S. Livingstone and T. Owen Prison-Lm, (OUR Oxford 1993) Chapters 6 and 10 
4'9 Douzinas (2002). Op. cit at 185 
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police access to confidential material in the TA 2000 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, but 
the ability to control public assembly, speech, and protest in accordance with the SOCPA 
480 2005 . Secondly, by coercion into acceptance of public policy without 
due regard for 
individual freedom by situations of perceived emergency, exemplified by the ATCSA and the 
TA 2005. Although, one example to take issue with Stone's observation that with any 
Parliamentary attempt to protect civil liberties in relation to controls grounded on national 
emergency, the problem is not so much that it is democratically decided that the rights of the 
individual must give way, but that they are ever seriously raised at all, is the Government's 
defeat in Parliament over the proposed 50 day detention without trial; as the erosion of freedom 
continues under justification of state necessity, it is becoming all the more difficult to regard 
Parliament as an effective HR guardian, other than at the most general level. 
To conclude, as the nature and volume of UK reform post the HRA strikes at the (arguable) 
universalism of the ECHR,, the Government's treatment of criminal justice, asylum and 
terrorism, serves to highlight the reality of a universal HR order in which the argument of the 
cultural-relativist is played out. The primary effect of the HRA, in terrns of protecting the rights 
and freedom of the individual, is the general removal of the need to petition Strasbourg for the 
deliberation of a potential breach of the ECHR, and the creation of a private law remedy for the 
award of damages against any public authority which is found to have violated its provisions. A 
compromise between sustaining state sovereignty and formally acknowledging the ECHR, the 
charge that UK law is practicably interpreted so as to accord effect to the ECHR, falls essentially 
to the UK judiciary. The UK courts are charged with applying the right to life, liberty, fair-trial, 
security, respect for family/private life and effective legal remedy; the prohibition on torture, 
slavery, forced labour, discrimination, abuse of lawful punishment; and respect for the freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion, expression, and association, in a way that gives the ECHR, a 
purposeful reality. Yet, the courts must also heed the prerogative of the Government to govern, 
and not substitute judicial insight for executive policy. 
Despite such limitation however, throughout 2005 and 2006, the Government signalled its 
dissatisfaction with the role of the judiciary in the asylum, immigration and counter-terrorist 
order by calling for legislative restraint on its ability to interpret the HRA . 
48 1 The dissatisfaction 
arose (in part) in relation to a number of court rulings, including that of Judge Sullivan that 
482 control orders under the TA 2005 were ECHR incompatible . Following Judge Sullivan's 
judicial condemnation of the counter-terrorist measure as a deprivation of liberty, the 
Stone (2004). Op. cit at 9 
Reported in The Independent Newspaper 29 June 2006 p. 14 
482 Ministers brought in the control orders in 2005 after the House of Lords ruled that the previous policý of detention of terrorist- 
Suspects %Nithout trial was incompatible. The new laws gave the Home Secretary the power to impose control orders on all terror- 
suspects whether national or foreign 
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Government's position was made clear: whereas in any political argument concerning the rights 
of the individual and national security the latter would prevail; in the event of further judicial 
alienation of its policies, steps would be considered to ensure that the courts Nvere statutorily 
restricted altogether, from frustrating any measure introduced to enforce them. 
The controversy between what the judiciary has come to consider a political attack by the 
Government on its long held constitutional role, and what the Government considers to be an 
undermining of its authority as decision-maker by an ambitious judiciary, seems a long way 
from any opinion that, insofar as the outspokenness of the judiciary under the HRA could 
promote the concern of the individual, such could only have a beneficial influence on the 
Government without the need for constitutional confrontation. The HRA has brought with it 
something of the unexpected: a (very public) fracturing in the relationship between the 
Government and the Judiciary, and a risk of the ability of the latter to speak out on issues 
concerning national security being statutorily restricted altogether. Whether such controversy 
can seriously be regarded as an indication of the success of the HRA, or merely a catalyst for re- 
engagement by the latter of the argument that there are implied limits imposed by the common- 
law on the absolute powers of the Queen in Parliament however, is perhaps best assessed by 
examination of the actual protection accorded by the judiciary, the ECHR rights and freedoms of 
the individual. 
166 
Section 4: The ECHR, HRA 1998 and the UK Judiciary 
Section 4.1: The HRA 1998 and the UK Judiciary 
On 2 October 2000 the UK Government claimed to have brought home the ECHR by, means of 
the HRA. Six years later, the same Government declared that the UK required a profound 
rebalancing of the FIR debate. The reason given was the need to limit the abuse by the judiciary 
of Sections 2 and 3 of the HRA. Criticising the reasoning of the legal establishment, the Prime 
Minister declared (inaccurately) that the point about the HRA was that it allowed courts to strike 
down acts of Parliament. ' Three areas in which a faction of the judiciary appears to have 
demonstrated concern over the interest of the individual are terrorism, asylum and criminal 
justice. The tenor of criticism has revolved around the effect of policy on fundamental liberties 
and an assertion that the duty of the judiciary lies not to the Government but to the electorate. 
Whether such criticism constitutes evidence of the ability of the ECHR to protect the individual, 
or rather judicial concern over a perceived constitutional threat to its own order, Section 4 of 
this thesis examines the judicial treatment of the ECHR post the HRA, as intimated in relevant 
case-law. 
The way in which the ECHR impacts on domestic law is through the judicial obligation in 
respect of statutory interpretation in Section 3 of the HRA and the ability of the court to declare 
domestic law ECHR incompatible under Section 4. However, the duty of construction does not 
affect the validity of incompatible legislation if primary legislation prevents the removal of the 
incompatibility. In this sense the effect of the ECHR remains practicably no greater than it was 
prior to the HRA. 2 
345 Yet, highlighted by Kavanagh , Feldman, Bennion, Jowell and Oliver, 
' the role of the 
judiciary has changed from the time when deviation from the literal approach to interpretation 
was regarded as a 'usurpation' of legislative function. ' Certainly, insofar as Parliament's 
original intent is no longer the sole deciding factor, Section 3 has shifted the interpretative focus 
toward the concern of ECHR compatibil ity. 8 According to Ewing, such departure from the 
search for Parliament's original intent represented an indication of a 'restructuring' of the UK's 
Independent Newspaper 29 June 2006 p, 2 
2 C. Gcartý Civil Liberties (OUP, Oxford 2007) 26 
A. Kavanagh 'The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication Under the Human Rights Act 1998' (2006) O. JL. S. 179 
D. Feldman 'The Human Rights Act and Constitutional Principles' (1999) L. S. 165 
J. Bennion 'What is Possible Under Section 3(l) of the Human Rights Act 1998' [20001 P. L. 77,91 
6 j. JoNNell and D. OhN er The Changing Constitution (OUP. Oxford 2000) 103 
7 G. Marshall 'The Linchpin of Parliamentary Intention: Lost, Stolen or Strained"' [2003] P. L. 236 
In the absence of guidance in Section 2 of the HRA as to the quantification of damages, the court in R (Bernard) v Enfield London 
BC [2002] E\VHC Admin 2282 ruled that damages should be calculated on normal tort pfinciples on the ground that it was obliged 
to reach a decision that did not undermine the telos of the ECHR, and in Andrews v Reading BC [20041 EWHC 970 (QB), despite the 
case falling outside of the terms of a statutory scheme for compensation, the court held that the possibility that an absence of 
compensation could result in a breach of Article 8 constituted a viable concern in accordance ýN ith the telos of the ECHR 
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classic constitutional order. 9 However, by its nature, the HRA is a construct of a dualist order 
derived from a commitment to the sovereignty of Parliament. Whether such (arguable) 
adjustment to traditional principles of statutory interpretation' 0 can support a claim that the 
HRA has affected HR protection to the degree suggested by Ewing, is questionable. 
Although prior to the HRA, the judiciary could be relied on to question some kinds of freedom 
threatened by executive action, " there were limits as to what it would do in shaping HR law., 2 
According to Street, two limitations were (1) its reluctance to clash with Government officials. 
and (2) a determination not to immerse itself in public PoliCY. 13 Applied to analysis of the 
ECHR, a narrow construction of the HRA and adherence to established legal thought remain 
characteristic of the se If-re strainer. The idea that the interpretative focus under Section 3 is no 
longer solely what Parliament originally intended, or what statutory language literally meant, 
regarded as 'a defiance of coherent exposition. ' 14 
However,, the ability of the judiciary to look beyond Parliamentary intent has brought about 
changes in the traditional functioning of statutory interpretation, insofar as a broad view of the 
ECHR and (an arguable) willingness to move beyond established constitutional agency has 
came to characterise the finding of the activist. " Accordingly, two approaches grounded on two 
philosophies re-emerge: that of the activist examined in Kremnitzer's composite 
constitutionalist view of the role of the judiciary in decision-making advanced by Cohn ;, 6 and 
that of what Hoffman terins the se I f-re strainer, " determined to leave any change in the 
treatment of the individual to the Government. 
Judicial Activism versus Seff-Restraint 
According to Starmer, the functioning of Section 3 resulted in a '180 degree shift' in judicial 
focus from enforcing public duties to protecting individual rights. " Insofar as a number of 
rulings indicate a heightened HR awareness, the observation is not unreasonable. 
For example, prior to the HRA, where a tribunal ordered release of a detainee subject to a 
condition which was not fulfilled, detention continued and the jurisdiction of the tribunal ended. 
" E. Ewing 'The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy' (1999) 62 M. L. R. 79 
'0 As intimated by Lord Nicholls in Ghaidon v Mendoza [200412 AC 557 Paragraph 30, that 'the question of difficulty is how far, 
and in what circumstances, Section 3 requires a court to depart from the intention of the enacting Parliament; ' and Lord Woolf in 
Popular Housing v Donaghue [20021 QB 48 Paragraph 72 
11 R vAfinistry qf Defence ex-parte Smith [19961 QB 517, Rv Secretary ofState, ex-parte Fire Brigades Union [199511 All ER 888; 
ReV [1994] 1 AC 377 
Other than its constitutional limitations: including the 'unincorporated' status of the ECHR 
11. Street Freedom, the Individual and the Law (Penguin Group Publishers, London 1982) 263 
Marshall (2003), Op. cit at 237-8. A continuing desire of a faction of the judiciary to comply foremost with Parliamentary 
intention expressed in R (, 4nderson) v Secretary of State. for the Home Department [2002] 3 WLR 1800 
15 A. Kavana-11 'The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the Human Rights Act' (2006) O. JL. S. 26(l), 179 
16 M. Cohn *Judicial Activism in the House of Lords: A Composite Constitutionalist Approach' [20071 P. L. Spr 95 
17 R (On the 4pplication of Pro-L, lc 41liance) v BBC [20031 UKHL 23, and Klug, the judicial-deferrer, F. Klug 'Judicial Deference 
under the Human Rights Act* (2003) E. H. L. R. 125 
"' K. Starmer'Two Years of the Human Rights Act' (2003) E. H. R. L. R. 1,14 
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In R (1H) v Nottinghamshire Healthcare NBS Trust" the Court ruled that in order to render an 
order ECHR compliant, not only was it to be considered provisional, but subject to an obligation 
to monitor compliance, or order release. The ruling constituted a contravention of the decision 
in Campbell v Secretary of State 20 justified on Section 3, and the fact that the approach proved 
more consistent with the concern that a detainee was entitled to seek a court order for release. 
A similar approach was adopted in Rv the Commissioner of the Metropolis Police, ex-parte U 
and Rv Durham Constabulary, ex-parte R '2 
1R (Sim) v Parol Board 2 and R (0) v Harrow 
Crown Court. 23 As well as,, R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor 24 where, in the opinion of the court, it 
was not merely necessary for it to be active in terms of determining whether the treatment in 
question was acceptable (as opposed to merely reviewing the reasonableness of the decision 
taken) but that a purposive approach to statutory construction was an inherent requirement of 
both Article 6 of the ECHR, and Section 3 of the HRA. 
Such case-law represents only a fraction of rulings relating to Articles 5 and 6 which, despite 
representing an area of law traditionally less bound by statute, would appear to indicate an 
increasing HR awareness (arguably) not dissimilar to the civil-law order. But what of the 
influence of the HRA on judicial thought? What of the distinction to be drawn between the 
reasoning and motive of the activist and self-restrainer/deferrer as (arguably) evidenced between 
different levels of court, and between procedural and substantive law? 
The judicial approach to be followed when applying Section 3 formed the focus of RvA. 25 
Concerning a question regarding a preparatory hearing prior to trial, the House of Lords was 
presented with the question whether a sexual relationship between the accused and the 
complainant was of such relevance to the issue of consent, as to render its exclusion under 
Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 a breach of Article 6? 
In the opinion of Lord Steyn the exclusion of prior sexual history in Section 41 posed an acute 
problem of proportionality. In order to assess whether Section 41 was ECHR compatible, it was 
necessary to consider what evidence it excluded. If the impact of Section 41 was to deny the 
right in a significant range of cases, it could amount to a breach. Counsel for the Secretary of 
State relied on the principle that in certain contexts the executive retained a discretionary 
judgment within which policy choices could be made, and which the courts were bound to 
accord weight. Lord Steyn declared that when a question arose as to whether Parliament had 
'9 [2002] MHLR 87 
20 [ 19981 1 AC 120 
2' [2002] [AVI W 2486 (Admin) 
22 [2003] EWCA Cik 1865 
23, [20031 FWHC Admin 868 
12002] 1 WLR 4 
[200113 All ER 1. R vA (. %, 'o. 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 
169 
adopted a legislative scheme which made excessive inroad into an established right, the court 
was qualified to make its own judgment. Lord Steyn then went on to suggest the methodology 
to be adopted. 
26 27 Referring to the observations of Lords Lester , 
Wilson, and the criteria for determining 
proportionality in De Freitas, 2' Lord Steyn highlighted two processes of interpretation: a 
contextual approach relevant in minimising the prima facie breadth of Section 4 1, and the 
approach of Section 3 of the HRA. Examining which was the more appropriate, Lord Steyn 
declared that the obligation under Section 3 applied even where there was no ambiguity in 
statutory language. Under ordinary methods of interpretation a court could depart from statutory 
language in order to avoid absurd consequences, however Section 3 went further. In asking 
what meaning statutory words were capable of yielding, and whether they could be made to 
yield a sense consistent with Convention rights, it could sometimes be necessary to depart from 
former methods of interpretation which could include the need to replace a reasonable 
29 interpretation of a provision with one which was linguistically strained . In Lord Steyn's 
opinion, Section 3 required the court to subordinate the language of Section 41 to a broader 
consideration of relevance to be judged by common-sense criteria of time and circumstances. 
Because it was realistic to proceed on the basis that the legislature would not wish to deny the 
right of an accused to put forward a defence by advancing probative material, it was possible 
under Section 3 to read Section 41 as subject to the implied provision that evidence required to 
ensure a fair trial would not be treated as inadmissible. Constituting in the opinion of Starmer, 30 
the 'boldest' exposition of interpretative power under Section 3, the approach introduced a new 
element into statutory interpretation: the ability, when rendering domestic provision ECHR 
compatible, to render it subject to implied provision. But how bold was/is Lord Steyn's 
exposition? 
According to Cooke, Section 3 would require a very different approach to interpretation from 
that which the UK courts were accustomed .3' 
An approach in which the judiciary could depart 
from the traditional goal of statutory interpretation of understanding what Parliament meant by 
enacting legislation in its particular context, to interpreting the words of the legislation detached 
32 from that context . Despite Lord Steyn's referral to his approach as a 'reading of statutory 
language, the subjection of Section 41 to an implied provision constitutes a departure from the 
26 A. Lester 'The Art of the Impossible: Interpreting Statutes under the [HPA]' (1998) E. H. R. L. R. 665 
, -7 R. Wilson 'The Making of a Constitution' [ 1998] P. L. 370 
2"S [19991 1 AC 69 
21) ý Similarlý,, when *ust'fNin- a decision to read down Section 11(2) of the TA 2000 in Attorney-General's Reference No 4 of 2000 jI-C, 
[2004] UKHL 43, Lord Bin-ham declared that although the interpretative result was not the intention of Parliament when enacting 
the 2000 Act. it N%as the intention of Parliament when enacting Section 3 of the 1998 Act, ' Kavanagh (2006), Op. cit at 188 
"' Starmer (2003). Op. cit at 16 
31 1-11- Deb (1997) 582 (Col. 1272) (Hansard, London) 
Kavanagh (2006). Op. cit at 198 
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classic judicial approach summarised by Dame Butler-Sloss in Re K (A Minor), 33 or advocated 
by Lord Hope, Klug 34 and Marshal 1,35 according to whom, a court should defer only to what 
could literally be considered the will of Parliament, Yet, rather than speak of a potential conflict 
of intentions, it is arguable that Section 3 can be viewed as creating an additional presumption 
of statutory interpretation. Certainly Clayton and Tomlinson argue that the proper way to 
understand Section 3 is to acknowledge 'that it combines the traditional enacted intention rule 
with a constitutional presumption in favour of [ECfIR] rights' 36 According to Kavanagh, 
presumptions of interpretation have long been used in the common-law to protect fundamental 
rights. Clayton and Tomlinson's suggestion therefore, presents adjudication under Section 3 in a 
way already familiar in interpreting statutes: Although, 'Section 3 adds new content to the 
familiar presumption in favour of protecting [HR] because judges must now presume that 
Parliament does not intend to enact legislation which violates the ... [ECHR]; and differs from 
the old presumption that Parliament did not intend to legislate so as to put the UK in breach of 
its ECHR obligations because the latter was only held to have application in cases where the 
statutory provision was ambiguous... the presumed intention model does not provide a different 
method of adjudication or a different set of principles to inform that adjudication; rather it 
provides a different way of presenting ... that method. 537 
According to Kavanagh then, rather than 'restructuring' statutory interpretation, the approach 
adopted by Lord Steyn indicated the development of an additional factor to a process which 
(post the HRA) could be considered as consisting of three stages: (1) Determination of the 
meaning of the provision in question using ordinary methods of interpretation, the question 
being what did Parliament intend when enacting it; (2) Determination of whether the provision 
constituted a violation of the ECHR, requiring assessment in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality; And, (3) notwithstanding any primafacie conclusion in relation to the second 
stage, determination of whether the provision could be given effect in a way which was in fact 
ECHR compatible. 38 The observation is not unreasonable. 
3' 'The duty of the... court is to attempt to find [an ECHR] compatible interpretation. If [such an] Interpretation can be found, there is 
no Justification for a declaration of incompatibility... [However] Section 3... [now requires]... a very different approach to 
interpretation from that to which the UK courts are accustomed. Traditionally, the search has been for the true meaning, now it will 
be for a possible meaning that would prevent the making of a declaration. ' [2001] 2 All ER 719 at 732 
" Klug (2003), Op. cit at 128-129 
35 Marshall (2003), Op. cit at 237-238 
36 R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson The Lnt, of Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2000) 167 
37 Wiewing Section 3 as embodying a presumed intention does not remove the potential conflict of intentions [between that 
expressed in Section 3 and that expressed in the legislation under scrutiny]. It will still be the case that, when interpreting legislation 
in light of Section 3. the oNerriding goal of the interpretative process will be to find a Convention-compatible reading of the 
legislation. The differencc is that under the 'presumed intention model, ' that interpretation can be characterised as being in 
conformity NN ith, or cN en deriý Ing from, the NN Ill of Parliament [as expressed in Section 3J. ' Kavanagh (2006), Op. cit at 188 
Lord Stey-n *2000-2005: Laýing the Foundations of Human Rights La,. N, in the United Kingdom' (2005) E. H. R. L. R. 349; 
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The functioning of Section 3 formed the focus of Rv Lambert. 39 Concerning a prosecution for 
possession of drugs contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the Court was called on to 
determine whether the imposition under Sections 5 and 28 of a legal burden of proof on the 
defendant constituted a breach of Article 6. In reaching its decision, the Court, using ordinary 
methods of interpretation, considered whether Parliamentary intent in enacting Section 28 was 
to impose a legal burden of proof, as opposed to an evidential burden. This led to an assessment 
of whether the provision constituted both a legitimate aim and satisfied the principle of 
proportionality. On the ground that the provision constituted a disproportionate way of 
satisfying the legitimate aim, Section 28 was read as imposing an evidential burden only. 
Examining whether the provision could be given effect in a way which was ECHR compatible, 
the words 'prove' and 'proves' in Section 28 were read as meaning 'giving sufficient evidence' 
to raise an issue. 
Whether or not, such an approach can be seriously acknowledged as an indication that the role 
of Parliamentary intention has changed under the HRA, 40 insofar as 'in a number of cases which 
have arisen under Section 3(1) since the HRA has come into force, the judiciary has held that 
the statutory objective is legitimate, but that the means chosen by Parliament to achieve that 
objective have amounted to 'legislative overkill, 41 [the approach adopted in Lambert does show 
how] Section 3(1) can be used by the judiciary to qualify the effect of Parliament ,s enacted 
intention in previous legislation [so as to effectively allow] the courts to amend legislation and 
change the choices made by Parliament about how an area of the law will be regulated. -)42 
The approach was followed in Rv Keogh, 
43 Attorney-General's Reference Case (No. 4 of 
2 000 44 . 
45 46 ) and Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions As well as, Goode v Martin where, 
on the ground that the application of Civil Procedure Rule 17.4 (2) had no legitimate aim when 
applied to the facts in question, the court considered it appropriate to adopt the interpretative 
technique espoused by Lord Steyn in RvA. The ruling followed the reasoning of Cachia v 
Faluyi 47 where, according to Lord Brooke, the ability of the court to extend its interpretative 
role by means of the HRA. was to allow the interests of justice to be pursued in a way not 
48 previously open to the court . 
'9 [2001] UKHL 37 
"' Although clearly the rolc of Parliamentary intention is not discarded, insofar as when judges seek to identify the objective of the 
statute for the purposes of applying the principle of proportionality, they do so using ordinary methods of statutory construction 
4'Rv. 4 (Vo. 2) [2002] 1 AC 45- ,Rv 
Offen [200111 WLR 421 
42 Kavanagh (2006), Op. cit at 192 
13 [20071 EWCA Crim 528 
44 [20041 UKHL 43 
'512003] FWHC 273 
" [10011 1 All ER 620 
17 12001 J FWCA Civ 998 
" Highlighted in R. Cross Statutog Interpretation (Butterworths, London 1995) 49, long before the HRA, ajudge was accorded the 
abilitý to rectffý statutory language by means of reading in words NNhich he considered to be necessarily implied by words which 
\Nerc alread) present in die relevant statutorv text. ionore or alter words in order to prevent a provision from being absurd, 
unreasonable. unworkable or unintelligible. 'Although judicial rectification of statutory words has occurred before 1998, it is 
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However, both Goode and Cachia concerned restrictions resulting from provisions contained in 
secondary legislation. In the case of primary legislation the courts began to distance themselves 
from RvA and Lambert. Whereas, in International Transport Roth GmbH v Home Secretary, 
49 
the Court held that it was not for a Court to effectively rewrite a statutory scheme so as to leave 
out the offending burden of proof, or substitute a maximum penalty for a fixed penalty; the 
reluctance of the Court to interfere with Parliamentary objective was made clear in Re S (FC). 50 
In order to preserve the integrity of statutory law, interpretation which departed from a 
fundamental feature of an Act of Parliament constituted an unacceptable use of Section 3. 
Although Re S (FQ did not challenge the approach in RvA and Lambert, the line between 
interpreting a provision and legislating, was rigidly drawn. A line defined in Rv Daniel ,51R 
(Wooder) v Feggetter and Mental Health Commission, 52 R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for 
the Home De artment , 
53 Bellinger v Bellinger '54 and Ghaidan v 
Mendoza, 55 in more definite p 
terms. 
Representing a retreat from the approach employed in RvA, in Rv Daniel Lord Auld was 
anxious to set limits on the extent to which the meaning of statutory language could be altered 
in the course of attempting to secure ECHR compatibility. Although Lord Auld accepted that a 
court could read down legislation so as to accord the provision relevant safeguards, he was not 
prepared to accept the ruling in Lambert that words could be read so as to lower the relevant 
burden of proof to an evidential one. The ground for such reluctance was summarised in 
Feggetter. According to Lord Sedley the imperative of Section 3 was not anything as 
ýrevolutionary' as some of his colleagues believed. Once it was established that Parliamentary 
intent remained at the core of the meaning of a text, Section 3 could only ever constitute a tool 
of construction 'subordinate' to it. 
The approach of Lord Sedley is interesting. Examination of relevant case-law suggests that his 
reasoning represents an example of the first of three (arguable) approaches toward Section 3 
employed post the HRA: 
0A reluctance to defer from the plain intention of Parliament, as indicated from a plain reading of 
statutory language evidenced in the reasoning of Lord Nicholls in Re S (FC), Lord Auld in Rv 
Daniel, and Lord Sedley in R (Wooder); 
certainly the case that the HRA changes the constitutional context within which such an interpretative strategy takes place. A 
rectification under Section 3 is given a democratic pedigree since it is endorsed by Parliament in the 1998 Act... [And] given the 
persuasive application of Section 3 ... to all 
legislation whenever enacted, it means that a rectification of statutory words may become 
more common and less exceptional than before. ' Kavanagh (2006), Op. cit at 198 
"' [2002] 3 WLR 344 
50 120021 UKHL 10 
51 [2002] EWCA Crim 959 
52 [2002] EWCA 554 
53 120031 1 AC 83 7 
54 [200312 AC 467 
55 1200412 , \C 557 
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"A cautious deference to Parliament, evidenced in the reasoning of Lord Hope in Rv . 4, and Lambert; 
"A strained interpretation of statutory words, exemplified in the reasoning of Lord Steyn in RvA, and 
the application of Section 3 by Lord Brooke in Cachia and Goode. 
But how accurate is it to view judicial response to Section 3 in terms of separate approaches? 
How radical, in terms of protecting the individual has Section 3 been? How activist is the 
judicial activist, and for whose benefit? 
In R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 56 the House of Lords declared 
the power of the Home Secretary to control the release of mandatory life-prisoners under 
Section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 incompatible with the Article 6 right to a fair 
trial. As Parliament intended to give the Home Secretary such power, the possibility of reading 
out his role would constitute judicial vandalism. The ruling stood in contrast to the declaration 
of Lord Nicholls in Ghaidan v Mendoza that 'in the ordinary course the interpretation of 
legislation involves seeking the intention reasonably to be attributed to Parliament in using the 
language in question. Section 3 may require the court to depart from this legislative intention, 
that is, depart from the intention of the parliament which enacted the legislation..., [including, 
the modification under Section 3 ofl the meaning, and hence the effect, of primary and 
secondary legislation. -)57 According to Marshall, the ruling in Anderson constituted clear 
evidence of continuing judicial preference to hold fast to the 'linchpin' of Parliamentary 
intention, over and above the strong interpretative adjuration to read down statutory text, imply 
provisions in it, or strain it in pursuit of Convention -compatibi I ity. 
58 However, rather than 
regard Anderson as a retreat from the approach of RvA and Cachia and Goode, Kavanagh 
opined that the better way to understand Anderson was/is to view the ruling as a statement 
regarding the limits of judicial rectification in relation to the circumstances of the case. '9 
'Although the language in Anderson was couched in terms of respect for the will of Parliament, 
it should not be taken as authority for the proposition that the courts ... should never go against 
the intention of Parliament when interpreting under Section 3. ')60 But rather, as Lord Nicholls 
went on to state in Ghaidan, that a court should refrain from adopting a meaning which would 
61 depart substantially from a fundamental feature of an Act of Parliament . 
Illustrated in the above rulings then, the effect of Section 3 remains dependent on the approach 
of the judge who, (in his traditional handling of substantive law) usually takes as his point of 
departure the premise that as an outsider to the political process he should defer to the will of 
% [20031 1 AC 837 
57 1200412 AC 557 Paragraphs 30-32 
5' Marshall (2003). Op. cit at 245 
59 A. Kavanagh 'Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights After Anderson: A More Contextual Approach' [20041 P. L. 537 L, 
Kavanagh (2006). Op. cit at 203 
61 [2004] 2 AC -557 
Paragraph 33 
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Parliament. Although the above cases do demonstrate how Section 3 can be used b", the 
judiciary to qualify the effect of Parliamentary intention, when judges do engage in this type of 
interpretation, they invariably maintain that they are nonetheless enforcing the will of 
Parliament. Firstly, by claiming to give effect to Parliamentary intention as expressed in Section 
3; and secondly, either by claiming that any change to Parliamentary intention is compatible 
with Parliament's legislative aim underlying the provision in question '62 or 
by reconciling a 
novel interpretation with the underlying statutory objective. 63 Accordingly, it is arguable that 
any advancement in terms of rights protection has been primarily in relation to the judiciary's 
handling of procedural law. Whereas, the Courts will not sanction interpretation which results in 
the alteration of parliamentary objective, including the imposition of rights or responsibilities, in 
the case of procedural concerns, the approach is less rigid. And yet even then, whether the 
approach is in fact any less rigid is not without question. One example is the House of Lords 
placing a block on the transitional effect of the HRA in relation to concerns raised on appeal 
from trial occurring before the HRA came into force. 
Section 7 of the HRA provides that any person who claims that a public authority has acted in a 
way which is contrary to the ECHR is entitled to bring proceedings against the authority under 
the H RA, or rely on the ECHR right concerned in any legal proceedings. Yet, although the HRA 
does apply to the conduct of proceedings brought by, or at the instigation of, a public authority 
after its entry into force, even though the actual facts giving rise to a claim occurred before that 
date, Section 22(4) prohibits proceedings arising under Section 7 in respect of an act which 
occurred before the HRA entered into force. Adopting a purposive approach, one solution could 
be to hold that because courts are public bodies bound by Section 6 of the HRA, they are 
obliged to apply the ECHR which includes permitting ECHR points to be raised on appeal. In R 
v Lamber ?4 the House of Lords refused to accept such reasoning. Although the court held that 
the trial judge's direction to the jury on the defence in question was incompatible with Article 6, 
the question was whether the defendant could take any benefit from the ruling, albeit his trial 
and conviction took place before 2 October 2000. According to Lord Steyn, because the appeal 
court constituted a public body, it was bound not to breach the ECHR, unless statute gave it no 
other option. The majority of the Court disagreed. The retrospective effect of Section 7 applied 
only to proceedings concerning a public authority and did not include direction given by a trial 
judge. 'Legal proceedings' in Section 7(l) was defined in Section 7(6) to cover: (a) proceedings 
brought by, or at the instigation of a public authority; and (b) an appeal against the decision of 
the court. Because Section 22(4) of the HRA referred only to the first of these and made no 
mention of appeal proceedings, it was assumed that appeals were not intended to be covered by 
(, 2 Lord Nicholls in Ghajdan 
Lord Hutton in R vA, and Lords Steyn and Hope in Lambert 
120011 LIK HL 37 
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it. In accordance with a literal interpretation of Sections 7-22 of the HRA, the intention of 
Parliament was to prohibit the effect of the ECHR in relation to appeals from trials which 
occurred before the HRA came into force. That a trial may relate to events which may well be 
unlawful once the HRA has come into force, but which were lawful at the time, was irrelevant. 
The decision was grounded on both an acknowledgement of the floodgates argument that to 
have held otherwise would have been to allow for countless convictions being challenged under 
the HRA, and a legalistic approach far removed from the purposive reasoning of following a 
route which would have protected the right on the basis that it would be consistent with the telos 
of the ECHR. According to Lord Steyn, the House of Lords was a public authority for the 
purpose of Section 6 of the HRA, thus obliged to take decisions which were themselves 
compatible in all respects with the judicial obligations in Sections 3 and 4. Irrespective of the 
literal reading of Section 22(4), the Court was obliged to interpret Section 28 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971 in a way which was compatible with Article 6. In the opinion of Hope, such an 
argument would render Section 22(4) otiose since all appeals would have to be dealt with under 
ECHR principles whenever the trial took place, and this could not have been what Parliament 
intended. 
The ruling in Lambert was disappointing. The commitment of the court to a narrow legalistic 
approach resulted in a fetter on the transitional effect of the HRA, insofar as it could have 
positively related to ECHR concerns raised on appeal from trials occurring prior to the 2 nd of 
October 2000. A fetter more clearly highlighted in Rv Kansal . 
6' Examining the ruling of 
Lambert the House of Lords held that the case had been wrongly decided and that the HRA did 
apply to appeals heard after it came into effect in relation to trials before that date. But, because 
Lambert was such a recent ruling it would be inappropriate to depart from it. Grounded on 
reasoning which placed the doctrine of stare decisis and precedent above consideration of the 
ECHR, the ruling diminished the value of the latter by placing legal certainty above any 
protection that it could have given the right in question. 
With regard to appeals in relation to trial decisions prior to October 2000 then, the impact of the 
HRA on the essentially Diceyean approach of the UK courts, has done little to address the 
protection of the rights of the individual. Despite judicial reservation expressed in Rv Rezui 
66 
67 
and Rv Benjafteld. the principle relating to retrospectivity remains. But this is not to suggest 
that the courts have not acknowledged its shortcomings. In Commissioner of Police v Hurs? 8 
the Court of Appeal took time to examine the approach adopted in both Lambert and Kansal 
and provided by its own example, how it could be avoided. 
0 [2002] UK HRR 169 
120021 UK HL I 
[20021 UK IIL 2 
[2003] EWHC 1721 (QB) 
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Concerning the issue of retrospectivity in relation to an inquest into a death occurring before 
October 2000, the court was called on to examine an application for judicial revie" of a 
coroner's refusal in November 2002 and June 2003 to resume an inquest into the death of a 
person whose circumstances suggested a lack of vigilance by the authority responsible for his 
welfare. In the opinion of the Court, a legalistic reading of the HRA in relation to events 
occurring prior to October 2000 may well have been an arguable approach for the judiciary to 
adopt, but this did not mean that Section 3 could never be used in relation to circumstances 
which existed prior to that date. The issue under consideration in Hurst was whether an inquest 
should be reopened, an event which, in the absence of any countervailing consideration of 
unfairness to any other individual, could be justified on the ground of satisfying not only the 
demands of Article 2 of the ECHR, but the requirements of Section 3. 
The approach resembled that taken one week earlier by Baroness Hale in R (Kehoe) v the 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions . 
69Called on to consider an alleged violation of Article 
6,. according to Baroness Hale, the Child Support Act 1991 placed the enforcement of child 
maintenance into the hands of an authority obliged by the HRA to ensure enforcement of any 
ECHR concern, which required as wide a reading of statutory provision as necessary, including 
the implication of additional rights. Accordingly, the Child Support Agency was obliged to act 
with reasonable speed in enforcement proceedings so as to satisfy the implied right of the 
claimant to an accurate deliberation of the payment of maintenance. 
Despite the logic inherent in Baroness Hale's reasoning however, a broad approach has 
continued to remain the exception rather than the non-n. Whereas, in R (Hurst) v Commissioner 
of Police of the Metropolis'o the direction of the Court of Appeal that the inquest on a death 
occurring in May 2000 be reopened was overruled, and the question 'how' the deceased died 
replaced by the narrower question 'in what' circumstances; in RvJ (Attorney-General's 
Reference Case No 2 of 2001)" a stay of proceedings, awarded on the ground that the facts in 
question constituted an Article 6 breach of the requirement of reasonable expedition, was held 
to only constitute an appropriate remedy where a fair trial was not possible, otherwise matters 
such as unreasonable delay could be reflected in a reduced sentence in the event of a conviction, 
or compensation in the event of an acquittal. Consistent with the approach adopted in Lambert 
and Kansal, the House of Lords upheld the ruling. The ruling is objectionable for a number of 
reasons. 
Firstly, it is arguable that the telos of the ECHR requires the asking of whether the prosecution 
should have acted differentIN, to achieve a fair trial, as opposed to concentrating solely on 
'9 [20051 UKHL 48 
[2007] 2 "TR 726 
[2004] 2 WLR I 
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technicality. Secondly, the majority ruling in RvJ stands in contrast to the nature of the earlier 
Privy Council decision in HMAdvocate vR 72 in which the court held that the prosecution could 
not proceed when there had been a breach of the reasonable time remedy. In RvJ the House of 
Lords was not willing to defer to a recent contrary decision. Reluctance, made (arguably) more 
interesting by the fact that the difference between RvJ and the concern over retrospectivity was 
that the authority overturned was one which favoured defendants. The observation is interesting. 
Returning to RvA, highlighted by Stone, rather than interpreting Section 41 in a way which 
would have provided guidelines, Lord Steyn's approach served to put back the question of what 
was fair for the purpose of Article 6, into the hands of the judge. 
73 Illustrated in the ruling of R 
74 
ýy (Hindawi) v Home Secretar and the response of Lords Lester, Bridge, Steyn, Woolf and 
Rawlinson to proposed changes to the role of the judiciary in the judicial review ouster clause 
II of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004, the courts have not been 
silent in protecting their role over perceived executive encroachment . 
7' Although in Andrews 76 
Lord Steyn retracted his reasoning in RvA by accepting that his approach to Section 3 was not 
appropriate where the suggested interpretation was contrary to the express words of the 
statutory provision, Stone's observation concerning the rulings of RvA and RvJ, give rise to 
questions concerning the motive behind the court's approach. Questions, in relation to three 
areas of HR concern: terrorism,, asylum and various aspects of criminal justice, made (arguably) 
more pertinent post the HRA, by the heightened degree of executive and judicial antagonism 
over the conflict between Government policy and judicial concepts of independence and the rule 
of law. 
Section 4.2: Various Aspects of Criminal Justice 
An approach frequently adopted by the UK courts is the use of a point of technicality to define 
an issue as falling beyond the concern of the ECHR. " One example, illustrated in R (BR) 
(Sentencing: Extended Licences) v Home Secretalý7 8 and R (Uttely) v Home Secretary'79 is 
when questions arise as to what is a criminal charge. 
One of the developments of the last 20 years has been the ancillary order against persons 
convicted in criminal courts. In R (BR) the court was called on to consider the application of an 
order in relation to two assaults committed in 1976 and 1982, and whether an extended licence 
period constituted a criminal penalty for the purposes of Articles 6 and 7. The Court of Appeal 
12 12003] 2 WLR 317 
71 Stone (2004), Op. cit at 45 
74 12004] EWHC Admin 78 
75 lit- Deb (2003-2004) 658 (Column 1041) (Hansard, London) 
76 [20021 LIK HL 46 
7' R (A) v Harrow Crown Court [20031 EWHC Admin 
7 'k 
[20031 EWCA Crim 2199 
79 120031 FWCA Civ 1130 
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held that the order constituted a preventative as opposed to a punitive power, therefore its use in 
relation to an offence prior to its introduction was not prohibited by Article 7. In reaching its 
decision, the Court disregarded the fact that the extended licence constituted a form of 
suspended sentence with a prospect of a detainee being recalled to prison not just for 
committing a further offence, but where the Home Secretary decided that the risk of his 
committing an offence was high . 
8' The ruling stood in contrast with the Article 7 prohibition on 
retrospectivity, which included the principle that the maximum sentence accorded should be that 
which was/is applicable at the time of the offence. 
In R (Uttely) the question for the Court was whether a licence period expiry at the three-quarter 
point of the sentence amounted to an additional penalty if the prisoner was sentenced for an 
offence occurring before the Criminal Justice Act 199181 was introduced. The Court of Appeal 
held that the licence was a part of the sentence under the CJA when applied to offences 
committed before its enactment The Secretary of State appealed. The Minister submitted that 
the Court's finding that the change to release effected by the CJA would mean that the sentence 
imposed was greater than it would have been before the Act, was wrong. The applicable penalty 
meant only the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the offence in question, and that the 
penalty applicable in Uttley had not changed under the CJA. The House of Lords agreed . 
81 Its 
reasoning is questionable, not least because part of the reasoning of the court in reaching its 
decision was to take note of the Practice Direction pursuant to which judges were supposed to 
amend the sentence imposed under the CJA, so as to avoid making it more severe under the new 
provisions. 
Contrary then, to any perceived heightened 14R culture post the HRA, there would appear to 
remain (in this area of HR concern at least) ajudicial preference to concentrate on established 
procedures, rather than the normative logic of the ECHR. According to DouzinaS83 and Allen 84 
such preference is due to the fact that jurisprudence has continued to acknowledge the concept 
of HR as deontic concepts belonging to the universe of norms. An approach according to 
Ewing, 85 exemplified by a judicial deference to the will of Parliament, grounded on a policy of 
non-engagement to follow the political imperative underpinning the legislative provision in 
question. Examining the deference argument in relation to the application of the ASBO, the 
argument is compelling. 
R (Giles) v Parole Board [2002] EWCA Civ 951 
Hereafter, CJA 
[20041 UKHL 38 
83 Douzinas (2002), Op. cit at 
Allen (1994), Op. cit at 385 
FNvIng (1999), Op. cit at -9 
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The ASBO, Anonymity Orders, and the ASBO Child 
The ASBO represents an example of neo-classical philosophy that individuals take 
responsibility for their own action, with little concern for its broader implications for civil 
liberties. On analysis, it is a philosophy which appears to be strictly adhered to by the courts. 86 
Called on to determine the legal status of the ASBO for the purposes of Article 6, in McCann v 
Manchester County Counciý' the Court held that an ASBO constituted a civil proceeding 
insofar as proceedings constituted: 
I. A two stage process of obtaining an order, and when necessary, initiating proceedings for its breach; 
2. The involvement of no technical punishment; 
3. Proceedings essentially administrative in nature. 
The reason underlying the classification was explained in McCann. 88 Despite being a measure 
which could lead to imprisonment, the ASBO was not a concern for the purpose of Article 6. An 
application for an order did not constitute a criminal charge, but a preventative measure, on the 
ground that its imposition involved no finding of guilt. Accordingly, the restriction on an 
individual's freedom within a specified area (and the value accorded hearsay evidence based on 
anonymous or undiscovered sources) was lawful. In reaching its decision, the court thought it 
necessary to consider the social problems which had led to the introduction of the ASBO, in 
particular the Government's attempt to protect the interest of the law-abiding majority, and the 
fact that the initiative not only filled an existing lacuna, but satisfied a need to restore public 
confidence. Accordingly, the HR implications of the ASBO, including the imprisonment of 
persons subject to it, were not addressed. Although the ruling made clear that even though the 
ASBO was classified as civil,, this did not mean that findings were to be made on a bare balance 
of probabilities, any suggestion that the civil-standard of proof fell foul of the ECHR, or that the 
functioning of the ASBO infringed Articles 8 and 11, was accorded little credence. The ASBO 
was a procedure prescribed by law, necessary for the prevention of disorder. 
The reality of the classification was made clear in Clingham v Kensington and Chelsea London 
Borough Council, 89 and R (0 v Secretary ofStatefor Constitutional Affairs. 90 
8"A. Ashworth 'Social Control and "Anti-Social Behaviour: - The Subversion of Human Rights' (2004) 120 L. Q. R. 263 
"" [2001] 1 WLR 1084 
88 [20031 HL AC 787 Paragraphs 16,42 and 85 
'9 [20031 1 AC 787 
"" [2004] FWCA ON 312 
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Highlighted by Emmerson and Ashworth, 91 the ECHR and the ECrtHR adopt the approach that 
where proceedings are in substance criminal, regardless of whether domestic la" classifies them 
as civil, they should nevertheless be treated as criminal for the purpose of the safeguards 
(regarding liberty and due-process) that the ECHR applies to those charged with a criminal 
offence. 92 According to Ashworth and Redmayne, 'the whole point of the ASBO regime is to 
circumvent this... [And] although the House of Lords [in Clingham] held that the standard of 
proof in the civil proceedings [was/is] so high as to be indistinguishable from the criminal 
standard, the main thrust of its decision was that the Government had succeeded in its 
circumvention. 93 The ruling is objectionable. In so far as it appears that the Government has 
been able to by-pass the protections for criminal charges and open up a way of dealing with 
crimes that effectively avoids HR safeguards, the courts have allowed the recent tendency 
affecting the criminal process that is the slippage between criminal and civil procedures to 
function as 'a means of avoiding the protections of criminal procedure, while ensuring that, by 
means of making breach of the civil order an offence of strict liability with a high maximum 
penalty, severe sanctions are available. ' 94 
With regard to R (All), called on to consider a challenge to the interim ASBO scheme, the Court 
of Appeal held that the without notice procedure introduced by the Magistrates Courts (ASBO) 
Rules 2002 did not constitute a breach of the ECHR, insofar as the procedure did enable a 
person subject to it to apply to have the order reviewed. The finding gave rise to criticism from 
I egal -practitioners generally, in whose opinion, if the without notice procedure could not be 
legally considered to be offensive then it was near impossible to anticipate any successful 
challenge to the interim ASBO scheme. 95 Echoing the observation of Ewing, that judicial regard 
for the rights of the individual offender almost invariably came back to the political imperative 
that underpinned the legislation in question, 96 such criticism revolved around suspicion that the 
prevailing political stand to take stricter law and order measures had created such a neo-classic 
climate, that the judiciary was compelled to follow. The observation is not untenable. Certainly, 
that the policy objective of an ASBO remains paramount in the judicial mind is exemplified in 
R (Singh) v Chief Constable of West Midlands. 97 
In R (Singh), the court was called on to review the legality of the issue of a dispersal 
98 
authorisation order under Section 30 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. The application 
for review was based on two grounds: (1) that a dispersal order could not be used to prevent 
91 B. Ernmerson and A. Ashworth Human Rights and Criminal Justice (Sweet and Maxwell, London 200 1) 
92 Engel v Netherlands (1979) 1 EHRR 647 
"' Ashworth and Redmayne (2005), Op. cit at 13 
94 lbid p. 14 
95 Scraton (2004). Op. cit 841 
'K' Ewing (I 999)ý Op. Cit 767 
117 [2005] EWCA 2840 (Admin) 
" flereafter. ASBAct 
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protestors from exercising their right to freedom of expression. insofar as the ASB Act could 
not be used for a purpose other than that of the control of anti-social behaviour. and (2) that tile 
order issued was disproportionate, insofar as the police did not consider using alternative 
measures prior to its imposition. Both arguments were dismissed. With regard to the question of 
legality, although in the opinion of the Court the provision did lack the inclusion of an express 
exception to protest, it was not necessary to make use of Section 3. The language of the ASB 
Act clearly indicated Parliament's intention that the dispersal order could be used to cover any 
form of public protest which involved a risk of disorder arsing. As for the issue of 
proportionality, although the ability to protest as part of the freedoms guaranteed in Articles 10 
and II was necessarily effected, insofar as the order fell within the permitted exception of being 
in accordance with a procedure established by law and proportionate to the aim to be achieved, 
the scheme provided a lawful basis for interference with it. 
In terms of HR protection, the ruling is disappointing. Certainly, the rejection of the applicant's 
argument that as a matter of principle the dispersal order could not apply to public protest, and 
that to apply the low-level threshold permitting control under anti-social behaviour legislation 
would have the potential to effectively destroy protests which could not otherwise be prohibited, 
appears to stand in contravention to a dictum of Lord Hoffman's which seemed directly in 
point: 99 'the principle of legality means that Parliament must ... confront what it is doing and 
accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous 
words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified 
meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express 
language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the 
most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. "Oo 
Giving credence to the concern that 'there [being] no certainty that, in some future period of 
civil-libertarianism stress [such powers] will not be turned to as a way of imposing political 
conformity on pain of criminal sanction, ' the result was judicial confirmation of the ability of 
the state to exercise its power in almost any situation where a power is statutorily authorised. 10' 
Apart from standing in contrast to the long established constitutional claim that an individual 
has liberty to do anything which is not lawfully prohibited, the finding appears to constitute one 
of a number of responses to low-level disorder, (contrary to the claims of White), ' 02 indicating a 
judicial preference to follow the political imperative. A preference exemplified more clearly in 
the handling of anonymity orders and the treatment of the ASBO child. t-11) 
99 Gearty (2007), Op. c it at 113 
R (Simms) v Secretary qf Statefior the Home Department [2000] 2 AC H5 at 131 
Albeit, 'the strong orientation of the orders towards anti-social conduct, backed bý- Government advice that has accompanied their 
application, has so far helped to steer the procedure a\\a\ from aný- application in the arena of public demonstrations, ' Geartý 
(2007), Op. cit at II 1- 112 
102 (1999) FHRLR 55 
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The treatment of anonymity orders in respect of the ASBO subject formed the focus of R 
(Stanley) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner and Brent LBC. 103 Highlighting an arguable 
continuance of the political imperative of a neo-classic law and order strategy to shape the 
courts response toward applications for anonymity orders, the court held that the distribution of 
pamphlets identifying the subject of an ASBO did not constitute unlawful interference, insofar 
as disclosure was necessary for the prevention of crime. Although in reaching its decision the 
court did justify its decision on grounds of proportionality, it did so without consideration of the 
effects of disclosure on the individual concerned, reiterating verbatim the reasoning adopted in 
Mc Kerry v Teesside and Wear Valley Justices. 104 
In Mc Kerry the court was called on to consider the continuance of an anonymity order made by 
a Youth Court pursuant to Section 49 of the Children and Young Person's Act 1933.1 05 The 
Court held that the decision of the Youth Court to lift the order would remain. Reflecting the 
political imperative of the ASBO regime, the subject of an ASBO could be subjected to 
vilification in both local and national press as part of the ASBO's overall 'name and shame' 
programme. Accordingly, where the behaviour complained of had been proved, the ASBO child 
could be denied anonymity. 
The rulings stand in contrast to the exercise of the power of the crown parens patriae by the 
court, where an injunction can be awarded in order to protect a child from publication of details 
which would reveal his identity. 'O' Informational privacy is to some extent safeguarded by a 
judicial balance between the right of the public to be kept informed of what is going on in court, 
and the need for the welfare of the child not to be put at risk by identification., 07 However, one 
difficulty in relation to dealings concerning the interests of the child is that the ECHR does not 
make specific reference to them. In accordance with its understanding of the EC14R as a living 
instrument,, the ECrtHR has addressed the omission by using the international UNCRC to adopt 
an interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR so as to accord moderate protection to what has 
technically become a child's right to a personal-life. 108 The exact position formed the focus of R 
(Howard League) v Secretary of State. 109 Called on to consider the relevance of international 
treaty following the HRA, the court held that although Article 3 of the UNCRC 1991 and 
Article 24 of the European Charter could not be legally binding, insofar as they proclaimed, 
reaffin-ned or elucidated the scope of HR recognised by the ECRR, they should be taken into 
10-' [20041 EWHC Admin 2229 
[20001 Crim LR 594 
Hereafter. CYP 
Re, X'(, 4 Ifinor) (Wardship: Ityunction) [1984] 1 WLR 1422 
1117 Re C (11ardship: Wedical Treatment) (Vo 2) [1999] Farn 39 CA. Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878 
108 Costello Roberts v UK (1995 ) 19 EHRR 112-. .4v 
UK (1999) 27 EHPR 611 
109 120031 1 FLR 484 
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consideration when applying a measure of domestic law. Accordingly, where what could be 
regarded as an ECHR right was/is engaged, the welfare of the child should be considered. 
The actual impact of the ruling was made clear in R (A) v Leeds Magistrates Court-' 10 Even 
where it could be argued that the interest of a child was such as to require that an ASBO should 
not be issued, or that its terms be different from those proposed, it was nevertheless incumbent 
on the defendant to provide an explanation of his case. Although there could be cases where it 
was/is inappropriate to impose an ASBO by reason of a child's age, the child's welfare was not 
a 'talisman' which if not pronounced would invalidate any ASBO made. As an indication of 
what Ewing"' ten-ns the deference given by the judiciary to the prevailing law and order 
concerns of Parliament, the reduction of the 'best interest' principle to a secondary 
consideration is disconcerting. However, when such deference becomes all the more serious, is 
when it can be said to adversely impact on what are best described as popularly perceived 
existing rights and liberties. 
Control of the Freedom ofPublic Protest 
The freedom of the governed majority to assemble and express opinion on the activity of the 
governing minority is commonly cited as one of the fundamental characteristics of liberal 
democracy, 112 autonomy and self-development. "' Yet, highlighted by Phillipson and Fenwick, 
UK courts have 'shown little recognition of the ... value of public protest. Instead-the 
interest 
ofjudgments [centred] on orthodox statutory construction ... the judiciary have been confined to 
applying the constraints on public protest in existing law, whether or not those restrictions go 
beyond those nationally and internationally deemed necessary in democracies, and whether or 
not they were developed in the context of political protest .... To an extent due to the 
judges' 
inevitable preoccupation, under a constitution based on negative liberties, with the legal content 
of the restrictions of public protest. ' 114 Certainly the extent to which the freedom was exercised 
prior to the HRA was dependent not merely on the existing law, but the way in which it was 
enforced. The only certainty in the way it was enforced by the UK courts being variance 
according to political circumstances. ' 15 In the words of Bailey, Harris and Ormerod 'the more 
stable the political system, the greater ... the toleration of political protest. [As] effectiveness of 
HO [2004] EWHC 443 (Admin) 
Ewing (1999), Op. cit at 79 
'Rights of peaceful protest and assemblý are amongst our fundamental freedoms: they are numbered among the touchstones 
which distinguish a free socict) from a totalitarian one, ' White Paper Review of Public Order Laii, (Cmnd. 9510) 1985 Paragraph 
1.7 (TSO, London) 
Brokdoýf (1985) 69 Bverfg-e 315 
G. Phillipson and H. Fenwick 'Public Protest, the Human Rights Act and Judicial Responses to Political Expression" [20001 P. L. 
627,630 
"5 Highlighting the 'frag Ile nature... of rights which lack a positive definition, ' N. Taylor and B. Fitzpatrick 'Trespassers Might Be 
Prosecuted: The European Convcntion and Restrictions On The Rights To Assemble' (1998) E. H. R. L. R. 293 
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protest increases, [the more] toleration is reduced [and] the law enforced more rigorously., 116 
Whether or not the HRA has had any real influence on the judicial approach toward control of 
the freedom then, the observation is interesting. 
'Until October, 2000, the right to public protest in the UK was protected only in the traditional 
constitutional manner: citizens could do anything that the law did not forbid. By contrast, under 
the [ECHR] as received into UK law under the [HRA], they are able to exercise positive rights, 
circumscribed by specified exceptions, or exceptionally, incompatible domestic legislation. "" 
Section 6 of the HRA renders Articles 10 and II binding on public authorities. Further, 'in areas 
of law concerning political expression [in particular] concerning political speech in the media, 
the judiciary have considered the content and value of the speech in question, rather than 
confine themselves to the legality of interferences with it. In such cases, courts have either 
overtly adopted ... 
Strasbourg principles, or have strongly emphasised the high status that 
freedom of speech holds in the common-law.... Even where media freedom collides with values 
the judiciary have historically been strongly concerned to uphold... the [HR] dimension has at 
least been 
... given some prominence 
in the judgments. ' 118 Accordingly, it was not unreasonable 
to presume that the response of the UK court toward the ability to assemble and peacefully 
protest post the HRA, would have consisted of a more vocalised determination to protect such 
freedoms from state encroachment in accordance with Sections 3 and 4. The actual influence of 
the HRA is illustrated in the approaches adopted in two cases: DPP v Jones'19 and Percy v 
DPP. 120 
In Jones, the defendants were charged with breaching conditions imposed on the freedom to 
protest in accordance with Section 14A of the Public Order Act 1986.12 1 Because some of the 
conditions imposed were lawful, some unlawful, and severance between the two types could not 
be made,, the defendants were convicted of having taken part in a 'trespassory assembly. ' The 
defendants appealed, and their convictions were quashed by the Crown Court, restored by the 
Divisional Court and quashed by the House of Lords. The main question was whether the 
peaceful non-obstructive assembly in question fell within the category of legislative purposes 
for which the highway might lawfully be used by the public. The House of Lords held that it 
did. Although the facts concerned engagement of Articles 10 and 11, little reference was made 
to them. The approach is objectionable on three grounds. 
Baileý,, Harris and Ormerod (2001). Op. cit at 389 
Phillipson and Fenwick (2000), Op. cit at 627 
Mid p. 631 
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Firstly, given the (arguable) opportunity to take 'account of the advent of positik-e rights to 
speech and assembly under Articles 10 and II with the enactment of the [HRA] and the 
growing jurisprudence on a common law "right" to freedom of expression, ' 122 deten-nination of 
the freedom was decided with little regard for anything other than whether use of the highway 
to conduct a protest was such that could be classed as a use ordinarily associated with it without 
amounting to a public nuisance. 
Secondly, insofar as the lawfulness of a long established freedom which had not been declared 
unlawful was rendered dependent on the existence of another positively declared right, the 
ruling constituted an affront to the fundamental principle that an individual had the freedom to 
do anything he liked provided that that it did not constitute a crime, a tort, or some other act 
prohibited by law. 
Thirdly, regardless of whether 'it must be doubted whether the exercise of the vague and far- 
reaching banning powers available under Section 14A will always satisfy the requirements of 
the ECHR, [insofar as] many assemblies will cause ... only a marginal degree of disruption... 
what the [ECHR] demands ... is not knee-jerk derogation from the positive part of the Article II 
right, but a sensitive balancing, which enables that if a ban is imposed, it is indeed necessary in 
a democratic society, and thus reflects the demands of proportionality. Section 14A of the 
Public Order Act 1986,, in so far as it allows for the prohibition of peaceful, non-obstructive 
assemblies, could therefore breach the requirements of the [ECHR]. ' 123 
The approach adopted in Jones formed the focus of Phillipson and Fenwick. Whereas Lord 
Clyde considered that the law of trespass defined the issue, insofar as English law admitted of 
no positive legal right to hold a peaceful non-obstructive assembly on the highway, Lord Irvine 
stated that he found it unnecessary to have regard for the ECHR. Both rulings proceeded on the 
basis of an orthodox approach to analysis of the common-law authorities. An approach which 
accorded 'a higher place to the uncertain value of preserving accepted custom, than to the 
supposedly fundamental [HR] declared in Article 11 . 
9124 Further, according to Phillipson and 
Fenwick, there was no arguable awareness of the background of the case, insofar as the 
legislative attack upon the right to peaceful assembly of which Section 14 was the culmination, 
was resolved by little serious reference to other than the interpretation accorded nineteenth- 
century case-law on real property. The approach stood in contrast with that Of SiMMS12' and 
Reýynolds 126 (decided within months of Jones) where freedom of expression, both as a 
12 22 Phillipson and FmN ick (2000), Op. cit at 627 
12' Taylor and Fitzpatrick (1998), Op. cit at 299 
'2' Phillipson and Fenwick (2000). Op. cit at 635 
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constitutional right and as embodied in Article 10, was the 'starting point' of legal reasoning 
and the values underlying it identified. 
With regard to Percy, the court was called on to consider the conviction of a defendant for 
engaging in behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarrn or distress while protesting at a US air- 
base. Examining the relevance of the ECHR, the Court had held that because Article 10 was 
qualified and the risk of public disorder unlikely, the focus lay solely on whether the behaviour 
complained of was necessary in a democratic society. Insofar as the behaviour complained of 
was disrespectful to one cultural group, the manner in which the appellant had protested 
constituted behaviour which was restricted by Section 5 of the POA. The defendant appealed. 
The Court declared Section 5 ECHR incompatible. Although, in reaching its decision, the Court 
accepted that Article 10 could protect the exercise of a freedom of expression which others 
could interpret as insulting behaviour, because the Court had confined its examination to only 
the manner in which the behaviour complained of had given insult, the requirement of 
proportionality had not been addressed. 
The ruling in Percy represented a change in judicial approach toward public protest. Firstly, in 
reaching its decision, the court acknowledged the need to protect the freedom as part of the 
freedom of expression, and set about a re-c lass ification which effectively created a 
differentiation in public order law between (1) disorder, obstruction and/or trespass generally, 
and (2) public protest which created just such an effect. 
Secondly, in the opinion of Bonner, Fenwick and Harris, whereas the approach adopted in Jones 
represented the kind of disregard for the telos of 14R which had 'bedevilled' public protest 
generally in the UK judicial mind, the approach in Percy followed a more definite structure 
'exhibiting some of the elements of the approach termed activist. ' 127 
(1) By examining firstly and fully the scope of the ECHR, finding that the protest in question did fall 
within Article 10(l); 
(2) By finding that Article 10 related to both the content and fon-n of protest, and that the presumption in 
favour of freedom of expression applied equally to both elements; 
(3) By holding that the relevant test in Article 10(2) was to be applied broadly, despite the often reiterated 
need to afford it a restricted interpretation. 
According to Bonner, Fenwick and Harris then, whereas the 'starting-point' for the self- Z__ 
restrainer is to examine the exceptions of Article 10(2) while adopting a minimalist approach to 
the HRA; an activist approach can encourage the court to go further than ensuring that only the 
12 ' D. Bonner, H. Fen\N, Ick and S. Harris Iudicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act' (2002) LCL. Q. 549 at 570 
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minimum standards laid down in ECHR jurisprudence are maintained, insofar as the ECHR 
injunction to further realise rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR preamble is also 
addressed to domestic courts. 128 In the words of Bonner, Fenwick and Harris, 'where the 
common-law is applicable in a protest case, the judiciary would be expected to view themselves 
as bound to reach an outcome consistent with the [ECHR] under Section 6 of the HRA. 
Approaches under the HRA to statutory public order law... might allow for either a minimalist, 
or an activist stance. The courts could view the matter as one of interpretation under Section 3 
following Re W (Children) (Care Order), and as a last resort, could issue a declaration of 
incompatibility under Section 4, or even where statute was applicable, might conduct free- 
standing enquiry into ... compatibility... by using Section 6.029AIthough, according to Bonner, 
Fenwick and Harris, it could not be said that a change in judicial approach toward the freedom 
to protest would guarantee it in respect of a protestor who chose to behave reprehensibly, the 
likelihood that the freedom of expression dimension of protest could and would be recognised, 
was now higher. Whether such recognition has been in fact favourable (or even constant) 
however, is subject to debate. 
For example, the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 130 constituted an (arguable) 
response to the problem of long terrn political protest which impeded access to Parliament, or 
disruption of its work. The result was Sections 132-138 which, according to Loveland, went so 
far beyond merely addressing the concern of protecting Parliamentary workers from low level 
anti-social behaviour, was commonly suspected of forming a solution to the problem of dealing 
with the long term demonstration of anti-war protester Haw. 13 1 The lawfulness of Haw's 
prolonged public demonstration at Parliament Square, and the attempt to remove him under the 
SOCPA, was considered in R (Haw) v Home Secretary. 132 
In accordance with Section 178 of the SOCPA, the Home Secretary is afforded the power to 
engage any incidental, consequential or transitory measure thought necessary to give the 
SOCPA full effect. Article 42(2) of the SOCPA (Commencement No. 1, Transitional and 
Transitory Provisions) Order 2005 provided that reference to demonstrating without 
authorisation in a designated area, and notice of a demonstration in a designated area, were to 
take effect as references to demonstrations continuing on or after commencement of the 
SOCPA. The question in Haw was whether the order was ultra vires. In accordance with the 
Court it was. In reaching its decision, the Court applied ordinary rules of statutory construction. 
12' FolloNN ing Percy, the approach to be used was considered by the House of Lords in Re W (Children) (Care Order) and Re S 
(Children) (Care Order) [20021 UKHL 10, where it was suggested that the more 'secure' approach was to engage Section 3 of the 
HRA 
129 lbidp. 565 
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The intention of the legislature was to be deduced from the words which it employed. No 
reference was made to the ECHR as to the possibility of the order constituting a violation of 
either Article 10 or 7. In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged what was described by 
Loveland as an essentially 'orthodox ... conservative constitutional methodology, 
' which wove 
together two points of principle: (I ) that penal statutory provisions should be strictly construed. 
in the sense that they should be accorded the meaning that interfered least with individual 
liberty; and (2) that statutory terms should be subjected to a literal construction, unless such led 
to an absurd result. 133 The Home Secretary Appealed. The Court of Appeal held that: (1) the 
Commencement Order was made intra vires in accordance with the will of Parliament; (2) that 
the SOCPA rightly replaced the outdated Section 14 of the POA: and (3) that the engagement of 
any interpretation which left existing demonstrations unregulated, was wrong. 134 For a number 
of reasons, the approach is open to criticism. 
Firstly, in its deliberation of the disapplication of Section 14 of the POA to existing 
demonstrations prior to the I August 2005, it is arguable that insofar as Haw was a sole 
protester, the former provision, having no relevance to the facts of the case, simply did not 
apply. 
Secondly, 'using Section 132(6) as a conduit, [the Court] read Section 132(l) not simply in the 
context of but as subordinate to Section 14 in respect of its temporal scope ... But why [as 
Loveland highlights] does Section 14 control Section 132 rather than vice-versa? One might 
have thought that on the application of a simple lex posterior principle, any inconsistency 
between the two measures would have to be resolved in favour of the later provision. ' 135 
Thirdly, regardless of the obligations placed on the court under Section 3, the ECHR was 
accorded no great consideration. Whereas, the relevance of Article 10 did not feature in any 
serious deliberation, the prohibition against retrospectivity embodied in Article 7 was 
disregarded in what appears to be not merely the creation of ex-postfacto criminal law, but the 
removal by retrospective criminalisation of what was a widely democratically respected 
freedom prior to the SOCPA. 
The observations are interesting. However, Haw is not the only example of a ruling in which the 
court appeared to abandon regard for a long established freedom in order to satisfy a perceived 
need to target an area of political concern. Giving rise to similar concern are the rulings 
concerning Laporte. ' 36 
Loveland (2007). Op. cit at 256 
[20061 EWCA CIN 5 32 
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In apprehension of a likely breach of the peace, authorisation was granted pursuant to Section 
60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, to enable police to exercise a statutor) 
power of stop and search. In pursuance of the order,, the police stopped and searched a van 
containing protestors en route from London 5 km from a restricted airbase. As a result of a 
search, items were seized which indicated that the occupants were protestors, and both van and 
occupants escorted back to London. The action was challenged by way of judicial review. In 
delivering the judgment of the Administrative Court, Judge May agreed that the court was 
obliged to conduct a review and concluded that although the officer had been entitled to 
exercise the power available to him, which included preventing protestors from proceeding 
nearer to the airbase, the escorted return to London was unlawful on the ground that: (1) there 
was no immediately apprehended breach of the peace sufficient to justify even a transitory 
detention; (2) that detention on the escorted vehicle for two and a half hours went beyond 
anything which could reasonably be said to constitute a transitory detention; and (3) that the 
length of the detention was disproportionate to any apprehended breach of the peace. "' The 
Chief Constable appealed. In a cross-appeal the protestors questioned the finding of the 
Administrative Court on three grounds: (1) that it was wrong in its application of a 'real risk' 
test for preventative action short of arrest or detention; (2) that the court was wrong to have 
applied a test contrary to Section 6 of the HRA; and that (3) the court was wrong to have 
concluded that the circumstances were such as to have justified the preventative action taken, in 
view of Section 6 and Articles 10 and 11. 
The finding of the Administrative Court was upheld. The decision by the police not to exercise 
their common-law power of arrest in the absence of a sufficiently imminent threat to the peace, 
and the decision to prevent the protestors from proceeding to the airbase grounded on 
apprehension of a breach arising, was reasonable. However, although the exercise of police 
power was lawful, the manner in which it had been exercised fell beyond that which could be 
regarded as proportionate. Accordingly, the escorted return to London was unlawful. In 
reaching its decision, the Court raised a number of concerns in relation to what it regarded as 
the impact of the ECHR on common-law. 
Firstly, although the police action complained of did give rise to an interference with Articles 10 
and 11, because the concern of proportionality turned on the facts of the case, the prevention of 
the protestors from entering the vicinity of the airbase was not unlawful, even though it 
involved the exercise of what was effectively a blanket-ban. Secondly, although the freedoms to 
express and impart information, and assemble, were of significance to the functioning of 
democracy, both Articles 10 and II were subject to express qualifications in which police action 
117 120041 EWCA ON 1639 Paragraph 47 
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did fall. Thirdly, and in contrast to the finding of the Administrative Court, the appeal could not 
succeed without careful examination of the impact of Article 5. In accordance xvith the 
Administrative Court, Article 5 did not encompass a negative obligation not to act in breach of a 
peace, since a breach was well within the ambit of Article 5(l)(c) which provided that a 
detention could be lawfully carried out for the purpose of bringing a person before a competent 
legal authority. Yet, the Court side-stepped Article 5 by holding that it did not apply to the 
stopping of the vehicle in question. Where reasonable force was used to detain to prevent an 
immediate apprehended breach, although such could be defined as transitory detention, it did 
not constitute detention for the purpose of Article 5. With regard to the escorted return to 
London however, the Court held the detainment of protestors did constitute detention for the 
purpose of Article 5, and as a disproportionate response, an ECHR violation. 
The claimant appealed. 138 The arguments advanced were summarised by Lord Bingham. Albeit, 
the interference by the Chief Constable was for a legitimate purpose it was (a) not prescribed by 
law; and (b) premature, indiscriminate and disproportionate. The House of Lords held that the 
finding that the interception of the vehicle was necessary to prevent an apprehended breach of 
the peace was wrong. Such interference constituted indiscriminate action. In reaching its 
decision, the Court held that the requirement of imminence appropriately identified the 
common-law power to take preventative action as a power of last resort, catering for situations 
about to descend into violence. Accordingly, what was imminent had to be judged in the context 
under consideration. Whereas, both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal had effed in their 
understanding of the concept of imminence by linking it to the reasonableness of the 
preventative action, rather than identifying imminence itself as the threshold for taking 
preventative action, it was not believed that the circumstances had been such as to indicate that 
a breach of the peace was imminent. 
To summarise then, prior to the HRA the scope of fundamental freedoms consisted of that 
which was not lawfully prohibited. This negative approach to liberty was theoretically altered 
following the introduction of the HRA. Certainly, the handling of the immanency threshold in 
Laporte serves to highlight how the role of the court in ensuring that state power which impacts 
on an individual's fundamental freedom is properly applied, is paramount. Whether the rulings 
throughout Laporte (and arguably Percy) suggest that post the HRA, given the mandate to 
accord greater consideration to the ECHR order, a faction of the courts have demonstrated a 
consistent willingness to do so, is not without doubt. 
Despite any suggestion that the attitude of the judiciary is symptomatic of a young system in 
which the search for standards is bound to give rise to the occasional inconsistency, the 
13" [20061 LIKIII, 55 
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response of the judiciary to the HRA, has not excluded the courts refusing to acknowledge 
altogether the relevance of ECHR law. 139 Whereas in R (von Brandenburg) v E. London, City 
Trust and Others 140 the House of Lords decided to disregard the ECHR altogether. in R JH) v 
Home Secretary"' the Court refused to examine with reference to the European order, the 
question as to what constituted a public official for the purpose of the HRA. The rulings are 
indicative of a judicial approach characterised by a narrow interpretation of the ECHR and a 
limited acceptance of the HRA grounded on a Diceyean conviction in the common-law's ability 
to protect existing liberties. Combined with a suspicion of foreign jurisdictions, an extreme use 
of the approach is evident in a number of cases. Whereas in Myles v Director of Public 
Prosecutions 142 the Court held that clear domestic law outweighed any persuasive foreign 
authority; in R (Napier) v Home Secretary 143 the process of Prison Governors adding extra-days 
to an existing sentence for disciplinary reasons was held not to constitute a breach of Article 6, 
albeit so ruled in Ezeh and Connors v UK. 144 
The rulings are interesting. In accordance with the UK's characteristic handling of the ECHR, 
the UK courts are engaged in a balancing exercise between the interests of the individual and 
the State, 115 as opposed to treating the relevant ECHR concern as a right and subjecting any 
deviation from it to thorough scrutiny; An approach which, exemplified in Blum v DPP 146 and R 
(Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, 147 in the hands of the self-restrainer, can 
lend itself easily to the concern of the individual being placed below that of the state. For 
example, in R (Marper) the Court was called on to determine Convention compatibility of 
police retention of DNA from acquitted suspects. The practice was challenged on the ground 
that it breached Articles 8 and 14. Although it could be argued that the Court could have 
employed a broad purposive interpretation and placed the Government to provide strict proof as 
to why acquitted persons should have their DNA retained by the State, in reaching its decision 
the Court adopted a classic narrow interpretation of the ECHR and held that discrimination for 
the purpose of Article 14, referred only to gender and religion. As a result, the practice of DNA 
retention created a distinction between two groups of innocent persons: those who had been 
investigated and found innocent, and those who had not. The claimant appealed. The Court of 
Appeal considered the legality of Section 81 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 and 
held that the retention of DNA did constitute a breach of Article 8. In reaching its decision, the 
139 R (Saadi) v Home Secretary [2001] 1 WLR 356, R (H) v Secretary of Statefor the Home Department [2003] UKHL 59; R (K) v 
Camden and Islington Health Authority [2001 ]M HLR 24 
140 [2003] UKHL 58 
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144 (2002) 35 EfJHR 691, See: R (Carroll) v Home Secretary [2002] lWLR 548: Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [20021 
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Court interpreted the phrase respect for a private life as giving rise to an obligation on the State 
not to subject an individual to unjustified invasion. The practice of proportional ity was to be 
applied broadlY. The case reached the House of Lords. "' 
The House of Lords (with the exception of Baroness Hale) took a view which reflected that of 
the Divisional Court. According to Lord Steyn, it was of paramount importance that the police 
should be allowed to make use of forensic technology for the purpose of combating crime. The 
general view of the use of such technological developments by other ECHR signatory-states 
was that the practice did not offend against the telos of the ECHR, nor was it likely that such 
information would be used for purposes other than that for which the technology was devised. 
The hypothetical case of a state misusing such infori-nation was dismissed, on the ground that 
any event of misuse could be adequately met by the national courts. Whether the retention of 
such infori-nation satisfied the test of proportionality, Lord Steyn had little doubt that it did. The 
information was kept for a limited purpose, was of value only when compared with actual 
comparators removed from a crime scene, and provided a tool in the twenty-first century fight 
against crime. With regard to the claim that retention of DNA constituted a violation of Article 
14 which prohibited discrimination in relation to the application of the ECHR, any 
discrimination which did arise was not one based on status in the sense which invoked Article 
14. Apart from according little credence to the discriminatory use made of the practice, the main 
concerns behind the reasoning of Marper can be surnmarised as follows. 
Firstly, a 'problem faced by UK courts as they seek to interpret Article 8 is the lack of .. a 
domestic tradition of privacy and Strasbourg jurisprudence that avoids seeking to define the 
limits of Article 8. [In this sense, the ruling in Marper involved] a disappointing analysis of the 
scope and application of Article 8(l), with little significant attempt to identify the normative 
foundations of the right. ' 149 
Secondly, the ECHR constitutes a 'living instrument' that should be interpreted in the light of 
present day conditions, including technological developments . 
150 Not only do recent rulings of 
the ECrtHR disclose an increasing willingness to hold that the collation and storage of personal 
data concerning suspects interferes with Article 8(l), but support for the application of Article 
8(1) derives from the recognition in data-protection legislation of the impact on individual 
privacy of the retention of personal data, indicating, according to Roberts and Taylor, an 
increasing applicability of a notion of privacy to the retention of data. 
[20041 UKHL 39 
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Thirdly, 'on a reductionalist view that the ... concern of privacy 
is the control of information, the 
primary harm occasioned by the taking of a sample comprises not the violation of bodily 
integrity, but the loss of information into the hands of the state.... What the state then does with 
the information ... merely affects the magnitude of the 
interference. ' 151 Insofar as the retention of 
DNA constitutes in fact an indefinite interference with the subject's private life, it is arguable 
that the court's 'standpoint that if the retention of DNA ... 
did involve an interference with 
privacy it was modest or insubstantial ... proceeded 
from a flawed premise. ' 152 
Finally, it was a longstanding domestic policy that those who were acquitted were able to insist 
that the police no longer retain any DNA samples they may have had taken from them. 
Accordingly, if it was accepted that those who had been acquitted (and who were, perhaps, 
wrongly prosecuted) should be able to remove these samples from the police, it is not 
unreasonable to question why the court did not consider it necessary to seriously question 
whether a fundamental right was engaged. The appellants argued that they had not been 
convicted, yet were continuing to be subjected to discriminatory inclusion on the relevant 
database. 'The House of Lords thought there was nothing to this point ... however, under the law 
at the time,, fingerprints could only be taken without consent before charge, if they could help in 
the investigation of the offence for which the suspect had been arrested.... [Accordingly], to 
keep them in order to investigate future crime [was/is] to use them for a ... 
different purpose. ' 153 
In Marper, the court held that a Chief Constable needed not to review every case in which DNA 
had been taken from an unconvicted suspect. 'The effect of the decision ... grounded on 
utilitarian considerations, [was a widening of the statutory scheme] to an extent that the words 
of the statute [did] not appear capable of bearing and beyond the point to which reasonable 
arguments of proportionality... [could] be sustained. ' 154 
In view of the above, it is arguable that the decision in Marper constituted a clear example of the 
continuing Diceyean confidence of the court to protect the rights of the individual from state 
encroachment. Coupled with a pragmatic temperance toward the role of the ECHR however, 
the reasoning is not exclusive to the issue of personal privacy. Certainly, in R (Persey) v 
DEFRA 155 and R (Howard) v Secretary of State for Health, 156 the narrow approach adopted by 
the Court allowed the Government's conduct in relation to two particularly sensitive areas of 
public concern to go effectively unchecked. 
, 5, Roberts and TaNlor (2005), Op. cit at 382 
lbid p. 385 
Ashworth and Redmayne (2005), Op. cit at 128 
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Yet,, regardless of such criticism, the ECHR is not an ideal order. Areas exist in which the 
individual is not protected. For example, the ECHR maintains that rules relating to criminal 
evidence are a matter for the national court. Accordingly, the ECrtHR has no concern in 
investigating such issues as collaboration, the competence of witnesses, DNA testing, or 
evidence of bad character. In this respect, the confidence which legal positivism expresses 
regarding the common-law's ability to protect civil liberties could well be justified. Certainly, in 
relation to evidence of bad character, the common-law would appear to provide better 
protection of the accused's interests than the ECHR. "' 
Further, 'being a document that has to be interpreted and applied in a number of jurisdictions, 
reflecting diverse political ideologies, the [ECHR] can only ever aspire to being a minimum 
statement of [HR], which in the final analysis, imposes very few positive obligations on 
states. ' 158 The relationship between the ECHR and the State remains one of pluralism not 
monism. 159 Hardly then, a death-knell to the national legal order, the reality of the ECHR's 
'incorporation' by means of the HRA remains far removed from any prognostication that the 
role of the national court based on new grounds for judicial review imported from Europe, 
would transform the UK constitution and open up a field of impossibility for the Government to 
make any decision without being challenged. Rather, any advance made in the 
acknowledgement of the ECHR by the adoption of a purposive approach characteristic of the 
judicial activist, has just as frequently been met with a pragmatic temperance. Temperance 
particularly evident in the approach toward agent provocateurs and the discretionary exclusion 
of evidence improperly obtained. 
Agent Provocateurs and the Discretionary Exclusion ofEvidence 
Section 78 of PACE,, in conjunction with a judicial ability to stay proceeding as an abuse of 
process 160 and a common-law power to exclude evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs 
probative value, 16 ' has allowed the courts to develop a judicial discretion to exclude evidence 
improperly obtained from a court of law. Applied to the concern of HR however, one area of 
157 If not some of its ECHR neighbours. For example, whereas in the UK a raising of the accused's bad character before a jury may 
be held to adversely effect the presumption of innocence unless there are special circumstances for doing so, in some civil orders 
such as France, there is no prohibition on the evidence of bad character being put before a jury at the commencement of trial 
'58 As exemplified in the UK's dealing with the concern of assembly: 'In the absence of supranational legal coercion, it is regrettable 
that... there has been not even a domestic legislative gesture towards a positive right of assembly. In the absence of a positive right, 
it is even more disappointing that the prohibition of a peaceful, non-obstructive assembly under Section 14A of the Public Order Act 
1986 maN, on account of the vagueness of the provision, through the complex semantics of "disruption" and "community" reach the 
verN minimal threshold of the Convention ... 
That 
... this 
lack of clarity. .. allows 
breaches of the Convention to occur, and that this 
maN not be unintentional. ' Taylor and Fitzpatrick (1998), Op. cit at 299 
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police action which continues to give rise to particular concern is where police effectively set up 
a crime. 
In accordance with Article 6, police entrapment is regarded as a breach of an individual"s right 
to a fair trial. However, despite the ECHR's prohibition on law enforcement officers eliciting a 
crime,, only in extreme circumstances will entrapment be regarded as a defence., 62 Unless a 
defendant was caused by state agents to commit a crime which he otherwise showed no 
willingness to commit, the commission of that offence does not amount to entrapment .1 
63 The 
distinction is based on the defendant's willingness to participate, as opposed to the lawfulness of 
the police practice in question. 164 Yet, the issue of discretionary exclusion of unlawfully 
obtained evidence remains pertinent in so far as it raises questions concerning the unprincipled 
use of evidence of criminality. The aim of the minimum standards promoted by the ECHR 
should be to secure a basic level of protection for everyone. However, the omission of Article 
13 from the HRA was justified by the Government on the ground that an effective remedy could 
be crafted from the Act. But what of the remedy applicable in relation to the use of evidence of 
criminality obtained (arguably) in breach of the ECHR? 
The approach of the UK court toward the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence has always 
been awkward. "' Grounded on a distinction between the discretionary exclusion of evidence as 
a means of securing a fair trial, and exclusion as a means of affording fair treatment, 166 whereas 
in Rv Looseley, Attorney-General's Reference Case (No. 3 of 2000), 167 the court had little 
hesitation in ruling that the appropriate remedy for entrapment was/is a stay of proceedings for 
abuse of process; 168 Section 78 of PACE only went so far as to impose a discretion on the judge 
to determine whether the admittance of evidence illegally obtained would have such an adverse 
effect on the fairness of proceedings, that it should be excluded. 169 
According to Ormerod and Birch, Section 78 consisted of three flaws: (1) a lack of clearly 
acknowledged rationale; (2) ambiguity as to the interests it sought to protect; and (3) too 
unconstrained a discretion. "O 
162 Rv Elwell and Rv Derby Ref LTL 18/5/2001 EXTEMPORE (Unreported elsewhere) 
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With regard to the first flaw, although it could have been hoped that the attitude of the courts 
toward Section 78 would have led to a more rights based approach with the enactment of the 
HRA, such was not the case. 'Since the 1990's, the courts [having] wedded themselves to the 
reliability principle, Section 78 remains firmly anchored in reliability rather than rights based 
principle. ' 17 1 Accordingly, 'Evidence obtained illegally is not ipso facto inadmissible ... The 
passing of the [HRA does not] alter that position. ' 172 Since Section 78 does not oblige the courts 
to adopt a protective or disciplinary approach, it is understandable that the courts have 
developed a reliability based approach allowing for focus on the question of guilt, as opposed to 
moral judgments. However, the trial process is not 'merely about reliably convicting the 
guilty ... there is an important judicial responsibility to maintain the moral integrity of the trial 
process. To date, the courts have relinquished the opportunity to use Section 78 to 
establish ... this moral legitimacy. ' 
173 
With regard to the second flaw, Section 78 remains of such vagueness as to the meaning of 
fairness and the subject it seeks to protect, as to allow for judicial evasion of a principled 
rationale. 174 One aspect of this is the courts narrow interpretation of Section 78 as being a fair 
trial based discretion, as opposed to fair treatment and the development of what is essentially an 
artificial, if not illogical, fair trial/fair treatment distinction; insofar as 'whether one is 
considering the possibility of excluding evidence on account of pre-trial police impropriety, or 
the possibility of staying proceedings on account of such impropriety, what is at stake is surely 
the same: should the prosecution be deprived of the facts of the pre-trial impropriety ?1 75 
Another,, according to Grevling, is whether the obligation to have regard to the fairness of the 
proceedings requires the judiciary to consider the interests of the prosecution, as well as the 
defendant, and if so, an overstepping of the role of the judge, adding to the dangers inherent in 
the exercise of exclusionary discretion. 176 
Finally, albeit Section 78 allows the court to respond to the needs of the instant case, in order 
for discretion to justly supplement rules of admissibility, judicial discretion should be clear and 
transparent in terrns of the standard to which the judge must be satisfied before applying his 
discretion. According to Ashworth, Section 78 lacks these attributes: 'Enticing the judge into 
the world of balancing where issues of principles may be presented as facts and where the 
relative weight of the counter-veiling factors, and the reasons for assigning that weight, are 
rarely spelt Out., 177 According to Ormerod and Birch, such observation prompted the question 
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whether the flaws in Section 78 could be remedied by adopting a more structured format which 
could identify the purpose of the discretion including the interests to be served, and lead the 
courts to adopt a more rights based approach to exclusion . 
178Echoing the call for transparency 
and consistency of the Auld Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales, 179 the 
structured approach was explored by Roberts and Ormerod. 180 
Drawing on the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Rv Mack, 18 ' Roberts and Ormerod 
proposed a structured scheme to regulate the conduct of entrapment operations and remedies for 
abuse, including a pre-operation threshold criterion that would secure ECHR compliance. The 
starting-point consisted of a refining of the test of entrapment laid down in Mack"'2 by the 
development of a pre-operation threshold consisting of three different tests related to the type of 
operation conducted' 83 to define the boundaries of legitimate covert activity prior to an 
entrapment operation commencing. Having formulated three threshold tests to define the 
boundaries of covert activity, Roberts and Ormerod then went on to consider the actual 
functioning of such an operation. 
According to Roberts and Ormerod, the fundamental distinction in evaluating police conduct 
was between facilitation and instigation. In entrapment cases, police behaviour amounted to an 
offence of incitement under English law subject to proof of mens rea. However, the question 
was whether the police had caused crime, and this could not be answered by asking whether 
they had incited it. 184 Rather, a better approach would be to compare police behaviour to that of 
the 'unexceptional participant' engaged in the activity in the circumstances, insofar as it should 
be the actual propriety of police conduct that should be at the forefront of enquiry. Police 
activity would then constitute illegitimate entrapment either when it failed to satisfy a pre- 
operation threshold condition, or having satisfied the criteria, went beyond what was 
unexceptional participation in the context of the operation. With regard to the remedy available, 
although the applicability of remedies would remain a matter for the court, under a structured 
approach to entrapment, it would be possible to delineate the two alternatives of a stay of 
proceedings for abuse of process and exclusion. Whereas the remedy most appropriate in 
respect of a breach a pre-operation threshold would be a stay of proceedings, unless police 
171 Ormerod and Birch (2004). Op. cit 286 
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conduct was so morally discreditable as to constitute an affront to public conscience, 185 the 
exclusion of evidence under Section 78 would constitute the appropriate remedy where the 
police conduct in question would render the reception of the evidence at trial unfair. 
Examining the evolution of the UK's doctrine of entrapment and the correct approach to 
improperly obtained evidence under Section 78, Ormerod, Birch and Roberts highlight 
convincingly the advantages in transparency and consistency of adopting a structured discretion 
to the exclusion of evidence. However, added to the defects identified, is the argument by 
Squires that the legal framework governing entrapment' 86 necessitates serious departure from 
general criminal law approaches to assessing liability, including principles ordinarily stressed as 
fundamental to the criminal law. According to Squires, 'entrapment doctrine determines liability 
for criminal acts by reference to the kind of environment inhabited by their perpetrators, a 
perspective the law ordinarily attempts to exclude. ' 187 However, the distinction between a police 
authority actually causing crime, and merely offering an opportunity to commit crime, is 
problematic. 188 Consideration of the defendant's background and the context in which a crime 
was committed is difficult to reconcile with the principles to which the criminal law generally 
claims to adhere. Such consideration is usually regarded as impermissible in the determination 
of criminal liability, which focuses upon the defendant"s mens rea at the moment he commits a 
criminal offence and not the kind of social world he inhabits. According to Squires, 'if 
correct ... and defendants in entrapment cases are committed or acquitted by reference to their 
backgrounds, then the courts are, in effect, making determinations of blameworthiness. ' 189 
Mohoney opines a solution. 190 Examining the law as it once stood in New Zealand, the HRA is 
based (to an extent) on similar reasoning to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Section 3 
of the New Zealand Act 1990 provides a similar structure to Section 6 of the HRA, albeit unlike 
Section 7 of the HRA, the New Zealand Act does not provide a remedies clause. Yet, such 
absence did not prevent the judiciary from developing a principle which upheld the telos of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights. Following the New Zealand Act coming into force, the courts 
developed the primafacie exclusionary rule that a finding of a breach of a specified right led to 
an automatic presumption that evidence obtained as a result of a breach was to be excluded, 
unless the prosecution could demonstrate that there were good reasons for it to be admitted. 
'85 In NNhich case the remedy to be applied would be a stay of proceedings 
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The development of a presumption of exclusion for breach of specified rights was justified in 
Baigent's Case. 191 Although the rule could be criticised for seeming to favour the defendant, it 
was nevertheless right that it should be granted formal recognition on the ground that courts 
were bound to protect the rights and freedom of all citizens. 192 Applied to the UK, should a 
judge find that in securing evidence there had been a breach of an ECHR right, but nevertheless 
allowed that evidence to be used, then he would be at the very least turning a blind eye to that 
illegal securing and, by a compounding of the ECHR breach, an arguable disregard of the 
obligation in Section 6 of the HRA. In this sense, the argument against the approach toward the 
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence appears relatively clear, if by formal 
acknowledgement of the ECHR, the HRA declares that certain rights and freedoms are 
fundamental, then the judiciary should ensure that this is given effect. The language of Section 6 
of the HRA arguably mandates this, which is why the approach followed in UK case-law is 
disappointingly unprincipled. 
To summarise, the judicial approach toward the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence and 
the handling of entrapment, serves as yet another example of how (in the main) the UK 
judiciary has moved cautiously in terms of HR acknowledgment. Whereas, in what had the 
potential to be a significant ruling in terms of the transitional effect of the HRA, in Rusbridges 
Toynbee v Director of Public Prosecutions 193 the House of Lords illustrated a limited 
acknowledgement of Section 3; the reasoning of the court in RV j194 is hard to reconcile with 
that of Kansal and Lyons. 
Analogous to Kansal, the ruling in Rv Jconcerned facts already adjudicated in HMAdvocate v 
R. 195 Sitting as the Privy Council the House of Lords had held that an unreasonable delay in 
criminal proceedings constituted a breach of Article 6. Unlike the majority of the House of 
Lords in Kansal and Lyons however, in RvJ the Court refused to consider HMAdvocate and 
overturned the authority without justification. Breach of the right to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time was not sufficient to prevent a prosecution. The rulings of Kansal and 
Lyons, and RvJ, highlight an inconsistency in judicial approach toward both ECHR and UK 
authority. However, in ten-ns of the ECHR influencing the UK legal order, a number of cases 
where the appellate courts have firmly rejected arguments based on the ECHR in relation to 
substantive law, is exemplified in the process of overruling. 116 
191 [ 1994] 3 NZLR 667 
192 Examining the replacement of the prima. /acie rule with a balancing practice which allows account to be taken of various matters, 
including the seriousness of the offence to NN hich the eN idence in question is relevant, according to Mohoney what seemed to have 
concerned the courts was that the prima facie rule gave rise not to a technical problem in its application, or a constitutionally 
inappropriate exercise of the court's jurisdiction, but to a somewhat mechanical approach. An approach which in other legal 
contexts would have been termed legal certainty 
'93 [20031 LJKHL 38 
194 [200412 WLR 1 
195 [2003] 2 WIR 317 
196 R (Green) v Police ComplaintsAuthority [20021 F\VCA CIN, 389 
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For example, in R (Farrakhan) v Home Secretary9' the High Court had held that the Home 
Secretary's prohibition of the US leader of Islam to enter the UK constituted a breach of Article 
10. Failure of the Home Secretary to provide adequate reasons for the ban had led to a finding 
that the decision had not been properly balanced. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Although 
failure to provide reasons for a decision was questionable, and the risk to community relations 
(were the US leader to enter the UK) minimal, the Home Secretary was in the best position to 
decide whether a ban was necessary. 
The ruling is not exceptional. In relation to substantive law, the impact of the ECHR remains 
dependent on the prevalent attitude of the judiciary; that, that attitude (be it activist or self- 
restraint) differs in relation to what issue the court has under consideration; and that a narrow, 
linguistic approach emphasising a precise reformation of the statutory words in question, serves 
to bolsterjudicial reluctance to encroach upon established legal practice. Constituting a form of 
tabulated legalism characteristic of the judicial se If-re strainer, it is an approach illustrated not 
merely in Rv Lichniak and RvP ah, 198 but in the reasoning adopted (albeit in relation to a Yr 
concern falling outside of criminal justice) in Wilson v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry. 199 
In Wilson the House of Lords held that the Court of Appeal had been in error to declare the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 incompatible with Article I of Protocol 1, and Article 6. The case 
concerned the inability of a pawnbroker to enforce a contract for technical reasons, with the 
result that the borrower was able to recover the security without repaying the loan. In the 
opinion of the Court, because the technicality restricted the right to a fair and public review of 
the case, as well as an adverse interference with the claimant's property rights, the relevant 
provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 were incompatible. The House of Lords disagreed. 
Whereas Article 6 was not applicable, the concern was as to the substantive law, rather than to 
the fairness of the trial process; any interference with the claimant's property rights in 
accordance with the statute in question was proportionate in the context of the overriding 
general need to regulate such pawn-broking agreements. 
'9'QBD (Admin) 1/10/2001 -, LTL 30/4/2002 (2002) ACD 5 
"" Over the years, the House of Lords have considered two concerns regarding the legitimacy of the mandatory life-sentence for 
murder: whether the mandatory nature of the sentence was compatible with the ECHR; and whether it was right that a Government 
authority should set the terni of the tariff. as opposed to an independent tribunal. The concerns formed the subject for determination 
in Rv Lichniak and Rv Pj, rah [20021 UKHL 47. In both cases the question for the Court was whether it was proper to serve a 
mandatory Indeterminate sentence on tNNo prisoners convicted of murder, but who had been found by the trial court not to constitute a 
future danger. In reaching its decision, the House of Lords dismissed the ar ument that the imposition of such a sentence constituted L_ L, 9 
a breach of the prohibition on degrading treatment under Article 3, and a right to libert) in accordance with Article 5. It Was open to 
Parliament to require a life-sentence for murder and the Home Secretary to set the tariff term accordingly. The fact that the sentences 
and the tariffs imposed \\ere individualised in relation to the facts of the case, prevented their imposition from constituting an 
arbitrary ECHR breach 
199 P003] UKHL 40 
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The ruling, moved by Government lawyers to overturn the declaration of incompatibilitý, 
highlights perhaps the greatest failing of the ECHR order: a lack of control over a signatory- 
state's compliance. The ECHR may set out minimum standards of protection agreed b\ 
signatory-states, but in practice their application is often at best strained, grounded on an 
underlying fear of the loss of state control over the domestic legal order. Albeit the (above) 
case-law illustrates an increasing judicial awareness of the concern of FIR post the HRA, it 
remains (arguably) only an awareness of the need to promote, as opposed to protect. As 
W 200 illustrated in the ruling of Lord Nicholls in Re Sand Re , that Article 13 was not an ECHR 
right defined in the HRA, so that legislation which failed to provide a remedy for infringement 
of Article 8 was not for that reason incompatible with the HRA . 
20 1A finding objectionable on 
the ground that the narrow approach adopted not only cut across the developing notion of 
positive obligations under Article 8, but also ignored the Government's assurance that the non- 
inclusion of Article 13 was not intended as a limitation, but a recognition that it was already 
adequately provided for. 
Yet, this is not to suggest that the HRA has had no significance in relation to substantive law; or 
that the judicial response has remained solely one of self-restraint. Certainly, a number of cases 
outside the criminal sphere highlight a move away from what can be described as the austerity 
of tabulated legalism, toward a principled approach more in conformity with both the ECHR 
and HRA. 
202 In Ghaidan v Godin Mendoza , the House of Lords was called on to 
determine the entitlement 
of a same sex partner to succession to a tenancy in relation to Articles 8 and 14. On the death of 
the tenant, the landlord attempted to obtain possession of the property. The surviving partner 
claimed that he was entitled to succeed to the statutory tenancy. Following the reasoning 
adopted in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association, 203 the County Court disagreed. 
Concerning similar circumstances, the House of Lords had held that a partner of a same sex 
relationship was to be regarded as a member of the tenant's family within the meaning of 
Paragraph 2(3) of Schedule I of the Rent Act 1977 and entitled to an assured tenancy, but did 
not constitute a surviving spouse for the purpose of Paragraph 2(2), therefore was not entitled to 
a statutory tenancy. The partner appealed. Disagreeing with the linguistic approach to the 
statutory wording of Paragraph 2(21), the Court of Appeal held that a broader interpretation in 
accordance with the HRA extended the term spouse to include same sex partners. The case 
reached the House of Lords. The Court held that Article 8 did not impose a positive obligation 
loo [2002] LIKHL 10 
2"' [20021 UKHL 10 Paragraph 60 
2"2 [20041 UKIlt, 30 
203 [200111 AC 27 
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to provide a house, however the different treatment of sexual orientation that characterised the 
Rent Act 1977, constituted an unjustifiable discrimination contrary to Article 14. 
The case is significant. In reaching its decision, the House of Lords adopted an approach to the 
interpretation of paragraph 2(2) of the Rent Act 1977 which effectively reversed the 
discrimination. Examining its judicial obligation under the HRA, the Court held that the intent 
of Parliament was to impose a broad capability on the judiciary to do all that it could to achieve 
ECHR compatibility; that the capability to declare an incompatibility under Section 4 of the 
HRA constituted a remedy of last resort; and that far from limited to cases of statutory 
ambiguity, the obligation under Section 3 applied to cases where statutory interpretation using 
normal principles would lead to a breach of the telos of the ECHR. The Court then went on to 
discuss the use of interpretative techniques, including the practice of reading into provisions 
words which technically altered their meaning. According to Lord Nicholls, once it was 
accepted that Section 3 could require legislation to carry a meaning which departed from the 
unambiguous meaning the legislation would otherwise bear, it became impossible to suppose 
that Parliament had intended that the operation of Section 3 should depend critically upon the 
form of words adopted by the Parliamentary draftsman. That would make the application of 
Section 3 something of a semantic lottery. Except where compatible interpretation was 
inconsistent with the nature of the legislation, or where interpretation would inappropriately 
interfere with public policy, Section 3 could require a court to depart from the legislative 
intention of the statutory provision in question. 
Throughout Ghaidan, the House of Lords adopted a broad, purposive approach to the 
interpretation of the Rent Act 1977 and Section 3 of the HRA. The same form of activism 
evident in Rv Edwards, 204 where the Court abandoned a legalistic reading of Section 352 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 and looked instead to the substantive effect of its application to Sections 
. 205 357 and 353 , and the order placed on the 
Home Secretary to commence an independent 
enquiry into the death of an offender placed in custody with a prisoner known to be overtly 
racist in R (Amin) v Home Secretary. 206 According to the Court, although the UK recognised a 
common-law duty to prevent prisoners committing suicide while detained, 207 the ECHR added a 
second dimension which included the implication of additional rights to accord practical effect 
to those set out in the ECHR. Adopting a purposive approach characteristic of the ECrtHR, the 
Court examined its role under Section 3 and held that Article 2 implied a duty on the State to 
protect life, NN'hich included independent investigation into any death concerning state 
204 120051 FWCA Crim 2923 
2`5 With the result that the words 'innocent intention' NNcre accorded a different, and more appropriate, meaning in accordance N%ith 
the circumstances to which theý "ere applied 
206 12003 ]UKHL51 
2"' Reeves v Commissioner of Police ( 2001 jI AC 3 60 
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involvement. 208 The ruling is interesting. The judiciary's consideration of NN hat was in fact the 
implication of additional rights in order to accord the ECHR significance would again appear to 
indicate an increasing HR awareness post the HRA. Whether such awareness can be seen as 
willingness to accord greater credence to the substance of a claim, as opposed to legal 
technicalities however, is perhaps best exemplified in it's handling of the issue of privacy. 
Section 4.3: Privacy 
There has never been a right to privacy in common-law. 209 Such absence was examined in 
Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No 2) .2 
10 The Court was unable to prevent 
State telephone-tapping on the ground that the authority in question had committed no wrong. 
Accordingly, the principle that all persons could do all that which was not prohibited by law 
was applied to administrative action. Demonstrating a classic Diceyean authority to justify its 
inability to pronounce on the legality of state action, the fact that the Court could have raised the 
objection it did in Entick v Carrington that the practice produced an illegality, was not 
addressed. 
A similar observation was reiterated in Kaye v Roberston. " 1 Although the common-law did not 
recognise an action for invasion of privacy, it remained outside the jurisdiction of the Court to 
create one. However, due to the nature of the intrusion in question, held it to amount to a 
malicious falsehood and granted an injunction against the relevant publication. While, in Marcel 
v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 212 albeit Lord Browne-Wilkinson acknowledged 
that privacy was a concern which Parliament could not be assumed to have legislated so as to 
interfere more than was necessary in order to secure public interest and demanded clear 
statutory language before the executive could impugn a citizen's rights, nevertheless held that 
there remained in UK law no right to privacy. 213 
The cases are interesting. On the one hand, the rulings highlighted the disability under which the 
judiciary, adhering to its perceived role when faced with a unique situation, was placed; ' 14 while 
on the other, intimated the possibility of the activist being creative within the common-law to 
develop a form of protection akin to the functioning of a right to personal privacy. A possibility 
mooted by Sir John Laws, who thought that privacy was one of the areas where it should be 
208 An approach evident in R (Middleton) v Coronerfor West Somerset [20041 UKHL 10 
209 Rv Brown [ 19961 1 All ER 545 
. 
Lord Walker in OBG Limited v Allan [2007] 2 WLR 920 at 985 
210 11979] 2 All ER 620 
211 [1991] FSR 62 
212 [ 199112 \A'LR 1118 
211 FolloNNino the approach employed in Rv Home Office, ex-parle Kheivaja [19831 1 All ER 765-, Rv Home Office, ex-parte 
Bugdql, caj, [19761 1 All FR458, andRi, Home Office, ex-partePhansopkar[1976] QB606 
214 in contrast to France. N% here Article 9 of the French Ciý it Code provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private life-, 
and the US, Nvhich has developed a right to PfivacN derived from principles of English law Crozons v Director of Missouri 
Department of Health I 10 L IS 2 841 (1990) 
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appropriate for the judges to take a hand. If any (arguable) possibility to take such 
consideration seriously was given to the judiciary by the HRA, the question is has it done so? 
The broad phraseology of Article 8(l) provides that everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, home and correspondence. A person who infringes that right will be 
liable in damages unless he can bring himself within the exceptions of Article 8(2). To establish 
interference,, the evidential burden falls on the claimant,, while the burden of proof falls on the 
State to show that interference is justified. The role of the court is to determine whether the 
interference is proportionate to the aim. A concept which replaces the traditional judicial review 
test of irrationality which would promote favourable intervention by the courts, as well as the 
technical reassessment of established common-law principle. Whether such development has 
characterised the response of the judiciary however, is debatable. 
In Wainwright v Home Office 216 the court held that, insofar as UK Courts had refused to 
consider a principle of privacy, no tort of invasion existed in domestic law. Although in 
reaching its decision, the court did acknowledge the potential of Article 8 for creating such a 
right and declared that the provision could be well be appropriate in accordance with Section 6 
of the HRA where trespass to the person was not available, the development of such a tort 
required legislation, not judicial innovation. Yet (aside from a general reluctance of the House 
of Lords to develop the concept of privacy in relation to personal searches) the ECHR has not 
been without impact. Following the HRA, the courts have responded cautiously to claimants 
seeking protection of the right to private life where, without such protection, a claimant could be 
subjected to a substantial threat of death or injury. 217 Accordingly, and based on established 
common-law and equitable principles, there would appear to be evidence of rulings beginning 
218 219 
to be shaped by reference to a right of privacy. A development highlighted by Stone , 
Delany, and Murphy 220 in the interface between Article 8 and the right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10. 
Article 10 provides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, to hold opinion, and to 
receive and impart information without interference by public authority. Article 10(2) provides 
that the exercise of such freedom may only be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions and penalties as prescribed by law. With regard to privacy, Section 12(4) of the 
HRA directs that where a court considers whether to grant a remedy, which if granted may 
2" J. Laws 'Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional RightsT [1993] P. L. 59,65 
216 [20031 UKHL 53,16 
217 Venables v., Vews Group Yewspapers [200111 All ER 908 
2'8 G. Phillipson 'Transform in---, Breach Of Confidence? To%Nards A Common-LmN Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act' 
(2003) 11. L. R. 66,726, and G. Phillipson and H. FemNick 'Breach of Confidence as A Privacy RemedN In the Human Rights Act 
Era' (2000). If. L. R. 63.660 
219 Stone (2004), Op. cit at 445 
220 11. Delany and C. MurphN JoNvards Common Principles Relating To the Protection of Privacy Rights"' (2007) E. H. R. L. R. 568 
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affect the exercise of an Article 10 right, the court must have regard to the democratic 
imperative of the right of newspapers to freedom of expression. 
221 In AvR, concerning the continuation of an interim injunction, Lord Woolf considered the 
limitations of privacy as against the freedom of the press, and held that in the majority of 
situations where the protection of privacy was justified, relating to events after the HRA came 
222 into force, an action for a breach of confidence would provide the necessary protection . 
This 
meant that at first instance, it could be readily accepted that it was not necessary to tackle the 
question of whether there was a separate cause of action based on a new tort involving the 
infringement of privacy. Indicating (in relation to interim proceedings at least) a strong 
presumption in favour of publication in relation to public figures, Lord Woolf then went on to 
state that any interference with the press had to be justified insofar as it would have an effect on 
its ability to perform its role in society, irrespective of whether a publication was in the public 
interest. However,, the telos of the ruling of Lord Woolf 'represents just one side of the equation 
and while the [HRA] might have been predicted to give added protection to ... 
freedom of 
expression, in reality it is the right to privacy which has been the real beneficiary of the 
legislation.... partly evidenced by the ... transformation of the traditional remedy 
for breach of 
confidence into what can now be described as the tort of "misuse of private information" [and 
the fact] that it has been Uudicially] acknowledged that neither Article 8 nor Article have 
precedence over the other. 223 
The interface between Article 8 and Article 10 was raised again in three levels of Court in 
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers. 224 The case concerned the publication by the defendant 
newspaper details of the claimant's attendance at Narcotics Anonymous. The claimant 
challenged the publication on grounds that it constituted a breach of her Article 8 right to 
respect for a private life, a breach of confidence, and a breach of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
The Newspaper defended its publication as an exercise of its Article 10 right which, in 
accordance with Section 12(4) of the HRA, the Court was obliged to have regard. The Court 
examined both interests and ruled in favour of the claimant. The Newspaper appealed. Stressing 
the importance of the freedom of expression the Court ruled in favour of the defendant. The 
House of Lords disagreed. Examining the ECHR at length, the court acknowledged that Article 
8 protected the claimant's right to privacy, but that recognition was given in Article 8(2) to the 
protection of the freedoms of others. Article 8 was balanced against Article 10. The effect of the 
221 120031 QB 193 
222 Freedom of expression has long occupied a significant position in the value system upheld by the UK courts (R v Secretary of 
Slate for the Home Department ex-parte Simms [ 199913 WLR 328) acknowledged prior to the coming into force of the HRA of 
having attained the status of a constitutional right with high attendant normative force (WcCartan Turkington Breen v Times 
Newspapers Limited [2001] 2 A. C 277) 
12' Delany and MurpliN (2007), Op. cit at 572 
2 '4 120021 EWHC QB 4991 [200312 \Vl-R 80, [200412 AC 457 
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disclosure was a factor to be taken into account in assessing the extent of the restriction that ýN as 
needed to protect an Article 8 right, and was important enough to justify limiting the 
defendant's Article 10 right asserted on behalf of the public. Demonstrating a willingness to 
look at the substance of the claim, the court had little hesitation in declaring that ivhereas public 
life was a matter forjournalists, a person's private life was a matter for the national court. In the 
opinion of Lord Hoffman, there was no question of Article 10 having precedence over Article 8. 
Nor was there a presumption in favour of one Article rather than the other. The question was the 
extent to which it was necessary to qualify the one right in order to protect the underlying value 
which was protected by the other. 
225 
The ruling constituted a development in terms of legal practice. The alternative to raising a 
privacy claim in the court consisted of an order of print media self-regulation governed by the 
Press Complaints Commission, so inconsistent in its balancing of competing public and private 
interests,, that in practice media lawyers tended not to use it. But what of the real influence of 
the ruling in Campbell on substantive law? Whether a tort of privacy will come to be recognised 
as actionable either in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR, 226 or as opined in 
Wainwright, what analysis does suggest is the development (post the HRA) of an increasing 
judicial awareness of a need to protect privacy born out of the equitable remedy of a breach of 
confidence, and acknowledgement that neither Articles 8 or 10 have automatic precedence over 
the other. 
For example, in McKennitt v Ash 227 the Court held that in order to apply breach of confidence 
the question to be asked was whether the information was private for the purpose of Article 8, 
and if so, whether the right of the owner to keep the information private outweighed any 
exercise of the freedom of the publisher to disclose it. In reaching its decision the Court upheld 
the principled approach formulated by Lord Steyn in Re S (a child): 
I. That following examination of the nature of the information in question, insofar as it impacted on the 
autonomy and dignity of the claimant, neither Article 8 nor 10 had precedence over the other; 
2. That where conflict did arise, primary focus should be placed on the comparative importance of the 
rights being claimed in the individual case; 
225 [2004] 2 AC 457 at 474 
22" Although the ECrtHR has not sought to accord either Article 8 or 10 pre-eminence over the other, despite what Delaný and 
Murphy term 'the theoretical presumption of equality between Articles 8 and 10' [Delaney and Murphy (2007) Op. cit at 5701 it is 
arguable that restrictions haN c been placed on Article 10 in order to protect a right to privacy under Article 8. Whereas in Peck v UK 
120041 P. L. 850, the ECrtHR held that the broadcast of CCTV footage of the applicant, who was neither a public figure nor 
participating in aný public event, constituted a disproportionate interference with his private life; in Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 
40 EHRR 1, the ECrtHR appeared to almost 'rule out in advance' the possibility of any speech value in the discussion of private facts 
[H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson Media Freedom and the Human Rights 4cl (OUP, Oxford 2006) 695] when it held that the 
publication of material relating to the private life of an applicant who was not exercising any official function could not constitute 
anN form of public interest justified in an Article 10 context 
22- [20061 E\VCA Civ 1714 
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3. That the court was obligated to take into account justification for interfering with each right. and in 
228 doing so, apply the test of proportionality equally to both interests . 
How, exactly, such balancing was to be carried out, was examined in HRH Prince of Wales i, 
Associated Newspapers 
. 
229The court was called on to examine the publication of a number of 
written entries made by HRH in a private diary given to a newspaper by an employee in breach 
of her contract of employment. HRH sought an order to restrain publication grounded on breach 
of confidence. In the opinion of the court, the claimant was entitled to a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, and that disclosure of the entries in question was not necessary in a democratic 
society. The Newspaper appealed. The Court dismissed the appeal. In reaching a decision, the 
court examined the approach to be employed between the balance of Articles 8 and 10 and 
declared that, although the test was one of proportionality, an element to be weighed in the 
balance was the importance in a democratic society of upholding any duty of confidence which 
was created between individuals. 
The rulings in Re S, McKennitt and HRI-I are interesting. In applying the principle of 
proportionality, the court accorded weight to the strength of the privacy interest of the claimant, 
and in doing so, accorded credence to the argument that public figures remained entitled to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from unauthorised public disclosure. Certainly, to the rights 
evangelists, such rulings can be seen as an indication of the development of a reasoning in 
keeping with the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR, if not an indication of greater willingness to take 
'serious' stock of ECrtHR rulings in which UK law has been found wanting. 230 However, 
although post the HRA it is arguable that the judiciary has been accorded a greater ability to 
extend its influence over the concern of HR in domestic law, privacy aside, exemplified by its 
handling of different ECHR Articles, statutory provisions, and areas of procedural and 
substantive law, in particular in those areas according to Ewing 'where HR would appear to 
matter the most, ' 231 whether it has consistently chosen to do so, is far less straightforward. 
228 [2005] 1 AC 593 at 603 
221) [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 
2" However, despite movement towards adopting the same form of balancing exercise between Article 8 and Article 10 rights and 
the use of similar language. there do still remain numerous differences between the ECrtHR and the UK's handling of the specific 
concern of privacy. Whereas. 'a gulf still exists in relation to the interpretation placed on the concept of public interest [between] the 
Jurisprudence of the [ECrtHRJ ... and the ... 
[broader interpretation accorded the concept in the UK]... courts; ' 'While a person 
bringing a claim before... [LIK] ... courts ... maý 
be deemed to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place in limited 
circumstances depending on the nature of the claimant's activities and the manner in ývhlch the material was obtained, this issue has 
been interpreted in a much more expansive ), Naý bý the [ECrtHRI, as the decision in Von Hannover v Germany [(200-5) 40 EHRR 11 
illustrates. ' [Delaný and Murphý (2007) Op. cit at -15821 
23 ' Bving (2004), Op. cit at 850 
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Section 4.4: Terrorism and Asylum 
232 Under Sections 21-23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 , where the 
Secretary of State reasonably believes that the presence in the UK of any person reasonably 
suspected of terrorist involvement constituted a risk to national security, that person could be 
subjected to indefinite detention. The provision breached Article 5, insofar as the purpose of 
detention was not to facilitate deportation, extradition or the conclusion of a criminal trial. 
233 Accordingly, the UK derogated from Article 5. The validity of the derogation was challenged 
in A (and Others) v Home Department. 234 
In reaching its decision in A (and Others), the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 235 had 
examined the Government's claim that although the ATCSA 2001 prima facie breached the 
ECHR, such action fell within the flexibility accorded by the ECHR to allow the suspension of 
some rights in times of public emergency. Because the UK was regarded as a target for terrorist 
attack, the SIAC agreed with the Government's assessment of the extent of the threat required 
as a precondition of derogation. On this point, the Court of Appeal agreed. There could lawfully 
be derogation to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation. With regard to Article 14, 
the SIAC had upheld the contention that the derogation, insofar as it allowed for the 
imprisonment of foreign nationals only, was unlawful. The Court of Appeal disagreed. In 
reaching its decision, the Court noted that there were justifiable grounds for selecting to detain 
only non-national suspected terrorists. Such detainees did not have a right to remain in the UK, 
nor were they likely to be detained for longer than the public emergency continued. When 
dealing with measures concerning public emergency, deferral should be made to the Home 
Secretary who was in the better position to reach a decision. 236 The ruling was criticised, not 
least by Waldham. 237 According to Waldham, the reason which led to the detention of suspects 
under Section 23 was the fact that they could not, in the circumstances, be removed from the 
UK. Such a reason was irrelevant to the purpose of determining the lawfulness of a process of 
state detention based on discrimination, a matter which the Court of Appeal in Ghaidan had 
referred to as being of significant 'constitutional' importance. 
212 Hereafter, ATCSA 2001 
233 HRA (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 
234 12002] EWCA Civ 1502 
235 Hereafter, SIAC 
236 See: the rulings of Lord Slynn and Lord Hoffmann in Rehman v Home Department [2001] UKHL 47 who doubted the propriety 
of thejudiciary challenging the judgment of parliament and the executive as to the nature, scale and immediacy of a threat to national 
security, as well as the measures taken to counter-act it, grounded on a commitment to the constitutional arguments that: (1) 
democratic accountability remained the basis for legitimacy of policy related decision-making; and (2) that the judiciary remained 
notably less competent than either parliament or the executive to make risk-assessments relating to national security. However, for an 
alternative view on the constitutional role of the judiciarý vis-d-vis risk-assessments and policy judgements of executive and 
legislati% e bodies See: D. Feldman. Human Rights, 'Terrorism and Risk: The Roles of Politicians and Judges [2006] PI 364-, and A. 
Barak 'A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy' (2002) 116 H. L. R 16 at 150; as well as, the rulings of 
Lords Hope, Bingham, Scott and Baroness Hale in R (On the, 4pplication of Limbuela) v Secretary of Statefor the Home Department 
[2005] UKHL 66 
2'_ J. kValdharn -Why LaN%yers Should be Ashamed of the Latest Ruling on Internment' (2002). %'I. J 152, No. 7054,1633 
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The decision of the court to defer to the view of the Home Secretary was criticised by Eýý ing. 238 
Demonstrating, according to Ewing, a tendency of the UK courts to avoid involvement in areas 
concerning the rights of individuals coming face-to-face with the state, 239 the ruling in .4 
provided a clear example of the primary strategy employed by a court for an exercise of non- 
engagement: deference to the decision-maker . 
240 Given the opportunity under the HRA to 
examine the HR concerns of the individual, the court chose instead to defer to the Home 
Secretary both the determination of a public emergency, and the action to deal with it. While the 
HRA may well have allowed for a wider range of questions to be asked before the court, by its 
refusal to move beyond the deference approach, the fact that the ECHR had been formally 
acknowledged by the HRA added little in the way of HR protection. 241 On analysis, the 
observation is not unreasonable. 
In R (Abbassi) v Secretary of Statefor Foreign Affairs 242 the court was called on to examine the 
UK Foreign Secretary's failure to assist a number of UK detainees indefinitely detained without 
access to legal advice or representation, right to challenge the legality of detention in the US 
courts, or right to habeas corpus. In reaching its decision, the court emphasised what it 
considered to be two obstacles to intervention: (1) the functioning of the principle of 
international practice which prohibited the courts from examining the legitimacy of action taken 
by a foreign sovereign state; and (2) a tradition of constitutional independence which prohibited 
it to adjudicate on action taken by the executive in the conduct of foreign relations. 
Accordingly, the claim that the Foreign Secretary was bound by the HRA to intervene on behalf 
of the claimants was dismissed. It was too political a consideration to suggest that the ECHR 
could require a signatory-state to take positive action to prevent the effect(s) of any 
institutional ised violation of HR that took place on territory that lay outside its jurisdiction. The 
impasse was judicially criticised. In the opinion of Lord Steyn, 243 albeit the ruling was 
constitutionally understandable, the court's refusal to pronounce on the injustice of the detention 
process constituted a breach in principle of its moral duty to guard against unprincipled 
executive use of state power. 
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Despite constitutional objection for judicial intervention, both A and Abbassi do serve to 
illustrate a reluctance of the judiciary (post the HRA) to detach itself from a policy of non- 
engagement grounded on both the nature of the decision-maker and the decision. However. such 
reluctance is not merely confined to public policy. Exemplified in the courts handling of Section 
44 of the Terrorism Act 2000244 in R (Gillan and Quinton) v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, 245 the same reluctance is evident not only in relation to considerations of policy. 
but also the actual functioning of it. 
Section 44 of the TA 2000, granted the police power of random stop and search over such area 
as designated by the relevant authority for articles of a kind which could have been used in 
connection with terrorism. Once an authorisation had been made, the power was exercisable 
without the requirement that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the person stopped had 
any terrorist involvement. Examining whether authorisation of the power could be challenged in 
a court of law, the court held that it could not. The assessment of risk to public safety and the 
formulation of measures to safeguard national security were concerns solely for the State to 
decide. The court then went on to examine the way in which the power was applied. Despite 
questions regarding the way in which the power had been used in the instant case, the court held 
that falling marginally short of persuasive evidence that the circumstances were such as to 
justify need, the court was prepared to accept the argument that Section 44 had not been 
unlawfully executed. With regard to the nature of the decision, although the court was quick to 
acknowledge the HR impact of Section 44, the assessment of the risk posed by terrorist activity 
outweighed any consideration of the claimants' Articles 8,9,10, or II ECHR rights. 246 
In terms of HR protection the decision of the court was disappointing. Insofar as the concerns of 
the claimants were concerned, there was no attempt (a) to give an account of the nature of the 
risk at the event; (b) to give an account of the evidence relied upon to justify the finding that 
there was a threat relating to the particular event; or (c) to explain why it was necessary to 
violate the multiple rights of the claimants to avoid that risk. , 24' The claimants appealed. 
The question for the court was what interpretation should be put on Section 44 of the TA 2000, 
in light of its failure to use the normal reasonable suspicion requirement. Reiterating the Court 
of Appeal's ruling that in the context of terrorism it was not the role of the court to interfere 
with either an assessment of risk, or the choice of action taken to counter it, 248 the challenge to 
the authorisation to randomly stop and search was dismissed. According to the court, the 
requirement of the TA 2000 that an authorisation could be given if it was expedient to do so, 
244 flereafter, TA 2000 
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was clear and lawful. The argument that Section 44 should be construed as requiring necessity 
was dismissed on the ground that Parliament had chosen to apply a less strict standard of 
expedience. On the facts of the case, the evidence did not indicate that the renewal of the 
authorisation was anything other than a bona fide use of a power based on an informed 
evaluation of the risks involved in the area. With regard to the application of the ECHR, 
whereas Article 5 could not be engaged on the basis that prevention from joining a 
demonstration by a random power of stop and search could not be equated with custody, any 
potential breach of Articles 8,10 or II could only be dismissed, insofar as the interference 
complained of constituted a proportionate response to satisfy the needs of a greater state 
interest. 
Although the ruling of the House of Lords was technically hard to fault, the reasoning of the 
Divisional Court and Court of Appeal gave rise to two questions: Why did the UK consider 
itself in need to resort to a course of action which dispensed with the requirement of reasonable 
suspicion; and why, if there were no reasonable grounds to suspect that a person was involved 
in terrorism, could this not be considered as a reversal of the burden of prooP 
In the opinion of Ewing, insofar as the HRA was delivered on the assumption that it would lead 
to greater protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, the courts' treatment of national 
security in Abbassi and Gillan was/is disappointing. In their preference to exercise caution in 
their handling of the ECHR in an area of law in which the needs of the individual for protection 
was/is at its most, the courts appeared to place the concern so far below that of the state as to 
render incredible any argument that in times of crises it could not offer protection regardless of 
whether the crises was caused externally or internally. As long as the courts appeared prepared 
to defer without question to the judgment of the executive, 249 and to limit the (arguable) impact 
of the HRA by applying it so narrowly as to cause the Joint Committee on HR to criticise its 
failure to ensure that fundamental freedoms were as widely applicable in domestic law as the 
250 ECHR required , 
it would require more than the HRA to effectively alter the dominant judicial 
perception of its own HR role and 'stand up to government when liberty [came] so unfairly 
face-to-face with security. ' 251 
But is this to suggest that, in terms of its impact on substantive law, the HRA has proved futile? 
Professor Oliver offers a different perspective. According to Oliver, it was not unreasonable to 
predict that as the jurisprudence of FIR developed post the HRA, judicial deference in and 
between higher and lower courts would decline. Examining the response of the national court 
post Ewing's 2004 analysis, the argument is compelling. 
2'9 R vNelson Carmona [20061 EWCA Crini 508 
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" 52 In A (and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department the court examined the 
Government's justification for Sections 21 and 23 of the ATCSA 2001,253 in particular the 
inability of the Home Secretary to deport non-nationals where there was a risk of their being 
subjected to Article 3 treatment in the receiving country, and held that the inability applied to 
cases of expulsion. Whether there existed a public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
within the meaning of Article 15, the court examined the meaning of the provision, as well as its 
own role,, and held that national authorities were in principle in a better position than courts to 
decide on both the presence of a national emergency and the scope of derogation necessary to 
avert it. In this sense, Article 15 did give authorities a wide margin of appreciation. However, 
the national court was empowered to rule on whether the authority had gone beyond the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The court then went on to consider the 
lawfulness of the derogation in terms of proportionality. 
Article 15 requires that any measures taken by a signatory-state in derogation of its ECHR 
obligations should not go beyond what is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 
Adopting the approach laid down in de Freitas v Secretary of Ministry ofAgriculture, Fisheries, 
Lands and Housing, 254 in order to determine whether the limitations imposed were arbitrary or 
excessive, the court asked (1) whether the objective of the ATCSA was sufficiently important to 
justify limiting Article 5; (2) whether measures designed to meet the objective were rationally 
connected to it; and (3) whether the means to impair the right was no more than necessary to 
accomplish the objective. 
Focusing primarily on the second and third limb of the criteria, the court then went on to 
examine its own role in the ECHR regime and held that for the international protection of HR to 
be effectively carried out, the order required courts to exercise their own judgment. 255 Because 
the ECHR presupposed domestic controls in the form of preventative Parliamentary scrutiny 
and posterior judicial review, this was why states enjoyed a large margin of appreciation in 
respect of such derogations as those concerning issues of national security. This, according to 
the court, was the essence of the principle of subsidiary protection of ECHR rights. The 
256 traditional Wednesbury approach to judicial review afforded inadequate protection . It was 
now recognised that courts should themselves form a judgment whether an ECHR right had 
been breached, and that the intensity of review was greater under the proportionality 
257 
approach . As courts were not precluded 
by any doctrine of deference from scrutinising the 
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issues raised (and in the case of the UK specifically charged with the application of ECHR law 
in accordance with the HRA) the court felt itself under no constitutional restraint to defer from 
the formerjudicial conviction of a tension between Articles 14 and 15. 
In the opinion of the House of Lords, not only was the argument that the threat to the nation 
from international terrorism was predominantly from foreign nationals unsupported, what could 
not be justified was the decision to detain one group of suspected international terrorists defined 
by nationality and immigration status, and not the other. In accordance with the telos of the 
ECHR,, what had to be justified was not the measure in question, but the difference in treatment 
between one person or group, and another. If the threat presented to the security of the UK by 
UK nationals suspected of being terrorists could be addressed without infringing their right to 
personal liberty, it had not been shown that any similar measures could not alternatively address 
the threat presented by foreign nationals. 
As in the ruling of Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ, 258 the finding in A (and 
Others) highlighted the importance of the role of the national court in the defence of the rights 
and liberties of the individual. Whether, it can be said to support a claim that as the 
jurisprudence of HR has developed post the HRA judicial deference in and between higher and 
lower courts has declined, with the degree of certainty Oliver proposed, or that the motive of the 
Court can be rightly claimed to be as a result of greater judicial determination to ensure that the 
executive functions with greater regard for the rights of the individual however, the ATCSA 
259 gave rise to a second dispute, which in A (and Others) v Home Secretary (No 2) significantly 
divided the judiciary. 
Under Rule 44(3) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, the 
SIAC was/is able to receive evidence not deemed admissible in a court of law. In A (and 
Others) (No 2) the House of Lords was called on to decide whether such evidence, obtained 
under torture, could be used to support a claim that the test for certification of the Home 
Secretary's use of his power of detention had been appropriately made out. In reaching its 
decision, the Court of Appeal had been divided in its opinion as to what approach should be 
adopted. In the opinion of Lord Neuberger, by means of the HRA, the court was not only able, 
but obliged to accord consideration to the opinion of the international community, including the 
directly enforceable Article 6. To pen-nit the use of evidence obtained under torture was to go 
against the telos of the ECHR and HRA, insofar as the use of such evidence, and an inability of 
the detainee to cross-examine it, would constitute a clear breach of Article 6. The majority 
disagreed. Rather than examine the concern in terrns of the impact of such evidence on the 
25" 12006] EWCA ON 1141 NNhere examining a challenge to the use of the TA 2005 bN the Home Secretary, the Court appeared 
sufficiently NNillin- to acknoNkledge the HRA to at least encourage the executive to function within the relevant statutory framework 
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individual, the correct approach to be adopted was to acknowledge only its laNNful position in 
accordance with common-law. According to common-law principle, unless information had 
been wrongly obtained, all information was capable of being submitted as evidence. As the 
information to be put to use for the purpose of securing national security had not been procured 
or otherwise wrongly obtained, then it was capable of being submitted as lawful evidence. 
The House of Lords disagreed. Not only was the common-law indicative of a constitutional 
prohibition on the use of the 'fruits of torture' generally, its prohibition on the use of evidence 
obtained under torture was not one which could rest on whether the evidence had been obtained 
in good faith. The correct approach was to acknowledge the common-law's regard for evidence 
obtained by torture as offending against ordinary principles of justice, as reflected in both 
international and ECHR law. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal was wrong to permit the use of 
the fruits of torture grounded on an implication from the language of Rule 44(3) of the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003. Only by express statutory language 
could the use of such evidence be admitted. 
Following its reproach of the majority ruling of the Court of Appeal, the Court then went on to 
determine the extent of the prohibition. According to Lords Bingham, Nicholls and Hoffman, 
where there was a reasonable argument to suggest that evidence could have been obtained under 
torture, and the SIAC was unable to conclude otherwise, the SIAC was obliged to exclude it. 
The majority disagreed. If the SIAC was uncertain as to whether evidence had been obtained by 
torture, it should nevertheless admit it, but in doing so, bear in mind such possibility when 
evaluating it. The ruling is questionable. 
Firstly, the House of Lord's reproach of the Court of Appeal's reliance on the implication it 
drew from the ordinary language of the SIAC (Procedure) Rules 2003 as an intimation of the 
court's possible response to any statutory authorisation of the admissibility of evidence obtained 
under torture, is not entirely encouraging. Use of the fruit of torture, is a disturbing practice 
which rightly should offend against all understanding of liberal democracy. The admissibility of 
such evidence stands in direct contravention with the telos of the ECHR and certainly most 
international law. 260 
Secondly, with regard to the extent to which the prohibition on the admissibility of evidence 
obtained under torture should be extended, the limitation set by the court on the circumstances 
in which the absolute prohibition can be invoked, at least for the individual involved, is not 
without problem. In order to give effect to the prohibition, its functioning will rest on a burden 
of proof that the evidence was obtained by the use of torture. However, in view of the nature of 
2('() Including Article 12 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Torture, and Article 15 of the UN Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 t, L- L- 
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SIAC proceedings, including the appellant's possible ignorance of the evidence against him, 
and possibly its author, due to the use of closed hearings from which the appellant's legal 
representatives are excluded, and the subsequent inability to examine the evidence against him, 
such a burden could prove impossible to discharge. 
Finally, with regard to asylum, as a result of the HRA, asylum is subject to HR consideration 
derived from the ECHR (except Article 13). How such has translated into practice, is best 
assessed by an examination of the judiciary's actual treatment of the individual in those areas of 
the asylum process in which claims have risen the most: the removal, detention and treatment of 
the asylum-claimant. 
Article 3 provides that no one shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or 
punishment. The right protected relates specifically to an individual's personal integrity and 
human dignity. At the same time, the standard for deten-nining whether a state has violated 
Article 3 is to an extent subjective. The ECHR recognises the need for a margin of appreciation 
concerning a state's ability to govern entry, residence and expulsion of non-nationals. 
Nevertheless, signatory-states are obliged to safeguard persons in respect of whom there are 
grounds for believing that there is a risk of their being subjected to treatment in breach of 
Article 3 if removed or if their removal is likely to cause suffering. In accordance with the 
HRA, the judiciary is accorded the power to deten-nine what a legislative provision requires. 
Forming the subject of political debate, the use of that power is interesting. 
On the 20th of February 2003, the Home Secretary claimed that he was discouraged with the 
situation where Parliament debated issues and the judges overturned them. The statement 
referred to the rulings of Judge Collins in R (J) v Home SecretarY261 R (Al) v Home Secretary 262 
and R (Q) v Home Secretary. 263 
In R (J) and R (M) v Home Secretary, the lawfulness of the Government's requirement that a 
claim be made upon arrival at the port of entry in accordance with Section 55 of the Nationality, 
264 Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 , was called 
into question. The claimants questioned the 
following asylum practice: 
Whether the National Asylum Support Service 265 had the power to support asylum-claimants 
pending a decision on whether Section 55 prohibited support; 
The meaning of the words as soon as reasonably as practicable; 
2`1 COI 15 1/2003 
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263 [2003] MCA Civ 364 
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3. Whether a Section 55 denial of support constituted a breach of Article 3 and 8; 
4. Whether there was a duty on the NASS to provide written reasons for its decision(s); 
5. Whether Section 55 constituted a breach of the limited right of an Article 6 right of appeal. 
The court concluded that the Government's measure of prohibiting support if a claim was not 
made at port was unlawful and unjust. In accordance with his understanding of the judicial role 
under the HRA, Judge Collins declared that Section 55 had been enforced too rapidly and that 
the asylum-claimants in question had suffered flawed decisions due to inadequate consideration 
of the reasons for their late applications. In the opinion of the court, understanding the reasons 
for a delayed claim was vital for the functioning of Section 55. Judge Collins then went on to 
state that although he was aware that his ruling would weaken the anticipated effect of the 
Government's rulesl Parliament could not have intended that genuine refugees would/should be 
faced with either returning to persecution, or face destitution. The reason for Judge Collins's 
finding was reiterated in R (Q). 
In R (Q), the court examined the compatibility of Section 55 with the ECHR and held that its 
operation based on inappropriate investigation, and the assumption that a failure to make a 
claim 'as soon as reasonably practicable' justified a refusal of state support, breached Articles 3, 
6 and 8. Although judicial review was available, this could only constitute a remedy where the 
facts of the case had been properly investigated and full reasons given. The finding was 
supported by Lord Lester, who identified what he perceived to be an underlying conflict 
between two UK constitutional principles: (1) the supremacy of Parliament; and (2) the 
independence of the Judiciary; and (in response to the Government's pledge to cut the power of 
the UK courts to override Parliament by means of introducing legislation to effectively 
'enshrine the sanctity of parliamentary supremacy) characterised the response of the Home 
Secretary to the ruling(s) of Judges Collins and Sullivan generally as driven by a desire to 
undermine the independence of the judiciary, rather than an expression of genuine concern with 
what he perceived to be the greater need of the nation. 
The Home Secretary appealed. The appeal was dismissed. 266 The Court held that the system 
operated unfairly, and that the remedy of judicial review could not comply with Article 6, so 
long as limitations existed in relation to fact finding. Analysing the functioning of Section 55, 
the Court held that Section 55(5) obliged the Secretary of State to provide support in so far as 
this was necessary to prevent a breach of Article 3. Although the burden of proof lay on the 
applicant to establish inhuman treatment, it was for the Minister to act fairly in deciding 
whether or not the burden had been discharged by providing a fair system. 
2"" [20031 EWCA CIN 364 
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The ruling represented one of the most controversial rulings post the HRA. The court's handling 
of the alleged shortcomings in the asylum order in R (Q) was seen as another example of the 
judiciary's enthusiasm for 'overruling' Parliamentary acts designed to deal with asylum. The 
controversy continued. 
In R (Limbuela, Tesema and Adam) v Home Secretary267 the functioning of Section 55 was 
found to constitute a breach of Article 3. In the opinion of Judge Collins, it was a matter of 
shame on the part of the Government that it was found in breach of Article 3 which represented 
a standard below which no Government should fall. The Home Secretary appealed. 268 The court 
held that any act which resulted in an imminent risk of the individual being subjected to 
conditions in breach of Article 3 meant that the power to provide support under the NIA 2002 
became a duty by virtue of the HRA. The court then went on to question whether the state was 
obliged to take preventative action against an asylum-claimant's circumstances reaching a 
standard which engaged Article 3. According to the court, the scope of Article 3 ranged from 
state authorised violence to executive decision. The court examined the shortcomings of Section 
55, which included an absence of a statutory right of appeal, and held that the state had a 
responsibility to take measures which were more than a mere long-stop in individual cases as 
they arose. If the scale of destitution was such that a system of charitable support was unable to 
cope, then it was the responsibility of the state to take reasonable measures to ensure that it 
could. This it was held,, was not inconsistent with the wording of Section 55(5)(a) which 
empowered the Home Secretary, as an exception to the general prohibition on providing state 
support, to exercise a discretionary power to avoid a breach of Article 3. The courts could not 
determine on a day to day basis which cases met the Article 3 threshold. In the opinion of the 
House of Lords,, the policy of the Home Secretary had the effect of causing destitution of a kind 
which fell below the threshold established in Pretty v The UK 269 for a substantial number of 
people. The opinion of the court toward the policy behind Section 55 was summed up by 
Baroness Hale. In denying not only all forms of state relief, but all forms of self-sufficiency to a 
class of individuals lawfully present in the UK, Section 55 had taken the poor law policy of less 
eligibility to a new extreme which even the poor law itself could not have contemplated. 
Although the underlying political reasons for resorting to such treatment could be understood, it 
remained the responsibility of the state not to subject any individual to suffering which 
contravened Article 3. Such an end could notjustify the means. 
To summarise, the concern of asylum remains a matter of political will. The protection accorded 
the asylum-claimant by judicial intervention against the excessive use of state power, 
267 [2004] EW'CA Cl\ 540 
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constitutionally limited. Yet, it is arguable that the ability of the judiciary to engage in the issue 
of asylum by means of the HRA has not been without impact. Certainly, adopting a purposive 
approach toward the interpretation of Article 3 in R (Q) and R (Limbuela, Tesema and . 4dam) 
the judiciary were able to highlight a flaw in the Government's asylum policy insofar as it 
adversely affected the asylum-claimant's fundamental HR. However, whether the judicial 
motive is consistently one of genuine concern with the rights of the asylum individual is not 
without question. 
For example, in R (S, D and T) v Home Secretary, 270 Judge Maurice Kay held that the refusing 
of asylum support to a number of asylum-claimants in accordance with the functioning of 
Section 55 was unlawful. Judge Maurice Kay examined the claims in relation to Article 3 and 
held that the fact to be determined in each case was whether the claimants had made their claims 
for asylum as soon as was reasonably practicable after their arrival. In the case of S and D, this 
was the following day to their arrival, however in the case of T this was not until six days later. 
Judge Maurice Kay examined each application at length and held that it was open to the Home 
Secretary to conclude in the cases of S and T that the claims for support fell within Section 55, 
but in the case of A the decision was quashed because the reasons advanced were based on pre- 
conditions about how asylum-claimants and their agents act. In reaching his decision, Judge 
Maurice Kay analysed the ruling in Pretty v UK271 which laid out treatment which constituted a 
breach of Article 3, and held that the statutory refusal of support, leading to the claimants being 
reduced to living in such conditions as to cause fear, humiliation and a diminution in human 
dignity, constituted a breach of Article 3. 
The Home Secretary appealed in relation to applicant T. A distinction on the facts was drawn 
between the treatment of D and S, and that of T. In the case of T, the applicant had been granted 
financial accommodation but was not deemed to be in need of immediate medical treatment. 
The court held that refusal to grant financial support to a claimant who was not in need of 
emergency treatment did not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. The ruling 
demonstrated a division in judicial thought between the lower and higher court. The latter 
conservative ruling of the Court of Appeal, standing in contrast with both the telos of Article 3 
and the approach of the lower court. The result of the decision was to draw a distinction 
between an applicant who was deemed to be in need of immediate medical treatment and an 
applicant who was not: A disregard of the concern of human dignity inherent in Article 3 
leading in practical terms to an actual lowering of the intended European standard of protection. 
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According to Clayton, the ruling of R (S, D and T) was/is interesting. - Treatment, * for the 
purpose of invoking the protection accorded by Article 3, must satisfy a threshold of severt-,. 
Accordingly, what constitutes treatment should arguably be influenced by current 
understanding, 273 understanding in which the acknowledgement of the ECHR as a 'living 
instrument' would indicate movement toward a lowering of the threshold. In contrast, the 
position indicated in a number of UK rulings concerning the removal of the failed asylum- 
claimant in expulsion cases, would appear to suggest the possibility of the threshold in the UK 
actually moving upwards. 
Following a broad interpretation of what constituted 'treatment, ' for the purpose of Article 3; in 
Dv UK 274 the Home Secretary was prevented from deporting an asylum-claimant in an 
advanced stage of AIDS receiving treatment to a country where treatment was not available. In 
contrast, in Bensaid v UK 275 the court upheld a decision to remove a claimant suffering from 
schizophrenia to a country where no treatment was available. In reaching its decision, the court 
made a distinction between cases in which the treatment giving rise to an arguable Article 3 
right would occur in the receiving country,, and cases (such as D) in which a breach would arise 
only as the result of a lack of medical facilities in the receiving country. In the opinion of the 
court, the distinction between an Article 3 breach arsing as a result of positive action (as 
opposed to negative action) was relevant insofar as the ECHR could not have reasonably 
intended to interfere with the executive right to make immigration decisions. The reasoning 
represented the development of an idea propounded in U11ah v Home Secretary 276 and described 
by Clayton as a 'new line of case-law' limiting the state's liability for breaches of HR by 
proposing that immigration decisions were, with limited exception, beyond the reach of HR 
protection. 277 A proposition which, according to Clayton, having already been ruled against by 
the ECrtHR in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali , 
278 served not only to add credence to the 
argument that all ECHR rights should be subject to serious scrutiny against the interest of the 
si gnatory -state, but more specifically, the most fundamental tenet of HR reasoning that is the 
absolute nature of Article 3. 
To conclude, the subjection of the asylum-claimant to the risk of Article 3 violation and the 
treatment of the terrorist-suspect creates one of the most serious threats to the survival of HR 
laws and values. In the case of the 'war on terror' HR 'language ... serves to create a permanent 
state of emergency with corresponding compromises, suspicions and even perversions of the 
2" Claýlon (2004), Op. cit at 74 
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[HR] framework.... It provides the easiest opportunity for legal derogation ftorn most rights and 
freedoms and the political and societal appetite to go with it. 5279 One impact of the deployment 
of the language of terrorism is that on the 'reasoning' of the judiciary. Although it is without 
doubt that the above rulings indicate a judicial move toward greater HR awareness post the 
HRA, there remains 'plenty of evidence of the courts being very slow to challenge [both] 
ministerial and police assumptions [and their consequences] about what the exigencies of 
national security now require in this new era of alleged global terrorism. ý 280 In the final 
analysis, and despite few cases concerning detention, torture and control orders, the old 
deference regime ofjudicial restraint has survived. 
219 S Chak-rabarti 'National Securitý and Human Rights' in K. Economides (and Others) 'A Symposium on the 2005 Hamlyn 
Lectures' [2007] P. L. 209 at 226-227 
2 C. Gearty (2007). Op. cit at 48 
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Section 5: Citizen UK 2000 and the European Convention for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
This thesis Citizen UK 2000 set out to review the 'effect' of the ECHR on the constitutional, 
political and legal order of the UK. Not only by analysing its influence on policy and legislative 
debate, but by examining the functioning of the order as deduced from statutory provision and 
case-law in 3 areas of HR concern: terrorism, asylum and criminal justice. Analysis resulted in 
the following observations. 
Section 53: The ECHR and the Signatory-State 
A review of the functioning of the ECHR in relation to the constitutional order of the UK was 
prefaced by analysis of its early functioning in France: a signatory-state whose presumed civil- 
law affinity with the ECHR order and HR history suggested that the ECHR would be accorded 
the same degree of acknowledgement as the concept of legal certainty; Germany: a signatory- 
state whose constitutional arrangement and (arguably) innovative judiciary, suggested an order 
more than capable of fulfilling its ECHR obligations; and the Netherlands: a signatory-state 
whose political stability, social cohesion and commitment to HR, suggested a heightened 
adherence to the ECHR. Analysis focused on two questions: 
0 Whether the ECHR's apparent affinity with the monist order of the civil-law tradition rendered it in 
relation to the UK dualist order an impracticable statement of ideal? 
Whether the ECHR, dependent on the signatory-state with its own constitutional arrangement and 
legal culture, supported a claim that a collective enforcement of HR protection could not exist 
empirically, therefore could not achieve as a transcending philosophy? 
Analysis results in a number of observations. 
Firstly, the effectiveness of the ECHR does not depend on the nature of as ignatory- state's 
constitutional arrangement or process of incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law, but the 
actual accomplishment of its minimum standards of protection, the functioning of the right of 
individual petition and adherence to the jurisdiction of the ECrtHR. l Accordingly, argument that 
the ECHR's apparent affinity with the monist order of the civil-law tradition renders it ill 
relation to the UK dualist order an impracticable statement of ideal, can not be supported. 2 
Analysis suggests that the UK's treatment of the ECHR post the HRA does not significantly 
' M. Rosenburg Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy (Durham Duke University Press, Durham 1994)- and 
Dickson (1997). Op. cit at 8 
2 Following analýsis of the claims of PolakieýNicz and Jacob-Fultzer (1991), Op. cit at 65; van Dijk and van Hoof (1990). Op. cit at LI - 585, Murphy and TanenhaLIS (1997). Op. cit at 659, and Bernhardt (1995), Op. cit at 26 
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differ from the early response toward the initiative of its ECHR neighbours: the legal confusion 
which surrounded the status of the ECHR, and the division in judicial thought bet"een the 
activist and self-restrainer regarding its application. 
Secondly, regardless of whatever constitutional theory a state may profess, there can never be a 
separation between law and PolitiCS. 3 Although within states a distinction can be drawn between 
the formalities of policy and the method of its enforcement, factors operate to conceal the 
impact of politics on the legal process. Foremost is the tradition of 'law habit. ' A specific legal 
atmosphere is created and reinforced by a political order which overt interference is perceived 
4 as unconstitutional . Analysis highlights the tradition operating in the uncertainty expressed 
over the legal status of the ECHR evident throughout the UK, French and Gen-nan Courts and 
the early fudging of the Netherlands Supreme Court. The tradition exists irrespective of the 
monist or dualist nature of the state,, or the fact that its legal system can be characterised as civil 
or common. 
Thirdly, by their nature constitutional guarantees of HR are naturally indeterminate in that they 
become factual only when their guarantee is put into practice. ' Applied to analysis of the civil- 
law order of France for example, the performative character of proclamations of rights 
illustrates that statement of rights as a forward-looking grammar of action can differ in 
application from both its subjective value and the meaning of its written content. Accordingly, a 
constitutional order may accord HR generally greater legal certainty, but not necessarily greater 
reality. 
With regard to the question whether the ECHR, dependent on the signatory-state with its own 
constitutional arrangement and legal culture, can support a claim that a collective enforcement 
of HR protection can not exist empirically, analysis of the functioning of the ECHR highlights a 
number of concerns which question its capability to accord universal HR protection. 
Firstly, according to the ECrtHR, the ECHR transcended traditional boundaries between 
international and domestic law by comprising elements of both. Whether that order was 
designed to substitute for the systems of individual states a common European order however, 
cannot be supported. The existence of a legal obligation to incorporate the ECHR into domestic 
law remains an issue open to subjective appreciation. However, in the absence of empirical 
evidence to the contrary, a requirement that a signatory-state is legally obliged to incorporate its 
provisions into domestic law can not be concluded either by the text of the ECHR, its 
preparatory work, or the practice of its parties. 
31 Keeler and A. Stone. Judicial Political Confrontation in Mitterrand's France, in G. Ross The Mitterrand Experiment (CUP, 
Cambridge 1987) 
4 Llewellyn (1930), Op. cit at 431 
5 Dickson (1997). Op. cit at 8 
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Secondly, although constructed on tenants of traditional treaty law, the EC14R can not be 
interpreted in the same way as other multi-lateral treaties of a synallogmatic character. The 
ECHR does not constitute a supercession of the signatory-state. Although an intention to create 
individual rights and freedoms can be surmised during the ECHR's drafting, ' grounded on the 
78 argument of Vasak and relevant ECHR case-law , it did not follow that the ECHR intended 
either to create directly enforceable rights, or on being granted the status of domestic laxv. 
Accordingly, the impact of the ECHR remains dependent on the co-operation of the signatory- 
state: the concerns of its prevailing Government and philosophical sentiment of its judiciary. In 
this sense, the conformity of state behaviour with its European obligations is promoted not by a 
vertical hierarchy of international tribunals but by a process of interaction with and within 
national courts. 
The reality is not ideal. The most obvious criticism of the universal 'nature' of the ECHR is the 
relative weakness of its structure as a statement of positive rights. Along with its tendency 
toward 'paucity in the ECHR jurisprudence in respect of actually defining the content of the 
rights it protects' identified by Masterman, 9 according to Ewing and Gearty 'it is well known 
that the terms of the [ECHR] are extremely vague, with most freedoms enjoying only qualified 
protection and with much depending on such vague phrases as 'necessary in a democratic 
society, ' 'pressing social need' and 'proportionality. "' Constituting the most practical 
deficiency in the use of the ECHR and its case-law as 'a template for a domestic [HR] 
jurisprudence, "' the observation highlights the limitation generally of most FIR instruments: 
that 'their linguistic texture and ... evolutive nature necessarily 
leaves the [national judiciary] 
with a significant margin of interpretative autonomy. ' 12 
Accordingly, the ECHR may offer the promotion of a common understanding of HR, but it is 
the character of the national judiciary which leads to their actual protection. 13 As exemplified in 
the passý reasoning of the Netherlands's judiciary (arguably) resulting in the number of judicial 
techniques identified by van DiJk; the application of HR to German Basic Law in what the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht repeatedly refers to as a militant democracy; and the ECHR's 
handling by the French judiciary which, more overtly cautious than its HR history would 
suggest, intimates a greater proximity between the legal and the political than popular French 
debate would suggest. However, in so far as the ECHR is utilised in different courts, in different 
6 Verdross ( 1970), Op. cit at 47, and Buergenthal (1970), Op. cit at 233 
7 Vasak- (1965), Op. cit at 39 
' Handyside v LW (1976) ECHR Series A No. 24,22, Swedish Engine-Drivers Case (1976) ECHR Series A No. 20,18, and Golder 
v UK (1978) ECHR Series B No. 16,9 
' Masterman (2007). Op. cit at 915 
10 Ewing and GeartN (1997). Op. cit at 147 
Masterman (2007). Op. cit at 915 
L. Irvine. Acovism and Restraint: Human Rights and The interpretative Process in Cambridge Centre for Public Lm%, The Human 
RightsAct and the Criminal Justice and Regulatory Process (Hart Publications, Oxford 1999) 14 
" Tridade (1978), OP. cit at 333 
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ways, such divergence gives rise not merely to difficulty in applying its jurisprudence in 
domestic law 14 but to an (arguable) sine qua non 
15 
within the context of the primary purpose 
that the initiative was arguably meant to secure: the promotion of a -uniform protection of 
certain fundamental HR among the Member States of the Council of Europe. ' 16 
To conclude, according to the early rhetoric of Strasbourg, the ECHR constituted a resolution of 
the Governments of Europe which purported to maintain a classic liberal philosophy rooted in 
the notion of the protection of rights accorded individuals solely by virtue of the ontological fact 
that they were human therefore, by definition, universal. " In accordance with its structure. the 
ECHR implies the significance of dialectic, as opposed to fixed opinion. It is a living innovation 
never completed but peripatetic, reflecting the belief that the issue of rights should be 
changeable according to new contingencies. In reality however, the outcome of dialectics is 
interpretative, political and in the final-analysis, constructed. The ECHR may propose solidarity 
in the form of a universal order, in practice its operation serves to highlight the irreconcilability 
of the conflicting principles that are HR and the supremacy of the State. 
Although the ECHR may well transcend traditional boundaries between international and 
domestic law,, establishing in the field of HR protection a new legal order, evidenced throughout 
its early functioning (and regardless of a signatory-state's constitutional arrangement) the 
ECHR remains an inconsistent system. The practical task of applying the ECHR fraught with a 
number of inherent problems: 
0 The delegation of an undefined discretion as to the scope of the ECHR and its application to specific 
facts; 
0 Indeterminacy of clear political and social aim; 
0 The natural limitation of legal language; 
& Conflict between the values of intemal consistency within the signatory- state's domestic legal 
system and other values, including prevailing national, social and political concerns. 
Whether the ECHR was intended to function in such a way is inconclusive. What is not, is that 
insofar as the ambit of a European HR order remained solely that of European states and not 
individuals, the ECHR would appear to have inherited a classic imagining of a universal 
political, legal and judicial reality, which lay (arguably) well beyond the there and then. 
Mastennan (2007). Op. cit at 916 
Warbrick (1989), Op. c1t at 715-716 
Lovis (2007), Op. cit at 722 
17 Cullen (1992). Op. cit at 165 
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Section 5.2: The ECHR and the UK Government and Legislature 
Narrowing the focus of analysis to the UK, this thesis examined the response of the Government 
and Legislature to the concern of asylum, terrorism and various aspects of criminal justice, and 
asked whether a universal concern for the individual could prevail against national politics. 
Analysis focused on the observations of Douzinas, 18 Simpson, 19 Osborne '20 and Bernstein : 
21 
0 That it is during periods of emergency when the need for protection is heightened, that the 
Government is most unwilling to accept any limit on its power; 
0 Despite the ECHR's attempt at universal protection grounded on the tenet of natural law, rights 
attend the principle of nationality, which excludes from protection all those who do not belong to the 
signatory-state. 
In order to examine the specific concern: 
Is the concept of HR protection becoming the last haven of sui-generis positivism, and if so, the 
ECHR a raison d'etre of the signatory-state? 
Analysis resulted in the following observations. 
The ECHR represents a classic construct of the twenty-first century nation-state: a declaration 
of popularly perceived universal rights and freedoms which is more uncertain in practice than it 
is absolute. Insofar as the ECHR's circumvention of its declarations by means of derogation and 
qualification allows its signatories to take measures to suspend the rights and freedoms 
contained therein, it cannot avoid the argument that its pretence at universalism conceals a case 
of cultural relativism, whereby HR remain the premise of the signatory-state. 
The reality of a universal order of FIR protection and the reach of liberalism is summarised 
throughout the work of Simpson, 22 and Bernstein. 23 When liberal states proclaim to protect 
universal rights they mean that the privileges of such are acknowledged only insofar as they are 
conducive to political good, and then only in relation to individuals who are accorded the status 
of citizen. The observation is particularly pertinent in relation to the UK Government's (and 
arguably Legislature's) treatment of three areas of HR concern: asylum, terrorism and various 
aspects of criminal justice. 
C. Douzinas The End of Human Rights (Hart Publications, Oxford 2002) 
Simpson (2002), Op. cit at 83 
Osborne (1991), Op. cit at 114 
Berristem in Osborne (1991). Op. cit at 119 
22 Simpson (2002). Op. cit at 83 
23 Bernstein in Osborne (1991). Op. cit at 120 
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Post the HRA, the objective of UK asylum policy has been politically pursued regardless of cost 
24 
to the individual, his family and/or dependents. Insofar as the asylum order has resulted in a 
discriminatory erosion of the non-national's universally acknowledged liberties and a policy of 
conditional nationality, it becomes apparent in the language of Osborne, that HR do attend the 
principle of nationality, and despite its generality exclude from the community of its own 
subjects all those who do not belong to the nation-state. Asylum-claimants are subjected to the 
law and its political distribution of rights but they are not laws subjects. The ECHR may declare 
a universality of rights protection on behalf of the universal man, but insofar as the negative 
freedom which the UK has continued to draw from its provisions is used to close society, the 
UK's response to the concern of asylum serves to illustrate that it is the separation between man 
and citizen which has continued to dominate HR thought . 
2' Applied to the concern of terrorism, 
the observation becomes increasingly persuasive. 
The Government's response to the threat of terrorism has resulted in a myriad of legislative 
development. Although it is arguable that the ability of a signatory-state to derogate from the 
ECHR in times of emergency highlights its appeal as a 'living instrument' to acknowledge the 
reality of HR as constructs which alter in form, content and social function, the extent to which 
the UK has extended the use of exclusion 26 questions the same order's ability to prevent a 
signatory-sate from lawfully exceeding its provisions. 
Amongst criticism of the corrosive nature of the anti-terrorist measures on the rights and 
freedom of the individual, lays the charge that in the way in which the UK has responded to 
terrorisml HR themselves have become an ersatz ideology: a legitimisation of state power with 
no regard for the interest of the universal man, rule of law or political process. Certainly, there 
can be few less suspicious statutory initiatives than the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the 
Inquiries Act 2005 which extended the powers of ministers while making them less answerable 
to Parliament. Or, such proposals as those of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill 2006 
whose original-draft would have allowed ministers to make law without reference to Parliament 
Despite universalist claims to the contrary then, it would appear that HR remain primarily 
constructs of political determination, shaped by the need to counteract whatever concern an 
increasingly multi-cultural state creates. In this context, the influence of the ECHR on the 
national governing authority remains questionable, scrutiny of the impact of executive action on 
the rights and freedoms of the individual increasingly superficial . 
2' For example, the intimation 
that beneath the Government's intention to radicalise the counter-terrorism regime lays an 
Chak-rabarti (2007). Op. cit at 209 
Osborne (1991). Op. cit at 114 
As NN ell as. the defining conditions which enable it to operate 
2 7, Stone (2004). Op. cit at 10 
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undertone of authoritarianism, whereby the age-old technique of exaggerating the threat to 
national security is used to justify measures which have no relevance to tackling terrorism, is 
disturbing. Certainly, the use of the Serious Organised-Crime and Police Act 2005 28 to suppress 
the relatively formerly 'free' practice of protest at the centre of political power, gives rise to the 
particular criticism that, insofar as the Government's response to the threat of terror appears to 
have resulted in the exchange of freedom for security, the SOCPA represents (from an arguable 
civil-libertarian perspective) little more than an advancement of the technical ability of the State 
to curb public-protest, either by the use of police power in accordance with the TA 2000 and 
SOCPA, or the prohibition of specified activity by means of the ASBO. 
Yet, according to Gearty, the criminalisation of free-protest constitutes a third phase in the 
history of the freedom of public protest and internal security in the UK . 
29A move away from 
the discretionary power of the police to keep order and their reliance on a 'protean common- 
law' as a basis for action, toward the legalisation of the control of public protest by means of 
statutory control . 
30 As a result, as police discretion has fallen away, the police have come to 
deploy their power under various statutes in preference to their previous commitment to a one- 
size-fits-all common-law. Two developments have pushed this process along. The first, 'the 
introduction of the [ECHR] into UK law [via the HRA]: the restrictions on protest that this 
charter permits must as a basic prerequisite be prescribed by law ... [in which case] the common- 
law has been severely cut back by the demand of forseeability that is entailed by the new 
European yardstick. The second ... the judges themselves, increasingly impatient with police 
invocations of broad common-law discretionary powers and more inclined to note the plethora 
of parliamentary laws that now cover the field and to counsel the authorities to rely on these. ' 31 
Whether the reality of a move from discretion to law, is the greater placement of civil liberties 
protection more fully into the democratic process as Gearty suggests, or simply a technical 
transfer of control from one state limb to another,. examining the Government's treatment of 
asylum and terrorism, it becomes clear that a universal-concem for the individual cannot prevail 
against national-politics. Firstly, it is precisely during periods of perceived national emergency 
when the need for protection is heightened, that the Government is most unwilling to accept any 
restraint on its power. Secondly, FIR and freedoms do attend the principle of nationality, which 
exclude from protection all those who do not belong to the signatory-state. Observations which 
do raise the specific concern: is the concept of FIR protection becoming the last-haven of sui- 
generis positivism, and if so, a raison-d'etre of the signatory-state? 
Hereafter, SOCIIA 
Gearty (2007), Op. cit at 185-187 
process having been ýN ell underwaý since the earlý part of the twentieth-centurv 
-" lbid p. 186 
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Post the HRA, the UK has seen a plethora of controversial criminal justice reform in which 
amendment to the rules oil evidence of bad character, statutory erosion of the rule of double 
jeopardy and interference %A ith tile presumption of innocence, constitutes part of a policy which, 
according to Liberal-Democrat spokesman Heath, and Marshal I-Andrews MP, '2 dernonstrates 
the increasing (arguable) 'authoritarianism' at the heart of the Government's approach toward 
the wider concern of' HR: a rebalance of the criminal justice order in favour of the state- 
compliant. 33, 
Grounded on the idea of preventative detention, such examples highlight an increasing concern 
central to the new punitive order. 3' The increased tendency of the criminal process to focus on 
risk, grounded on an increasing reliance on the assumption that tile systern can successfully 
identit'ý potential offenders. Reliance made worrýing, firstly by the fact that risk assessment 
jective assessment at the tools are still in a state whereby objjective tests invariably involve sub 
point of scoring, ý, vith the result that various health professionals can reach very different scores 
on the same offender, and secondly, that many traditional elements of mitigation are features 
which will produce higher scores on the risk assessment toll by the probation officer. 
Indeed, the implementation of policy post tile HRA, has resulted in a transparent and (arguably) 
further erosion of tile HR concern of tile individual in a la\, \ and order agenda to control 
potential, as well as actual offenders, to coerce drug-users into treatment, ensure that courts 
hand down severer sentences, control communities, criminalise political protest, and ensure that 
the state-compliant take a privileged place at the heart of tile system.. 'ý Certainly, one clear 
example of Government ambivalence about HR in their application to the criminal process is 
the introduction of the ASBO. Highlighted by Ashworth and Redmayne, tile FCilR and tile 
ECrtHR adopt the approach that, where proceedings are in substance criminal, thcy should be 
treated as criminal for the purpose of the safeguards that tile ECHR applies to those charged 
with criminal offences. However, 'the whole point of the [ASBO] is to circumvent this [111sotar 
as] ... it appears that the Government has been able to by-pass the protections for criminal 
charges and to open up a way of dealing with crimes ... that avoids the safeguards. 
"" According 
to Ashworth and Redmayne, such a development serves to highlight a second post IIRA 
tendency affecting the criminal process. 'Not too long ago it was a mark of enlightenment to 
suggest that some forms of misconduct should be taken out of the criminal law and dealt \Nltll 
Independent Newspaper 29 June 2006 p. 2 
Authoritarianism turther demonstrated in the Criminal Justice Bill 2006, and the introduction of powers to ensure that court-, 
operate to the presumption that offenders who breach bail, and/or oftlend while on bail, will be remanded in custodýý targets i'm tile 
time by which an offender who breaches his licence conditions ), %ill be returned to custodyý and alteration ofthe power ot'probation 
officers to var\ Punishment for breach of condition. without having to approach a court 
,4 Asli%\orth and Redma\ne (2005), Op. cit at 14 
The latest development being the introduction of Clause 26 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007, which proposes to 
abolish the Court of Appeal's ability to quash a criminal sanction 
,6 Ashworth and Redma\ne (2M). Op. cit at 13. See also A. Ashworth *Social Control and "Anti-Social Behaviouv" The 
Subversion of Human Riohts' (2004) 120 L. Q. R. 263 
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only through civil processes. Now it seems that that route is being exploited as a means of 
avoiding the protections of criminal procedure, while ensuring that, by means of making breach 
of the civil order an offence of strict liability with a high maximum penalty, severe sanctions are 
available. 07 
The observation is interesting. According to Feldman, 38 in a change in philosophy, facilitated (in 
part) by the heightened awareness of the need for HR protection by the ECHR, during the 
1970's and 1980's prisoners were (arguably) admitted to what was described by Livingstone 
and Owen as a second class human ity. 39The recognition of the rights of the offender was due to 
recognition of the value of the individual which led to a demand that any state interference with 
the individual required justification: the burden of proof resting on those who would interfere to 
show that such interference was necessary. The philosophy represented a clear expression of 
Mills's 1859 essay on liberty that the only purpose for which power could be rightfully 
exercised over any individual against his will was to prevent han-n to others. 40 
In contrast, a neo-classical philosophy of what is politically perceived to be in the best interest 
of the majority has gained overwhelming ground with the incumbent Government. Accordingly, 
the idea that the individual is impelled to act by social or economic force beyond his control is 
no longer feasible. The message from the political climate is one of rights and responsibilities: 
the power of the state to interfere with the customary freedom of protest, assembly, speech and 
expression, justified on the basis of reasserting the greater good/authority of the state. Insofar as 
the convicted prisoner, the anticipated offender and the anti-social juvenile remain on the fringe 
of the controlled society, the functioning of the criminal justice order gives greater significance 
to the question regarding the free and subjected subject raised by Douzinas: when does respect 
for established liberties and HR end? 41 Insofar as the drive of the Government to be tough on 
crime continues to have a damaging effect on the rights and liberties of the individual, the 
answer is when they are raised in relation to the 'wrong kind' of citizen: the state non- 
compliant. 
With regard to the role of Parliament, the extent to which it has been able to act as a guardian of 
HR post the HRA (limited in the way described by Stone) has continued to remain inherently 
hindered. Although, one example to take issue with Stone's observation that 'with any 
Parliamentary attempt to protect civil-liberties in relation to controls grounded on national 
emergency, the problem is not so much that it is democratically decided that the rights of the 
37 Ashworth and Redmaýne (2005). Op. cit at 14 
3" Feldman (1993). Op. cit at 270. Contrary to the claims of K. Ewing and C. Geartý Freedom Under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in 
Modern Britain (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990) 
Livingstone and Owen (1993), Op. cit at Chapters 6 and 10 
J. Mills On Liberty in M. Warnock Utilitarianism (Fontana Press, London 1962) 
Douzinas (2002), Op. cit at 185 
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individual must give way, but that they are ever seriously raised at all, -42 is the Government's 
defeat in Parliament over the proposed 50 day detention without trial-, as the erosion of freedom 
continues under justification of state necessity, it is becoming all the more difficult to regard 
Parliament as an effective HR guardian, other than at the most general level. 
To conclude, the Government's treatment of criminal justice, asylum and terrorism, serves to 
highlight the reality of a universal HR order. As the nature of reform post the HRA strikes at the 
(arguable) universalism of the ECHR, the argument of the cultural relativist is played out. What 
the reform also highlights is an age old question of the rule of law versus parliamentary 
supremacy. 
The primary effect of the HRA in terms of the UK individual is the general removal of the need 
to petition Strasbourg for the deliberation of a potential breach of the ECHR, and the creation of 
a private law remedy for the award of damages against any public authority which is found to 
have violated its provisions. Section 3(l) of the HRA provides that in so far as it is practicable 
to do so UK legislation must be read in a way that is compatible with the ECHR. Section 2(1) 
of the HRA provides that a court or tribunal determining a question in relation to an ECHR right 
must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the 
Strasbourg Court; any Opinion of the [then] Commission; and any Decision of the Committee 
of Ministers. A compromise between sustaining state sovereignty and formally acknowledging 
the ECHR, the charge that UK law is interpreted so as to accord effect to the ECHR falls 
ultimately to the UK judiciary. Yet the courts must also heed the prerogative of the Government 
to govern and not substitute judicial insight for executive policy and, while courts can quash 
administrative acts ruled in defiance of the ECHR. ) they cannot abolish primary law. 
Despite such limitation, throughout 2005 and 2006, the Government signalled its dissatisfaction 
with the role of the judiciary in the asylum, immigration and counter-terrorist order by calling 
for legislative restraint on its ability to interpret the HRA. The dissatisfaction arose (in part) in 
response to a number of court rulings on the effect of counter-terrorist reform, including that of 
Judge Sullivan that control orders under the TA 2005 were ECHR incompatible. Following the 
ruling, the Prime Minister's spokesman voiced the premier's dissatisfaction, and warned that the 
Government would, in the event of further judicial alienation of its policies, act to ensure that 
the courts would not frustrate measures introduced to enforce them. 
The controversy between what the judiciary has come to consider a political attack by the 
Government on its long held constitutional role, and what the Government considers to be an 
undermining of its authority as decision-maker, seems a long way from any opinion that, insofar 
'2 Stone (2004), Op. cit at 9 
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as the outspokenness of the judiciary could promote the concern of the individual, it could only 
have a beneficial influence on the Government without the need for constitutional confrontation. 
Whether such controversy can be regarded as an indication of the success of the HRA, or 
merely a catalyst for re-engagement of the argument that there are implied limits imposed by the 
common-law on the absolute powers of the Queen in Parliament, the HRA has brought with it 
something of the unexpected: a blatant fracturing in the relationship between the Government 
and the Judiciary, and a very real risk of the ability of the latter to speak out on such concerns as 
national security being statutorily restricted altogether. 
Section 5.3: The ECHR and the UK Judiciary 
The introduction of the HRA constituted a new age in UK HR development. HR could be relied 
on as the basis of legal argument which suggested the potential to give greater equality of arms 
between the executive and the individual. The way in which the ECHR primarily impacts on 
domestic law is through Sections 2 and 6 of the HRA, the obligation in respect of statutory 
interpretation in Section 3 and the ability of the court to declare domestic law ECHR 
incompatible under Section 4. One of the effects of Section 3 is that case-law may have to be 
revisited: a change to the legal principle of precedent. However, the duty of construction does 
not affect the validity of incompatible legislation, if legislation prevents the removal of the 
incompatibility. The HRA requires the courts to interpret legislation compatibly with ECHR 
rights in so far as it is possible, but carries 'no orthodox legal consequences' insofar as it 
requires governmental or legislative re-engagement to effectuate change. 43 In this sense, the 
effect of the ECHR remains technically no greater than it was prior to the HRA. 
44 45 46 47 Yet, highlighted by Kavanagh, Feldman , Bennion , Jowell and 
Oliver, the role of the 
judiciary has changed from the time when deviation from the literal approach to interpretation 
was regarded as a 'usurpation' of legislative function. 48 Implicit in the HRA is a departure from 
the narrow fon-nalistic approach of statutory interpretation characteristic of the UK judiciary, 
toward greater engagement of a purposive approach ensuring that executive action is subject to 
scrutiny grounded on a minimum standard of implementation. However, the effectiveness of the 
ECHR depends solely on the way in which the judiciary responds in fact to the HRA. Certainly, 
such areas as terrorism, asylum, and various aspects of criminal justice have witnessed judicial 
activity. But is this to suggest the development of a heightened regard for the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual? 
" Gearty (2007), Op. cit at 26 
44 K a% anagh (2006), Op. c it at 179 
" Feldman (1999), Op. cit at 165 
4' Bennion (2000). Op. cit at 91 
47 Jo-vvell and OhN er (2000), Op. cit at 103 
4S Marshall (2003). Op. cit at 236 
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According to Stone, for the most part, the attitude of the kind of approach adopted by the 
judiciary post the HRA can be characterised as 'cautious' rather than *bold. "9 However, 
analysis of the judiciary's treatment of HR indicates an increasing division in judicial thought, 
not only in relation to the impact of the ECHR on its ability to scrutinise executive action'O and 
the nature of rights themselve S, 5 1 but the protection of the individual who comes under the 
control of the state. The first is an approach of non-engagement. 
According to Ewing, 52 it is possible to identify a number of strategies of non-engagement: (1) 
deference to the constitutional decision-maker; (2) deference to the nature of the executive 
decision in question; and (3) deference to the exercise of executive power lawfully conferred. 
With regard to the engagement of (1): deference to the constitutional decision-maker, and (2): 
deference to the nature of executive decision, such is exemplified (in the main) in the judiciary's 
handling of the application of Articles 3,5,6 and 8 of the ECHR. In particular, its willingness to 
defer in times of perceived emergency, not only to executive determination of whether such 
emergency exists, and its treatment of the individual in the area of deportation, expulsion and 
executive detention; but in relation to such power accorded the police as the control and 
regulation of public protest and the power to stop, search and detain. This has taken the form of 
a refusal to intervene in a decision of the executive on the ground of public policy. In the 
opinion of the UK court, such exercise of non-engagement is justified on constitutional 
53 grounds. The ability of the Executive to assess a risk to national security or public safety, and 
the formulation of measures to safeguard against it, justified on grounds of political legitimacy. 
Such caution is particularly disturbing in relation to expulsion, in particular where an asylum- 
claimant could be exposed to treatment in breach of Article 3, and where the development of 
(arguably) a new line of reasoning limiting the state's liability for breaches of HR, places this 
54 aspect of state control beyond the concern of serious ECHR consideration . 
With regard to the third limb of Ewing's deference theory, such is exemplified in the judiciary's 
reluctance to intervene in such aspects of criminal justice as the functioning of the fruit of the 
poisoned-tree doctrine, admissibility of evidence unlawfully obtained, treatment of the 
individual subject to the ASBO regime, and exercise of police power of random stop, search, 
'9 Stone (2004), Op. cit at 55 
30 Fxemplified in the disagreement between Lord Steyn's approach toward the role of the i udiciary in HR protection which leans 
toward a primary/grander role of articulating and protecting fundamental rights and freedoms: Lord Steyn 'Deference: A 
Tangled 
Story' [2005] P. L 346, and the belief of Lord Hoffman in a separation of powers according a wider margin of discretion to 
democratic processes: L. H. Hofftnan 'The COMBAR Lecture: Separation of Powers' (2002) JR. 137 
5' See: C. Gearty 'Reconciling Parliamentar) Democracy and Human Rights' (2002) 118 L. Q. R. 248 
52 FNN ing (2004), Op. cit at 850 
5' Highlighted by D. Nicol, 'Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights After Anderson' [2004] P. L 274 at 280, and Kmanagh 
(2004) Op. cit at 97 
ý4 ClaNlon (2004), Op. cit at 462 
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and detainment. Where, a diluted standard of review is accorded the qualified ECHR Articles 8. 
10 and 
In the opinion of Ewing, the HRA was sold on the basis that it would lead to the protection of 
the rights and liberties of the individual. Accordingly, where the courts have been empoxN, ered to 
exert a protective influence against the exercise of sovereign and executive power, they should 
endeavour to do so. " However, as an instrument for the protection of individual rights, the 
ECHR (rendered no less certain by the HRA) offers only a 'weak palliative. 56 The findings of 
Ewing represent (to a degree) a reasonable depiction of one faction of the judiciary's treatment 
of the ECHR. Certainly, insofar as there are 'few cases where the courts have been prepared to 
stand up to Government where liberty comes face to face with security, ' it would appear that it 
will take more than the HRA to change the judicial role . 
5' But is this to propose that the HRA 
constitutes the exercise in futility that Ewing suggests? 
Just as there is evidence to support Ewing's argument, there is evidence to support Oliver's 
presumption that as the jurisprudence of HR would develop post the HRA, deference in and 
between the higher and lower courts would wane. Arguable examples of judicial engagement 
has included development of the welfare principle in relation to the ASBO child; 
acknowledgment of the need for a law of privacy (or something like it) grown out of breach of 
confidence; as well as its response to executive detention of the non-national terrorist-suspect 
without charge, use of evidence secured by torture, functioning of the rape-shield evidence 
rules, and the power of the executive to withdraw state-support from an asylum-claimant having 
failed to have made an asylum application as reasonably as practicable following his arrival in 
the UK. Grounded on the (arguable) premise that following the HRA 'the burden of progressive 
development of ECHR rights protection falls on the judiciary, 58 in exercising its margin of 
interpretative autonomy, two judicial approaches are evident: 
The use of alternative sources of authority in accordance with the telos of the ECHR, including 
comparative law/jurisprudence, not necessarily restricted to circumstances where there is 'no steer' 
from Strasbourg organs . 
59 Exemplified in the protection of personal privacy under common-law 
breach of confidence, influenced (in part) prior to Campbell v MGN Ltd '60 
by relevant Australian 
legal text; the influence of US and Australian law on consideration of the rape-shield provisions as 
part of the proportionality enquiry in RvA (No. 2) ;61 and South African and Canadian jurisprudence 
55A theory particularly supported throughout the work of R. Stone Textbook on Civil Liberties (OUP, Oxford 2004). - J. Steiner and 
P. Alston International Human Rights in Context (OUP, Oxford 2000, and G. Clayton Immigration and Asylum Lnv (OUP, Oxford 
2004) 
Ewing (2004), Op. cit at 850 
lbid p. 852 
Martens (1998). Op. cit at 14 
Phillipson (2003). Op. cit at. 726 
[200412 AC 4ý7 
[200211 AC'45 
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on the courts consideration of the proportionate nature of the restrictions on the presumption of 
innocence in Rv Lambert. 62 
(2) The development of such common-law concerns as access to a court of law, legal advice and the 
63 
principle of legal professional privilege accorded a sense of democratic legitimacy by the ECHR. 
Exemplified in Campbell v MGN Ltd . 
64 
Yet5 it is arguable whether such involvement is indicative of a consistent change in judicial 
willingness to acknowledge the HR concern of the individual. Having been given the 'ability' to 
participate in the development of an effective HR order, a faction of the UK courts have 
continued to demonstrate an unwillingness to acknowledge ECHR principles on the ground that 
the common-law already serves to protect the value in question, 65 or that to apply the logic of a 
66 foreign jurisdiction is to encroach on parliamentary sovereignty. In this sense, examination of 
the judiciary's treatment of the individual appears to support the arguments of both Ewing and 
Oliver in relation to their respective stand taken toward judicial deference. However, what 
Ewing and Oliver fail to address is the reasoning behind the movement of the judiciary either 
way. A reasoning which, on analysis, would seem to suggest not merely a difference in 
treatment of different ECFfR Articles in different areas of law, - 
but also a difference in motive. 67 
One possible explanation is that underlying any favourable finding is an interest grounded not 
so much on protecting the individual against the power of the state, than a determination to 
protect its own constitutional standing. Certainly, the judiciary has jealously guarded the 
principle that any dispute about the propriety of executive action should be open to testing by 
the courts. 68 Insofar, as HR are acknowledged as a counterbalance to the exercise of executive 
power, rather than shifting the balance post the HRA in favour of greater consideration being 
accorded HR, conflict between policy and judicial concepts of independence and the rule of 
law, would seem to have thrown open greater tension between the judiciary and the executive. 
In this sense, the ECHR may have envisaged the construction of a legal system befitting a 
European order of cultural pluralism and ethical awareness, on analysis however, the reality 
appears somewhat different. Although it was generally argued that 'incorporation' of the ECHR 
would give rise to a new jurisprudence of rights that would mitigate the moral poverty of legal 
positivism, to overestimate the ECHR's theoretical capability, is to underestimate the ability of 
the judiciary from rendering it as lawfully transient as it would desire it to be. Whether or not, 
the observation that an approach of judicial non-deference can be claimed to be not so much a 
62 1200212 AC 545 
61 Masterman (2007), Op. cit at 930 
64 [200412 AC 457 
('5 Lord Bingham in Rv Secretatý, of Satefor the Home Department, ex-parte Daly [20011 UKHL 26 
(" Re S. Re It'. and R (On the. 4pplication of, 4nderson) v Secretary of Satefor the Home Department [200311 AC 837 
0 A. Young 'A PeculiarIN British Protection" (2005) 68 M. L. R 85, R. Edwards 'Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act' 
(2002), II. L. R 859 
`8 HL Deb. (2003-2004). (Col. 1041). (TSO, London) 
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concern with the rights of the individual, as opposed to the preservation of its own role, 
adopting, the approach of legal realist Llewellyn: that law should be understood in terms of 
practice rather than rules, analysis of judicial response to the ECHR results in a number of 
observation S. 69 
The UK judicial order is cited as a paragon of political independence. However, the reality of 
judicial independence is ambiguous. Dispute resolution remains the focus of the judicial task in 
HR adjudication and identifies the Judge at the centre of legal activity. However, in the case of 
the ECHR,, it is questionable whether dispute resolution is the primary raison d'etre of the 
judicial system. Courts of First Instance are ordinarily concerned with the adjudication of 
relatively settled legal doctrine to the fact situation of cases. According to the judiciary, 
certainty in the law, achieved by the exposition of rules and established doctrine, remains the 
court's primary task. Trials are explained as scenarios in which the hegemony of legal ideology 
is affirmed and legal doctrine prevails. From the viewpoint of legal ideology then, no trial in 
which legally correct procedures have been followed can be seen as political. Politicisation 
arises only where proceedings are deliberately manipulated in ways to secure a particular 
outcome., an act inconsistent with the independence characteristic of judicial reserve. 'O The task 
of the lower court judge is the promotion of certainty of law through extrapolations of legal 
doctrine. In contrast, appellate courts deal with the uncertainty of rules argued on Appeal: its 
function to enhance the technical quality of legal doctrine, affirm the judiciary's independence, 
and serve to reinforce the tenet that the decision in question has not been performed 
perfunctory. Yet, insofar as the judiciary are considered to contribute impartially to the Appeal 
process, they do contribute to the promulgation of beliefs considered to be the foundations of 
social order. According to Cotterrall, the effect is threefold. " 
Firstly, the maintenance of legal ideology serves to facilitate both state control and doctrinal 
uniformity. Secondly, the maintenance of legal ideology serves to facilitate the legitimating of 
the socio-legal order as a whole, reinforcing political and Governmental activity: the 
preservation of the socially imminent general will in accordance with Parliamentary assertion. 
Thirdly, judicial pronouncements founded on established legal doctrine commit not so much to 
resolving disputes, as defining the boundaries within which disputes are possible. 
The legitimisation of the socio-legal order through the maintenance of legal ideology formed the 
subject of analysis by Griffith . 
72 Analysing judicial function, Griffith argued that while the 
judiciary are without prejudice in the sense of having no policy interest in the outcome of a 
69 Lle\\cl]Nn (1930), Op. cit at 431 
Cotterrall (1984). Op. cit at 216 
lbid p. 216 
72 J. Griffith The Politics qf the Judiciary (Fontana Press. London 1981) 230 
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case, it can not remain neutral. Judges are required to make personal choices which are 
presented to them as determinations of where public interest lies. Examining judicial perception 
of what constituted the public interest, Griffith highlighted the broad interpretation given to the 
concept, and listed its constituents as including the interests of the State; the preservation of laýN 
and order; and the promulgation of political views and values ordinarily associated XN ith 
conservatism. Whether the primary task of the judiciary can be seen to be sustaining relations of 
power, judicial behaviour has commonly suggested almost superficial review and an insistence 
that deliberation remain the concern of Parliament and not the court. Griffith then goes on to 
ground the judicial function of legitimisation on an unelaborated elite-theory in which the 
common values of a privileged class are reflected in decision-making, and which by definition 
are necessarily illiberal. Applied to the functioning of the ECHR however, the analysis is too 
simplistic. The argument that judges are elite bound does not explain the dichotomy in HR 
analysis which is the division between judicial activism and self-restraint; or why the judicial 
view of the public interest may (on occasion) place the judiciary in conflict with the 
Government. 
Rather, the framework of judicial reasoning constitutes (in the main) a utilitarian concept of 
adjudication that leads to the practical and pragmatic: a legalistic interpretation of the ECHR 
73 
and its Section 3 HRA obligation . As legal doctrine continues to reflect 
fundamental concepts 
rooted in a common-law tradition which does not exclude the exceptionalism of English law, 
the judicial activist seeking to develop national law in accordance with the telos of the ECHR as 
it evolves, is obliged to confine his reasoning to rules of common-law and equitable remedy. 74 
The simplest explanation is that throughout the constitutional order the judiciary maintain a dual 
position as both the 'rationaliser' of legal doctrine, and 'reinforcer' of the existing socio-legal 
order. The judiciary is required to fulfil both tasks. However, albeit explanations of judicial 
behaviour are deducible from the deten-nination of cases in which the court openly demonstrates 
its regard for the treatment of certain types of interest, value and claim, such explanations do not 
always reflect the reasoning advanced by the court. 75 Applied to analysis of 14R, the way in 
which the ECHR has been treated by the judiciary in relation to asylum, counter-terrorism and 
various aspects of criminal justice, gives rise to the argument that rather than protecting the 
rights and freedoms of the individual, the initiative has primarily served to highlight the 
underlying tension between the Sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law. Rather than 
found an explanation of judicial behaviour on values which judges as members of an elite are 
7 -Analysis of judicial behaviour imparts two influences on judicial reasoning: (1) precedent, and (2) the character of legal doctrine 
and legal ideolooN, includ ng collect've N alues within the legal culture as to how exactlý judicial responsibilities are to be carried out 
74 An observation maintained throughout the work of M. Allen, B. Thompson and T. Walsh Constitutional and Administrative LnS. 
(Blackstone Press. London 1994) regarding the role of the FCHR prior to the HRA 
Llewellyn (1930). Op. cit at 43 1 
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considered to incorporate into their conception of public interest then, a more feasible reality as 
Clayton suggests, is that functioning under a political order without either written constitution 
or mandate, the judiciary strive to protect what it perceives to be the most vital justification of 
its authority: an image of independence and objectivity. " 
To conclude, the factor which has made the ECHR a particular too] in the universal promotion 
of HR, is the development by the ECrtHR of a jurisprudence which has expanded the language 
of the ECHR by the finding and development of implicit rights to ensure that express rights are 
acknowledged in practice. How far in fact that jurisprudence invades the national judicial mind 
however, remains dependent not merely on the actual sentiment of the prevailing national 
judiciary, but on the socio-legal and political environment of the time. The introduction of the 
HRA constituted a new age in UK HR development. From that date onwards HR could be relied 
on as the basis of legal argument which suggested the potential to give greater equality of arrns 
between the executive and the individual. However, HR are only effective to the extent that 
rules of law permit HR argument to be considered by decision-makers. " Whether post the 
HRA, UK judicial reasoning has remained a utilitarian management of adjudication committed 
to the imperative of organising legal doctrine either to maintain its own authority, or fulfil 
legislative goal, exemplified by the treatment of asylum, terrorism and various aspects of 
criminal justice, HR remain no less an uncertain and difficult alliance: referring to the concern 
78 of humanism and the secular discipline of law. 
With regard to the influence of the ECHR on the incumbent Government, although the latter 
introduced the HRA, its pronouncements of policy post the HRA contain little reference to HR 
issues and, in the field of criminal justice, 'often seem to make a virtue out of avoiding or 
minimising HR protections.... If the Government were to ... defend this approach, 
it would 
probably be on the ground that it [was/is] well aware of the [HR] issues, but that the challenges 
facing contemporary society... [calls for] exceptional measures [including] more stringent... 
measures [to fight] terrorism and combat ... crime... Apart 
from the misconception that HR 
become less important whenever the detection of terrorism and/or the prosecution of crime is 
the objective, or that the upholding of HR does not in itself form part of the greater public 
interest, the approach may have been convincing, were it not placed in the context of a society 
which not only aspires to the rule of law, but which has long proclaimed its adherence to 
various international treaties on HR, including the ECHR. '9 
7(' R. Claylon 'Judicial Deference and Democratic Dialogue' [20041 P. L 33 Z-- 
7 Dickson (1997), Op. cit at 8 
See: J. Alder, 'The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights* [20061 P. L Win. 697 regarding the 
suitability ofjudicial determination of HR, and C. Geartý 
Can Human Rights Survive9 (CUP, Cambridge 2006) 69-74 
71 AshNN orth and Redmayne (2007). Op. cit at 57 
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In the final analysis: 
The Article I ECHR agreement by the UK to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights I 
defined in Section I is not matched by a realisation of those rights by everyone within its 
jurisdiction; 
0 Whether the HRA constitutes 'simply a mechanism which governs the interpretation of statute law 
and development of the common-law by reference to the (fluid) standards of an international treaty, 
or provides the courts with a mandate to develop and expand on those standards found in the 
[ECHRI in the domestic context, ý80 there remains no clearjudicial consensus; 
0A decline in autonomous law has resulted in a convergence of the legal and political and the creation 
of a national responsive law" in which HR concern is frequently placed below that of the prevailing 
Government, and (arguably) judiciary; 
0 Subject to the prevailing policy of the national Government, the ECHR constitutes an order for the 
promotion of the concept of HR protection, as opposed to a consistent system for the actual 
protection of the rights and freedom of the individual. 
Masterman (2005), Op. cit at 907 
In a similar N ein to that highlighted by P. Selznlck. Lmt, and Society in Transition- Toward a Responsive 
Law (Harper and RoNN. 
London 1978) 
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Appendix I 
Operation of the Individual Petition Procedure in Accordance with Article 34, Protocol II 
The individual applicant makes an application to The European Court of Human 
Rights and his Case is registered 
I. 
The Case is assigned to a Chamber of the European Court for a Preliminary 
assessment of its merits by a Jude Rapporteur 
The Case is referred, in accordance with the assessment of its merits, either to the 
Chamber, or a Committee 
The Chamber decides on the admissibility of The Committee rules on the admissibility of 
the Case in accordance with the relevant the Case by a unanimous decision and Vote of 
Provisions of the Convention the whole Committee 
The Chamber decides on the Where the Committee is not Where the Committee is 
admissibility of the Case in *----unanimous as to the admissibility unanimous as to inadmissibility 
accordance with the relevant of the Case (i. e. ) undecided the Case is concluded 
provisions of the Convention 
I 
The case is declared inadmissible 
The Chamber proceeds to Give 
Judgement 
The case is declared admissible 
The Chamber attempts to reach an The Chamber relinquishes 
amicable/Friendly Settlement the case to the Grand 
Chamber to decide 
The individual applicant accepts the Decision of the The applicant makes an appeal against the Chamber's 
Chamber decision 
A Panel of the Court deten-nines ýýhether or not to 
award Leave to Appeal 
Leave to Appeal is denied Leave to Appeal is granted and the 
Grand Chamber hears the case 
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